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ABSTRACT 
Many convicted offenders around the world do not vote in elections because they 
have been disenfranchised, which is the legal deprivation of their voting rights as a 
consequence of their convictions. Addressing this practice from the perspective of 
legal and constitutional theory, this dissertation deals with the question of how 
modern democracies should understand the connection between the right to vote and 
the commission of a criminal offence. After careful analysis of issues related to the 
democratic importance of the right to vote, the civic virtue of offenders and the 
requirements of a democratic punishment, the dissertation argues that 
disenfranchisement is a practice that constitutes an unjustified exception to the 
general principle of universal suffrage. However, it may also critically express and 
shape some of our general ideas about democracy and citizenship. In particular, it is 
argued that the exclusionary and degrading aspects of disenfranchisement can 
illuminate inclusionary aspects associated to the right to vote. In making this 
argument, it is suggested that the right to vote not only works as a right of 
participation but also embodies a mechanism of democratic recognition. Addressing 
the current common law jurisprudential trends on disenfranchisement, it formulates a 
case for a strong judicial review of legislation in cases in which voting eligibility is at 
stake.   
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“Once a people begins to interfere with the voting qualification, one can 
be sure that sooner or later it will abolish it altogether. That is one of the 
most invariable rules of social behaviour. The further the limit of voting 
rights is extended, the stronger is the need felt to spread them still wider, 
for after each new concession the forces of democracy are strengthened, 
and its demands increase with the augmented power. The ambition of 
those left below the qualifying limit increases in proportion to the number 
of those above it. Finally the exception becomes the rule; concessions 
follow one another without interruption, and there is no halting place until 
universal suffrage has been attained”. 
 
Tocqueville, 1835 
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INTRODUCTION 
any convicted offenders around the world do not vote in elections 
because they have been legally deprived of their voting rights as a 
consequence of their convictions. Most countries restrict this 
measure to those serving prison sentences. Others disenfranchise 
broader groups of offenders, sometimes covering all those ever convicted for a 
serious offence.1 This kind of practice also commonly involves the denial of the right 
to stand as a candidate in public elections and the right to hold public office, thereby 
configuring a constellation of exclusions from the public sphere; or in other words, a 
cancellation of democratic citizenship. It is perhaps for this reason that this practice is 
important for legal and constitutional theory, which in recent years has focused on the 
concept of citizenship. However, the relevance of this practice can be extended far 
beyond. 
This work is concerned with the relationship between democracy and 
disenfranchisement. One could say it has two centres of gravity. It is about the right 
to vote and its immense but perhaps under-theorised significance for democratic 
communities. As such, it explores some of the mutual legal and theoretical 
implications between this right and democracy as a normative ideal. However, it is 
                                                 
1. See, generally, Ispahani, 2009. 
M 
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not a work concerned solely with the right to vote. It seeks to investigate the nature 
and importance of the right to vote under the influence of disenfranchisement, which 
may show up aspects that are, in general, “unnoticed and untouched”.2 In this way, it 
is also a work about the idea of crime and the figure of the offender or criminal as a 
relevant subject for analysis in the discourses of law and politics. The connection 
between these two themes, the right to vote and the offender, informs an inquiry 
about a practice that constitutes an exception to the general principle of universal 
suffrage, and so may critically express and shape our general ideas about democracy 
and citizenship.  
The legal practice of criminal disenfranchisement embodies a tension between the 
idea of democratic participation and the exclusion experienced by those who break 
the rules prescribed by the community. For example, according to Kant, “no human 
being in a state can be without any dignity, since he at least has the dignity of a 
citizen. The exception is someone who has lost it by his own crime”.3 Agamben, on 
the other hand, suggests that the exclusion from citizenship of those condemned to a 
punishment cannot be seen “as a simple restriction of the democratic and equalitarian 
principle” but as part of a modern “need to redefine the threshold in life that 
distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside”.4 Kant presents the 
crime and its consequences as an exception that can be justified according to a 
rational argument, while Agamben, in contrast, presents it as something that is deeply 
revelatory about the meaning of the general regime of equality and citizenship. The 
tensions between explaining the general rule in terms of the exception and vice versa 
is perhaps an immanent element of the debate on criminal disenfranchisement.5  
                                                 
2. Christodoulidis, 2004:183. 
3. Kant, 1996:471-2 (emphasis added). 
4. Agamben, 1998:126 (emphasis added). 
5. The relationship between citizenship and the crime as clearly expressed in the practice of 
criminal disenfranchisement has been the concern of numerous and important political 
philosophers (e.g. Aristotle, Beccaria, Locke, Hobbes, Mill, Montesquieu, Rousseau,). For a 
review, see Planinc, 1987. See also Ewald, 2002; Manza & Ugger, 2006:24-6. 
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The exceptional exclusion of criminal offenders from the general rule of the universal 
franchise expresses a tension between two of the main democratic aspirations of 
modernity in which the right to vote can be codified, namely democratic participation 
and political inclusion. The argument of this dissertation is grounded in that tension.  
The importance of participation in democracy can be identified as the driving force of 
any deprivation of participatory rights, among which voting seems to hold a special 
place. Democratic participation contributes to how we understand disenfranchisement 
partly because it expresses the significance of voting deprivation but also because it 
contains a metric according to which it can be curtailed under certain parameters. 
Claiming criminal disenfranchisement as a legitimate democratic practice involves 
the aim of limiting participation without producing a disruption of the general 
democratic principles. This claim is defended by arguing that disenfranchisement is a 
democratically justified exception to universal suffrage grounded in a demand of 
civic virtue or as an expression of democratic condemnation. 
The first major claim of this dissertation is that this defence of disenfranchisement 
codified in terms of participation cannot be sustained. This is because, it is argued, 
democratic participation must be grounded in the presumption that everyone who is 
regarded as bearing the capacity to follow the law must also be legally equipped with 
the capacity to participate in the process of law-making and in particular in decisions 
about what is to be considered criminal conduct. However, this argument cannot be 
drawn so simply. As Foucault did when he asked “Can we not see here a consequence 
rather than a contradiction?”6 one may ask: “What is served by disenfranchisement?”7  
If criminal disenfranchisement cannot be democratically justified in the metric of 
participation, and there are numerous signals to indicate that as a practice it embodies 
punitive degradation and political exclusion, perhaps this practice is revelatory of 
                                                 
6. Foucault, 1995:272. See also Dilts, 2014:4. 
7. Dilts, 2014:17.  
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another relevant aspect of the right to vote; an aspect of democracy that is irreducible 
to the logic of participation in the legitimacy of the state power: the political dynamic 
of inclusion and exclusion within the boundaries of the political community. This 
informs the practice of disenfranchisement in a more obvious way than the legally 
codified discourse of participation.  
When codified in terms of inclusion (and exclusion), and this is the second major 
claim of this dissertation, the right to vote and in particular the entitlement to vote, 
perhaps differently from other rights of participation, expresses the recognition of 
subjects as citizens in contrast to those disenfranchised. The exclusion of the 
disenfranchised from the sphere of those considered equal members of the community 
constitutes a practice of disrespect.  
The articulation of this tension between participation and inclusion, and the claim of 
the importance of the right to vote as a mechanism of recognition, may not only be 
useful in understanding competing conceptions of democracy, citizenship and the 
right to vote and in making visible the exclusionary and degrading logics currently 
operating in certain jurisdictions. It might also guide and illuminate, as a more 
concrete objective, the current jurisprudence on the right to vote in cases dealing with 
criminal disenfranchisement.  
This is the context in which the third and final major claim of this dissertation 
emerges. The treatment of disenfranchisement by those courts that have reviewed its 
compatibility with fundamental rights has, on one hand, been negatively affected by 
the method used by the courts blocking the development of powerful democratic 
arguments and, on the other, has not properly acknowledged the importance of the 
value of the right to vote as a mechanism of recognition. 
INTRODUCTION 
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The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows. Section I presents a 
working definition of criminal disenfranchisement. Section II presents a brief outline 
of the legal, political and scholarly context with which this research engages. Finally, 
Section III offers some methodological notes. 
I CONCEPTS: WHAT IS DISENFRANCHISEMENT? 
This legal practice, which is in a curious intersection between criminal and electoral 
law, has various names and adopt different forms, depending on the jurisdiction in 
question.8 This dissertation uses the generic concept of criminal disenfranchisement 
(hereinafter CD) to refer to all those cases in which a convicted criminal offender 
(hereinafter offender) is legally dispossessed, permanently or temporarily, of the right 
to vote. This assumes that the offender was eligible regarding citizenship and age and 
that conviction is the reason of disenfranchisement.  
This section is dedicated to describing CD and its various characteristics, observing 
some tendencies, offering conceptualizations and showing the similarities and 
differences between different institutional models of CD. 
1 Starting point 
As CD adopts many names and forms, and depends on several features that change 
from country to country, it is important to give an account that is cognizant of those 
                                                 
8. In the US, it is known as ‘felony disenfranchisement’ in reference to the kind of crime 
committed by those to whom it is applied. In Australia and the United Kingdom, it is known as 
‘prisoner disenfranchisement’, regarding its restriction to some of those persons currently 
serving prison sentences. German Criminal Code calls it an ‘ancillary measure’ (Nebenfolgen). 
Most Latin American countries, following Spanish codification, establish it as an “accessory 
punishment of incapacitation” (pena accessoria de inhabilitacion). Some other countries have 
gone further, including this institution in their constitutions and adopting it as a cause leading 
to the loss of citizenship (e.g. Chile: pérdida de la ciudadanía). All of the above are just 
different names for the same legal practice. On the necessary awareness of this issue, see 
Damaska, 1968a:350. 
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differences, whilst not losing sight of the common features that enable referring to 
those different national practices in theoretical terms as a common practice. For these 
purposes, it could be useful to start looking at one particular case. A standard 
academic description of the British regime of CD, which has concentrated great 
attention since Hirst v The United Kingdom No. 2 (2005), states: 
“The current law in the UK is that convicted prisoners (with few 
exceptions) are denied the right to vote in national or local elections while 
they are incarcerated. Remand prisoners, and sentenced prisoners 
imprisoned for contempt of court and for non-payment of fines, are 
allowed to vote”.9  
Following this definition, CD can provisionally be described as the deprivation of the 
right to vote affecting some offenders during the time they are serving a prison 
sentence. This description gives a reference point against which we can analyse the 
different national particularities and variations of CD based on a specific number of 
key institutional features. 
These features address different questions explicitly or implicitly present in the legal 
description.10 Firstly, who are the subjects affected by the ban? This is the question 
about the scope of CD. In the UK case, the scope involves convicted prisoners, with 
some exceptions. Secondly, for how long are the offenders deprived of their rights? 
This is the question about the length of CD. The British case seems to affect 
offenders only during the time of their imprisonment. Thirdly, how can the affected 
subjects recover their rights? This is the question addressing the existence and 
modalities of re-enfranchisement methods, for which the presented quotations of the 
British model of CD do not offer an explicit answer. Fourthly, what are the rights that 
                                                 
9. Easton, 2009:224. The main British legal provision regarding CD, Section 3 of the 
Representation of the People Act 1983, prescribes: “A convicted person during the time that he 
is detained in a penal institution in pursuance of his sentence [or unlawfully at large when he 
would otherwise be so detained] is legally incapable of voting at any parliamentary or local 
government election”. 
10. A similar catalogue in Kleinig & Murtagh, 2005:217. 
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are denied to the affected subject? This is the content of the CD question, which 
seems to receive an explicit answer in the mentioned by the legal provision: the right 
to vote. Finally, what are the legal sources that stipulate CD? Do these include the 
constitution, direct parliamentary legislation, delegated legislation or a judicial 
judgment? These features are reviewed in this section. 
2 Institutional elements 
Who are the subjects affected by CD? Taking a comparative overview, there are two 
main variables on which the scope of CD depends: the fact of the imprisonment of the 
offenders and the kinds of offences that warrant its application. The first element is 
the imprisonment. Based on this variable, two models of CD can be considered. The 
prison-based model links CD to the imprisonment of the offender, independent of the 
character or status of this imprisonment. This might include inmates serving a 
sentence or those being held on remand. The crime-based model, on the other hand, 
considers CD independently of imprisonment. Here, CD could affect inmates, but can 
also affect ex-prisoners, including those who have already served a prison sentence or 
who are on parole. It also can affect those who have never been imprisoned, including 
those who are being prosecuted but not imprisoned, or those who are on probation.11  
The second important consideration is the kind of crime to which CD is linked. Here 
two other models can be drawn, depending on whether or not it affects all prisoners. 
First, the blanket ban model affects all imprisoned offenders without further 
considerations. The UK model of CD is usually referred to as a blanket ban, even 
when technically it is not, due to the exclusion of some categories of prisoners. The 
targeted model can disenfranchise prisoners serving sentences for (i) serious 
offences, (ii) special and narrowly selected crimes, or (iii) a combination of both 
                                                 
11. On this this difference, see Fitzgerald, 2007. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
19 
criteria.12 In the first category, a standard of seriousness can be prescribed for a class 
of crimes (e.g. ‘felonies’, ‘infamous crimes’) or a length of imprisonment (e.g. 3 
years or more).13 In this later case, the application of CD depends on factors different 
from the kind or seriousness of the crime but the seriousness of the punishment. In 
the second category, the special nature of the crime can be based on such categories 
as moral turpitude, offences against the public, or even precise offences related to the 
public sphere such as abuse of office, election offences or terrorism, or completely 
unrelated crimes, such as bribery, larceny, duelling or bigamy.14 These variables 
coexist in every legal system that features CD. However, the configuration of the 
models in practice usually adheres to the logic of combination in mixed or hybrid 
models.15  
For how long are the offenders deprived of their rights? Based on the previous 
distinction between the prison-based and the crime-based models, the length of CD 
may or may not be connected to the length of imprisonment. The prison-based model 
tends to re-enfranchise prisoners immediately after they have served their prison 
sentence, allowing re-inscription on the electoral register or eliminating the ban ipso 
                                                 
12. The ‘targeted’ concept is from Geddis, 2011:451. 
13. In some cases deprivation is applied based in the actual sentence length (e.g. Australia) and in 
other cases is applied based in the potential sentence length (e.g. Chile). 
14. See Itzkowitz & Oldak, 1973:727-8. 
15. The British system of CD may be considered as a mixed system in which the general rule is the 
prison-based model under a blanket ban basis (Section 3, Representation of the People Act 
1983). This means that as a general rule, nobody outside the prison is disenfranchised and 
everybody in prison are excluded from elections. However, this general rule incorporates two 
groups of exceptions. The first group comprises a group of offences that undermine the 
integrity of the electoral process, which involve CD regardless of whether the sentence 
involves imprisonment for the offender (Sections 158-60 and 168-74, Representation of the 
People Act 1983). The second group of exception is constituted by cases of imprisonment 
where offenders retain their right to vote. These cases include subjects detained on remand, for 
contempt of court or default in payment of fines, since they are not included in the concept of a 
“convicted person” under section 3: “but not including a person dealt with by committal or 
other summary process for contempt of court” (Section 3.2, Representation of the People Act 
1983). However, the right to stand as a Parliamentary candidate is not withdrawn by that 
provision, but is rather rescinded permanently in the case of those offenders who have been 
imprisoned for more than one year (section 1, Representation of the People Act 1981). In the 
event of the election of a candidate affected by this disqualification, his or her election shall be 
void and the seat shall be vacated (Section 2, Representation of the People Act 1981). 
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iure. This means that the duration of CD corresponds strictly with the duration of 
imprisonment. In the crime-based model, however, CD can continue after inmates 
leave prison and can affect offenders who have never been to prison. In the first case, 
CD may expire a certain amount of time after the prison sentence has been served or 
may affect ex-prisoners permanently, in a lifetime disenfranchisement. In the second 
case, prisoners under probation are disenfranchised, effectively being treated as 
prisoners in this regard and may recover their rights according to the general rules 
affecting prisoners. Finally, some jurisdictions apply CD to those offenders on parole.  
How can the affected subjects recover their rights? Some forms of CD entail the 
permanent loss of rights. Those affected by form of temporary CD can either be 
rehabilitated ipso iure, which can be immediately after an offender has served their 
sentence or a variable period after this,16 or require an additional process to be re-
enfranchised. In this second case, CD becomes permanent if the rehabilitative 
procedure is not executed or is failed.17 Therefore, the difficulties involved in the 
access to this procedure and being successful could conceal the intention of a 
definitive and perpetual form of CD.18 In the US, due to CD commonly affects 
                                                 
16. See Itzkowitz & Oldak, 1973:728. When an additional process is required, this can consist of a 
mere re-inscription in the electoral register; a more complex administrative procedure, such as 
clemency boards (e.g. Florida); a judicial decision (e.g. Italy); or a process under a political 
authority, such as Governor pardon (e.g. Delaware, Kentucky) or a Senate agreement (e.g. 
Chile) which will probably exert a discretional power for the rehabilitation of the offender’s 
voting rights. A mixture of these procedures is also possible, such as administrative 
recommendation before a political decision. 
17. See von Hirsch & Wasik, 1997:604. 
18. The rehabilitation process may consider various elements. Especially relevant are the gravity 
of the crime and the number of times the person has been criminally sentenced; rehabilitation 
may be difficult or impossible when the offender has been imprisoned more than once, 
particularly where the offence is part of a group of serious, violent or political crimes. 
Additionally, the negative proof of good behaviour and the positive proof of a reinsertion in 
the community life can be elements that determine the reincorporation of the offender. 
However, the probability of an affirmative answer depends largely upon the discretion of the 
officers in charge. Even if mechanisms to regain voting rights are provided, the difficulty to 
fulfil the demanding requirements or complicated and expensive procedures may become a de 
facto permanent disenfranchisement (see Manza & Uggen, 2006:83-90). Allen (2011) 
demonstrates how the demand of unobtainable eligibility document may end in a model of 
‘documentary disenfranchisement’. The bizarre requirement of the payment of all carceral 
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released offenders, an important part of the debate is focused on the difficulties that 
some states present in the process to regain the suspended rights.19  
What are the rights that are denied to the affected subject? The rights or status 
affected by CD is one of the least addressed of its features in the literature. The right 
to vote is the one usually affected and the one that consequently receives most 
attention in the debate, and on which this work is focused. Even though the more 
common modality deprives prisoners of the right to participate in any electoral 
process, it is interesting to note that some jurisdictions allow prisoners to vote in 
general or federal elections but not in local elections.20 It is important to note that the 
right to vote is usually subject to limitations in two respects. First, a person can be 
prevented from voting. Second, a legal provision can preclude a person from 
registering as voter. However, the right to vote is not the only political right affected 
by a criminal conviction. Also grouped under the deprivation of political rights is the 
right to stand as a candidate for election.21 Those rights can also be denied indirectly 
by excluding offenders from the legal status of citizenship.22 
                                                                                                                                                    
debts in order to resume voting rights in some states of US is explored in Cammett, 2012. For a 
survey of the restoration processes in the US (and their problems), see Mauer & Kansal, 2005. 
19. For instance, many of the constitutional arguments put forward for academics are directed to 
challenge only ex-felons disenfranchisement and not the exclusion of current prisoners. See, 
for an overview of the debate, Manza & Uggen, 2006:81ff. See also Dilts, 2014:10-1. 
20. That can be attributed, in some cases, to an attempt to mitigate the hypothetical impact of the 
population of prisoners in the constituency of the prison’s locality. In other cases, it is because 
the franchise is divided between federal and state levels, each of which can regulate CD with 
autonomy (e.g. Australia) (see Rottinghaus & Baldwin, 2007:693). CD is sometimes extended 
also to the right to participate in referendums (See Priscilla Nyokabi Kanyua v Attorney 
General (2010) and McLean and Cole v United Kingdom (2013)). 
21. See Damaska, 1968a:357-9. This can be established explicitly by statutory provision or 
implicitly, both by interpreting the right to vote as both passive and active, and by making a 
requirement for standing as a candidate the bearing of the right to vote. Additional effects may 
implicitly be provided by the deprivation of these rights when statutory provision requires the 
right to vote for the exercise of another right or public function such as holding office in the 
judiciary or the civil service. Additional exclusionary effects – for instance, to be part of a 
court’s jury – can also be grouped under the deprivation of political rights. 
22. In this way, the deprivation affects (ambiguously) all legal positions attached to this status. 
These legal positions can include current or prospective positions in the press, trade unions, 
political parties, and the competence to form a political party (see Damaska, 1968a:356-7). 
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What are the sources that stipulate CD? It can be determined by different legal 
sources. Four methods can be observed in the comparative law.23 The most common 
way is by a legislative statutory act, which can be the output of a relatively recent 
deliberative process or the maintenance of historical and traditional rules. CD can 
also be set by administrative rules; that is, by rules that lack deliberative inputs. It 
may be provided for in a constitutional rule, either by an express authorisation to a 
legal arrangement (e.g. Italy, Kenya, US) or by a direct constitutional CD rule (e.g. 
Chile).24 Finally, CD can be applied without any statutory or constitutional legal 
basis, simply by the absence of a mechanism allowing prisoners to vote. In this case, 
offenders while in prison formally maintain the right to vote.25 
Does CD require judicial intervention? The concrete application of CD may just 
follow a general statutory provision (‘by operation of law’) or, alternatively, can 
follow a particular judicial or administrative decision that declares the particular 
instance of CD. In this latter case, even though CD is based on a statutory rule, which 
allows its application to a particular case, it is the judicial or administrative decision 
that is its direct source. This could be based on the particular circumstances of the 
offender or the crime that is to be judged by a courts (a discretional power) or just in 
the legal requirement of determining this effect in the judicial decision (a mandatory 
intervention).26 Some judicial decisions and academic articles consider that judicial 
                                                 
23. The importance of the legal sources involved in CD resides in the fact that the kind or 
normative hierarchy of rules by which CD were settled can influence the process of modifying 
or challenging that legislation, the powers involved in its reformation, the quorums of reform 
and the judicial review strategies in domestic and international legal fora. This works in two 
directions. Firstly, depending on the hierarchy of the rule, the procedure to change or challenge 
it will vary. Second, the greater the legitimacy of the legal instrument (e.g. due to the 
deliberation involved in a democratically-formed sources), the more difficult it is to challenge 
by judicial procedures and the less weight can be given to arguments from human rights or 
democratic illegitimacy. Nevertheless, not only these strategic consequences directed towards 
challenging the legislation follow from these factors. The symbolic importance of CD can also 
depend on its legal source. 
24. See Damaska, 1968a:348-9. 
25. This was the case in August v Electoral Commission (1999). See below Chapter 2, Section 
I.3.1. 
26. See Damaska, 1968a:349. Von Hirsch & Wasik classify disqualification measures in three 
categories: those that follow automatically the conviction; those imposed at the sentencing 
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intervention is convenient due to its contribution to the legitimacy of CD. The 
reasons presented are chiefly related to the judicial control of arbitrariness and the 
publicity of its effects for penological functions.27  
3 A working definition of criminal disenfranchisement 
In relation to the scope, it has been observed that CD can include not only prisoners 
but also other subjects criminally prosecuted who remain outside the prison system 
and even ex-convicts that have served their sentences. The length of the CD also 
varies considerably, reaching even a lifetime, while rehabilitation methods range 
from the legally regulated automatic restitution of rights to the discretional political 
decision. The content of CD affects primarily the right to vote, but can equally affect 
the right to stand as a candidate and other public-standing rights and positions. 
Finally, the source of CD is not only statutory, but can be a constitutional or 
administrative regulation, and may even be the product of the inaction of the rule-
making process. 
These institutional characteristics permit a broad new definition of CD as the removal 
of the right to vote and other political rights from a person who is subject of the 
punitive power of the state. This definition is considerable broader that the old 
definition based in the British model mentioned before, the deprivation of the right to 
vote affecting some offenders during the time they are serving a prison sentence. The 
new definition has the advantage that is relatively abstract and unencumbered by 
technical legalisms and therefore it allows engagement with a more theoretical 
reflection, and therefore, it can adequately cover the legal practice of CD in different 
jurisdictions. Such broad definition may be subject to criticisms regarding two 
aspects. 
                                                                                                                                                    
stage; and those imposed by a regulatory authority, being this one public or private (1997:601-
3). 
27. See Demleitner, 2000. See also Frodl [31-4]. cf Marquardt, 2005. 
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Regarding the element of scope, it could be suggested that CD does not depend on 
imprisonment but mainly on the criminal sentence. In the UK, however, the measure 
only applies to offenders that are serving sentences in prison. It should be considered 
if this is a question of terminology or, in contrary, it involves deeper controversies. 
There are reasons to stick to the new definition. First, CD not always follows 
imprisonment. There are cases in which non-incarcerated offenders are affected by 
the ban (e.g. affecting the right to stand for elections). There are also cases in which 
incarcerated subjects are able to vote (e.g. prisoners on remand28). The exceptions to 
the prison-based model are considerable more numerous in comparative law (e.g. 
Germany, US, Chile, Turkey). Second, from a theoretical perspective, when the 
discourses of the justification of CD are examined, almost every argument for CD is 
based on the criminal conduct of the offender rather than his status as an inmate.29 If 
this is accepted, it is easy to see that the fact that prisoners are the more commonly 
subjected to CD is a regulative rather than an essential characteristic of CD, being an 
element to decide the scope of CD (above was described as a prison-based model). 
Regarding the element of content, the definition expands the coverage to other 
political rights. The broader category of political rights, as the rights that allow the 
participation of the citizens in the decision-making process, may at first glance appear 
in an arbitrary way to speak about a practice commonly known by its effects in the 
right to vote. When it is suggested that CD involves the deprivation of the broader 
category of political rights, it is delineated in terms of affecting those rights that 
enable the person to participate, passively or actively, in the process of political 
decision-making, therefore excluding other measures related to civil liberties or social 
welfare. The more important of these other rights covered by this extensive definition 
                                                 
28. This conceptualization faces a problem in the case of those legally disenfranchised while 
detained awaiting conviction (e.g. article 16, Chilean Constitution). They are in a different 
situation of those that still formally enfranchised but are deprived from a mechanism to 
exercise the vote from prison. The better explanation for this variable, which considers the 
application of CD to non-sentenced inmates and non-incarcerated prosecuted subjects, comes 
from the general idea of anticipation of the effects of a likely criminal conviction (see 
Mañalich, 2011a:138-45). 
29. See below Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
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is the right to stand as a candidate or run for public office. It is a right that 
corresponds completely and exclusively to democratic citizenship, which would make 
sensible a joint analysis along with the right to vote, as a mark of exclusion from 
formal political participation. Notwithstanding the good existing reason for a joint 
analysis, the right to vote and the right to stand as a candidate present important 
differences that make a joint analysis more complex and inconvenient.30 First, to 
expand the analysis would unnecessarily weaken the position of advocated of 
inclusion because, for example, it is commonly argued that the exercise of public 
authority demands standards of virtue and capacity higher than the required to 
exercise the right to vote.31 Second, and perhaps more important as an argument, is 
that the duties of public officers are especially incompatible with the fact of 
imprisonment – elected officials must perform their duties outside the prison –, thus 
adding a practical dimension to the strategic circumspection.32 This work does not 
deal with the additional complexity required to give an account of both rights. That is 
why in what follows it limits CD to the deprivation of the right to vote, leaving other 
political rights to further research. 
II CONTEXT: WHAT IS HAPPENING WITH DISENFRANCHISEMENT? 
The context of the analysis of CD is given by: (1) the increasing jurisprudence on the 
right to vote and the political tension that have produced in those countries in which 
the issue has been discussed, and (2) the recent raise of academic works that deal with 
CD coming from different disciplines. 
The first and perhaps most important element of the momentum that CD is 
experiencing is given by a set of relatively recent judicial decisions that considered 
                                                 
30. See, about the relationship of these two rights in US constitutional law, Steinacker, 2003. 
31. This has been argued, for example, to establish the incoherence rule that deprive of the right to 
vote to those that still can run for office or serve as members of parliament. See Joint 
committee, 2013:58. See also Orr & Williams, 2009:134. 
32. See Lippke, 2007:221-2. cf Ramsay, 2013b:431. 
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CD as a significant problem from a constitutional and human rights (hereinafter also 
fundamental rights) perspective. In several jurisdictions during the last 20 years, in 
which could be called ‘a judicial trend’, courts have struck down legislation regarding 
CD as a violation of the right to vote.33 These judgments have not categorically 
proscribed CD as an undemocratic and impermissible practice but, in contrast, have 
accepted, with some reservations, that representative institutions can pursue 
legitimate aims through this kind of legislation. In the opinion of most of the Courts, 
the problems with CD have therefore been associated not necessarily with its motives, 
aims or reasons, but mostly with the lack of a proportional relation between the aim 
being pursued and the measure employed.34 
This recent trend in judicial analysis is a pale reflection of the idea, consolidated and 
acknowledged even by its advocates, that CD “run[s] counter to the modern trend of 
extending voting and other fundamental rights”.35 In a re-assessment initiated forty 
years ago in the US, scholars had nearly reached consensus upon the harmful effects 
of CD. This consensus is such that some have argued that critics of 
“disenfranchisement may feel a bit like a boxer entering the ring only to discover that 
there is no opponent to fight”.36 Various arguments are offered by scholars from 
diverse disciplines such as constitutional and criminal law, criminology, sociology 
and political science. For instance: (1) there has been an affirmation of the negative 
effects of CD on the process of the reintegration of offenders;37 (2) critics have 
pointed out the degrading effect that CD carries with it, transforming offenders into 
second-class citizens;38 (3) it is applied in terms of producing a racially 
                                                 
33. See e.g. Behan, 2014: Ch. 2. 
34. See below Chapter 2. 
35. Sigler, 2013:1. 
36. Manza & Ugger, 2006:12. 
37. See e.g. Demleitner, 2000; Dhami, 2005. 
38. See e.g. Fletcher, 1999; Behrens, 2004; Easton, 2006. 
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discriminatory impact;39 (4) it is held that offenders are exposed to unfair treatment 
by impeding them to express their interests in the rule-making process.40  
This overwhelming academic consensus, coupled with a judicial trend, contrasts with 
the high rates of support for CD in some of the jurisdictions in which the issue has 
been raised, amongst both the political class and the public. This is not a coincidence; 
the reluctance of politicians to support the inclusion of offenders in the franchise may 
in turn be based upon the opposition of the public opinion.41 The concerns of 
politicians are usually expressed by arguing that the correct performance of their 
representative function consists in listening to their constituency, and that what they 
have heard regarding this issue is clear opposition to giving offenders access to the 
right to vote. Public opinion, in its turn, might be shaped by a populist political 
discourse on being tough on crime, leading to a vicious circle of penal populism.42  
The reasons offered by governments in defence of CD have varied according to the 
different contexts in which they are expressed. In the courtroom, when governments 
have been compelled to explain the rationale of CD, the arguments have been short 
and consistent: CD serves as an additional punishment of offenders, promoting civic 
responsibility and respect for the rule of law.43 However, politicians addressing the 
issue in parliamentary debates or in the media have been less restrained, and 
arguments have occasionally become an exercise in wedge politics as evidenced by 
the statement of one British Prime Minister who claimed: “It makes me physically ill 
even to contemplate having to give the vote to anyone who is in prison”.44 They have 
also offered arguments that are more intuitive such as “when you break the law, you 
                                                 
39. See e.g. Fletcher, 1999; Mauer, 2004. 
40. See e.g. Easton, 2006; Demleitner, 2000; Behrens, 2004; Dhami, 2005. 
41. For example, according to Yougov (2012), conducted in November 2012, 63% of Great Britain 
rejected the idea of prisoners voting. 
42. See e.g. Manza & Uggen, 2006: Ch. 9 (US); Easton, 2006:452 (UK). 
43. See e.g. Hirst [74-5]. For a detailed discussion about the justification offered in other cases, 
see below Chapter 2. 
44. David Cameron, PM. See Hansard, HC Deb 517 col 921, 3 November 2010. 
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cannot make the law”;45 or that “convicts are incapable of running their own lives and 
should not be allowed to run ours”.46  
In an attempt to give more solid theoretical foundations to this defence of CD, some 
voices within the scholarship have risen up against the academic consensus and 
provided important insights into this debate. Those who defend some form of CD 
have sustained one or more of the following arguments: (1) that CD is an expression 
of democratic will and must be respected as such;47 (2) it expresses the importance of 
people’s self-determination within a democracy;48 (3) it sets forth an element of civic 
virtue as a requirement for participation in elections;49 (4) and it constitutes an 
expressive form of punishment, in the context of the commission of serious crimes or 
crimes against democratic values.50  
Beside the scholarly debate, the popular and political support for CD against the 
judicial trend on CD has led to the emergence of a conflict that can be described as 
paradoxical. On the one hand, the courts striking down legislation passed by 
representative institutions following a democratic procedure may generate criticism 
from the perspective of democracy, especially for its contra-majoritarian 
implications. On the other hand, the action of the courts can also be seen as protecting 
democracy against abusive majoritarian decisions. In the first case, democracy is seen 
as a procedure of decision-making. In contrast, in the second case, democracy is 
taken as normative ideal in which everybody should have an equal right to participate 
                                                 
45. David Davis, MP. See Hansard, HC Deb 523 col 493, 10 February 2011. 
46. Francis Marini, Massachusetts legislator, cited in Ewald, 2004:116. 
47. See Altman, 2005; Latimer, 2006. For a critical assessment, see below Chapter 7. 
48. See Ramsay, 2013a; Ramsay, 2013b. 
49. See Manfredi, 2009:268-77; Clegg, 2002; Latimer, 2006; Sigler, 2013. For a critical 
assessment, see below Chapter 4. 
50. See Hampton, 1998; Lippke, 2007:203; Manfredi, 2009:274-7; Re & Re, 2012; Bennett, 2012. 
For a critical assessment, see below Chapter 5. 
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in the processes of decision-making.51 This paradoxical conflict of interpretations of 
the relation of CD and democracy make this debate even more complex. 
In sum, these arguments have opened a legal, political and theoretical debate about 
the meaning of the exclusion of offenders from certain rights; the scope, importance 
and role of voting rights; the constitutional structure of the right to vote; and so forth. 
In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to state that the main issue in relation to 
which the right to vote is currently discussed, at least in legal circles, is the case of 
CD. This debate poses questions that strike at the some of the contradictions 
underlying modern representative democracy and exposes fragilities on which our 
legal and political institutions, practices and discourses are sustained and, therefore, 
invites us to revisit the importance and validity of ideas such as universal suffrage or 
the claim that the right to vote is a fundamental democratic right. 
III METHOD: HOW TO THINK ABOUT DISENFRANCHISEMENT? 
The several registers in which these debates have been couched and are still being 
developed require the construction of a narrative that excludes certain relevant 
aspects of the problem while reducing complexity in a way which allows us to deal 
with it in intelligible and productive terms. Some brief methodological notes are 
therefore necessary. 
In the context of the judicial trend, political opposition and ongoing academic debate 
about CD, the general objectives of this dissertation are: (1) to investigate the 
substantive reasons concerning why an adult citizen ought to be disenfranchised when 
criminally convicted; and (2) to analyse this mechanism of political exclusion in 
relation to the importance attached to the right to vote in a democratic political 
community. 
                                                 
51. See below Chapter 3, Section I. 
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To pursue these general objectives, this work adopts the method and perspective of 
legal and constitutional theory. Therefore, this work does not constitute a causal 
explanation (as in political science or sociology) that contributes to explain the why, 
where and when of CD,52 neither it is a historical reconstruction (as in history or legal 
history) of CD.53 Nor is it a doctrinal analysis of the legislation and the jurisprudence 
(as in constitutional law or human rights law) regarding CD. However, judicial 
decisions are analysed and some observations are made in Chapter 2 and Chapter 8. 
From the perspective of legal and constitutional theory, there are two main competing 
perspectives from which CD has been critically analysed. The first proceeds on the 
basis that CD is consequence and manifestation of a more comprehensive system of 
social, political and legal oppression. The second sees CD as institution that can be 
examined in its particularity and therefore can be abstracted from the question about 
the society in which this practice is found. 
                                                 
52. When dealing with CD, political scientists have tried to explain its existence or survival in 
certain jurisdictions during certain periods of time in causal terms; that is, by examining 
several structural features and trying to identify patterns (e.g. political and criminal culture or 
institutional heritage) to explain why it exists in some countries and not in others. They have, 
in general, concluded that “there is no single variable that explains why or how countries allow 
or disallow prisoners to vote [, and therefore] political cultural explanations matter as much as 
structural allowances” (Rottinghaus & Baldwin, 2007:697). They have commonly called for 
“case studies that examine specific political context, social norms, sentencing guidelines and 
cultural treatment of offenders” (Rottinghaus & Baldwin, 2007:697). On this line of enquiry, 
see also Behrens, 2004; Ewald & Rottinghaus, 2009b; Demleitner, 2009; Ispahani, 2009; 
Uggen et al, 2009. On causal explanation of the difference of regulation within the US, see 
Fellner & Mauer, 1998; Preuhs, 2001; Murphy et al, 2010. 
53. The standard academic works on CD are full of references to its historical origins and many of 
those suggest that CD constitutes the contemporary legacy of pre-modern exclusionary 
practices such as infamia or civil death (See e.g. Damaska, 1968a:352-4; Demleitner, 
2000:765-6). Most of them make ambiguous, indirect and superficial references. Few of them 
give an account of the ways in which these practices can be historically connected (See e.g. 
Damaska, 1968a and Damaska, 1968b). In this line, the alleged heritage of CD poses the 
question of explaining its rationale in terms of its traditional function, which is antithetic to the 
suppression of the other aspects of practices such as civil death. Some go even further and 
structure normative criticisms based on historical arguments. In particular, see Pettus, 2013: 
Ch. 1 and the brief discussion bellow Chapter 6, Section I. 
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1 Racial disenfranchisement 
Assuming the first perspective, CD has be investigated as fully embedded in practices 
of structural violence, for example, the racism and “systematic institutional biases”54 
that diminish the position of vulnerable members of society, leading them to be the 
natural ‘clients’ of the criminal system. From this starting point, CD is not an 
exception but part of a continuous system of measures that target and diminish the 
position of those persons and groups; as such, CD is not understood as any more nor 
less than other mechanisms designed to disempower those minorities.  
This perspective has received extensive study in the US, in particular, attaching to 
CD the potential to continue in the electoral field the discrimination that racial 
minorities experience in other spheres.55 For example, what may be called the 
demographic effect of CD has been documented – the fact that a disproportionate 
number of the disenfranchised are non-white –, which constitutes one of the core 
elements of the claim that, at least in the US, CD is a structurally determined and 
racially motivated practice.56 According to this perspective, CD works not only by 
denying the vote to particular individuals that belong to those vulnerable 
communities but also by diluting the electoral strength of minority groups, thereby 
                                                 
54. Munn, 2011:231-7. 
55. About the debate about disenfranchisement as an instrument of racial discrimination, and about 
its demographic impact, see Harvey, 1994; Shapiro, 1993; Hench, 1998; Fellner & Mauer, 
1998; Fletcher, 1999; Mondesire, 2001; Dugree-Pearson, 2001; Preuhs, 2001; Ewald, 2002; 
Thompson, 2002; Taormina, 2003; Karlan, 2004; Ispahani & Williams, 2004; Mauer, 2004; 
Martinez, 2005; Miles, 2004; Behrens, 2004; Goldman, 2005; Ewald, 2004; Ewald, 2005; 
Figler, 2005; Manza & Uggen, 2006: Ch. 2-3; Krousser, 2007; Crutchfield, 2007; Bowers & 
Preuhs, 2009; Pinard, 2010; Katzenstein et al, 2010; Tylor, 2012; Cammett, 2012; Chin, 2012; 
Schaefer & Kraska, 2012; Uggen et al, 2012; Nelson, 2013; Richard, 2013. 
56. This approach is adopted by all the US monographic books. See, from a historical perspective, 
Holloway, 2014; from post-colonial theory perspective, Pettus, 2013; a Foucauldian reading of 
the practice in Dilts, 2014; in sociological perspective, Manza & Uggen, 2006. For a 
journalistic report of the same reality, with interviews to ex-prisoners, politicians, and voting 
rights activists, see Abramsky, 2006. Finally, other US monographic titles are: Brown-Dean, 
2004; Hull, 2006 (a rather superficial summary of the US debate); Pinkard, 2013. 
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affecting election outcomes and legislative policy choices.57 These ideas have solid 
factual foundations, both historically58 and currently,59 and have been strongly 
documented in the US literature.60  
Two examples are particularly demonstrative. First, during the close 2000 US 
presidential election in Florida – defined by a margin of 537 votes – approximately 
827,000 persons were affected by CD in that state (more than 5 million in the whole 
country), counting a significant percentage (10.5%) of the black population of the 
state. According to expert analysis, had ex-prisoners been permitted to vote (27.2 
                                                 
57. See e.g. Karlan, 2004:1149. See also Manza & Uggen, 2006: Ch. 7-8. About vote dilution, 
which is the manufactured devaluation of the political impact of some individuals’ votes, who 
nevertheless maintain their formal status as voters, see e.g. Karlan, 1989; Karlan, 1992; 
Gerken, 2001; Karlan, 2004; Pettus, 2013.  
58. Historically, this claim is supported by extensive scholarship that has demonstrated that the 
activation of use of CD after the Reconstruction Era was motivated by the aim of 
disempowering the newly enfranchised black population. This broader aim, which also 
motivated measures such as poll taxes and literacy tests, was effective until the civil rights 
movements arose (See e.g. Manza & Uggen, 2006: Ch. 2). Katherine Pettus' (2013) suggestion 
is that, emptied of its original political significance in the context of the US post-slavery 
regime, CD adopted the form of a political weapon, which once captured by the partisan-
motivated white supremacists, was aimed at the political exclusion of a racial group – the 
formerly enslaved African Americans – rather than at particular individuals who showed 
themselves undeserving of political participation. Pettus’ core argument is that the injustice of 
CD is given by its racially-motivated abuse and manipulation (Ch. 5). In contrast with the 
interpretation of Pettus, CD was marked, for Holloway (2014) by ambivalence. It served to 
tactically reproduce structural power relations based on traditional social hierarchies, while 
simultaneously existing in tension and even opposition with other aspects of the electoral 
practice. On the one hand, the use of a traditional framework of social morality associated with 
infamy constrained the possibilities of abuse of legislative and judicial means through the 
formality of a legal discourse; on the other hand, the aims of racial disempowerment were 
inscribed within a broader ongoing practice of partisan politics (see also Wang, 2012), in 
which winning an election no longer depended upon persuading the electorate, but instead on 
the manufacture of a favourable constituency. An example of how those tensions and 
contradictions were expressed but also accommodated can be found in the ambiguity of the 
usage of the concept of infamy, linked not only to the commission of the crime (infamia facti) 
and therefore affecting certain criminals but also as an effect of certain types of punishment 
(infamia iuris), with the consequence, for example, of disenfranchising all those locked up in 
state prisons (wearing striped uniforms) but not in county jails. 
59. Currently, this claim is based on two factors: first, US disenfranchisement laws clearly arise as 
the harshest and most restrictive of the western world, affecting prisoners, ex-prisoners, 
parolees and probationers; second, that the rates of incarceration and conviction in the US are 
also the highest in the world, mainly due to political assumptions related to ideas such as the 
war on drugs initiated by conservative governments in the 1970s (See e.g. Manza & Uggen, 
2006: Ch. 3-4). 
60. On the historical and current practices of vote suppression, see, generally, Wang, 2012. 
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percent would vote), Al Gore would have carried the state (due to an estimated 68.9 
democratic preference) and the election by more than 30,000 votes.61 Second, “the 
Census Bureau counts incarcerated individuals as residents of the jurisdiction in 
which they are incarcerated”. This has serious implications in many states, resulting 
“in largely white, rural communities having their population increased at the expense 
of the heavily urban, overwhelmingly minority communities from which most inmate 
come”.62 This has repercussions in apportioning representation, redrawing of political 
boundaries and allocation of funding to state and local governments.63  
Notwithstanding its massive impact in the US debate, the link between structural 
injustice and CD may not be only limited to the American case64. For societies in 
which, unlike the US, the racial factor is not preponderant, this perspective can 
assume other forms such as class oppression and xenophobia as forms of violence, 
intolerance and exploitation.65 
2 Abstract normative democratic theory 
A second perspective seeks to investigate theoretical and normative possibilities of a 
legitimate practice of CD. In doing so, it proceeds on the hypothesis that the criminal 
system is not per se unjust and is not necessarily captured by practices of domination 
and exploitation. For example, it ignores whether or not rates of incarceration are 
relevant enough to influence the results of any electoral result, or if the criminal 
justice system and incarceration policies have a disproportionate impact on the 
representation of minorities. It requires the assumption that even if problems such as 
                                                 
61. See Manza & Uggen, 2006:191-3; generally about the influence of CD in US electoral results 
see Manza & Uggen, 2006: Ch. 8 
62. Karlan, 2004:1159. 
63. See also Pettus, 2013:106-119; Manza & Uggen, 2006:201-2.  
64. It has also received some attention in other jurisdictions, see e.g. Winder, 2010. See also Orr, 
1998:74-82; Easton, 2006:451-2; Prison Reform Trust, 2013:573.  
65. cf Pettus, 2013:151-3.  
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the demographic effect of CD are compelling, they do not prove that CD is wrong in 
itself, but only that it is wrong under determinate circumstances.66 
This dissertation adopts this second perspective, developing its analysis with some 
degree of abstraction from those aspects and focussing instead on the normative 
principles underlying democratic and constitutional institutions and practices, and 
analysing the compatibility of those principles with the practice of CD. From this 
perspective, CD is normally criticised due to its lack of commitment to democratic 
principles, appealing to a contradiction between publicly pronounced values affirmed 
as a normative horizon of punitive and electoral democratic practices and the implicit 
standards that are present in the current practice of exclusion of offenders from the 
franchise.67 
As rightly mentioned by Andrew Dilts,68 this approach is an incomplete picture of the 
importance of CD. Scholars that have adopted this perspective in the study of CD 
rarely investigate and explore ‘the reality of citizenship’69 expressed in these tensions 
and contradictions located in the intersection between punishment and citizenship.70 
The second stage of this research, therefore, starts from such contradictions. 
Exploring the meanings, functions and effects of CD does not necessarily lead only to 
an un-democratic or illegitimate institutional practice but can contribute positively in 
terms of what such practice can tell us about the relations of power that underlie it 
and the principles according to which those relations are organised71. The interplay of 
the exclusionary principles and logics underlying CD with democratic institutions and 
constitutional principles may contribute to reveal productive constitutional 
dissonances and uncovering the actual logic of disenfranchisement. It might also 
                                                 
66. See e.g. Beckman, 2009:122. 
67. See, similarly, Shklar, 1991:14-15. 
68. See Dilts, 2014:15.  
69. See Shklar, 1991:15.  
70. See Note, 1989. See also Shklar, 1991; Pettus, 2013; Dilts, 2014. 
71. This is the approach adopted by Andrew Dilts (2014) in a book that this dissertation could not 
take into account, except in the introduction (1-26). 
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invite us to think about modern democracy in different and more complex terms; 
terms that are based on the recognition of the exclusionary logic of CD and may 
therefore lead to the creation of spaces of denunciation and resistance against the 
practice.72 
                                                 
72. In that sense this project has a different aim from that of Dilts (2014), Katzenstein et al (2010) 
or Furman (1997) which look to find in CD a diagnosis of the general exclusionary logic of the 
liberal tradition in the US.  
 2 
 
JUDICIAL TRENDS ON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
n recent years, the debate on criminal disenfranchisement has achieved 
renewed momentum particularly due to a tension between courts and 
parliaments in the context of the judicial review of legislation. For the 
purposes of this work, the judgments that review the constitutionality or 
compatibility of CD with Human Rights instruments are organized, according to their 
outcomes, into two main categories. The first group of judgments are those allowing a 
total ban on offenders’ right to vote. This does not mean that the jurisdictions in 
question actually deprive all offenders of their right to vote, but that the courts have 
not made any argument that would impede such a policy, either at present or in the 
future. The better-known judgment of this group is the US Supreme Court’s 
Richardson v Ramirez (1973) that continues to be the leading case of CD in US Law.1 
                                                 
1. In Ramirez, the Supreme Court of California ruled the unconstitutionality of CD of ex-
prisoners whose terms of incarceration and parole had expired by applying the strict scrutiny 
standard of review, based on the idea of the right to vote as a fundamental interest of the 
potential voter. The Supreme Court reversed that decision declaring that the member states 
could pass legislation depriving former prisoner of their voting rights without violating the 
equal protection clause of the (Section 1 of the) Fourteenth Amendment. In arguing this, the 
Court exempted the case of criminal conviction from the group of electoral qualifications that, 
according to the case-law of the Court are subject to strict scrutiny, therefore requiring the 
states to show a compelling interest. This exemption was based on a historical and judicial 
interpretation, which indicates that Section 2 explicitly sanctions the exclusion of felons from 
I 
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Generally, US case-law has constructed a protection of the right to vote in negative 
terms, by prohibiting discrimination in the allocation of the right to vote based on 
race, sex and age.2 Regarding CD, however, the Court blocked the possibilities of 
review based on the disputable constitutional authorization of CD in Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that limits challenges to the legislation based on arguments of 
equality and discrimination.3 This blockage has led to locating hopes for 
liberalization of CD in the political arena, especially in State legislatures. This has 
achieved some degree of success.4 For this reason, the US debate, which currently 
feeds the most vibrant theoretical discussions on CD, is very different from the way 
other western jurisdictions deal with this issue.5 The United States is not, however, 
                                                                                                                                                    
the franchise. This constitutional sanction is not present in other restrictions to the right to vote 
invalidated in previous cases by the Court, such as poll tax or residential requirements. 
Accordingly, the Court argued that if this section expressly exempts the case of criminals from 
the reduction of representation, this could not be a restriction prohibited by Section 1. The core 
of the reasoning of the Court was: “[T]hose who framed and adopted the Fourteenth 
Amendment could not have intended to prohibit outright in [Section] 1 of that Amendment that 
which was expressly exempted from the lesser sanction of reduced representation imposed by 
[Section] 2 of the Amendment. This argument seems to us a persuasive one unless it can be 
shown that the language of [Section] 2, “except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,” 
was intended to have a different meaning than would appear from its face” [43]. The question 
that follows from such reasoning is what is the standard of rationality to which the state action 
must be subjected according with the Court, if any? The Court did not answer this question in 
Ramirez. Discussing the judgment, see e.g. Issacharof et al, 2007:25-37. For a disclaimer about 
the exclusion of US case-law from this research, see above Chapter 1, Section III. 
2. See e.g. Karlan, 2013:88. One must add to that problem that the franchise is determined by 
state legislatures (see Pettus, 2013: Ch. 2). For perhaps the more interesting analysis of the US 
case-law on voting rights, see Michelman, 1989. 
3. About the systematic and historical interpretation of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
see Fletcher, 1999; Chin, 2004; Brooks, 2005; Morgan-Foster, 2006; Bourne, 2007; Liles, 
2007; Varnum, 2008; Tolson, 2014; Re & Re, 2012; Ewald, 2013; Nelson, 2013.  
4. About recent legislative and judicial (specially under the Voting Rights Act) enfranchisement 
trends in the US, see Shapiro, 1993; Person, 2002; Prince, 2003; Behrens, 2004; Hasen, 2004; 
Brooks, 2005; Handelsman, 2005; Newman, 2005; Wilkins, 2005; Hull, 2006; Morgan-Foster, 
2006; King, 2006; Manza & Ugger, 2006:28-34, 221-5; Ordway, 2007; Ramirez, 2008; Ewald, 
2009a; Porter, 2010; Eisenberg, 2012.  
5. About these differences, see Ziegler, 2011:210-38. About the general constitutional debate 
about CD in the US, see du Fresne & du Fresne, 1969; Reback, 1973; Itzkowitz & Oldak, 1973; 
Note, 1974; Tims, 1975; Vile, 1981; Note, 1989; Shapiro, 1993; Hench, 1998; Fletcher, 1999; 
Demleitner, 2000; Hamilton-Smith & Vogel, 2001; Note, 2002; Clegg, 2002; Ewald, 2002; 
Thompson, 2002b; Person, 2002; Bennett, 2003; Stainacker, 2003; Behrens, 2004; Karlan, 
2004; Cosgrove, 2004; Behrens, 2004; Ewald, 2004; Ewald, 2005; Marquardt, 2005; Miller, 
2005; Wilkins, 2005; Nunn, 2005; Latimer, 2006; Clegg et al, 2006; Askin, 2007; Bourne, 
2007; Demleitner, 2009; Ghaelian, 2013; Grady, 2012; Nelson, 2013.  
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the only jurisdiction that has decided to permit some form of CD.6 Recent cases 
addressing CD issued by courts from Botswana,7 Chile,8 India,9 Ireland,10 Mexico,11 
and New Zealand12 have also resorted to constitutional provisions to block challenges 
to CD. 
A second group contains judgments in which the courts have explicitly prohibited or 
limited CD, the better known of which is perhaps Hirst v The United Kingdom No. 2 
(2005). Within this group of judgments, one can distinguish additionally, on the one 
hand, judgments that explicitly allowed the government some margin, albeit limited, 
for disenfranchising offenders under certain conditions. This is the case with the 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) and those 
from Australia and Hong-Kong. On the other hand, there are some judgments in 
which the courts have struck down the ban completely, which includes cases from 
Canada, South Africa, Israel and Ghana. In some of these latter cases, it is uncertain 
whether new legislation with a different scope would be compatible with 
constitutional protection of the right to vote. 
Not surprisingly, there is an important coincidence between the outcome of the two 
main groups of judgments and the standards of scrutiny applied by the courts. All the 
cases within the first group, those allowing CD, were resolved without any strict 
                                                 
6. See Hunter v Underwood (1985). In this case, the last addressed at the higher level, the 
Supreme Court affirmed that Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits explicit CD 
discriminatory clauses or explicit discriminatory motivations but not CD discriminatory 
results. 
7. See Thomas Sibanda v the Attorney General (2009). About this case and CD in Botswana, see 
Abebe, 2013:438-40. 
8. See, about the case-law and CD in Chile, Mañalich, 2011a; Marshall, 2011a; Marshall, 2011b. 
9. See Chief Election Commissioner v Jan Chaukidar (2013). About this case and CD in India, 
see Singh, 2008; Chandrachud, 2013. 
10. See Breathnach v Ireland and the Attorney General (2001). About this case and CD in Ireland, 
see Behan & O’Donnell, 2008; Hamilton & Lines, 2009; Behan, 2011; Behan, 2012; Behan, 
2014. 
11. See article 38 II, Mexican Constitution and the case-law analysed in García, 2009. 
12. See Re Bennett (1993). About this case and CD in New Zealand, see Robins, 2006; Geddis, 
2011. 
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constitutional examination, on the basis that either CD is expressly authorised by the 
constitution (USA, Chile, Mexico and Botswana), the Court had no powers of review 
(New Zealand), or there was no constitutional conflict to solve (Ireland). It has been 
observed that under a different standard of review, those judgments would reach a 
similar solution to those of the second group of judgments.13  
The second group of judgments, those that prohibited or limited CD, have in common 
the fact that they undertook a substantive constitutional review of the legislation. This 
chapter will focus on this group, and in particular, on those judgments that have 
applied a similar legal methodology to deal with CD, one mainly based upon the 
doctrine of proportionality. In this scenario, when the courts struck down the ban 
completely or partially, they did so as a consequence of a rational analysis of the 
legislation as a device for limiting the fundamental right to vote. It will be observed 
that amongst the courts engaged with proportionality, none rejected CD in terms of its 
radical incompatibility with democratic principles.14 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section I summarises and contextualises 
the main cases that have prohibited or limited CD using the legal method of 
proportionality. Section II develops a descriptive analysis of the judgments. Finally, 
Section II examines critically the outcome of the judgments and indicates some of its 
shortcomings. 
I JUDICIAL TRENDS ON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
During the last decade, CD has begun to be understood as a significant problem in 
some jurisdictions and, accordingly, laws have begun to be examined under 
democratic and human rights standards. In particular, activists challenging legislation 
                                                 
13. See Morgan-Foster, 2006:314-8. 
14. See a brief of these cases below Chapter 7, Section III.1. 
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on judicial review cases based on its violation of fundamental rights have started to 
gain success, pointing out a formula to challenge CD that could eventually be 
exported to other jurisdictions to pursue a worldwide progressive agenda.  
Five cases in which the courts have followed a similar path are salient in this 
respect.15 All those decisions dealt with cases in which CD affected offenders serving 
prison sentences. The judicial decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case 
Sauvé v Canada No. 2 (2002) (hereinafter Sauvé) is probably the most influential of 
all these challenges, having been expressly and authoritatively cited by all the other 
courts. It found the legal provision that deprived all prisoners serving sentences of 
more than two years unconstitutional and authorised the suffrage of all Canadian 
inmates within the prison system. Shortly after Sauvé, the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa handed down Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO (2004) (hereinafter 
NICRO) , in which express references are made to the Canadian judgment. In NICRO, 
the legislation that excluded all prisoners from voting was considered 
unconstitutional. A year after this sentence, the ECtHR analysed whether the electoral 
exclusion of prisoners in the United Kingdom was in accordance with the European 
Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR) in Hirst v The United Kingdom No. 
2 (2005) (hereinafter Hirst). It found the general ban of prisoners’ voting 
incompatible with the convention. The Court also drew its judgment with explicit 
references to Sauvé. Two years later, discussing for the most part Hirst and Sauvé, the 
Australian High Court’s Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) (hereinafter Roach) 
confirmed the constitutionality of the legal provision that bans those prisoners 
serving sentences of three years or longer. At the same time, however, it ruled that 
the amendment that introduced a general ban affecting all inmates was 
unconstitutional. Finally, and just a year later, the High Court of Hong Kong handed 
down Chan Kin Sum v Secretary for Justice (2008) (hereinafter Chan Kin Sum). The 
judgment affirmed that the general ban of prisoners’ voting rights was 
                                                 
15. The literature on the comparative analysis of these judgments includes Ewald & Rottinghaus, 
2009a; Plaxton & Lardy, 2010; Ziegler, 2011; Beckman, 2013; Behan, 2014: Ch. 2. 
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disproportionate and discriminatory based on arguments previously discussed in 
Sauvé, NICRO, Hirst and Roach. 
Perhaps an introductory note on proportionality is necessary to understand the 
structure of the forthcoming analysis. Proportionality is the legal method to which the 
main cases on CD have resorted. Proportionality is a “set of rules determining the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a limitation for a constitutionally protected 
right by a law to be constitutionally permissible”.16 Proportionality is not the same as 
mere reasonableness; it has a more precise and detailed content devised to expose 
judicial reasoning as a rational legal exercise.17 Proportionality permits, once the fact 
of the limitation of a right been agreed, an assessment of whether such a limitation is 
constitutionally justified. The proportionality analysis involves, and this varies 
depending of different formulations, three main steps. First, the method of 
proportionality depends on the previous identification of the right affected, the 
standards for the restriction of that right, and the limitative legislation that is 
examined. The right need to be affected by the legislation. Second, it focuses on an 
analysis of the legitimacy or constitutionality of the aim or purpose pursued by the 
legislature. It examines if the purpose of the limitative legislation is constitutionally 
permitted. Third, the proportionality test in itself is applied, on the one hand, 
assessing if the limitative legislation is rationally connected with the purpose and it is 
necessary, in what is a means-end assessment, and, on the other hand, assessing 
whether the gain in the satisfaction of the legislative aim is proportionate to the 
limitation of the right.18 
                                                 
16. Barak, 2012:3. 
17. See Barak, 2012:371-8. 
18. The bibliography on proportionality is quickly growing. See e.g. Huscroft et al, 2014. 
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1 ECtHR: Hirst v United Kingdom No. 2 (2005) 
In 2005, ECtHR handed down its judgment on Hirst, the first case in which the Court 
analysed CD in detail,19 ruling that the British legislation violated the ECHR. The 
provision in question was Section 3(I) of the Representation of the People Act 1983 
(hereinafter RPA 1983) that allegedly institutes a blanket ban of prisoners’ voting 
rights.20 It affirms that “[a] convicted person during the time that he is detained in a 
penal institution in pursuance of his sentence is legally incapable of voting at any 
parliamentary or local government election”.21 The legal debate around CD in Hirst 
                                                 
19. Hirst is the first case in which CD is analysed substantively and in detail by the ECtHR. Before 
Hirst and prior to the enactment of the Protocol 11 of the ECHR, the European Commission of 
Human Rights had considered the question of CD three times. In X v the Netherlands (1974), H 
v The Netherlands (1983) and Holland v Ireland (1998), the Commission ruled inadmissible 
the complaints because they were manifestly ill-founded. In the two later judgments, the 
Commission considered the total disenfranchisement of sentenced prisoners against the 
provision of Article 3 of the First Protocol (hereinafter A3P1) of the ECHR. In both cases, 
Labita v Italy (2000) and Vito Sante Santoro v Italy (2004), the judgment was based upon the 
wide MOA awarded to the domestic authorities to decide on this issue. However, those cases 
were related to the case of those who were being investigated as they were suspected of 
belonging to criminal organisations and, therefore, were not cases in which the Court dealt 
with a general hypothesis of CD (Hirst [68]). 
20. The UK has a long history of CD. The Forfeiture Act 1870, the first statutory prohibition of 
prisoners’ voting, liberalised the previous common law system of attainder, excluding from 
voting those sentenced to an imprisonment of more than 12 months. Cheney suggests that 
considering the limited number of people able to vote at that time, the provision of the 
Forfeiture Act had the purpose of sanctioning elected representatives who had abused their 
functions (2008:134). Those prisoners remained, however, unable to vote due to the absence of 
mechanisms for absence voting and registering. In the Representation of the People Act 1918, 
no statutory provision was contemplated, however, neither were any means to access the ballot 
box. The result was a de facto blanket ban affecting all prisoners. The introduction of the 
postal ballot in 1948, after the adoption of the principle of universal suffrage (Representation 
of the People Act 1928), raised the question of whether or not prisoners could use this 
alternative. From 1967 all prisoners were able to participate in elections following the 
enactment of the Criminal Law Act 1967, until a blanket ban was prescribed by Representation 
of the People Act 1969; this would also be the last time a CD provision was discussed in 
Parliament. This general ban was modified by the Representation of the People Act 2000, 
enabling remand prisoners to exercise the right to vote. About the historical development of 
CD in the UK, see Murray, 2012:3-11. See also Joint Committee, 2013:7-11. 
21. Section 3 RPA 1983 excludes two classes of inmates: “persons dealt with by committal or 
other summary process for contempt of court” ((2)(a)) and those imprisoned for non-payment 
of fines ((2)(c)). Additionally, defendants remanded in custody retain their right to vote.  
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was focused on whether Section 3(I) violates human rights, specifically the rights that 
follow the state obligation to hold free elections under A3P1 of the ECHR.22  
The ECtHR was not the first court to apply proportionality to analyse the 
compatibility of CD and the right to vote; Canada (1993 and 2002) and South Africa 
(1999 and 2004) both handed down judgments before Hirst. Nor does the ECtHR 
boast the clearest jurisprudence about what makes CD incompatible with the right to 
vote on these grounds.23 However, the ECtHR, due to its jurisdiction over all 
countries of the Council of Europe, provided a set of cases in which the jurisprudence 
of the Court can be judged carefully.24 Hirst and the decisions that follow it have 
generated a substantial discussion, especially in the UK,25 regarding the intervention 
of the Court in sensitive national affairs. 
Before the submission to the ECtHR, the Hirst case was considered at the domestic 
level. R v Secretary of State for Home Department, Ex parte Pearson and Martinez, 
Hirst v Attorney General (2001)26 was the first time the issue of CD had been 
judicially considered since the enactment of the current legislation in 1983.27 In this 
                                                 
22. For commentaries of the judgment of the Grand Chamber, see Foster, 2009:497-8; Power, 
2006:288-93; Easton, 2006; Thomson, 2011. 
23. There is an agreement in the literature about the doctrinal influence of Sauvé over the further 
judgments, based on the sophistication of both the majority and the minority judgments 
(Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:102). 
24. The legal literature on Hirst and the judgments of the ECtHR is extensive. See Foster, 2004; 
Easton, 2006; Lewis, 2006; Powers, 2006; Jago & Marriot, 2007; Cheney, 2008; Pérez-Moneo, 
2009; Plaxton & Lardy, 2010; Foster, 2009; Briant, 2011a; Briant, 2011b;; Murray, 2011b; 
Murray, 2011a; Joint Committee, 2013:14-7. 
25. Regarding the political repercussions of these judgments, especially the tensions between the 
British Government and Parliament and the ECtHR after Hirst, see, generally, Bates, 2014. The 
bibliography is, however, constantly growing, most of which has been directed to analyse the 
institutional tension in terms of a judicial dialogue and a problem for parliamentary 
sovereignty; see Lewis, 2006; Foster, 2009; Briant, 2011a; Briant, 2011b; Nicol, 2011; Murray, 
2011a; Murray, 2011b; Thomson, 2011; Davis, 2012; O’Cinneide, 2012; Bates, 2012: 408-9; 
Bellamy, 2012; Fenwick, 2013; Hiebert, 2013; Young, 2013; Joint Committee, 2013:22-33. 
About the influence of the press, see Rozenberg & Wagner, 2013; McNulty, 2014. See also 
Peroni & Burbergs, 2010; Raab, 2011; Leconte, 2013.  
26. For commentaries of this case, see Foster, 2001; Powers, 2006:276-80; Foster, 2009. 
27. For previous judicial decisions, see Murray, 2012. 
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judgment, the Divisional Court dismissed the application that sought a declaration of 
incompatibility of Section 3 under the Human Rights Act 1998.28 After failing in its 
attempt at the domestic level, the Hirst case was taken to the European level, where it 
was considered first by the Fourth Section of the ECtHR before the UK government 
appealed for it to be considered by the Grand Chamber.29  
The main issues addressed by the Court were, firstly, the margin of appreciation 
(hereinafter MOA) enjoyed by member states to set CD measures that relates the 
current case with the previous case-law in relation to electoral issues. Secondly, the 
Court addressed the proportionality of the legal provision. Generally, the Court 
concluded that the wide MOA of domestic legislatures could not cover the provision 
of a “general, automatic and indiscriminate” [82] ban, such as Section 3(I). 
                                                 
28. In order to do so, the Court first argued that the right to vote is subject to limitations and 
conditions, for which it referred to the ECtHR jurisprudence [4, 16]. Secondly, it argued that 
domestic legislations have a wide MOA to exclude prisoners from the right to vote, in 
accordance with the doctrine of the abovementioned European Commission [14-6]. Where that 
line of exclusion should be traced, then, corresponds exactly to where Parliament deems the 
coordinates to be [20]. Thirdly, though it is difficult to articulate a defence of CD legitimacy 
based upon its aim, there are elements of electoral regulation and punishment articulated by the 
Parliament, which is the legitimate actor to adopt these kinds of decisions [40]. The domestic 
cases after Hirst have not changed the status quo established by these cases. In Smith v Scott 
(2007), the Scottish Court of Appeal recognized the incompatibility of Section 3 (regarding 
this case, see Kesby, 2007; Foster, 2009:501). After this case, domestic courts have refused to 
make such kind of declarations. In 2013 two cases were heard by the Supreme Court: R (on the 
application of Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice and McGeoch v The Lord President of 
the Council (2013) (hereinafter Chester and McGeoch). In these cases the Court refused to do 
any declaration of incompatibility but also “declined the Attorney General’s invitation not to 
apply the principles of Hirst” (Joint Committee, 2013:21) (regarding these cases, see Wagner, 
2013; Ziegler, 2013; Tomkins, 2013; Tickell, 2014; Lansbergen, 2014). For analysis of the 
UK’s domestic court attitude after Hirst, see Briant, 2011a; Murray, 2011b; Joint Committee, 
2013:20-1. 
29. In the Chamber judgment, the framework of review was similar to that considered by the UK 
court: Mathieu-Mohin as standard of review of A3P1 [36-38] and the recognition of the right to 
vote as an essential component of a democratic society vis-a-vis the wide MOA of the 
contracting states [40-1]. Despite heavily criticising the legitimate aims argued by the UK 
Government, the Chamber left open the question of legitimacy [42-7] to focus instead on the 
proportionality of Section 3. The Chamber considered the provision of Section 3 
disproportionate because it disenfranchises “a large category of person” indiscriminately, 
automatically, “irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence” and producing an 
arbitrary general effect [49]. By this means, the Chamber introduces the proportionality test as 
that upon which the Grand Chamber would assess CD. For commentaries of the judgment of 
the Chamber, see Foster, 2004; Power, 2006:280-288; Foster, 2009:493-7. 
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1.1 The margin of appreciation 
This is the only judgment of the analysed that was handed down by an international 
court. However, as the analysis carried out here focus in the legal reasoning of the 
courts, this does not seem a problem for a join analysis. It is important to pay 
attention, however, to the doctrine to which the ECtHR has traditionally appealed to 
incorporate into his reasoning its position as an international court.  
The doctrine of the MOA has been used by the Court “to take account of the room for 
manoeuvre that national authorities may be allowed in fulfilling some of their main 
obligations under the Convention”.30 The ECtHR’s analysis of MOA in Hirst 
confronted directly the previous evaluation made by the British court, which stated 
that CD should remain completely within the competence of the legislature. The 
Court, in Hirst, considered the requirements for applying MOA to the case of CD [79] 
and determined that for this to be granted a decision must be preceded by a 
substantial discussion before being settled and not merely display passive adherence 
to a historic tradition. This substantial discussion can be demonstrated not only by 
legislative debate, but also when the issue has been considered by the judicial 
instances of the country [48]. The Court further specified that this discussion must 
consider competing interests or assess the proportionality of CD in relation to voting 
rights. The Court considered that such discussion was absent in this case [22], and 
condemned the UK for not satisfying these requirements [78-82]. 
After affirming this, the Court added that if it is true that the MOA is wide, it is not 
all-embracing [82], and called for an irreducible limit to the MOA, based on the 
proportionality test itself.31 It is, at the very least, strange that the Court made an 
                                                 
30. Joint Committee, 2013:13. The MOA doctrine was first fully articulated in Handyside v United 
Kingdom (1976). See Lang, 2013:841-3. 
31. This was the main disagreement raised by the dissenting opinion of judges Wildhaber, Costa, 
Lorenzen, Kovler and Jebens [4]. 
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effort to express that the UK did not satisfy some alleged requirements to be granted 
a MOA, and then consider that Section 3 fell outwith it as a consequence of its lack 
of proportionality.32 This raises the question of whether the satisfaction of these 
standards should warrant the widening of a state’s MOA, that is, whether or not 
different deliberative processes should be granted different margins.33 
1.2 The right to vote and the source of the scrutiny test 
In Hirst, the standard of the review was the obligation ‘to hold free elections’ of the 
A3P1.34 The right to vote is not expressly stipulated and has been attributed to the 
creative activity of the Court under the ‘living instrument’ doctrine.35 Under this 
premise, the right to vote was recognised by the ECtHR in Mathieu-Mohin and 
Clerfayt v Belgium (1988) arguing that the text of the protocol entails individual 
rights to vote and to stand as a candidate for national election and not only inter-state 
obligations. This idea has been ratified in later judgments36 and applied in Hirst 
[57].37 
The Court affirmed substantive ideas regarding the right to vote. It affirmed that the 
vote is a right and “not a privilege”, and that in a democratic state, universal suffrage 
“has become the basic principle”, which demands a “presumption […] in favour of 
inclusion” [59]. On the other hand, however, the Court acknowledged that the right to 
                                                 
32. cf dissenting opinion of Judge Björgvinsson in Scoppola [26-8]. 
33. This is an interesting issue that must be considered for further research.  
34. A3P1 ECHR: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable 
intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion 
of the people in the choice of the legislature”. 
35. In Tyrer v The United Kingdom (1978) the Court established that “the convention is a living 
instrument which […] must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions [15]”. See 
Powers, 2006:260-2. See also Lang, 2013:839-41; Joint Committee, 2013:13. 
36. See Matthews v The United Kingdom (1999); Labita v Italy (2000). 
37. The fact that the A3P1 does not state that there is a subjective right to vote, and the allegation 
of the British government that this case law ignores the intentions of the original drafter, have 
formed the object of a series of arguments in the UK debate about the legitimacy of the 
creative activity of the Court. See Joint Committee, 2013:13-4. 
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vote is not absolute, and in the absence of an express limitation clause, it is 
nonetheless the object of implied limitations. Due to the fact that the ECHR lacks a 
general clause of limitation of fundamental rights,38 it corresponds to the contracting 
parties setting those limitations, which ought to be accorded a wide MOA due to the 
“numerous ways of organizing and running electoral systems” [60-1]. Starting on the 
basis of a presumption of universal suffrage [59], these limitations must respect some 
requirements implicit in A3P1, that the Court inaugurated in Mathieu-Mohin [52], 
and which have been confirmed in subsequent judgments. The standard considers 
three elements: first, “it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the 
rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them 
of their effectiveness”; second, the limitation must pursue a legitimate aim or proper 
purpose; and third, the means employed must not be disproportionate [62].39  
1.3 The purpose 
The UK government sought to justify Section 3 RPA 1983 by appealing to the 
following abstract purposes: 
“preventing crime and punishing offenders and enhancing civic 
responsibility and respect for the rule of law by depriving those who had 
breached the basic rules of society of the right to have a say in the way 
such rules were made for the duration of their sentence. Convicted 
prisoners had breached the social contract and so could be regarded as 
(temporarily) forfeiting the right to take part in the government of the 
country” [50]. 
                                                 
38. Some provisions have explicit limitation clauses, which is not so in the case of the A3P1 
(Barak, 2012:135, 141). Powers (2006:254-8) is wrong when he considers the standard of 
limitation of the right to vote is that of “necessary in a democratic society”, which is the 
specific standard of limitation of the right to respect for private and family life. 
39. See also Scoppola [104]. See a detailed analysis of the case law of the ECtHR in the analysis 
of these elements in Powers, 2006:262-7. 
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In a decision essential to understanding the criticism articulated in following 
chapters, as a consequence of the application of the MOA doctrine, the Court did not 
undertake an examination of the legitimacy of the governmental aims.40 This was 
considered a question of particular flexibility in the context of the broader variations 
within the European democratic models.41 Despite the reservations expressed, the 
Court did not find the aims “per se incompatible with the right” [75]. 
1.4 The proportionality judgment 
Having satisfied the requirement of a legitimate purpose, the Court’s ruling regarding 
Section 3 was based on a proportionality analysis. However, the Court did not 
proceed to examine the measure in terms of the traditional formulation of the 
proportionality test, this is, in terms of its rational connection and minimal 
impairment and the balancing or proportionality in a strict sense, or at least not 
explicitly. It did so with reference to an ad-hoc and specific test, currently known as 
the Hirst test. 
In the core of the test, the Court considered that the “general, automatic and 
indiscriminate” [82] deprivation of prisoners’ right to vote is incompatible with the 
Convention, appealing to the necessity of a certain graduation or proportionality 
between the measure of Section 3 and the circumstances of the incarceration of 
prisoners. The Court followed closely the Chamber’s judgment, which affirmed that 
CD was general because it stripped a “large group of people of the vote”; it is 
automatic because it applies “irrespective of length of sentence of the gravity of the 
offence”; and it is arbitrary because its results depend “on the timing of elections” 
[41]. In the central paragraph of its judgment, the Court stated that 
                                                 
40. See below Chapter 7, Section II. 
41. This is an argument that is repeated in other judgments. 
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“while the Court reiterates that the margin of appreciation is wide, it is not 
all-embracing. […] section 3 of the 1983 Act remains a blunt instrument. 
It strips of their Convention right to vote a significant category of persons 
and it does so in a way which is indiscriminate. The provision imposes a 
blanket restriction on all convicted prisoners in prison. It applies 
automatically to such prisoners, irrespective of the length of their sentence 
and irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence and their 
individual circumstances. Such a general, automatic and indiscriminate 
restriction on a vitally important Convention right must be seen as falling 
outside any acceptable margin of appreciation, however wide that margin 
might be, and as being incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 
[82]”. 
The ECtHR concluded that Section 3 RPA 1983 violates the right to free elections 
because it does not take into account the nature of the offence and the duration of the 
imprisonment in determining the application of CD. In other words, the Court 
suggested that CD depends on nothing more than the mere fact of imprisonment [77]. 
Affirming this, the Court left open the possibility of a proportionate application of 
CD, when the legislation considers those factors. However, the Court was cautious in 
saying that it is for the legislative authorities at the domestic level that must 
determine the “means for the securing the rights guaranteed by the Article 3 of the 
Protocol 1” [84]. The use of proportionality did not consider the elements of the 
proportionality test traditionally outlined by the doctrine but concentrated on an ad-
hoc proportionality examination. However, it can be argued that the proportionality 
test was implicit to that ad-hoc test.42  
Three other judgments followed Hirst. The three of them confirmed the reasoning of 
Hirst, including the wide MOA,43 the legitimacy of the aim of punishment and the 
enhancement of civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law,44 and 
                                                 
42. It is however not unusual that the ECtHR did not explicitly apply proportionality in terms of a 
structured test. An overview of the case law of the Court shows that the terms of the 
proportionality evaluation are made ad-hoc to the cases. See Legg, 2012:178-81. 
43. See Frodl [23]; Greens [110]; Scoppola [83]. 
44. See Frodl [30]; Scoppola [90-2]. 
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proportionality as the test to be applied.45 They partially differed, however, in the 
concrete formulation of the demands of the proportionality test.46 
In Frodl v Austria (2010) (hereinafter Frodl) the First Section of the Court analysed a 
challenge against Austrian legislation, which disenfranchises those imprisoned for 
more than one year, affirming that it was incompatible with A3P1. According to the 
Court: 
“Disenfranchisement may only be envisaged for a rather narrowly defined 
group of offenders serving a lengthy term of imprisonment [28]. […] 
Under the Hirst test, besides ruling out automatic and blanket restrictions 
it is an essential element that the decision on disenfranchisement should be 
taken by a judge, taking into account the particular circumstances, and that 
there must be a link between the offence committed and issues relating to 
elections and democratic institutions” [34].47  
Frodl was considerably more stringent than Hirst, demanding very specific 
requirements, and therefore narrowing the MOA “almost to vanishing point”.48 The 
confessed purpose of the Court was to “establish disenfranchisement as an exception 
even in the case of convicted prisoners” [35].49 With this interpretation of the Hirst 
ruling, the standard of the Court became stricter, narrowing the options for European 
governments to produce a reform in accordance with expectations of the Court. 
Just after Frodl, the Fourth Section of the Court decided Greens and M.T. v United 
Kingdom (2010) (hereinafter Greens), finding a violation of the right to free elections 
due to the UK government’s delay in implementing Hirst. However, on this occasion 
                                                 
45. See Frodl [24]; Scoppola [93-6]. 
46. See Joint Committee, 2013:17-9.  
47. This was also the reasoning of the Second Section’s Chamber judgment in Scoppola.  
48. Joint Committee, 2013:17. 
49. This exceptional character can be linked to the doctrine that prisoners retain all their rights and 
freedoms save for the right to liberty, insofar as these are compatible with the fact of 
incarceration, as well as the democratic idea that limitations on the franchise are exceptional 
based on the democratic principle of universal suffrage. 
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the Court returned to the idea of not giving any guidance for the required legislative 
proposal [113] – not even in relation to the judicial intervention and anti-democratic 
and electoral offences demanded in Frodl. The Court emphasised that the definition 
of the policy, within the wide range of alternatives available, rests with the 
government [114]. Additionally, it gave the UK government a six-month deadline to 
introduce an amendment to Section 3 into Parliament [115]. 50 
With Scoppola v Italy No. 3 (2012) (hereinafter Scoppola) the issue of CD returned to 
the Grand Chamber six years after Hirst.51 It was expected for this judgment to 
provide a final clarification of how the ECtHR addresses CD. The Court made an 
effort to make its judgment compatible with its previous decision while analysing the 
compatibility of the Italian regime of CD. The judgment claims to be consistent with 
the ruling of Hirst [82] but it clearly seemed to be saying that Frodl [34, 71] went too 
far. 
At the core of its argumentation, the Court used a comparison between CD in the UK 
and its Italian counterpart, arguing that Italian CD does not fall within the category of 
“general, automatic and indiscriminate” proposed by the Hirst test but within the 
Italian government’s MOA. This effort considered three aspects of the legislation. 
Firstly, under the Italian system, CD is applied only to some prisoners, so is not 
general as the UK ban is [108]. Secondly, it considers material elements, namely the 
length of the prison sentence (offences resulting in a sentence of three or more years’ 
imprisonment) and the nature of the crime committed (even lesser imprisonment 
terms when the act involves an offence against the state), so it is not indiscriminate as 
the UK approach is [105]. Accordingly, what seems to be important for the Court is 
                                                 
50. Greens thus returned with strict textualism to the Hirst ruling, first, by considering the judicial 
declaration of CD desirable but not obligatory. Second, by finding that there should be a link 
between the conduct and the sanction, which cannot necessarily be restricted to electoral and 
democratic offences, but may consider factors such as the length of sentence and the nature and 
gravity of the offence as relevant variables for attaining proportionality (See Briant, 
2011b:281). 
51. For commentaries of the judgment, see Pitea, 2012; Foster, 2012; Lang, 2013; Jaramillo, 2014. 
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that the Italian legislation provides a targeted-ban rather than as a blanket-ban.52 
Thirdly, the duration of the CD depends on the prison sentence length, so it is not 
automatic because it shows “the legislature’s concern to adjust the application of the 
measure to the particular circumstances of the case in hand, taking into account such 
factors as the gravity of the offence committed and the conduct of the offender” 
[106].53 With this qualification, the Grand Chamber expressly distanced itself from 
both Frodl and the chamber judgment in Scoppola, conceding that not only a court 
but the legislator can determine and consider the particular circumstances of the 
application of CD. Therefore, confirming Greens, an intervention by a judge is 
desirable but not necessary [97-102]. In addition, no mention was made of the 
requirement in Frodl of links between the offence with democratic and electoral 
values.54  
                                                 
52. See above Chapter 1, Section I.2.1. 
53. The element of arbitrariness it is not mentioned in this case. 
54. To understand better what seems to be the last word of the ECtHR on the issue of CD, 
Scoppola must be situated within a broader legal framework. CD can affect the right to vote in 
several dimensions: the only one in which Italian legislation is less restrictive of the right to 
vote than its UK counterpart is the scope of the measure; that is, the determination of which 
offenders are subjected to the suspension of their voting rights. The Court focused on this 
aspect, paying scant attention to other aspects, such as the duration, modalities of application, 
sources, and method of rehabilitation of the Italian legislation. Regarding duration, Italian CD 
bans serious offenders for much longer whilst the UK system does not. Every UK prisoner that 
is released from prison, independently of the seriousness or nature of the offence and the 
length of the imprisonment, returns to their community being able to exercise the right to vote, 
while in Italy some ex-prisoners remain disenfranchised temporarily or permanently. The 
modes of application are relatively similar because the judge’s participation does not affect the 
applicability of the measure – which as noted by the dissenting opinion is also automatic – but 
determines the gravity of the punishment (the length of the prison sentence) with which CD is 
associated. Regarding the sources, while the UK legislation is an Act of Parliament (RPA 
1983), in Italy the administrative norm that extends the forfeiture for holding public office to 
the right to vote (Presidential Decree No. 223/1967) lacks the democratic deliberative input of 
a legislative norm. Finally, while UK law permits automatic rehabilitation after release, 
permanently banned Italian citizens must apply to a procedure that depends upon the ex-
prisoner displaying “consistent and genuine display of good conduct” [109]. This comparison 
leads to the conclusion that in the Scoppola judgment, the Court reduced the Hirst test and 
therefore the proportionality of CD in relation to the ECHR to the concrete aspect of the scope 
of CD, and particularly in relation to the length of the prison sentences to which it is applied. 
None of the other aspects of CD seem to be considered or, at least, sufficiently considered (See 
e.g. Ziegler, 2013; Jaramillo, 2014:43). If the emphasis were placed on other aspects, for 
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The Court placed great value on the political participation of offenders serving prison 
sentences shorter than three years, explicitly affirming that the key factor for this 
decision was the finding that “there is no disenfranchisement in connection with 
minor offences” or those which “do not attract sentences of three years’ 
imprisonment or more” [108]. The key aspect to satisfy the ECtHR in this regard 
seems to be to “discriminate between less serious and more serious offences”.55 This 
might be considered a reversal for prisoners’ rights in relation to previous 
judgments,56 or at least a sign of an inconsistent jurisprudence on the right to vote.57 
In sum, “the extent to which convicted criminals are entitled to participate in the 
electoral process remains unclear” 58 and the development in recent years has been 
unpredictable in the case-law of the ECtHR.59  
                                                                                                                                                    
example, the temporary duration of the measure and the difficulties of the process of 
rehabilitation (which has informed, for instance, the US debate), the results might be different. 
55. Joint Commiteee, 2013:20. See also Gardner, 2012. 
56. See e.g. Ziegler, 2012.  
57. See the dissenting opinion of Judge Björgvinsson [26-8]. He argues that the Hirst and Scoppola 
rulings are inconsistent because the latter drops two of the requirements established by the 
former, Italian legislation being as “automatic” as UK legislation. He also notes that there is no 
examination of the circumstances under which the MOA is to be conceded to the Italian 
Government, as there was in Hirst (see also Lang, 2013). Pitea (2012) puts great emphasis on 
the fact that the ECtHR in Hirst examines British legislation in abstracto, whilst in Scoppola 
the Court proceeds “without examining whether the solution adopted would lead to respect of 
proportionality in each and every case”. The inconsistency between the cases, according to 
him, can be explained in terms of an “Unsolved Tension between “Individual” and 
“Constitutional” Justice”. Yet more sceptical is Milanovic (2013), who suggests that Scoppola 
is a case of strategic judgment, “hardly a decision born out of principle”, in which the ECtHR 
“has no desire to diminish its own authority by overruling Hirst”, but concedes that its 
demands went too far, therefore granting the United Kingdom the possibility to comply with 
Hirst by passing “essentially cosmetic changes” to the corresponding legislation. 
58. Jaramillo, 2014:41. After Scoppola, two chamber judgments have contributed to confirm Hirst 
as the leading case on CD before the ECtHR. They have, however, continued casting doubts on 
the consistency of the Court case-law. In the arguably more important Söyler v Turkey (2013), 
the Second Section of the ECtHR applied the Hirst test to the case of suspended sentences. In 
this case a prisoner was released from prison on probation but was still affected by CD until 
the end of the period of the original sentence [36]. The Turkish government argued that the aim 
of CD was “encouraging citizen-like conduct” and rehabilitation, and the Court following Hirst 
affirmed that such an aim was not per se incompatible with A3P1 [37]. In relation to the 
proportionality of the measure, the Court confirmed that judicial intervention is not essential 
but “in principle, likely to guarantee the proportionality of restrictions on prisoners’ voting 
rights” [39]. The Court also confirmed that a blanket ban, such as that affecting prisoners in 
Turkey, is indiscriminate because it “does not take into account the nature or gravity of the 
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2 Canada: Sauvé v Canada No. 2 (2002) 
The Supreme Court of Canada dealt with CD in 1993, striking down a blanket ban on 
prisoners voting in Sauvé v Canada No. 1 (1993).60 The Court briefly stated that the 
contravention of Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by the 
Canada Election Act 1985 was not justified according to the limitation clause of 
Section 1 but had been “drawn too broadly and fails to meet the proportionality test, 
particularly the minimal impairment component of the test”. After Sauvé v Canada 
No. 1 (1993), the Parliament responded by enacting a new provision, this time 
narrowly tailored. This became the subject of a new case, Sauvé, in which the Court 
considered the constitutionality of the new CD provision of Section 51(e) of the 
Canada Election Act 2000, which denied the right to vote to “every person who is 
imprisoned in a correctional institution serving a sentence of two years or more”. The 
Court, in a judgment of extraordinary depth and quality, ruled that the provision was 
                                                                                                                                                    
offence, the length of the prison sentence […] or the individual circumstances of the convicted 
person” [41]. However, the Court in Söyler does not explicitly condemn the 
disenfranchisement of convicts with suspended prison sentences, but makes references to the 
non-serious character of the committed offence [44] and its insufficient link with the sanction 
of CD [45]. In Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia (2013), the First Section of the Court sustained 
that the fact that CD is laid down in the Constitution (article 32.3) rather than in an act of 
Parliament is not an impediment to declaring the incompatibility of the Russian blanket ban 
affecting all prisoners with the A3P1 applying the Hirst test. Interestingly, according to the 
Court, the compliance with the ruling “can be achieved through some form of political process 
or by interpreting the Russian Constitution by the competent authorities” [111]. In a third case, 
McLean and Cole v United Kingdom (2013), the Fourth Section of the Court confirmed that the 
protection of the right to vote of the A3P1 does not extend to referendums [31-33] and local 
elections [26-30] but only those elections “concerning the choice of the legislature” [32], 
hence, only parliamentary elections. It dismissed, with that argument, the claim against the 
exclusion of those in prison from be part in the Scottish independence referendum (see Section 
3, Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013). Tickell (2014) notes that the 
nature of an independence referendum could be interpreted as determining “which legislature 
Scots will be governed by in future. It may not be a choice about the individuals who will 
constitute the legislature but […] a referendum on independence has a much closer connection 
to the issues attracting protection of A3P1” (293). 
59. See Joint Committee, 2013:20. 
60. Previous cases anticipated that the prisoners’ right to vote would eventually be asserted by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. In Sauvé v Attorney-General of Canada (1991) (Ontario Court of 
Appeal) and Belczowski v The Queen (1991) (Federal Court), the courts ruled that the blanket 
ban affecting all prisoners was unconstitutional. Both decisions were appealed before the 
Supreme Court, which confirmed that the legislation was unconstitutional. 
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unconstitutional because the limitation of the right to vote was not justified under 
Section 1 of the Charter.61  
2.1 Deference 
The main disagreement between the majority and the dissenting vote in Sauvé was 
concerned with the margin of deference that the Court must grant to the parliament to 
decide on this kind of issue. 
The majority vote affirmed that “[t]he right to vote is fundamental to our democracy 
and the rule of law and cannot be lightly set aside. Limits on it require no deference” 
[9]. This is true, the Court affirm, even for the legislative regulation of issues in 
which social and political philosophies can reasonably disagree, as was pointed by 
the influential dissenting vote in the case of CD. Accepting this argument would lead 
to “reverse the constitutionally imposed burden of justification” [10], whose function 
is to require justification for the limitation of those rights, and more so when the right 
is the “cornerstone of democracy” and has been exempt from the notwithstanding 
clause of Section 33 [12-4]. It is precisely in these cases, in which the legislative 
choices threaten to undermine the foundations of the participatory democracy 
guaranteed by the Charter that the courts must be vigilant” [15]. 
2.2 The right to vote and the source of the proportionality test 
The legal basis of the plaintiff claim in this case was that CD infringed the right to 
vote expressly laid down in Section 3 of the Charter: “Every citizen of Canada has 
the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a 
legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein”. 
                                                 
61. The bibliography regarding Sauvé v Canada No. 1 (1993) and Sauvé, and the Canadian legal 
debate on CD includes Manfredi, 1998; Hampton, 1998:23-6; Schafer, 1999; Brown, 2003; 
Parkes, 2003; Manfredi, 2007; Manfredi, 2009:260-8; Plaxton & Lardy, 2010. 
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The standard of scrutiny for the limitation of fundamental rights has been built upon 
Section 1 of the Charter, which states that rights are only subject “to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society”. The standard test was settled in R v Oakes (1986), and recalled in Sauvé, 
where the Court ruled that the government must show both a pressing and substantial 
objective (proper purpose) and the proportionality of the measure, in particular, that 
the measure is “rationally connected [with the objective], causes minimal impairment, 
and is proportionate to the benefit achieved” [7]. The fact that the government 
conceded that the CD provision violated the right to vote [6] increased the burden of 
proof borne by the government, which had to demonstrate (“to satisfy the reasonable 
person” [18]) that the limitation was justified under the test [10]. 
Especially regarding the element of a proper purpose element, the Court set a high 
standard of justification. The purpose of CD cannot be “trivial” and cannot be 
“discordant with the principles integral to a free and democratic society”. Therefore, 
the purpose must satisfy a standard of importance that “a simple majoritarian 
preference to abolish a right” would not satisfy and that would be satisfied when what 
is sought is the protection of other competing rights [20]. The required purpose must 
therefore be “pressing and substantial”. 
2.3 The purpose 
In the absence of a specific problem that CD was held to resolve, the government 
stated that CD pursues two broad objectives: first, “to enhance civic responsibility 
and respect for the rule of law”, and second, “to provide additional punishment or 
‘enhanc[e] the general purposes of the criminal sanction’” [21]. 
The Court expressed its concern regarding the offered purposes. First, it noted that 
there were doubts regarding “how much these goals actually motivated Parliament”, 
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however, it proceeded to analyse the government’s proposal [21]. Second, the Court 
conceded the legitimacy of the purposes, notwithstanding that such “[v]ague and 
symbolic objectives [...] almost guarantee a positive answer to this question” [22] and 
that the purposes had not been “precisely defined so as to provide a clear framework 
for evaluating its importance” [23].62 The Court emphasised that it did not 
straightforwardly dismiss the government objectives merely for prudential 
considerations [27]. 
The Court in Sauvé rejected the government’s argument at a later stage, at the level of 
the rational connection, but from the analysis of the aims offered, it can be concluded 
that the Court did not consider any of the purposes outlined by the government as 
‘pressing and substantial’.  
2.4 The proportionality judgment 
The Court analysed the proportionality of CD in relation to each of the alleged 
purposes, concluding that they lacked a rational connection with the legal provision 
of the Election Act 2000. The government claimed that depriving prisoners of the 
right to vote advanced the first purpose, respect for the law held by both the inmate 
and the community in general, by arguing: first, that it sends an “educative message 
about the importance of respect for the law”; and second, that it avoids demeaning the 
political system. CD advances the second purpose in that it imposes a legitimate 
punishment “regardless of the specific nature of the offence or the circumstances of 
the individual offender” [29]. 
The answer of the Court went so far in philosophical argument as to label strange the 
empirical issue that the government put forward. Regarding the first argument, the 
                                                 
62. Regarding the argument of the Court in relation to the possibility of offering abstract values for 
the purpose of the limitation of rights, see Brown, 2003:309-14. 
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Court reasoned by explaining that the premises on which respect for the law in a 
democratic society such as Canada are built cannot be used to argue that depriving 
suffrage reinforces that same respect for the law. In fact, the opposite is the case, 
according to the Court. A “[b]ad pedagogy”, which is “more likely to harm than to 
help respect for the law” [30], “anti-democratic and internally self-contradictory” 
[32] and running against the Canada commitment to “the inherent worth and dignity 
of every individual” [35] were the categorical terms in which the Court referred to the 
argument. Similar categorical statements were used to dismiss the complementary 
arguments about enhancing civic responsibility [37]. The failure of the argument of 
respect for the law, therefore, was based on the likelihood that CD will “send 
messages that undermine respect for the law and democracy than messages that 
enhance those values” [41].63  
In regard to the argument that “allowing penitentiary inmates to vote ‘demeans’ the 
political system”, the rational connection between that purpose and the provision, 
according to the Court, is based upon the inadmissible, “ancient and obsolete” 
premise that prisoners are in a sense unworthy of the respect or dignity deserved by 
every citizen able to participate in the elections [37, 44]. In this way, both 
justifications failed the rational connection test. Finally, the Court considered the 
diverse penological functions that CD can perform, concluding that the ‘additional’ 
punishment effect claimed by the government was not convincing.64 All punishment 
functions were already either covered by imprisonment or could not be rationally 
expected to be performed by CD [48-50]. Thus, again, the measure fails the test of 
rational connection. 
Even when the Court found the failure of the proportionality test at the first stage, it 
evaluated the provision under the other elements of the test a fortiori, also concluding 
that it would fail to pass them. Regarding the minimal impairment test (necessity), the 
                                                 
63. See the analysis of the argument in Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:106-12. 
64. For a complete analysis of this functions, see below Chapter 5. 
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Court considered that the provision was not only over-inclusive but that there was no 
clear standard by which to assess the measure. Even if it is taken for granted that the 
purpose of the measure is to affect only serious offenders, there is a lack of 
justification regarding necessity. The Court questioned what ‘serious’ offender might 
be taken to mean and how a line that separates these offenders from ‘minor’ offenders 
can be rationally drawn, and, second, what makes the category of serious offender 
different from minors offenders in such a way as to restrict their right to vote [54-5]. 
Finally, assessing proportionality in the strict sense, the Court, pointing out problems 
affecting democratic legitimacy [31, 58], the rehabilitative function of prisons [59] 
and a disproportionate impact on the aboriginal population [60], concluded that “the 
negative effects of denying citizens the rights to vote would greatly outweigh the 
tenuous benefits that might ensue” [57]. 
Sauvé is an important judgment maybe because it set an argumentative standard 
relatively high. It is full of arguments relative to the protection of democracy and 
fundamental rights, which frame its progressive outcome in a reasoned and principled 
way. Finally, the substantive arguments offered by the Court are organized in terms 
of the proportionality legal method. 
3 South Africa: Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO (2004) 
The South African Constitutional Court handed down judgments in 1999 and 2004 
striking down CD legislation. The Court first considered the issue in August v 
Electoral Commission (1999) (hereinafter August), in which the absence of a 
prisoners’ voting system was imputed as an unconstitutional inaction. Five years 
later, the issue was revisited in the NICRO judgment where the new legislation, 
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which deprived all prisoners with the exception of those who had a right to fine, was 
considered unconstitutional.65  
The Interim Constitution of 1993, in transition from the apartheid regime,66 did not 
disenfranchise prisoners, but Section 16(d) of the Electoral Act of 1993 prescribes 
CD for those sentenced without option of a fine for the crimes of murder, robbery and 
rape. This disposition was rapidly amended in 1994 to allow all prisoners to vote. The 
final Constitution of 1996 did not settle any specific provision in relation to CD. The 
Electoral Act of 1998 stipulates a number of categories of persons disqualified from 
voting, among which prisoners were not included. This is the legislative scenario in 
which the first case was analysed by the recently established Constitutional Court.67  
3.1 August v Electoral Commission (1999) 
The Court in August dealt with the inaction of the Electoral Commission, the 
administrative service in charge of implementing the elections, in providing a 
mechanism of voting for prisoners. The defence of the Commission was mainly based 
on the argument that prisoners are allowed to vote but they cannot physically do it 
due to a fact (the imprisonment) that depends on their own misconduct and not on 
some action of the Commission [20]. In order to explain why it had not provided a 
system of voting and registration for prisoners, the Commission argued: first, that to 
                                                 
65. On August and NICRO judgments, and the South African legal debate on CD, see Muntinhgh & 
Sloth Nielsen, 2009; Plaxton & Lardy, 2010; Abebe, 2013. 
66. Muntinhgh and Sloth Nielsen (2009) explains that the discussion about CD was carried out in 
the context of the transition from the apartheid regime, with the first democratic election taking 
place in 1994 under the framework of the Interim Constitution (succeeded by a final 
Constitution in 1996). Three general considerations must therefore be taken into account. First, 
imprisonment was one of the apartheid regime’s main tools of social control. Second, many of 
the anti-apartheid political prisoners later became important politicians and were actively 
involved in the negotiations around the drafting of the Constitution (224-5). Third, criminality 
has been described as one of the main social problems for the post-apartheid governments 
(238-41). Consideration of these three factors makes it easier to understand the evolution of the 
ambivalent public attitude towards prisoners’ voting in South Africa. 
67. See Muntinhgh & Sloth Nielsen, 2009:229-31. 
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do so would involve “immense logistical, financial and administrative difficulties” 
[13], and second, that this kind of special voting mechanism should be reserved or 
preferably implemented to help other categories of persons physically deprived of 
their vote (such as expatriates, poor inhabitants of remote areas) [8, 30].68  
The Court answered these arguments peremptorily by stating the general principles 
that “the vote of each and every citizen is a badge of dignity and of personhood” 
[17],69 prisoners retain all those rights not expressly deprived by the legislature [18], 
and therefore the Commission had breached the Constitution by failing to protect the 
right to vote whose “very nature imposes positive obligations upon the legislature and 
the executive” [16].70 It stated clearly that “[t]he question whether legislation 
disqualifying prisoners, or categories of prisoners, from voting could be justified […] 
was not raised”, but also that the judgments “should not be read […] as suggesting 
that Parliament is prevented from disenfranchising certain categories of prisoners” 
[31]. 
Just four years after August, the government passed the Electoral Law Amendment 
Act 2003 that banned from voting all those prisoners without the option of a fine. The 
Court analysed that amendment in NICRO. The Court closely followed Sauvé when 
dealing this time with the provision explicitly disenfranchising prisoners. 
3.2 The right to vote and the source of the proportionality test 
The legal basis of the constitutionality judgment in the case of South Africa was 
relatively simple to demonstrate. The Constitution expressly laid down the right to 
vote and conferred it universality in Section 19(3)(a): “Every adult citizen has the 
right [...] to vote in elections for any legislative body established in terms of the 
                                                 
68. Regarding this arguments, see below Chapter 3, Section IV.2 
69. See below Chapter 6, Section III. 
70. Regarding these aspects of the right to vote, see below Chapter 6, Section III.2. 
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Constitution, and to do so in secret”. Additionally, the principle of “universal adult 
suffrage” is part of the fundamental values of the Constitution prescribed in Section 
1(d). 
The right to vote lacks a special limitation clause. This is not seen by the Court as an 
indication that it is an absolute right, but rather that it is governed by the general 
limitation clause of Section 36 [25]. This section stipulates a complex standard of 
limitation in which the limitation has to be both “reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom” and 
proportional. The detailed account of proportionality implies that any limitation 
should consider all relevant factors in “a balancing of means and ends” [37], the 
guidelines for which are in Section 36 and include “the nature of the right; the 
importance of the purpose of the limitation; the nature and extent of the limitation; 
the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and less restrictive means to 
achieve the purpose”. 
3.3 The purpose 
The Government offered an argument for the purpose of the legislation based purely 
upon instrumental reasons that tended to repeat the argument of August.71 That is, it 
argued on the grounds of logistical and financial inconvenience and the need to 
prioritize other citizens unable to exercise the right to vote in accessing additional 
resources, adding, however, the threat that prisoners’ voting poses for the integrity of 
the process [45]. The government also mentioned that allowing prisoners to vote 
would suggest that it was being soft on crime, whereas the message sent by 
government policy should be “one of denouncing the crime” [139]. 
                                                 
71. See below Chapter 3, Section IV.2. 
A JUDICIAL TREND 
 
 
63 
The Court refused to accept the logistical argument due to the absence of evidence 
[49]. It also argued that existing alternative methods of voting could be used to 
provide prisoners the opportunity to exercise their rights. The additional argument 
about being seen to be soft on crime was addressed with irony by the Court: “It could 
hardly be suggested that the government is entitled to disenfranchise prisoners in 
order to enhance its image; nor [...] in order to correct a public misconception as to its 
true attitude to crime and criminals” [56].72 However, the Court viewed the 
government’s aim in a better light when it recognised that 
“at the level of policy it is important for the government to denounce 
crime and to communicate to the public that the rights that citizens have 
are related to their duties and obligations as citizens. Such a purpose 
would be legitimate and consistent with the provisions of Section 3 of the 
Constitution” [57].73  
However, the Court pointed out the omission of any development of such an 
argument and the lack of information to support it in the submission of the 
government. At the end, the Court decided the case, asserting that the government 
failed to provide “sufficient information before the Court to enable it to know exactly 
what purpose the disenfranchisement was intended to serve” [65]. It did so after 
recognising that Section 36 of the Constitution (and here it followed Sauvé) is 
compromised by a high standard for the limitation of rights that requires, on the one 
hand, considering the importance of the infringed right and, on the other hand, the 
“importance and effect of the infringing provision” [37]. Considering the blanket ban 
of all prisoners without the option of a fine, the Court expressed the impossibility of 
balancing the impact of the intended purpose upon the right because of the lack of 
empirical information [67]. 
                                                 
72. See below Chapter 7, Section I.3. 
73. See below Chapter 5, Section II. 
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The Court therefore did not apply the rest of the proportionality test in this case. 
However, it is important to note that the government argued that the law was passed 
in accordance with the ruling of August that required a parliamentary provision for 
CD. In addition, the fact that the new provision disenfranchised only those prisoners 
without the option of a fine was an exercise in forging commensurability between the 
seriousness of the offense and the measure applied, as the dissent vote pointed out 
[125]. 
The judgment reiterates the importance of the right to vote, the survival of the 
fundamental rights of prisoners during their incarceration and the requirement that 
limitations must be rationally motivated and met the standard of proportionality. 
However, the ruling did not exclude the possibility that a future legislative attempt to 
disenfranchise prisoners could be found constitutional by the Court.74  
4 Australia: Roach v Commonwealth (2007) 
In 2007, the High Court of Australia handed down Roach, declaring the Electoral and 
Referendum (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures) Act 2006 contrary to the 
Constitution.75 This legislation had introduced a complete ban on prisoners’ voting 
for the first time in Australian history.76 The previous legislation, the Electoral and 
                                                 
74. See Muntinhgh & Sloth Nielsen, 2009:235. 
75. This legislation only affects voting rights in federal elections. The legislative power of each 
state has the competence to determine the franchise in state elections (See Redman et al, 
2009:168-9; 175-6). 
76. CD was introduced in Australia by the Uniform Franchise Act 1902, which denied the right to 
vote to those sentenced to a year of imprisonment or longer (Section 4). Since CD was limited 
to the period of imprisonment; it did not affect those who had already served their sentences 
(See Orr, 2003:1-2. See also Redman et al, 2009:168-9). In practice, however, inmates actual 
voting was an unusual phenomenon due to the broader absence of mechanisms that enabled 
such a practice (See Redman et al, 2009:175). It was only in 1984 that a reform to the current 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 re-drew the boundary for federal elections (Australia has a 
federal constitution) to disenfranchise those serving a sentence of five years or more. 
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Referendum Amendment (Prisoners Voting and Other Measures) Act 2004, deprived 
only those serving sentences of three years or more.77  
In Roach, a revolutionary decision for Australian standards of judicial review, the 
Court argued that the complete ban of prisoners voting (of the Electoral Act 2006) 
was incompatible with Sections 7 and 24 of the Australian Constitution, which 
implicitly enshrine the right to vote and universal suffrage. The argument was 
constructed on the basis of the lack of a substantial reason for total exclusion, and 
complemented by an ad-hoc standard based on the seriousness of the offence. 
However, the Court ascribed considerable importance to the right of the legislative 
power to limit the franchise and, therefore, upheld the previous legislation, which 
only deprived those prisoners serving sentences for serious offences, although the 
plaintiff’s argument maintained that both legislations were unconstitutional.78  
4.1 The right to vote and the source of the scrutiny test 
The legal basis of the right to vote and the principle of universal suffrage has been 
one of the most problematic issues of Australian constitutional history, because 
neither is explicitly stipulated in the Constitution and Australia has no charter of 
rights.79 Section 7 and 24 of the Constitution prescribe that the members of 
Parliament are “directly chosen by the people”, but do not explicitly recognise any 
protection of the right to vote or determine who is able to participate in elections. 
                                                 
77. Section 93(8)(b), in which that general rule is established, is complemented by Section 
93(8)(c) that ban permanently those who have been convicted of treason or treachery. See 
Redman et al, 2009:169-71. See also Orr & Williams, 2009:127. 
78. The bibliography about Roach, and the Australian legal debate on CD includes Orr, 1998; 
Ridley-Smith & Redman, 2002; Orr, 2003; Davison, 2004; Fitzgerald, 2007; Guttman, 2007; 
Orr, 2007; Brown, 2007; Redman et al, 2009; Orr & Williams, 2009; Edgely, 2010; Plaxton & 
Lardy, 2010; Hill & Koch, 2011. 
79. See Redman et al, 2009:171-5. See also, Orr, 2007; Davison, 2004:7-8; Hill & Koch, 
2011:214. For more detailed analysis of the doctrine and case law on the legal basis of the right 
to vote in the Australian Constitution, see Guttman, 2007:300-310. See also Orr & Williams, 
2009:124-7. 
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Therefore, any challenge to CD “would involve the High Court determining who 
constitutes ‘the people’”80 under those constitutional provisions. 
The Court in Roach defended the perspective of a historical constitution in which the 
right to vote has been stipulated and linked to the aforementioned sections as an 
implicit right, attached to the structure and the text of the Constitution through 
historical circumstances that include, fundamentally, the legislative development of 
the electoral system [5]. The legislative power that has contributed towards 
delineating and guaranteeing the right to vote in the Constitution is, on the one hand, 
limited by the implicit constitutional right and, on the other hand, is (and has been) 
entitled to define exceptions to it [7].81  
Those exceptions, however, cannot be arbitrary; they should be rooted in some 
“substantial reason” [8], “compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally 
prescribed system of representative government” [85]. The Court devoted 
considerable effort to affirming that the standard of review in this case cannot be 
equated to that applied by foreign jurisdictions [15, 17]. In the case of Australia, the 
judicial review is limited to assessing the rational connection between a substantial 
reason and the actual legislative intervention in the infringed right, leaving aside a 
minimal impairment requirement and therefore deferring to the Parliament to greater 
extent.82  
4.2 The purpose 
The proper purpose, or ‘substantial reason’ in the words of the Court, can be located 
in the argument that “serious offending represents such a form of civic 
                                                 
80. Redman et al, 2009:174. 
81. This ambivalence is based on the absence of a charter of rights, and on the Australian 
majoritarian culture that attributes great respect to decisions of the legislator on the basis of 
parliamentary sovereignty (Hill & Koch, 2011:214, 217). 
82. See Hill & Koch, 2011:215. 
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irresponsibility that it is appropriate for parliament to mark such behaviour as anti-
social and to direct that physical separation in the form of loss of a fundamental 
political right” [12]. This is closer to a punitive rational and therefore constitutes a 
move away from the idea of ‘electoral integrity’ suggested by the title of the 
challenged amendment (Electoral Integrity). The Court’s reasons for moving away 
from the idea that CD is an additional punishment are contextual to the federal 
structure of the country: federal law cannot punish state crimes. The Court, after 
weighing up these elements, stated that censure of serious offences can be considered 
a substantial reason, thereby opening up the question of the rational connection of the 
measure in relation to the aim.83  
4.3 The proportionality judgment 
Given that the notion of seriousness was present already in the legislative purpose, 
the rational connection test was constructed in such terms that it was limited to 
express the defective distinction between minor and serious offenders. Following 
Hirst, the Australian High Court asked Parliament to show regard for “the nature of 
the offence committed, the length of the term of imprisonment imposed, or the 
personal circumstances of the offender” [84]. The blanket ban of the 2006 Act did not 
satisfy such a test, in contrast to the previous provision that banned only those 
offenders sentenced to three years of imprisonment or more. 
If it is true that the outcome of the judgment is somehow positive, as an open critic of 
CD states, “[t]he result of the Roach case is therefore that the Commonwealth 
                                                 
83. According to Redman et al (2009), the legislative debate of the amendment was marked by a 
punitive atmosphere but no argument “beyond the ‘of course, it is bizarre they can vote” (178) 
was offered. In their analysis of the legislative debate they conclude that no serious argument 
about electoral integrity are made; no weight is given to the values of citizenship, human 
rights, participation or democracy; no attention is paid to the international law obligations of 
the county or to the comparative law; or the rehabilitative effect of the measure (177-83). 
Finally, they observe that the enactment of this provision “might be seen as a form of wedge 
politics” (184).  
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Parliament is only subject to relatively minor constitutional restrictions when limiting 
the franchise particularly when compared to overseas legal systems”.84  
5 Hong Kong: Chan Kin Sum v Secretary for Justice (2008) 
The case of Hong Kong can be used as a proof that the transnational judicial 
discourse in analysis is advancing in other jurisdictions. Moreover, it is also useful in 
that it demonstrates how as the trend advances, it also reproduces underlying 
principles and outcomes but also shortcomings. 
In Chan Kin Sum, handed down in 2008, the High Court of Hong Kong decided a case 
of judicial review on CD.85 The legal provision in question, Section 31(1)(a) and 
53(5)(a) and (b) of the LegCo Ordinance, denied the right to vote and to register as a 
voter to all those serving a prison sentence, and those who have received a suspended 
sentence. Remand prisoners, not affected by the law in question, were unable to vote 
due to the lack of mechanisms. 
The right to vote is clearly entrenched in Article 26 of Hong Kong Basic Law and 
reiterated in Article 21 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. According to the Court, it is 
not an absolute right [55-61] but can be the object of limitations if its restriction is 
justified by the Government [79-81] in accordance with the proportionality test [63-
74]. Regarding the legitimate aim element, the Court found that “prevention of crime, 
incentive to citizen-like conduct and enhancing civil responsibility and respect for the 
rule of law” could be considered a legitimate aim [88, 95-7]. 
                                                 
84. Hill & Koch, 2010:216. See also Orr & Williams, 2009:124. 
85. See Chan, 2010. For an account of the situation pre-Chan Kin Sum, see Chui, 2007. 
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When moving to the rational connection and proportionality element, the Court in 
Chan Kin Sum relied heavily upon the Hirst test advanced by the ECtHR.86 It 
sustained as a key aspect of the proportionality analysis that “the nature and gravity 
of the offence and sentence in question as well as the culpability and individual 
circumstances of the prisoner must be relevant considerations” to assess if CD can 
achieve the declared purpose; “a blanket ban and total disenfranchisement simply 
does not take into account those matters” [116]. Later, the Court emphasised how the 
exclusion of short-term prisoners may be considered arbitrary [120-8], concluding 
that “the general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction of the right to vote and the 
right to register as an elector cannot be justified under the proportionality test” [164]. 
The Court however, taking elements from Sauvé and NICRO, also focused on the 
potentiality of CD to prevent crime [139] and incentivize citizen-like conduct and 
respect for law [140-1], concluding that it cannot be affirmed simply “using common 
sense and experience in life”, due to the absence of concrete evidence in that 
direction [145]. Recalling August, the Court concluded by affirming that it “is not 
suggesting that some form of restrictions on voting cannot be imposed by the 
legislature against those in jail”, but those restrictions must be “compatible with the 
constitutional rights of prisoners to vote” [165]. 
II ANALYSIS 
1 The claim of a judicial trend 
In commenting upon these judgments, some literature has suggested that they form 
part of a transnational trend on CD, which is pulling national legislations towards a 
position that is more democratic and respectful of fundamental rights.87 In the words 
                                                 
86. See above, Section II.1.4. 
87. See Morgan-Foster, 2006; Ispahani, 2009; Plaxton & Lardy, 2010; Ziegler, 2011. See also 
Nunn, 2005:776-81; ACLU, 2006; Macdonald, 2009:1390; Mauer, 2011; Munn, 2011:224. 
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of Ruvi Ziegler, for instance, there is “an emerging global jurisprudential trend that 
increasingly views disenfranchisement as a suspect practice and subjects it to 
searching judicial review”.88 Notwithstanding the particularities of the judgments, 
this view identifies “a clear trajectory emerges towards expanding convicts’ 
suffrage”.89 They do this facing the same kind of problem and motivated by the same 
class of premises, leading to a rationalisation of national legislations according to 
democratic and fundamental rights standards.90 Ludvig Beckman adds that “is 
tempting to infer [from those rulings] that a new consensus on the importance of the 
right to vote is emerging among the courts”.91 This trend has been acknowledged by 
the courts. In Chan Kin Sum, the latest of the judgments, the Court self-consciously 
refers to this discourse, explicitly sustaining that “the modern trend is against 
disenfranchisement” [110].92  
Different authors elaborate the particularities of this trend. Substantive, formal and 
consequential elements can be distinguished.93 Plaxton and Lardy have pointed to 
some similarities between the judgments that could support the claim of a judicial 
trend.94 First, all of the judgments struck down CD legislation. That is, each judgment 
scrutinized the legislation and concluded that such practice was being exercised in 
terms incompatible with fundamental rights. In doing so, the courts led the way 
towards the configuration of a more lenient CD regulation.95 Therefore, at least prima 
                                                 
88. Ziegler, 2011:202. 
89. Ziegler, 2011:212. 
90. See Ziegler, 2011:222-3. See also Beckman, 2013:64. 
91. Beckman, 2013:64. 
92. See also Scoppola [95]. 
93. See Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:104-30. See also Ziegler, 2011:227-33. An exhaustive analysis of 
all the arguments offered by governments in terms of proportionality is carried out by Robins, 
2006:179-94. 
94. See Plaxton & Lardy, 2010. They limit their aspirations, but there is still an underlying 
common discourse when they “show that, although the above decisions reflect different modes 
of reasoning when confronted with legislation disenfranchising prisoners, several common 
themes run through them” (102).  
95. See also Ziegler, 2011. For an analysis of the implementation of the courts’ decisions, see 
Ispahani, 2009:46-50. Every government and parliament, with the exception of the UK has 
implemented the ruling of the Courts. 
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facie, the respect for fundamental rights and democratic principles does not only 
constitute the political background of the judgments but also the goal pursued and to 
a certain extent achieved by the action of the courts.96  
Second, the argumentations and opinions of the courts contain similar themes, and 
governments appeal to the same group of objectives when trying to justify the status 
quo against the constitutional challenge.97 Related to this, it is observed that the Court 
makes frequent references to international documents98 and comparative sources, 
especially to other courts addressing the same problem.99 In this regard, and going 
further, Ziegler identifies certain substantial qualities that allow one to speak of a 
unity in the courts’ treatment of these cases. What he terms a transnational discourse 
on the legality of CD appeals to two background elements which informed the courts’ 
decisions: “The democratic paradigm plays a significantly greater part in these 
                                                 
96. In addition to the direct effect of striking down legislation in the jurisdiction in which it has 
been successfully applied, a transnational discourse may also operate by means of producing an 
influence in other jurisdictions, such as the US, in which a reluctance to analyse this issue 
predominates and radical versions of CD continue to be practised. According to the estimation 
of Morgan-Foster, those forms of radical CD could not be allowed by the standards settled by 
the judicial trend. This is the main argument of Morgan-Foster (2006) and the implicit 
argument in Ziegler (2011), when he notes, on the one hand, that the judicial trend has led to a 
rationalisation of CD and, on the other hand, that “American participation in this ‘common 
enterprise’ is noticeably absent” (222). See also Ispahani, 2009:34-5. 
97. See also Ispahani, 2009:35. This idea may just be related to the common cultural and legal 
background of those countries in which the arguments have been used and themes considered. 
98. This dissertation does not develop any argument based on general international law 
instruments. See Ziegler, 2011. See also Nunn, 2005; Macdonald, 2009; Lang, 2013; Redman 
et al, 2009:186-95; Wilson, 2009; Ghaelian, 2013; Abebe, 2013. See also Universal 
Declaration of Human Right (1948), article 21 vis-a-vis article 2; International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966), article 25 vis-a-vis article 2; The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (1981), article 13; American Convention on Human Rights (1969), article 
23; European Convention on Human Rights (1950) and the First Protocol to the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1954), article 3. Especially 
interesting in this regard are the reports of the Human Rights Committee about the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). For a detailed review of the 
reports about these international instruments features, see Ziegler, 2011:245-7. 
99. See Ziegler, 2011:233-5. See also Ispahani, 2009:35. The cross-references between the Courts’ 
judgements are interesting to note. In Sauvé, there are references to August [35, 44, 58]; in 
NICRO, there are references to Sauvé [61-3, 66, 115, 149];]; in Hirst, there are references to 
Sauvé [24-7, 43]; in Roach, there are references to Hirst [15-17, 100, 163], Sauvé [13-7, 18-9, 
100], and NICRO [163]; in Chan Kin Sum, there are references to Hirst [75, 88, 90, 96, 99-108, 
150-1, 165], Sauvé [35, 91, 96, 141-2, 158-62], NICRO [146, 180], and Roach [88, 118, 135]. 
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judgments than in parallel American CD jurisprudence, as does the notion of convicts 
as rights-holders”.100 The first element engages with a democratic thinking in which 
the right to vote is inserted as a central component. The judicial trend is premised by 
the idea that universal suffrage guarantees all citizens a voice in the democratic 
process and the right to vote is the ‘cornerstone’ of participation in a representative 
democracy that aspires to the ideal of the self-government of the people. The vote, 
therefore, should not be treated as a privilege but rather as a fundamental right.101 The 
second element is referred specifically to the case of CD, and it supports the idea that 
prisoners are and must remain included in the sphere of the right holders. According 
to this perspective, the prisoners are in principle only deprived of the right to liberty. 
The deprivation of any other right, when demanded by prison security or other 
consideration, must be equally justified in terms of right standards.102 The 
consequence of this doctrine is that CD is seen as a prima facie violation of the right 
to vote and therefore must be subjected to constitutional review, and it is the 
government who must demonstrate that this prima facie violation is justified.103  
Third, all of the courts solved the case by applying a judicial review test related to the 
notions of proportionality when judging whether the CD statute is compatible with 
the constitution or human rights instruments. This legal methodology involves two 
aspects. On the one hand, the starting point in all these cases has been that CD is a 
case of the ‘limitation’ of a constitutional or human, and therefore must be subject to 
                                                 
100. Ziegler, 2011:222. See also Ispahani, 2009:35. 
101. See Ziegler, 2011:223-6. See also Orr, 1998:55-7; Easton, 2006:449; Guttman, 2007:310. 
102. See Ziegler, 2011:204, 226-7. Also, Cholbi, 2002:548-9; Foster, 2004:14-5; Easton, 2006:449; 
Guttman, 2007:310. British jurisdiction recognizes this principle in Raymond v Honey (1980), 
while it was held that “prisoners retained all civil rights that are not taken away either 
expressly or by implication” (Foster, 2004:14-5). 
103. See Ziegler, 2011:202. An example of this doctrine can be observed when in Roach the Court 
affirmed: “[p]risoners who are citizens and members of the Australian community remain so. 
Their interest in, and duty to, their society and its governance survives incarceration” [84]; or 
in Hirst when the Court affirmed: “prisoners in general continue to enjoy all the fundamental 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention save for the right to liberty” [69]. 
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judicial review applying a scrutiny test.104 On the other hand, they apply 
proportionality, or a similar mean-ends form of scrutiny test, to assess the 
constitutionality or compatibility of legislative interventions in voting rights. 
2 Differences and similarities of the judgments 
Having elements in common, the judgments also display important differences that 
can contribute to a better understanding of their outcomes and their future 
perspectives. On the one hand, they differ in the entrenchment of the right to vote, the 
standards of scrutiny applied and the engagement with value-based reasoning. On the 
other hand, they present similarities in the level of the aim accepted as a legitimate 
and of the concrete standards that they have set to consider CD as proportionate. 
Regarding the differences, first, despite the fact that each decision upheld the right to 
vote, there are considerable differences regarding the circumstances of this aspect. 
Roach is the only judgment that does not appeal to an expressly stipulated right to 
vote, but to an emergent implicit right. This can contribute to explain the 
‘progressive’ political character that some commentators have ascribed to this 
judgment. In a middle ground, Hirst relies on the affirmed doctrinal construction of 
the right to vote in the A3P1, which has been emphatically challenged by the UK 
government. Finally, Canadian, South African and Hong Kong Constitutions have a 
clearly constitutionally entrenched right to vote. All cases, however, considered the 
right to vote as the right under limitation by CD.105 This might be an implicit factor to 
understand some differences in the outcome of the judgments. The minor specific 
weight of an implicit right versus and explicit right may explain the lack of 
                                                 
104. About the existence of a general transnational discourse on human and constitutional rights, 
see e.g. McCrudden, 2000. 
105. Even when it was argued that CD also violated the right to equal protection, these claims were 
left unattended by the courts’ judgments. 
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radicalism in Hirst and Roach, considering that “legal systems operating under a 
charter of rights” allow “less parliamentary intrusion into civil rights”.106  
Second, the standard of scrutiny also varies from country to country, though these 
different standards reflect a similar attempt to rationalise legislation under ideas 
implicit in the doctrine of proportionality. All jurisdictions require the government to 
demonstrate a proper purpose for the legislation: a ‘substantial reason’ (Roach), a 
‘legitimate aim’ (Hirst), a ‘legitimate aim reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom’ (NICRO), 
‘legitimate objective’ (Chan Kin Sum) or a ‘pressing and substantial objective’ 
(Sauvé). The qualification of the standard of urgency of the purpose, while important 
in theory, is left mostly unattended in these judgments.107 The difference between the 
standard of scrutiny may only indicate the quality of the assessment of the relation 
between the means and the purpose. The lowest standard is found in Roach, in which 
the Court required only a ‘rational connection’ between the measure and the reason. 
Again, in the middle ground, the proportionality of standards of the ECtHR is 
tempered by the doctrine of MOA. The use of an ad-hoc test of proportionality makes 
difficult the inquiry in the application of proportionality by the Court. The Hong 
Kong High Court follows this doctrine. Finally, the most detailed and exigent are the 
test of the South African and Canadian courts, which apparently do not give any 
deference to the legislation and expressly setting the criteria for making it operative 
the proportionality assessment: ‘rational connection’, ‘minimal impairment’ 
(necessity), and proportionality in a strict sense. The results of the scrutiny also 
varied. NICRO fails in the ‘legitimate aim’. In Roach and Sauvé, the government 
failed to demonstrate the ‘rational connection’ and in Hirst and Chan Kin Sum due to 
the claims of over-inclusiveness, it may be presumed that the legislation failed to pass 
the rational connection test. 
                                                 
106. See Hill & Koch, 2011:214. See also Manfredi, 2009:269. 
107. The exception is the discussion between the majority and minority vote in Sauvé. On the other 
hand, the claim of Roach of being applying a standard of scrutiny different than that applied 
overseas is not referred to the assessment of the reasons offered by the government. 
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Regarding the similarities, first, the reasons (purposes, aims) used by governments in 
the five cases display a high degree of coincidence. The idea that CD is a form of 
punishment and that it encourages civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law 
was offered in all four of governments’ submissions, though the degree of 
sophistication offered and the regard shown by the Court for the arguments varied 
considerably. Other arguments, related to practical, economic and administrative 
concerns, were put forward only in NICRO. It is crucial to note that the governmental 
purpose was accepted as legitimate, with different degree of engagement in its 
analysis,108 in Hirst, Sauvé, Roach and Chan Kin Sum; being Sauvé the only that 
substantially objected that legitimacy. However, even the Canadian Supreme Court in 
Sauvé was ready to accept the arguments for CD offered by the government in a 
signal of deference. Legislation failed to pass the ‘legitimate aim’ test in NICRO, 
only due to the lack of Government argumentation. 
Second, with regards to the standards that the judgments have settled upon for CD, it 
can be affirmed that the judgments coincide in that CD can be acceptable only under 
certain and qualified circumstances. On the one hand, it cannot affect those offenders 
who have already served their prison sentences (as happens in some jurisdictions, 
such as the United States). On the other hand, and more importantly, CD cannot 
operate on a blanket basis that disenfranchises all prisoners without any reference to 
the nature or seriousness of the offence: it cannot rely on the bare fact of 
imprisonment. This implies that it could target serious offences and offences that 
relate with democratic procedures. Summing up, and according to the common 
conclusion of those judgments, CD should be restricted so as to affect only serious 
offenders and only for the duration of their prison sentences.109  
                                                 
108. See Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:133. 
109. See Morgan-Foster, 2006:310-4. See also Nunn, 2005:781; Banfield, 2008:5; Ispahani, 
2009:33; Macdonald, 2009:1389; Orr & Williams, 2009:133; Abebe, 2013:425. 
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III CRITICAL EVALUATION 
1 Scrutinizing the outcomes 
In relation with the outcome of the judgments, Plaxton and Lardy offer an interesting 
and critical analysis of these judgments.110 They all ruled that CD legislation limits 
the right to vote and that such a limitation is not justified under the constitutional 
standards of scrutiny. Three judgments ruled statutes unconstitutional and the ECtHR 
have ruled the British, Austrian, Turkish and Russian legislation incompatible with 
the ECHR and urged a legislative modification. However, none of the judgments 
expressly held that CD was tout court constitutionally or conventionally problematic. 
Although the courts embraced the ideas of prisoners as right holders and the right to 
vote as a fundamental right in the democratic system, none of them affirmed 
explicitly that to disenfranchise an offender was inherently incompatible with 
democracy.111 A detailed examination of this aspect is necessary. 
The Australian High Court in Roach, while striking down the blanket ban, upheld the 
previous legislation that disenfranchised prisoners sentenced to an imprisonment of 2 
years or more, and according to the Chief Justice’s opinion, “appeared unwilling to 
say that the statute could not have gone even further without offending the 
Constitution”.112 It is symptomatic of this tendency that the majority opinion relied 
“specifically in parts of the minority, rather than majority, judgment in Sauvé”113 to 
affirm the right of Parliament to exclude serious offenders. Commenters of the 
judgment argue that a ban affecting those serving sentences of two years would 
                                                 
110. They do not include Chan Kin Sum in their analysis. 
111. See Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:130. See also Duff, 2005a:211; Hill & Koch, 2011:226; Beckman, 
2013:77. 
112. Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:131.  
113. Orr & Williams, 2009:132. 
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survive constitutional scrutiny in the Australian Court but a six-moth rule would 
not.114  
In the Hirst judgment, the ECtHR declared the incompatibility of the legislation with 
the ECHR. The Court did not affirm this incompatibility in categorical terms but as a 
question of over-inclusiveness and therefore, showing reluctance to give precise 
directives, suggested that a targeted ban, instead of a blanket ban, would pass the 
proportionality exam. The terms of the Court’s expectations became clear and precise 
in Scoppola, where the demands of the Hirst test were reduced to the exclusion of 
minor offenders (those sentenced to fewer than 3 years of imprisonment). The case of 
the Hong Kong High Court is similar due to it follows closely the Hirst test. These 
cases, therefore, express clearly the limitations on the right to vote that are 
constitutionally or conventionally permissible. 
It is more difficult to extrapolate this point from NICRO and Sauvé because they 
struck down the provision and thereby allowed all inmates in the prisons of Canada 
and South Africa access to the ballot box. However, with careful analysis, it can be 
detected that these judgments also present a limited case against CD that may allow 
the government to re-enact the ban in a more restricted version passing the test 
presented in the judgements and, therefore, cannot be interpreted as abolishing CD 
outright. This is particularly so if they are interpreted in the light of the previous 
judgments in those jurisdictions. 
The case of NICRO is easier to argue than Sauvé. The Court referred to the poor 
argumentation of the government’s submissions and linked this factor to a failure of 
the defence of the legislation. The Court recognised the value of the purpose of 
communicating an aggressive attitude towards crime as a legitimate aim of 
importance [57-8], though the government did not make a strong case for that purpose 
                                                 
114. See Orr & Williams, 2009:134. 
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and did not provide detailed data and analysis of the factors involved. However, by 
recognising the importance of that purpose the Court remained close to the dictum of 
August: “This judgment should not be read, however, as suggesting that Parliament is 
prevented from disenfranchising certain categories of prisoners” [31]. 
To some extent, all these cases contain a recognition that the various governments’ 
attempts to disenfranchise prisoners have value and legitimacy and that a more 
limited form of CD could be justified. However, this is difficult to discern in Sauvé, 
in which the majority of the Court presented an outright negative assessment of CD in 
all the components of the proportionality test. Especially important in this respect, the 
Court show considerable reluctance to admit the aim pursued by the government as 
legitimate. It finally conceded that aspect. Nevertheless, from another angle, when it 
is observed that the case was decided by a narrow 5:4 majority and this is compared 
to unanimity of Sauvé v Canada No. 1 (1993), it appears that the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s opposition to CD is dependent upon the scope of the ban, this is, the universe 
of those affected by it. In Sauvé v Canada No. 1 (1993), the decision was handed 
down unanimously and the arguments of the Appeal Court were regarded as so 
compelling that the Court confirmed its reasoning in one short paragraph. Observing 
this evolution, Morgan-Foster observes, 
“[t]aking the two cases together, it would appear that the Canadian 
Justices are interested in the length of sentence when considering the 
disenfranchisement issue. There may well be some better place to draw the 
line, something longer than a two year sentence, where a majority of the 
Justices would agree that disenfranchisement is appropriate”.115  
The dissent in Sauvé was favourable to maintaining the two year limit for 
disenfranchising offenders, a limit that coincides with the majority vote of Roach and 
presumably the ECtHR would consider acceptable. If one adds to this the fact that the 
Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing proposed a limit of 10 
                                                 
115. Morgan-Foster, 2006:311. 
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years for CD,116 it can be concluded that Canada is not exempt from the ongoing 
negotiation of the duration of a sentence required to constitute a legitimate 
application of CD. 
The previous observations point to the fact that, all things considered, all judgments 
present an explicit or implicit acknowledgement that CD might be acceptable when it 
is applied only to serious offenders.117 In this regard, in analysing the judgments, it 
has been suggested that the more important aspect of them, beside the general 
rejection of the blanket ban, is the significant disagreement “among justices over 
whether less sweeping disenfranchisement passes constitutional muster”.118  
2 Pyrrhic victories? 
Echoing these observations, it is possible to read the judgments, perhaps with the 
exception of Sauvé, affirming a right to disenfranchise (proportionally) serious 
offenders rather than protecting the right to vote and advancing the cause of 
democracy and fundamental rights. The judgments can be regarded as pyrrhic 
victories: triumphs that must be considered as a defeat when the long-term objective 
of the human right protection and democratic promotion is integrated in the 
assessment of the judgments’ outcomes. 
                                                 
116. See Royal Commission, 1991. 
117. See Morgan-Foster, 2006:310-4. See also Easton, 2006:452; Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:130.  
118. Banfield, 2008:2. He argues that the political disagreement affecting the debate about CD may 
also explain the political compromise that the judgments implement. The variation between the 
more progressive decision (Sauvé) and the more conservative (Roach) can be explained by, on 
the one hand, the distance between status quo’s legislation (all prisoners’ suffrage in Canada 
versus 3 years or more ban in Australia) and the policy attempted by the government (2 years 
or more ban in Canada versus blanket ban in Australia) and, on the other hand, the stronger 
bargaining power of the Canadian Court due the coverage of the Charter of Rights in 
relationship to its Australian similar. Though Sauvé is the more disputed of all judgments 
analysed. The majority in Hirst was 12-5 (in Scoppola 17-1); in NICRO was 9-2 (August was 
9-0); in Roach was 4-2. 
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Following Beckman, it can be said that, with the exception of Sauvé and perhaps of 
some aspects of NICRO, the judgments of the trend cannot be regarded as part of a 
trend of ‘democratization jurisprudence’ or “a new emphasis on the interests in 
democratic participation”.119 In contrast, they must be read solely as incorporating the 
offender within an electoral regulation that is subjected to “rigorously applied 
standards of rule of law”.120 In other words, simply affirming that “the legislatures 
cannot have unlimited authority to tinker with voting rolls”.121 This later claim can be 
link with the obsession of the courts with the ‘arbitrary nature’ of the blanket ban, or 
other arbitrariness-like arguments, reflecting ‘rule of law’ standards of review. In 
contrast with this emphasis, the only judgment that engages actively in the “value of 
democracy” and “the significance of the individual interests protected by democratic 
rights” is Sauvé.122 Arguments against arbitrariness are not sufficient to envision the 
judicial trend as being protective of the fundamental right to vote and promoting 
democratic principles. They are perfectly compatible, for instance, with non-
democratic regimes and in this case with the exclusion of serious offenders.  
On the other hand, the democratic arguments offered by the majority in Sauvé 
coincide with the reasons to consider CD completely impermissible, as it will be 
argued in the following chapters.123 In that case, the use of proportionality is the 
reason because the judgment did not rule a complete proscription of CD. The same, 
but even more critically, can be predicated of the remaining judgments, in which 
democratic arguments do not play relevant roles in the judicial reasoning or are mere 
obiter dicta. 
                                                 
119. Beckman, 2013:64. 
120. Beckman, 2013:64. See also Ispahani, 2009:33; Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:131-3. 
121. Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:131. 
122. Beckman, 2013:68-9. Beckman seems to suggest that these standards (‘rule of law’ vis-à-vis 
‘democratic’) appeared within the structure of proportionality itself. 
123. See Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:129. 
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In this scenario, the assessment of the legal method of proportionality is critical. On 
the one hand, proportionality can be seen as a positive factor – an enabling one – in 
relation to the progressive aim of expanding the franchise among those sentenced for 
a criminal offence. In contrast with the judicial decision above analysed, challenges 
to CD in the US have failed mainly due to a constitutional blocking that impede a 
substantive scrutiny equivalent to proportionality to operate in that jurisdiction.124 
However, on the other hand, the limited outcome achieved by those judgments is not 
coincidental. Legalising the question and converting it into a question of legal 
proportionality (and so into a measure that should be assessed according to its social 
benefits), has introduced CD into a sphere of rational calculus and policy-making 
with a tendency to be framed as exclusion of arbitrariness rather than supporting 
substantive values, in this case democratic values.  
Summing up the findings of this chapter, which are not surprising but nevertheless 
important for the argument that follows, the courts engaged in a judicial review of 
CD committed to the application of proportionality instead of going into the 
substantive arguments to defend the policy against presumptive unconstitutionality. 
By doing this, the courts were also predominantly concerned with ideas closer to the 
rule of law, rather than democratic principles. It must be stressed that the right to 
exclude serious offenders endorsed implicitly or explicitly by this jurisprudential 
trend is difficult to justify without assumptions that are not present in the reasoning 
of the courts. 
In this context, this dissertation seeks to put forward some ideas that may, on the one 
hand, impede the legal analysis of CD from being captured by the limitations of 
proportionality and therefore enable closer scrutiny. On the other hand, it may allow 
for a judicial review of CD engaged with democratic principles. Going further, it 
                                                 
124. See Morgan-Foster, 2006: 314-8. 
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seeks to propose an interpretation of the right to vote that, in certain respects, is 
immune to certain forms of limitation.125  
However, the trajectory required to arrive at that conclusion must first pass through 
some prior stages. Understanding how proportionality contributes to avoiding or 
circumventing the fact that CD and the protection of democracy and the fundamental 
right to vote are incompatible requires an analysis of this latter claim. The following 
four chapters advance the claim that CD is affected by an inescapable democratic 
problem. The analysis of the judicial discourse and its use of proportionality is taken 
up again in the last chapter. 
 
                                                 
125. See below Chapter 7. 
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RIGHT TO VOTE, UNIVERSAL 
SUFFRAGE AND THE PROBLEM OF 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT  
ow can the disenfranchisement of offenders be assessed according to a 
substantive conception of democracy without restraints determined by 
proportionality? This chapter presents a theoretical framework within 
which the democratic analysis of CD can be carried out. The 
framework proposed consists in explaining the principle that makes the democratic 
legitimacy of representative government dependent on the participation of the people, 
in particular of that form of participation exercised through the right to vote. This 
framework coincides to a great extent with the democratic principles, on which the 
cases of the judicial trend are premised and to which they refer. The courts generally 
upheld the idea that the right to vote is a fundamental democratic right (‘the 
H 
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cornerstone of democracy’)1 and that the universal distribution of such a right is a 
‘basic principle’.2  
These premises can work in two registers. On the one hand, they can be seen as a 
description of the legal systems in which these cases are dealt with. On this register, 
the right to vote is a fundamental right in the sense that it is entrenched in the 
constitution or in a Human Rights instrument limiting the legislative decisions. 
Formally remaining national citizens, offenders enjoy the rights that those legal 
documents guarantee. In this register, however, these principles are perfectly 
compatible with the proportional limitation of the right to vote. 
However, these principles can also be seen, more deeply, as the crystallization of the 
adoption of a normative conception of democracy; a conception that lies behind the 
mentioned premises and that can be observed in some of the arguments offered, 
mainly, in Sauvé (but also in some aspects in August and NICRO). In a fine passage, 
the Canadian Supreme Court presents its conception of democracy and the value of 
the right to vote: 
“Denying penitentiary inmates the right to vote misrepresents the nature of 
our rights and obligations under the law and consequently undermines 
them. In a democracy such as ours, the power of lawmakers flows from the 
voting citizens, and lawmakers act as the citizens’ proxies. This delegation 
from voters to legislators gives the law its legitimacy or force. 
Correlatively, the obligation to obey the law flows from the fact that the 
law is made by and on behalf of the citizens. In sum, the legitimacy of the 
law and the obligation to obey the law flow directly from the right of 
every citizen to vote. As a practical matter, we require all within our 
country’s boundaries to obey its laws, whether or not they vote. But this 
does not negate the vital symbolic, theoretical and practical connection 
between having a voice in making the law and being obliged to obey it 
[…] [31].” 
                                                 
1. See e.g. Sauvé [9, 14]; NICRO [47]; Hirst [48-9]. 
2. See e.g. Hirst [59]. 
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Under such a conception, democracy is not seen only as a form of government in 
which representatives elected by the people take decisions by majority rule, but it 
also embraces the idea that democracy has a richer normative content. The principle 
according to which all those subjected to the law must have rights to participate 
equally in the law-making process is the core of that normative conception of 
democracy. In this register, citizenship is understood as a substantive democratic 
notion that includes the notions of membership and participation. In reconstructing 
these ideas, I closely follow Jürgen Habermas’ work on constitutional theory.3  
Explaining the theoretical assumptions of these premises, in turn, may illuminate the 
substantive problem proposed by the electoral exclusion of offenders, tracing an 
argument about the function, importance and scope that the right to vote has and must 
have in modern democratic regimes. This chapter, therefore, unpacks the idea that the 
right to vote is fundamental for democracy in this normative dimension not because it 
is entrenched in a constitutional document but because it constitutes a very important 
moment in the democratic legitimation of the law, and concludes preliminarily that 
under the principle of universal suffrage, offenders must remain, as paradigmatic 
subjects of the law, able to enjoy their voting rights if no democratic reason can be 
offered to the contrary. This conception places a very high burden of argumentation 
with those who seek to justify the disenfranchisement of an entire class of persons. 
This conception of democracy has two advantages. On the one hand, it is critical, in 
that it includes a systematic view of the practices of representative democracy, 
presenting a theoretical proposal with normative implications to drive such practices 
towards a regulative ideal. It refuses the argument of pure realism. On the other hand, 
it is to a certain extent realistic. It is able to present a conception of democracy and 
the right to vote that tie together institutions and discourses with an explanatory 
                                                 
3. See Habermas, 1996a. 
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potential for the current practices of democracy as a process of decision-making. It 
does not capitulate to pure normativism.  
This is not to say though that these ideas are the only possible conception of 
democracy and the right to vote. These ideas are obviously contestable, and yet they 
present the best reconstruction of the ideas of voting as a fundamental right and 
universal suffrage. The objection to any of these ideas is not something that is 
discussed at the level of the principles at this stage of the work, notwithstanding 
references to competing conceptions of democracy that are made throughout the text. 
Further chapters, however, discuss in detail the significance of CD in relation to these 
principles: the conception of the right to vote and the position of the offender in the 
political community. 
The structure of this chapter goes as follows. Section I introduces the idea of 
democratic legitimacy and, following Habermas, formulates the way in which such a 
notion may work in modern societies, conceding special attention to rights of 
participation and to the right to vote as a fundamental right of participation. Section II 
develops the distinction between input and output legitimacy. Thereafter it presents 
three models of democracy (aggregative, deliberative and contestatory) that 
emphasise different forms of production of democratic legitimacy and focuses on 
clarifying the circumstances in which the legitimating role of voting can fit with a 
normative democratic project. Section III turns to an analysis of the principle of 
universal suffrage as the principle that governs the distribution of the franchise. It is 
claimed that a democratic conception of this principle must grant voting rights, as a 
way to participate in the creation of law, to all those permanently subjected to the 
law. Finally, it formulates the democratic problem of CD that follows acceptance of 
the premises developed. 
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I DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF THE LAW 
1 Democratic legitimacy in modern society 
It is commonly affirmed that the prestige of modern representative democracy rests 
on the participation of people through elections. Behind this assertion lies the 
intuition that elections are a source of democratic legitimacy.4 Elections are a 
representation of political freedom and equality among citizens and of the idea that 
political power belongs to the people. They permit the identification of representative 
democracy with classic democratic forms. This identification did not inform all the 
original designs of representative institutions, some of which were meant to protect 
the republic against incompetence of ‘the mob’, and therefore embraced the idea of 
‘government for the people’. However, to highlight the importance of participation, 
and hence of the ‘government by the people’, seems an inescapable facet of the spirit 
of the democratic ideals of our time.5  
Democratic legitimacy, therefore, is an effort to reconcile the idea of representative 
institutions with the idea of a democratic form of government. This task is currently 
undertaken by means of a normative justification of the government authority to 
adopt collectively-binding decisions, mainly in the form of law, and to enforce those 
decisions with legitimate coercion. More ambitious projects of legitimacy require, in 
                                                 
4. This is true both for those who consider that the priority of democracy over other regimes 
resides merely in the possibility of government’s accountability and for those who contend - 
more ambitiously - that elections are an instantiation of the people’s right to self-government. 
For all of them, without elections, it may yet be possible to talk about some kind of legitimacy, 
but it becomes impossible to talk about the democratic legitimacy of such governments. 
5. About the relation of the principles of representative democracy with classic democracy and 
with the non-democratic principles of representation, see Manin, 1997. cf Schmitt, 2008:235-
307. 
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addition, prescribing an obligation to obey the law for reasons distinct from the threat 
of coercion or the moral identification with the content of those decisions.6  
The strong intuition that voting can contribute importantly to the justification of 
government authority and eventually to the peoples duty to obey the law directs the 
inquiry of exploring how democracy can generate legitimacy, and what the 
significance of voting is for democracy. The starting point to sustain this intuition is 
that democratic legitimacy relies upon a circle of legitimation in which: (1) the 
legitimacy of the law derives from (2) a law-making process conducted by 
representatives of the people, whose right to participate in that process is derived 
from (3) their election by the people through the exercise of their right to vote in free 
elections. 
At the outset, it must be observed that the particular circumstances in which 
democratic legitimacy might serve to explain the democratic legitimacy of the law are 
conditioned by the circumstances of modernity. Following Habermas, there are two 
mayor aspects that must be taken into account. The first is the plurality of ethical 
ways of being and understanding society that is paradigmatic of modern societies. 
Pre-modern societies were based on a common set of background assumptions that 
made social integration possible. Those common views and values have been 
undermined and fragmented by modernity.7 Second, modern society has become more 
and more complex in that every sphere of society has developed its own functions and 
rationalities. The term associated with this process is functional differentiation of 
social systems, and accordingly economy, law, and politics present at least a relative 
functional autonomy in relation to each other.8 In this context, an adequate account of 
democratic legitimacy must, on the one hand, be responsive to the need for a 
modality of social integration independent of shared values and visions of the world. 
                                                 
6. See Habermas, 1996a:28-34. See also Scharpf, 1998:2; Peter, 2011:56-74. 
7. See Habermas, 1996a:25-7. See also Rawls, 1996:35-40; Mouffe, 2000:17-35. 
8. See Habermas, 1996a: Ch. 1. 
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On the other hand, such an account must incorporate this social differentiation and 
therefore must be understood as belonging to the discrete sphere of politics 
(government authority) and the legal system (the obligation to obey the collectively-
binding norms). Therefore, it attempts “to show how the old promise of a self-
organizing community of free and equal citizens can be reconceived under the 
conditions of complex societies”.9  
2 Democratic legitimacy between law and democracy 
Habermas’s conception of constitutional democracy, including his theory of the 
relation between law and democracy as a legitimation procedure, and its 
methodological presuppositions of pluralism and social differentiation, plays a 
pivotal role for the argument of this dissertation. 
In modern societies social interaction requires the manufacture of a mechanism to 
stabilize social expectations. This need follows from the fact that we now live in a 
society in which the levels of dissent have grown, due to having been let “loose from 
the ties of sacred authorities” and the liberation “from the bonds of archaic 
institutions”.10 Pluralism and social differentiation, therefore, present a tendency to 
produce strategic interactions to face increasing disagreement. The mechanism 
capable of fulfilling that task is positive law,11 to which individuals qua ‘legal 
persons’ are unconditionally subjected. Social integration requires that the reasons to 
follow a rule not be of permanent discussion, and therefore the subjects of the law 
“cannot call into question the validity of the norms they are supposed to follow”.12  
                                                 
9. Habermas, 1996a:7. 
10. Habermas, 1996a:27. 
11. See Kindhäuser, 2011a:89.  
12. Habermas, 1996a:37. 
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The recourse to positive law circumvents the problems of dissent whilst avoiding the 
problem of the immanent coercion. The way out of the dilemma between social 
disintegration and coercion is that “the actors themselves come to some 
understanding about the normative regulation of strategic interactions”.13 
Subsequently, the law, in order to avoid being a mere instrument for the reproduction 
of relations of power, must be the outcome of a democratic procedure wherein the 
individuals qua ‘citizens’ are able to participate. This introduces into the legality of 
the positive law a demand for legitimacy, and particularly for democratic 
legitimacy.14  
The Kantian idea of an identity between ‘legal persons’ and ‘citizens’ is what 
constitutes the fundamental element of democratic legitimacy: 
“the coercive law tailored for the self-interested use of individual rights 
can preserve its socially integrating force only insofar as the addressees of 
legal norms may at the same time understand themselves, taken as a 
whole, as the rational authors of those norms”.15  
However, the entire matter is not resolved quite so easily. That would be the case, for 
instance, if a single citizen were to rule just himself, but legal democratic decisions 
are the outcome of a collective decision-making process in which individual influence 
alone is insignificant. This is where the idea of functional differentiation shows to be 
compelling. 
At the level of the political system, deliberative democracy is a process of decision-
making open to reason and in which decisions are preceded by a discussion open to 
the participation.16 This is what makes plausible the conclusion that the decisions 
made by the political system are, to a certain extent, common. This model depends on 
                                                 
13. Habermas, 1996a:27. 
14. See Kindhäuser, 2011a:90-91.  
15. Habermas, 1996a:33. 
16. See below Section II.1.2. 
RIGHT TO VOTE 
 
 
91 
the existence of what Klaus Günther, elaborating Habermas’ concept of 
communicative autonomy,17 has called deliberative personality;18 that is, someone 
who has the ability to evaluate actions according to reasons and act according to the 
reasons he or she accepts.19 This deliberative ability has a constitutive role for 
democracy because, as citizens, deliberative persons substantiate the process of 
deliberation with their critical engagement, dropping the role of self-interested 
subjects and assuming the “perspective of members of freely associated legal 
community”.20  
At the level of the legal system, because law must deal with social expectations, the 
reasons for which a deliberative person follows the law are irrelevant. That is the 
importance of positive law: “[l]egal norms are valid even for those persons who did 
not, or not exhaustively, participate in the democratic process”.21 Legal validity 
correlatively implies that it is not necessary for the legal person to follow the norm 
for the official reasons (those reasons offered in the deliberative process) because he 
or she can reasonably disagree with the norm. Legal validity, due to the formality of 
the legal code and its internal relation with the notion of legal person, liberates the 
person from communicative constrains and therefore guarantees individual freedom 
within the spheres of autonomy legally guaranteed; the legal person can internally 
disagree with the norm. In this sense, a legal person, invited to follow the norm by 
the legitimacy of the democratic process, can act according to the expectations “that 
the legal community has rationally agreed on” or, on the other hand, can act 
strategically towards the law.22 However, “the law obliges her not to violate through 
                                                 
17. See also Kindhäuser, 2011a:95-8.  
18. See Günther, 1996.  
19. This deliberative ability is an expression of communicative rationality, which is based on the 
capacity to recognize the illocutionary dimension of language, a capacity that is inscribed in 
the very notion of linguistic interaction and therefore must be understood as an ‘internal 
connection’ between reason and society. Regarding the notion of communicative rationality, 
see, generally, Habermas, 1984: Ch. 3. 
20. Habermas, 1996a:32. See also Rawls, 1996: Ch.2. 
21. Günther, 2001:10. 
22. See Habermas, 1996a:31  
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her actions the norm which she rejects”.23 The infraction to the law is understood as a 
disappointment of a normative expectation of the legal community rooted in the 
inclusion of that legal person qua citizen in the democratic process. This is 
fundamental, for example, to understand the meaning of a democratic punishment, as 
a response to those that have “failed to distinguish between fora”,24 and the 
possibility to understand CD as a punishment.25  
In this context, it is not the factual acceptance of the norm by the legal person but the 
citizen’s acceptance of the procedures through which the norm is democratically 
produced which sustain the claim of the law’s legitimacy. This deliberative process, 
which occurs under conditions of pluralism, must also appeal to the guarantee of legal 
regulation.26 Democratic procedures are legally codified in terms of legal rights, 
powers and competences. This legal regulation is also extended to citizens’ rights of 
political participation that guarantee the autonomy of the citizens and the flow of 
communicative power into the political system from the public sphere and elections 
Summing up, the deliberative process of decision-making constitutes the possibility 
of adherence to legal norms for the independent reason of their legitimacy, in addition 
to (and separate from) the facticity of the threat of sanctions. However, facticity can 
never be completely excluded from a democracy governed by the law.27 These 
elements are proportionally related: “the less a legal order is legitimate, or is at least 
considered such, the more other factors, such as intimidation, the force of 
circumstances, custom, and sheer habit, must step in the reinforce it”.28  
                                                 
23. Günther, 2001:10. 
24. Christodoulidis, 2004:195.  
25. See below Chapter 5, Section III. 
26. See Habermas, 1996a:126-7. 
27. See, for a criticism of this idea, Christodoulidis, 2004. 
28. Habermas, 1996a:30. 
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3 The conditions of democratic legitimacy 
Affirming the democratic legitimacy of the law in these terms formulates two 
demands: the law must be neutral and must be the fruit of a participatory process, in 
which those subjected to the law have rights to participate in the law-making.29  
A demand of neutrality in relation to the reasons for law’s abidance is related to the 
plurality of ethical ways of living in modern democratic societies.30 As previously 
seen, society can only deal with this pluralism by appealing to positive law as an 
unconditional set of reasons for action backed by coercion. However, positive law 
receives its legitimation from a deliberative democratic process that is oriented to 
decision-making rather than to consensus. Democratic decisions are adopted by 
majority rule, and therefore it is perfectly possible for a person to disagree 
substantially with the content of a legal norm or with the reasons for its adoption. 
Positive law, in this sense, cannot demand substantive agreement of the addressee but 
only adequate external conduct and conformity to the norms that coordinate life in 
complex societies. Accordingly, the law is neutral insofar as it respects the sphere of 
one’s reasons for following or breaking the law as a space of autonomy. This implies, 
on the one hand, that nobody can be punished for following the law, even when the 
law was followed for reasons that are self-interested, wrong or even immoral, and on 
the other hand, that positive law is immune to the distinction between criminal action 
and civil disobedience. The consequences entailed by this notion of neutrality are 
crucial to the adoption of a democratic conception of punishment. An offender cannot 
be punished because his conduct was a moral wrong but may only be punished 
because he committed an offence described in a legal norm.31  
                                                 
29. See Kindhäuser, 2011a:68-83, 93-102. 
30. See Kindhäuser, 2011a:75.  
31. See Kindhäuser, 2011b:221-2. 
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However, pluralism presents further problems for the justification of legal coercion 
and punishment, because it contests societal commitment to any one set of values. If 
the law cannot be understood as the expression of a substantive conception of the 
good, pluralism leads to great uncertainty regarding the justification of coercion and 
punishment. Under these conditions, in which not every person would have the same 
reasons to follow the law – some would follow it only because of its moral content, 
others only due to the threat of punishment – it is simple to conceive the law as the 
coercive imposition of a heteronomous will.32 To avoid that conclusion, what pluralist 
societies require is a reason to follow the law that is binding for every person for the 
same reasons.33  
Here is where the second demand of democratic legitimacy must be introduced. The 
law must be the consequence of a process of democratic law-making in which the 
subjects of the law are granted participatory rights, therefore adopting the role of 
citizens. In this role, a person may assume a critical position towards the legal norms 
and advocate for their modification or cancelation. Participatory rights constitute the 
mechanism according to which one, as a citizen, can express one’s rejection of the 
norm with which one disagrees, through participation in the deliberative process. A 
democratic public sphere constitutes the field in which deliberative persons, as 
citizens, can express the critical disagreement that positive law denies to them as 
‘legal persons’. Participatory rights can contribute to resituating the subjects of the 
law, so that they also assume a position as part-author of the law. The consequence of 
equipping them with participatory rights is that “citizens are politically responsible 
for their law” and “they recognize each other as being politically competent”.34  
It cannot be concluded, however, that participation in the law-making process 
grounds a duty to obey the law without questioning it. Due to the limitations of the 
                                                 
32. See Kindhäuser, 2011a:76-9.  
33. See Kindhäuser, 2011b:220-1; Kindhäuser, 2011a:83. 
34. Günther, 1996:1057. 
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democratic process of law-making, the legal norm may only claim provisional 
validity and must therefore remain open to discussion and disagreement. This is a 
powerful reason to embrace the principle of neutrality under democratic rule, 
especially from the perspective of those that reject the substantive content of the 
norm. A patriotic commitment to the law would be incompatible with a critical 
position regarding the norm, and therefore incompatible with the role of citizens as 
authors of the law in a democracy. However, democratic legitimacy of the law can 
demand a weaker commitment. This weaker commitment is based on the two roles 
that correspond to a person within a democratic community. The role of a legal 
person, as a subject of the law, has its counterpart in the role of citizen, as author of 
the law. The counterpart of the adscription of participatory rights to citizens is the 
duty to present their disagreement with the legal norm only by exercising those rights 
in the public sphere, and consequentially the duty, acting in the role of legal persons, 
to adapt their external behaviour to the norm with which he disagrees as a citizen.35 
This can be concluded from the fact that nobody can be legally forced to follow the 
law for heteronomous considerations. However, from this is not followed “a right to 
harm unfairly the communicative autonomy of others”.36 This allows the legal person, 
following the legal norms for reasons that are not the substantive identification with 
the norm or the threat of coercion, but out of loyalty to the outcome of a democratic 
process in which the person – in his role as citizen – is entitled to take part. Just 
under these conditions – neutrality and participation – is that the coercion can be 
imposed against a horizon of respect for individual autonomy and democracy. 
These two positions in which a person can be situated play a fundamental role for the 
structure of the constitutional state. The autonomy of legal persons and citizens are in 
a relation of co-originality and mutual reinforcement. Habermas presents it as 
follows: 
                                                 
35. See Kindhäuser, 2011b:227. See also Mañalich, 2011a:122-3. 
36. Kindhäuser, 2011a:105. 
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“[T]he only legitimate law is one that emerges from the discursive 
opinion- and will-formation of equally enfranchised citizens. The latter 
can in turn adequately exercise their public autonomy, guaranteed by 
rights of communication and participation, only insofar as their private 
autonomy is guaranteed. A well-secured private autonomy helps ‘secure 
the conditions’ of public autonomy just as much as, conversely the 
appropriate exercise of public autonomy helps ‘secure the conditions’ of 
private autonomy’”.37  
This relation of mutual reinforcement and co-originality between fundamental right 
and democratic decisions supposes the dissolution or transformation of this paradox 
into a fruitful core aspect of the manufacture of democratic legitimacy.38 The model 
of co-originality therefore concedes equal importance to the protection of rights of 
private autonomy and rights of public autonomy, both being legally guaranteed in 
terms of rights of autonomy. 
Summing up, it has been argued that the normative expectation of law-abidance 
conduct is based on the democratic legitimacy that is generated through democratic 
institutions and procedures. This means that a chance of a genuine motivation to 
follow the law for democratic reasons depends on the guarantee of equal political 
influence for every citizen and therefore “the right to exercise communicative 
freedom equally”.39  
According to this account, democratic rights of participation and, in particular, the 
right to vote has an important role in the realization of the democratic promise of 
being governed by our own laws. The conception of democratic legitimacy defended 
in this section lacks a detailed conception of the right to vote, maybe since their 
emphasis on deliberation draws a parallel with an emphasis on the right to have a 
voice over the right to have a vote. The following section seeks to position the right 
                                                 
37. Habermas, 1996a:408. 
38. See Habermas, 2001. For a criticism, see Christodoulidis, 1998; Christodoulidis, 2006. 
39. Günther, 1996:1055.  
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to vote in a broader democratic framework briefly elaborating the role that may 
correspond to other democratic rights of participation. 
II VOTING AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
The democratic legitimacy of the law is achieved by the exercise of rights of 
democratic participation by citizens that are subjects to the law. Affirming this, 
however, does not say much about the central importance of elections and the right to 
vote as cornerstone of democracy. 
1 Input and output legitimacy 
The role and the importance that voting plays in a given democratic account tends to 
differ considerably depending on the level of importance conceded to the idea that 
citizens have a right to participate in the self-government of the community. To 
illustrate this difference, it is useful to draw in the distinction between input and 
output legitimacy.40 At one end of the spectrum, ‘input legitimacy’ evaluates a 
government based on its connection to the people’s will and relies on the rhetoric of 
participation, according to which the bigger the distance between the persons affected 
by the decision and those who take the decision, the lower the level of input 
legitimacy.41 This implies that the law “should originate from the authentic 
expression of the preferences of the constituency in question”.42  
                                                 
40. See Scharpf, 1998:2. 
41. See Scharpf, 1999:7. 
42. Scharpf, 1998:2. For this account, democracy is an intrinsic value that need not depend on any 
other goal or outcome because what brings legitimacy into the scene is precisely the 
participation of those affected by the law in a process of law-making. For input legitimacy, 
therefore, rights of political participation, and in particular the right to vote, have a 
fundamental legitimating role. 
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At the other end, ‘output legitimacy’ evaluates the performance of the government in 
terms of the satisfaction of the common interest of the constituency, typically in 
accordance with factors such as stability, development, respect for fundamental 
rights, etc. A democracy that finds legitimacy in outputs is desirable for two 
instrumental reasons. First, it has a positive ability to achieve effectively some 
determinate outcomes and particularly profits from a great “problem-solving 
efficiency”.43 Democracy allows collective decision-making in a sphere that cannot 
be addressed by individual action, market exchanges or voluntary cooperation.44 
Second, it is desirable for its negative capacity to protect against the abuses of the 
majority and to assure that government power will not be used to further “the 
particular interest of the office holders”.45 
These kinds of legitimacy highlight the values and advantages of different aspects of 
representative democracy. On the one hand, its representative nature and the 
possibility of modulating the results of the democratic process by institutional design 
are linked with output legitimacy. On the other hand, its democratic nature and 
especially the importance of people’s participation are linked to input legitimacy. The 
inquiry that follows recognizes the wide disagreement regarding what constitutes the 
adequate balance of input and output legitimacy, but nonetheless rests on the 
argument of the importance of electoral participation and the right to vote as 
necessary elements of any conception of democratic legitimacy. In other terms, it 
affirms an idea of democracy that is committed to a high level of input legitimacy.46  
                                                 
43. Scharpf, 1998:3. 
44. See Scharpf, 1999:11. 
45. Scharpf, 1998:4. In this sense, output legitimacy involves substantive elements that do not, 
however, exhaust it. An output perspective “allow[s] for the consideration of a much wider 
variety of legitimizing mechanisms” than input legitimacy; the force of this legitimacy tends to 
be however “more contingent and more limited” (Scharpf, 1999:11). cf Ramsay, 2013b; López-
Guerra, 2014a:124-9. 
46. When it comes to participation; even when it is clear that the recognition of the right to vote is 
important; to hold free, periodic and competitive elections is not sufficient to achieve this end. 
The catalogue of elements that are deemed necessary to achieve input legitimacy include - 
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2 Aggregation, deliberation and contestation 
If it is agreed that representative democracy achieves an important quota of its 
democratic legitimacy through the input of elections, it must be recognized that this is 
not the only instance in which democratic legitimacy can be produced, but in 
different moments of the democratic process, in which the interests, values, reasons 
and preferences of citizens are channelled into the process of public decision-
making.47 Related with these different moments, three different conceptions of 
democracy may be identified, which emphasise elections, deliberation and 
contestation as core registers of democratic practice.48 These conceptions of 
democracy might also provide an account of a right balance and relation between 
input and output legitimacy, and an understanding of the role that elections might 
play in the legitimation of law. 
2.1 Aggregative democracy 
For an aggregative model of democracy, the democratic legitimacy is produced when 
the particular interests and preferences of electors are transmitted into the legislative 
process and give content to the law assuming to pursue an aggregation or tabulation. 
The fundamental moment of this process of transmission is elections, by means of 
                                                                                                                                                    
besides the right to vote - other democratic institutions such as other political rights - in 
particular rights of political participation, association and communication; a system of party 
competition, mechanisms of accountability of the representatives (see, e.g. Scharpf, 1999:14), 
as well as elements that cannot be automatically manufactured through institutional design but 
require a democratic practice and a democratic culture (see e.g. Hiley, 2006. See also 
Habermas, 1996a:461). Moreover, it can be argued that this catalogue of elements directly 
related with elections is too narrow; that it should be complemented with other voting-
unrelated institutional and cultural elements that work as resources and preconditions of 
electoral democracy. Examples would include the protection of individual rights, a certain 
degree of economic welfare and some sources of collective identity (Benhabib, 1996:67-8). 
Neither can social and economic equality be absent. This could lead to the problem of the 
circularity of the input/output distinction, or furthermore contribute to highlight the importance 
of a balance between inputs and outputs - in a relation of reinforcement, complementation and 
supplementation (Scharpft, 1999:12) - to stabilise a conception of representative democracy. 
47. See Hayward, 2009:114-24. 
48. See Hayward, 2009. 
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which the agenda of the representatives is influenced by the interest of the electors. 
Elections claim to be, on this model, the fundamental moment in which the 
democratic authorities become responsive to the interest of the people.49  
The value of voting in this context is determined by the aggregated influence that 
electors can exert upon the government by voting.50 By voting for representatives that 
have a similar political opinion, electors protect their own interests because the 
governmental elites will act according to those opinions and preferences if they wish 
to remain in power. This identity between those interests and representatives’ 
political discourses may be considered the crucial element in securing the importance 
of voting in the enhancement of democratic legitimacy. Other participatory rights, 
such as free speech, association and assembly tend to play a marginal role in the 
generation of democratic legitimacy in this model, which sees them as no more than 
enabling conditions of free and informed voting. 
The aggregative model is attractive because it concedes great importance to input 
legitimacy, and great importance to the right to vote as a legitimacy device. It also 
seems compatible with pluralist societies. However, when carefully analysed, it 
becomes apparent that the aggregative model is methodologically incapable of 
providing an adequate account of how those inputs are channelled and processed in a 
practice of a collective, and the nature of public participation. In relation to this first 
aspect, it encounters difficulties in explaining the nature of political participation as a 
public practice in which ideas should be defended with arguments that can be offered 
in public; as a practice of the “institutionalization of public use of reason”,51 that 
make possible contestability if “no link is made between decision and justification”.52 
On the other hand, aggregation of interests has difficulties providing solid 
explanation of output legitimacy, because democratic politics is more than just the 
                                                 
49. See e.g. Przeworski, 2010a. 
50. See Habernas, 1996b:22. 
51. Habermas, 1996b:23. See also Rawls, 1996: Ch. 6. 
52. Cheneval, 2006:164. See also Habermas, 1996a:302-8. 
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articulation of private interests, being rather a practice in which our common interest 
plays a fundamental role.53 In these two senses, aggregative democracy cannot 
explain how elections and politics in a democracy differ from individual participation 
as consumers in the market.54 In addition to these shortcomings, aggregative 
democracy faces an even greater problem in relation to its outcomes. The problem is 
commonly identified as the tyranny of the majority. The aggregation of votes and 
decisions based on majority rule may entail a situation where the interests of the 
majority are taken into account whilst the interests of the minority are ignored in the 
law-making process.55  
For these reasons, Fritz Scharpf is right when he says that “[o]n the standard premises 
of normative individualism […] plausible legitimacy arguments cannot be based on 
purely input-oriented notions of democracy”.56 Aggregation abandons the search for 
an answer to the question regarding how elections enable the practice of self-
government, and accepts as unavoidable a conception of the political process as the 
individual’s approval of the elite competition trying to maintain positions of power.57  
                                                 
53. See Habermas, 1996b:22. See also Pettit, 2000:108-11. Regarding this second aspect, for 
example, it struggles to explain the necessity of the provision of public goods and 
redistributive measures, as expressions of social solidarity (see Peter, 2011:20-5). 
54. See Elster, 1989:4-12. 
55. This criticism does not necessarily constitute a case against majority decisions - democracy is 
unimaginable without them - but rather a case against the mere aggregation of interests as the 
promise of those decisions (see Pettit, 1999:173-8). Indeed, there are some differences between 
a process that does not take one’s interest into account at all and a process in which your 
interests are considered but the process “may deliver a result – for reasons you can understand 
- that favours those others more than you” (Spitz, cited in Pettit, 1999:179). 
56. Scharpft, 1999:7. 
57. See Habermas, 1996b:22-3. In this respect, the seeming importance of input legitimacy could 
be limited by the elitism of certain plebiscitary features of a model in which democracy in 
itself has a limited legitimating potential. That could also be read as a self-defeat of the 
promise of input legitimacy in aggregative democracy and consequentially the strengthening of 
output legitimacy. In this reading, however, output legitimacy would be built completely in 
terms of the satisfaction of private interests, which is easily conciliated with the Hayekian 
concept of catalaxis which sees democracy as an imperfect substitute of rationally transparent 
market interactions. The concept was originally introduced by Hayek, 1979 (see also diZerega, 
1989). The distance between such a diagnosis and the suppression of democracy is very short. 
In this sense, aggregative models necessarily tend to oscillate between an elitist conception of 
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2.2 Deliberative democracy 
A second candidate is deliberative democracy. The concept of deliberation refers to 
the exercise of a form of collective decision-making, different to aggregation, which 
is carried out, first, illuminated by the public and impartial use of reason, and second, 
by recognising everybody involved in the process as having equal worth and equal 
rights to take part.58 The moment of insertion of democratic legitimacy is therefore 
the moment in which these ideal conditions are most easily accomplished: the process 
of discussion developed in parliamentary fora during a law-making process that is 
influenced by an also deliberative public sphere. In that moment, representatives and 
citizens reflect collectively upon what are and what ought to be the common interests 
that should motivate their decisions, which, in addition, contribute to shape individual 
interests and make them compatible with the interest of everybody else. This debate 
is procedurally organized towards a rational agreement, only after the points of view 
of everybody have been duly considered.59 The legitimacy of collectively binding 
decisions therefore depends on the institutionalization of a process of communication 
whose conditions could “meet the agreement of all those possibly affected”.60 Ideally, 
therefore, and against the methodological individualism of aggregative democracy, 
deliberation does not understand negotiation and bargaining as adequate terms on 
which the process of decision-making is carried out.61  
                                                                                                                                                    
democracy (see Schumpeter, 1976), which avoids the problem of the rational choice theory 
about the impossibility of aggregation, and a democracy normatively restricted to reproduce 
market-minded decisions, highly motivated to grant veto powers to avoid the tyranny of the 
majority (see Buchannan & Tullock, 1999). 
58. Habermas, 1996a: 118-132, Ch. 7. See also Benhabib, 1996; Cohen, 1996. 
59. See Benhabib, 1996:69-74. 
60. Habermas, 1996a:104. 
61. See Besson & Marti, 2006b: xvi. 
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To some extent, deliberative democracy responds to the deficits observed in 
aggregative democracy.62 On the one hand, the common interests of the people vary 
from their particular interests. The former are discovered when the latter are 
submitted into a process of public and critical exchange of opinions and arguments.63 
On the other hand, the articulation of more complex discourses and reasoning are 
necessary to satisfy those public interests that are absent when merely the aggregation 
of particular interests is taken into account. Finally, its orientation to consensus and 
the modification of the interest of the constituency within the deliberative process 
tend to impede decisions that can be seen as an abuse of the majority rule. 
The previous aspects are clearly linked to the discursive nature of the deliberative 
process, which makes that the right of participation with discursive potential, 
eminently between them the right to free speech, acquire preponderance over other 
means of participation. The relation of enhancement between voice and vote in the 
aggregative model mutates quite radically, and the right to vote is transformed in the 
democratic mechanism to palliate harm caused by the demand of decision-making 
that limit ongoing political discourses. Voting assumes as the second best to a 
consensual solution achieved in a rational conversation guided by the principles of 
publicity and transparency and enabled by freedom of speech, association and press.  
Deliberative democracy, nevertheless, has been criticised for being unrealistic and 
blind to differences proper of a pluralist society. Firstly, it is said that deliberation is 
too far away from the reality of political practices, especially those practices that are 
mainly governed by strategic bargaining and negotiation. In a similar vein, the 
manner in which legitimacy is produced disregards the core democratic institution of 
voting and deciding according to majority rule.64 In response, it can be argued that 
                                                 
62. Deliberative democracy arises as a response to the democratic deficit of those minimal, elitist 
and aggregative conceptions of democracy, predominant after the Second World War (Besson 
& Martí, 2006b: xii). 
63. On the aspect of shaping interests, see Michelman, 1989:451. 
64. See e.g. Elster, 1998; Besson & Martí, 2006a. 
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deliberation is a regulative ideal according to which political institutions can be 
organized to achieve political legitimacy and “does not aim to describe how they 
actually are”.65 The fact that deliberative democracy relies mainly on communicative 
action does not deny the necessity for strategic action in the certain moments, in the 
public sphere by social movements and in the parliamentary fora by both government 
and opposition, especially in order to stage conflicts. Additionally, a realistic 
deliberative democracy account must also consider voting and deciding by majority 
rule, and must give them a place in the deliberative process in which these notions are 
not considered as “a necessary evil, but as a fair procedural institution”.66 However, 
to consider voting as a conclusive moment of deliberation is substantially different to 
a model of ‘pure voting’ “which remain[s] indifferent to any interaction or 
communication among voters”.67  
Secondly, some have pointed out the exclusionary aspects of the deliberative model. 
It focuses “in a particular kind of supposedly reasonable political interaction”  that is 
not neutral but excludes a variety of voices and forms of participation.68 This problem 
of participation may rest, and this will be discussed with some detail later in this 
work, in a deeper problem of social and political recognition.69 In asking for 
consensual decisions, deliberative democracy is necessarily undermining the 
irreducible plurality of views present in society;70 in particular by mean of excluding 
those conceptions of good that are rendered unreasonable,71 and silencing those 
considered inacceptable to take part of the “constitutional sanctioning of the public 
sphere”.72 In relation to this second criticism, deliberative democracy is more 
vulnerable. An adequate answer must start by recognising the irreducible 
                                                 
65. Besson & Marti, 2006b: xv-xvi. 
66. Besson & Martí, 2006b: xvii. 
67. Besson & Martí, 2006b: xvii. 
68. See e.g. Young, 1990: Ch. 4; Dryzek, 2000: Ch. 3. 
69. See below Chapter 6, Section III. 
70. See e.g. Mouffe, 2000: 36-59. 
71. See Furman, 1997. 
72. Christodoulidis, 2004:198. See also Christodoulidis, 2006. 
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exclusionary dimension of democracy in general and deliberative democracy in 
particular. However, some attention must be paid to attempts to incorporate those 
different voices within the framework of deliberative democracy, by recognizing 
other forms of non-coercive communication as acceptable,73 particularly where these 
are supplemented with procedures that generate conditions for deliberation, 
agreement and compromise in cases of deep disagreement. 
In relation to the distinction between input/output legitimacy, prima facie deliberative 
democracy tends to collapse it. It “may be understood as a concept that builds a 
bridge between input and output oriented legitimating arguments by insisting on 
specific input procedures that will favour qualitatively acceptable outputs”.74  The 
input introduced by the individual electors is of marginal importance and it can be 
considered simply as the starting point of the law-making process. Although 
democratic outputs cannot be determined in advance because they are the rational 
consequence of a procedure structured to take collective decisions respecting certain 
procedural preconditions, it can be concluded that deliberative democracy, 
particularly in comparison with aggregative democracy, is an output-oriented model 
of legitimacy. 
Both models considered so far, in that they highlight elections and deliberation, share 
in common the key role that representative institutions play in the injection of 
democratic legitimacy. Against the argument that democratic legitimacy rests on 
elections and public deliberation, some critics have opposed a diagnostic based on the 
necessity of other forms of democratic legitimacy to supply the deficit of 
representative institutions due to the tendency of these institutions to stand for major 
social interests and exclude the disagreement.75 Contrary to elections and ruled 
                                                 
73. Dryzek argues in favour of storytelling, testimony, greeting, rhetoric and argument (2000:62-
74). 
74. Scharpf, 1998:3 in reference to Habermas, 1996a:301. 
75. See e.g. Mouffe, 1993:99. 
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deliberations, they see in the possibility of contesting the institutionally mediated 
law-making the very possibility to express a democratic voice. 
2.3 Democracy as contestation 
Democratic legitimacy could therefore adopt a third modality, based on contestatory 
democracy. For those that endorse this model, the more relevant aspect of democratic 
institutions is to produce opportunities for decisions to be challenged. This 
requirement can be based, depending on various versions of the idea, on different 
political conceptions of how legitimacy is generated. For conceptions such as Philip 
Pettit’s republicanism,  the goal of contestation arises from the necessity to limit the 
discretionary authority of the representative institutions and therefore to create 
freedom for the people. The authority of the government is legitimate insofar as the 
possibility of contesting its decisions is always open.76 For more radical conceptions, 
such as Chantal Mouffe’s agonism, the ambition of contestation is to challenge the 
hegemonic and contingent articulation of power-relations in society; government and 
law both being particular agents of power. The authority of representative institutions 
is never democratically legitimate because democracy is about staging conflict 
between those who have the power and those who contest the exercise of such 
power.77  
Contestation is therefore a practice of injecting legitimacy into democracy by means 
of challenges to decisions that are traced back to the majority of the representatives 
elected in turn by the majority of electors. This anti-majoritarian feature can make 
contestatory democracy very attractive; however it does not necessarily imply a 
                                                 
76. See Pettit, 1997:185. See also Tomkins, 2005. 
77. See Mouffe, 2013. See also Honig, 1993a. However, in these later accounts, one must 
distinguish the value of the transgression of the institutional forms itself, according to a view 
in which institutional politics is an attenuated form of democracy, from the democratic value of 
contestation to review and question the current relations of power supported by the 
institutional system. Just emphasising the second aspect, contestation can be seen as a 
mechanism of democratic legitimacy in the sense it is discussed here. 
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strong support for judicial review or other forms of limitations on politics by legal 
mechanisms. The essential element of contestation is the possibility of uncovering 
and making contentious what a representative process of democratic law-making has 
concealed. This is because, contrary to any subordination of politics to law, and 
antagonistic with the deliberative tendency to consensus, contestation is about 
maintaining the democratic process always open; in sum, questioning that law can 
assume a representative role.78 
In terms of the distinction input/output, similar to deliberative democracy, 
contestation places greater emphasis on output. This is so because it focuses on the 
negative outputs of the democratic process. Contestation, however, does not seek to 
produce a determinate result; instead, by means of questioning the output it forces the 
reassessment of the decisions under conditions of confrontation which might 
illuminate hidden aspects of the issue at stake. However, even if seen as output-
focused, contestation might also be seen as a practice of input legitimacy, particularly 
when it is performed directly by citizens and civil society organizations. In other 
terms, contestation is a form of participation, which may bring decisions closer to 
those affected by them. 
The major problem with a conception of democracy which lays emphasis on 
contestation is the scant attention paid to the process of law-making, including 
elections and parliamentary debate. This disregard may reveal a tendency to 
standardise all kind of government exercise of power as equally vicious or, in a better 
light, to obscure how elections and representative institutions can manufacture 
democratic legitimacy. In contrast, participatory rights that have the potential to drive 
manoeuvres of contestation obtain great democratic relevance. The right to free 
speech is important in this regard but also the right to judicial protection and crucially 
                                                 
78. See Christodoulidis, 2006:4-9.  
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the right to assembly, all of which enable the staging of conflict in different forum 
and in different forms. 
3 The importance of voting for democratic legitimacy 
These three models express different understandings of the principles on which 
democracy is grounded; further, they also express distinctive ways, commonly 
thought of as antagonistic and incompatible, in which democracy can be understood. 
However, each one of them highlights the importance of different modalities of 
legitimacy and certain practices that can contribute to produce it. Elections, 
parliamentary and civil society deliberation, political and legal contestation and 
social struggle – in sum consent and dissent – provide important elements whose 
significance any ambitious account of democracy cannot pass over. 
Regarding the importance of voting, aggregative democracy is the model that relies 
importantly in electoral practices but in the context of a considerably poor account of 
democratic legitimacy. Deliberative democracy, in contrast, is a more attractive 
normative model because it simultaneously permits an explanation of the current 
democratic institutions and practices of representative democracy, while subjecting 
them to critical scrutiny. However, at least at the core of its theory of legitimacy, 
deliberative democracy provides a relatively poor account of the value of voting.79 A 
model of deliberative democracy focused on the rationality of outputs can be 
considerably reinforced if it can also highlight the importance of input legitimacy. 
This injection of input legitimacy could adopt two main forms. First, it needs to 
highlight the importance of elections for the deliberative process. Second, it must 
highlight the aspects of democratic practices related with contestation. 
                                                 
79. See Hiley, 2006:56-7. See also Beckman, 2009:22. 
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3.1 Deliberative purity and input legitimacy 
Regarding the importance of electoral inputs in a deliberative model, Habermas 
suggestion is that elections inject ‘communicative power’ into the political system. In 
real democracies, people elect representatives who take decisions in their name. 
Representatives, however, need to engage in a political practice in which decisions do 
not correspond necessarily with the interest, values or preferences of the electors. To 
what extent those interests change during the law-making process, or to put it in other 
terms, what is the importance of the input channelled into the political system 
through elections, forms the object of considerable debate between those who hold 
deliberative accounts. This is important because there is a direct relation with the 
extent to which interest, values or preferences are blocked by the normative 
aspirations of deliberation, therefore limiting the responsiveness of representatives, a 
consequence which forms the basis for criticism of the elitism and unrealism of the 
deliberative model.80 
A pure-deliberative position set a very demanding goal for deliberation, bringing it 
closer to the notion of consensus, with all the exclusionary problems that entails. The 
deliberative ideal demands the recognition of the force of the better reason from all 
participants. As the better argument is objectively better, the deliberative ideal asks 
for a consensus over such reason. On this model, the inputs brought by elections into 
democracy are systematically filtered and purged by the use of public reasoning and 
the recognition of the force of the better argument. It must be said that the 
institutional design of representative democracy make this ideal considerably unlikely 
in practice.81  
The work of Habermas on constitutional democracy, on the other hand, maintains 
consensus as a regulative ideal while introduces a decision-oriented deliberative 
                                                 
80. See e.g. Levy, 2013:362-5. 
81. See e.g. Habermas, 1984; Habermas, 1999. cf Cohen, 1998. 
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style.82 In a law-making process legally regulated it is reasonable to aim for an 
outcome consensus rather than argumentative consensus.83 This difference is due to 
the fact that in his model, the commitment of democracy to communicative action is 
weaker than in a pure deliberative model, more adequate for the moral deliberation 
than for the institutional deliberation in pluralist societies. Deliberation in this model 
is committed in the task to reach “some understanding about the normative 
regulations of strategic interactions”,84 and not the justification of morally objective 
norms. In conditions of pluralism, he recognises a natural tendency to shift to 
strategic action within a law-making process and therefore the need to acknowledge, 
first, the importance of bargaining “where participants agree to a particular norm for 
different reasons through a negotiated consensus”,85 and second, the limited scope of 
deliberative principles as they regulate the political process, admitting that sometimes 
they are merely laying down the conditions of the bargaining processes in terms of a 
legal regulation that can be followed for strategic reasons.86 Thus, the deliberative 
ideal is reduced to the more modest ideal of favouring “those institutional settings 
that promote deliberation and in which the weight of negotiation and voting is 
reduced”.87  
This moderated optimism about the possibilities of consensus brings important 
consequences for the understanding of voting in democracy, because the importance 
of the inputs brought into the process is augmented and expectations of a purge on the 
inputs during the process of deliberation are attenuated. The ‘discursive dilemma’88 
                                                 
82. See Habermas, 1996a:306-7. 
83. See Kindhäuser, 2011a:102. 
84. Habermas, 1996a:26-7. 
85. Habermas, 1996a:166. 
86. According to Habermas “‘rational discourse’ should include any attempt to reach an 
understanding over problematic validity claims insofar as this takes place under conditions of 
communications that enable the free processing of topics and contributions, information and 
reasons in the public space constituted by illocutionary obligations. The expression also refers 
indirectly to bargaining processes as these are regulated by discursive grounded procedures” 
(1996a:107-8).  
87. Besson & Marti, 2006b: xvii. See also Mansbridge, 2006. 
88. See Pettit, 2008. 
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based in a tension between participation and deliberation is certainly attenuated.89 
Voting conserves its decision-making character, selecting candidates that would not 
be neutral in the discussion and defence of the interests, values and preferences of 
their electorate.90 This can be justified in deliberative terms, first, because democracy 
is understood as an ongoing process of will-formation in which even when it arrives 
at temporary agreements regarding norms that coordinate interaction in society, this 
does not imply an ethical agreement that dissolves the commitment to pluralism. 
Secondly and consequentially, the possibility of contesting and reviewing such 
agreements by those who disagree, as a fundamental element of democracy, 
recognizes great importance to the responsiveness of the political system and 
therefore to the input legitimacy of elections. 
3.2 Two-track democracy and deliberative elections 
The second way in which elections might have room in a deliberative model depends 
on the fact that elections can be influenced by a broader process of deliberation in the 
public sphere. Habermas, driven by the idea of functional differentiation, highlights a 
model of two-track deliberative democracy’ in which citizens’ participation is not 
carried out only by voting but also through the activities of civil society associations, 
political parties and mass media all of which generate an informal deliberation 
‘track’, a diagnosis of social problems, influencing the political system, and 
eventually causing struggle.91 In fact, Habermas dissolves formal and informal 
participation by appealing to the idea of “‘subjectless’ forms of communication”, 
which flow from the citizens and the public sphere deliberative forums into the 
                                                 
89. See e.g. Levi, 2013:355-7. 
90. See Habermas, 1996a:487-8. 
91. See Habemas, 1996a: Ch. 5. 
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political system’s deliberation which in turn converts this into administrative – and 
purely strategically-oriented – power.92  
Individually considered, people have limited possibilities to influence public 
decisions. However, civil society organizations may enjoy considerable strength and 
the ability to evaluate, question and influence the political agenda ‘from the periphery 
to the centre’.93 They can operate directly within the government decision-making 
process, for instance, by means of government consultation mechanisms through 
which civil society is heard. Furthermore, they can operate indirectly through their 
influence on the public sphere’s debate, which shapes public opinion on certain 
issues. Even more, “in a perceived crisis situation” when the political system is 
particularly irresponsive to the demands of civil society, “the actors in civil society 
thus far neglected in our scenario can assume a surprisingly active and momentous 
role”.94 The spontaneous actions of members of civil society through protest, civil 
disobedience and radical forms of political antagonism might permeate the political 
system reconnecting society and politics.95  
Deliberation, therefore, is not an activity that occurs just within institutions. At the 
same time that this might diminish the importance of elections as the main 
participatory channel, it also opens up a new viewpoint from which to see a relation 
of reinforcement between deliberation and elections.96 Elections, from a deliberative 
point of view, are moments of decision-making that to be valuable must be preceded 
and followed by a process of discussion and the interchange of opinions and 
information, which result in that decision being the conclusion of a procedure 
oriented by reason. 
                                                 
92. “[…]. Only in this anonymous form can its communicatively fluid power bind the 
administrative power of the state apparatus to the will of the citizens” (Habermas, 1996a:136). 
93. See Habermas, 1996a:359ff. 
94. Habemas, 1996a:380. 
95. See Habermas, 1996a:379-87. 
96. See Levy, 2013.  
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Probably the more important example in which democratic elections are tied with 
public sphere deliberation is in electoral campaigns, which are prospective-oriented 
discourses and are directed to address electors. Electoral campaigns are just the 
central moment of a constant, ongoing reflection and awareness occurring within the 
public sphere about the importance of the elections and what is at stake in them. 
Whether campaigns are made for persuading, informing or mobilizing electors, they 
are part of the general process in which people formulate their opinions, shape their 
values and take their decisions.97 That deliberative process of will-formation and 
decision-making in the public sphere resonates in the electoral outcomes. 
Consequentially, that deliberative process affects the way in which those outcomes 
influence the representative institutions. 
3.3 A Family Quarrel? 
Frank Michelman has suggested that any possible disagreement between Habermas’ 
deliberative model and democratic republicanism is a family quarrel due to their 
general similarities.98 Similar judgement could be made about the law-making process 
of certain contestatory theorists that favours a view of representative practices not 
very different from Habermas’ decision-oriented deliberative model. In the worst case 
scenario, these approaches to democracy are not identical nor opposed, but 
complementary.99 
Some theories of contestation, such as Mouffe’s, commonly manifest their strong 
opposition to a deliberative model of law-making, considering it harmful for 
democracy because its demand for rational agreements has a propensity for 
neutralizing conflict, depoliticizing society and avoiding the development of forms of 
                                                 
97. On democratic theory and electoral campaigns, see Gardner, 2008.  
98. See Michelman, 1996a. 
99. See e.g. Markell, 1997.  
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contestation against the hegemonic dimension of consensus.100 Even if it is correct, 
this is a criticism that can be directed only against pure-deliberative democrats; 
regarding Habermas, such a criticism only stands if it is focussed on his philosophical 
presuppositions, but disregards the realist concern underlying his proposals to 
regulate democratic practices.101 Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy seems 
equipped to avoid those criticisms: first of all, as a result of his emphasis on the 
“institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and conditions of 
communications”, rather than with the achievement of a factual consensus.102 One 
expression of this is the admission of instrumental rationality as being indicative of 
political plurality, which can play a role in the generation of spaces of dissent and 
resistance.103 Secondly, he recognizes the importance of contestation as a 
fundamental element of democracy, which is expressed, for example, in his theory of 
the public sphere or in his demand for broader public participation, which play an 
important role that eventually takes the form of a “struggle over needs”,104 and 
therefore might limit the hegemonic closure of the political system.105 The opposition 
between accord and struggle can be dissipated if it is conceived the possibility to 
think about accord as part of a more complex kind of struggle.106  
Others explicitly recognize their similarities, deeming deliberation as one of the basic 
requirements of contestatory practices. Pettit, for instance, believes that contestation 
requires, first, that the “decision-making [be] conducted in such a way that there is a 
                                                 
100. See Mouffe, 2000: Ch. 4. See also Meckstroth, 2009. 
101. See Khan, 2013:2. See also Markell, 1997. 
102. Habermas, 1996a:298.. 
103.  See e.g. Meckstroth, 2009:419. 
104. Habermas, 1996a:314. 
105. See Markell, 1997: 391-5. The agonistic theory of contestation, as noticed by Kahn (2013), in 
fact shows some convergence with Habermasian democracy: first, by highlighting the 
importance of civic accord as a framework of recognition; second, through the recognition of 
conflict and disagreement as a legitimate political element; and third, the value it accords to 
collective self-government as a democratic ideal. Others have also noticed some common 
points and relations between deliberative and agonistic democracy. See also Shaap, 2006; 
Knops, 2007; and Gürsözlü, 2009. 
106. See Meckstroth, 2009:419. 
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potential basis for contestation”.107 Even recognizing that a bargain-style of decision-
making can also become effectively an object of practice for contestation, he argues 
that a decision-making process wherein decisions are supported by reasons and those 
reasons are subjected to public debate provides more and better opportunities for 
contestation.108 Well-structured decision-making procedures “allow statement[s] to be 
supported and contradicted in ways that may catch [the] attention of unspecified non-
elites”.109 In particular, publicity and visibility of procedures, discussions and 
decisions permit the instantiation of a controlled and moderated political conflict that 
is productive for democracy.110  
3.4 Contestatory elections 
Democracy as contestation emphasises the shortcomings of electoral and 
parliamentary practice to express the existent plurality of interests, values and 
subjectivities. Its defendants are driven by a suspicion “of attempts to determine in 
advance what is to count as legitimate political action because this too often becomes 
a way of coopting radical challenges to the dominant interests within a society”.111  
Elections, in particular, embrace the “permanent possibility that this or that minority 
– stable or issue based – will be overlooked in the electoral process” and 
consequentially in the representative practices.112  
                                                 
107. Pettit, 1997:187. 
108. Pettit, 1997:187; Pettit, 2008:151-3. The failure of the deliberative process to reach consensus 
is not seen as problematic, from this point of view, because deliberation is seen as instrumental 
to contestation practices (Pettit, 1997:199). 
109. Sharpf, 1998:13. He continues: “Publicness works as powerful censorship mechanism [...]. 
That does not rule out self-serving communications. In public debates, however, self-interest is 
forced to masquerade as public interest - at which point the possibility of contestation allows 
competing interest or public-interested critics to challenge such claims” (Sharpf, 1998:13). 
110. See, generally, Goldoni, 2013a. 
111. Shaap, 2006:257. See also Pettit, 1997:183-4. 
112. See Pettit, 2000:126. 
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However, contestation is a reactive activity that must be performed under adversarial 
conditions. The alternative – to give protection to the interests of the minority – 
would be to grant them veto powers,113 which are deeply incompatible with even the 
expression of the majority and highly unconvincing as democratic model.114 
Challenging domination requires a target, and the outcomes of a process of elections 
and representative law-making are the logical target of any action of contestation. 
Moreover, this is not just logical but also democratically necessary. Democratic 
elections are not an arbitrary means to decide about who the authorities will be and 
which kind of decisions they will take. In this line, Bonnie Honig recognizes that the 
politics of decision-making (“the politics of settlement”) and the politics of 
contestation (“the politics of unsettlement”) represent “two impulses of political life, 
the impulses to keep the contest going and the impulse to be finally freed of the 
burdens of contest”.115  
Elections may have the potential to select and introduce interests into the law-making 
process. Even from the perspective of suspicion, the fact that “[t]hose who stand for 
political office will have an incentive to enhance their chances of election and re-
election by promoting any cause that can attract general support”,116 augments the 
chances of a “generous supply of candidates for consideration as matter of common, 
recognisable interests”.117 Pettit’s metaphor clarifies this in arguing that elections 
play the authorial dimension of democratic control over the government while 
contestation plays an editorial role.118  
Finally, there is another aspect where contestation and elections are compatible and 
even mutually dependent: elections may assume a contestatory role as contestation 
                                                 
113. See e.g. Buchannan & Tullock, 1999; Tsebelis, 2002. 
114. See Pettit, 2000:118-9. 
115. Honig, 1993a:14. 
116. Pettit, 2000:125. 
117. Pettit, 2000:116. 
118. See Pettit, 2000:114-8. 
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forums. According to Scharpf, elections are “important as the infrastructure of 
political accountability which institutionalizes and reinforces the normative 
orientation of office holders toward the public interest”.119 This contestatory 
potential, however, requires very demanding circumstances to be fruitful, which 
shows strong similarities with the requirements of deliberative processes. The rule of 
law, political participation, strong and plural civil society, competitive political 
parties, and credible media demonstrate that “conditions are in place, public power is 
exercised in the shadow of public attention and of public debates that have the 
potential of affecting the outcome of upcoming elections”.120 It is contexts such as 
these that it becomes possible and can be expected from citizens “to make sense of 
what it is happening and to respond to specific policy choices by approval, 
unconcern, or active opposition”.121  
III UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE 
The previous observation can contribute to affirm the value of voting, due its 
potential to generate democratic legitimacy, as a fundamental right in a democratic 
state. This section deals with universal suffrage, the other principle involved in the 
claim that democracy may assume the role of a normative ideal. However, the idea of 
universal suffrage as a normative principle must also be, as with the right to vote, 
developed and framed in constitutional language. To sustain that universal suffrage 
can adopt such a form, one must avoid an understanding of the franchise as fully 
contingent, inherently particularistic and dependent upon historical conditions.122 The 
                                                 
119. Scharpf, 1999:14. 
120. Scharpf, 1999:14. See the proposal of Gardner (2008) in which he argues that electoral 
campaigns have a general contestatory potential, becoming “a forum not just for peasant, 
voluntary, reinforcing encounters with like-minded, but also unwanted, destabilizing, and 
perhaps unpleasant encounters with those who hold different or even contrary views” (160).  
121. Scharpf, 1998:13 (1999?). See also Goldoni, 2013b:1074. 
122. Dahl, 1989:120-1. See below Chapter 6, Section III.1. 
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conclusion that there is no rational explanation available to the problem of inclusion 
must also be avoided.123  
1 The problem of boundaries 
The answer to the question about who should be entitled to vote in a democracy is not 
self-evident. This question has been highlighted by political theorists such as Robert 
Dahl and Frederick Whelan as the problem of inclusion in democracy or the problem 
of ‘the boundaries’.124 The answers to the question of the boundaries are complex, 
generate considerable debate and are marked by ambiguities.125 It is surprising, given 
the depth of the discussion about who must be included, and how the line must be 
drawn, how little attention has been paid to the indicators which demonstrate that 
somebody is included, being commonly assumed that being part of the political 
community is associated to/can be reduced to the legal entitlement to vote in 
elections. 
While admitting the danger of oversimplification, it may be said that there are two 
main kinds of reasoning used to answer the question of boundaries. The first starts 
from the premise that inclusion/exclusion proceeds according to some substantive 
principle or standard. The second follows the idea that it must be settled according to 
some legitimate procedural mechanism.126 Both propose a basis from which to 
determine who is included or excluded. Two examples of these kinds of reasoning 
                                                 
123. See Näsström, 2007:631-4. The boundaries problem has been usually framed in terms of 
complex and indeterminate questions about who are ‘the people’, how ‘the demos’ can be 
legitimately constituted, or who participate in its initial founding decision. See Näsström, 
2007. See also Whelan, 1983; Scherz, 2013. 
124. See Whelan, 1983; Dahl, 1989:119. The literature has grown recently. For an overview of the 
literature, see López-Guerra, 2005; Arrhenious, 2005; Cheneval, 2006; Goodin, 2007; 
Näsström, 2007; Weale, 2007:207-226; Beckman, 2009; Miller, 2009; Näsström, 2011; 
Saunders, 2012; Song, 2012; Scherz, 2013; López-Guerra, 2014a. 
125. See Dahl, 1989:120-1. 
126. The framing of these answers to the question of the franchise between principles and 
procedures has been taken from Note, 1987.  
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can be useful in highlighting some of the problems that a successful answer to the 
boundaries question must overcome. 
1.1 A human right to vote 
A first answer to the problem of the boundaries can be associated with a principled 
version of the franchise and has as its main tenets the idea of the right to vote as a 
human right and the claim of universal suffrage as its natural consequence. Every 
human being qua human being should be entitled to vote and the role of government 
must be limited to facilitating and protecting such a right.127  
This answer is difficult to defend in practice. At least two reasons support a strong 
intuition that undermines the above approach, both of which are associated with the 
participatory nature of the vote as a political right. First, those who will not be 
affected by a decision which issues from the process of decision-making can hardly 
claim to be included.128 Second, to engage in democratic process demands some kind 
of capacity: for instance, a baby cannot personally participate in democratic practices 
as a matter of fact.129  
                                                 
127. There are common presuppositions and strong ties between a conception of the right to vote as 
a human right grounded in the rational natural law, a conception of the political society based 
on a rational contract which articulates plural pre-political interests, and an aggregative 
conception of democracy. See Michelman, 1989:445-7. Miller (2009) assumes part of these 
premises when he argues that it “is going to appear anomalous if there are people not currently 
included in the demos whose interests are nonetheless impacted by the decision [democracy] 
takes” (214). 
128. Transient foreigners are the core case in which the attribution of the right to vote would be 
arbitrarily granted, especially when the working hypothesis is the nation-state franchise. See 
Beckman, 2009: 80-8. 
129. See Dahl, 1989:126-8. See also Saunders, 2011: 286. See also above Chapter 4, Section III. 
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The problem of grounding enfranchisement in humanity130 is not just its 
counterintuitive consequences, but that it is democratically problematic. Some critics 
of this idea suggest that this conception of the franchise is hardly compatible with the 
foundations of democracy as self-government. This is so, because democracy as a 
process of decision-making requires, as a matter of operation, the previous 
determination of those who are going to participate in the process.131 The problem, 
therefore, is that “an unbounded demos is not a performative demos because it cannot 
act”.132 At least, it cannot act in terms of a process that involves the institutions to 
which current democratic practices are tied: voting, discussion in the public sphere 
and parliament-producing decisions, the contestation of such decisions, and so on. 
Therefore, it cannot achieve the democratic ideal of the production of outcomes that 
can be recognized as common. In this sense, the openness of the franchise 
undermines the possibilities for not just democratic deliberation, but also social 
justice and solidarity through democracy.133  
1.2 Democratic self-definition 
If the universalistic principle of inclusion failed due not only to its disconnection 
from reality, but more especially owing to the lack of closure demanded by 
democracy, a second and different answer can proceed from the very negation of the 
premises of the first. There is no principle to which one might appeal in this matter 
because there exists no such thing as a human right to vote. This right is a political 
right – not a human right134– and as such, it corresponds to the polity to decide who is 
                                                 
130. Must be noted that the reference to humanity is already exclusionary and is premised in the 
problematic question of who is to be counted as member of these group (see Beckman, 
2014:2).  
131. An unbounded franchise would imply that everybody that is enfranchised is at the same time 
free to enter into the country to exercise his or her suffrage (a policy of open borders). 
132. Scherz, 2013:6. See also Cheneval, 2006; Lindahl, 2007. 
133. See Song, 2012. 
134. Regarding the distinction between the right(s) of man and rights of citizen, see Marx, 1844. 
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entitled to it.135 In a democracy, people must be entitled to take decisions, especially 
the more important decisions. Firstly, these decisions cannot be imposed externally, 
and secondly, between the several options available to regulate some aspect of 
people’s lives, the people should be able to choose freely the best according to their 
own preferences and their own sense of identity.136 However, such a simple 
democratic principle becomes considerably more problematic when the decision that 
must be taken concerns who will be entitled to take part in those decisions, that is, the 
definition of the rules of membership.137 
Defenders of self-definition argue that statutes passed by a parliament make 
membership rules an outcome of a democratic decision that must be respected as 
such, insofar as some basic deliberative standards have been followed and everybody 
has been listened. This would hold, for instance, if these decisions are the outcome of 
procedures that include long and detailed public debate in which the arguments of all 
sectors of society are considered, and they are carried out by the representatives of 
the people from diverse political tendencies.138 These may be, some argue, 
‘democratic exclusions’ or exclusions from the franchise that are democratically 
justified.139  
                                                 
135. This answer, instead of principles or standards, places an emphasis upon procedures or 
processes. Here again, there are common presuppositions and ties between a conception of the 
right to vote as a politically manufactured right, grounded in “determinations of the prevailing 
political will”, a conception of political society based on a common good, and democracy as a 
process of self-government (Michelman, 1989:445-6).  
136. See Altman, 2005:264. 
137. For a discussion of this problem in the case of CD, see below Chapter 7, Section I.  
138. See Altman, 2005:267-9. 
139. See Beckman, 2009:4. The belief that there is no democratic principle that orders the inclusion 
or the exclusion of anybody is compatible both with the minimalist claim according to which 
democratic procedures are the only important factor in determining self-definition to be 
democratic (Schumpeter, 1976:243-5) and with the strong republican idea that “the 
establishment and endurance of a constitutional right is strictly a matter of resolution on the 
part of the people politically engaged; the right has no grounding beyond actual human 
determination and therefore can exert no claims against the political resolutions that alone give 
it existence” (Michelman, 1989:446). 
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When it is observed that this merely procedural solution is compatible with a regime 
of apartheid, such as that which affected South Africa for many years, the problem 
that underlies self-definition becomes apparent. Even when the decisions are taken by 
majority-rule and with respect for other democratic procedures, the exclusion of part 
of the population from the franchise scarcely allows such a regime to be called 
democratic. Dahl rightly points out that under such a conception, “democracy is 
conceptually, morally, and empirically indistinguishable from autocracy”.140 This is 
not, to be sure, a quantitative question. The problem exists in a different form when 
those excluded from the franchise constitute the majority or a minority of the 
population, as was seen in the segregation policies affecting the US. In this case, self-
definition is in addition a paradigmatic case of the tyranny of the majority. This 
strong intuition about the arbitrariness of assessing inclusion just in terms of 
democratic procedures highlights the importance of the problem of the ‘legitimacy of 
the people’ as a distinct and separate problem from the ‘legitimacy of the 
government’;141 while both are problems of democratic legitimacy, the latter concerns 
the circumstances of the decision-making process, whilst the former is related to the 
subject that makes such decisions.  
Democratic self-definition faces, therefore, a problem of circularity when it is the 
case that the community decides on its own membership: “The people cannot decide 
until someone decides who are the people”,142 because the “criteria or bounds of the 
citizen body […] is a matter that is logically prior to the operation of the majority 
principle, and cannot be solved by it”.143 The decision concerning the boundaries of 
the franchise is always conditioned by its own basis, and unless this basis – the 
current members of the franchise – is presupposed to be democratically 
                                                 
140. Dahl, 1989:121. See also Scherz, 2013:2. 
141. See, generally, Näsström, 2007. 
142. Jennings, cited in Scherz, 2013:1. 
143. Whelan, 1983:16. 
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legitimated,144 there is an infinite regress. The question of the boundaries seems to 
refuse democratic theorization in terms of procedures of decision-making.145 
The answers to the question of the boundaries offered by universalism and 
proceduralism have been demonstrated to be inadequate. This does not mean that any 
principled or procedural solution, or a compromise between them, will necessarily 
fail to give rational grounds for the boundaries of democratic citizenship. The 
problems of closure and arbitrariness highlight the difficulties that such an enterprise 
must overcome to be successful. 
2 The principle of ‘all those subjected to the law’ 
In the literature, a general idea that has become prominent for determining inclusion 
within the franchise is the ‘all affected’ principle. According to this principle, all the 
people affected by a decision in a relevant manner should have a right to be involved 
in the process of decision-making.146 Its prestige resides in the supposition that it is a 
principle that answers the question of the boundaries democratically.147 It does so by 
stipulating a ground for inclusion that, firstly, avoids the arbitrariness of a definition 
that does the legitimacy to decide on the franchise as a granted power of the 
institutions of the state, therefore avoiding a conception of democracy as a form of 
decision-making but by adopting democracy as a normative ideal. Secondly, it is very 
attractive in the sense that apparently closes the circle of electors, thus avoiding the 
democratic problems of universalism, according to which everyone has the right to be 
included.148  
                                                 
144. See e.g. Rawls, 1996:12. cf Cheneval, 2006; Näsström, 2007:628-9. 
145. See e.g. López-Guerra, 2014b. 
146. See Dahl, 1989:119-31. Detailed treatment and literature review in Beckman, 2009. See also 
Goodin, 2007. 
147. See Arrhenious, 2005:5. 
148. See Arrhenious, 2005:8.  
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The principle of ‘all affected’ presents a strong relation with normative conception of 
democracy sketched in Section I, which in turn is based in the general idea that 
legitimate law only can be produced by a process in which all those whose interests 
are at stake are granted equal chances to influence the decisions. If linked to the idea 
that the right to vote is a fundamental mechanism of participation offered in Section 
II, this principle could be regarded as the adequate distributive principle of the 
franchise. 
The problems afflicting the ‘all affected’ principle, however, are important. Firstly, it 
is a proposal that would lead to a constantly fluctuating franchise, because those 
affected by one decision would not necessarily be affected by another. Each decision 
would demand a different composition of the franchise, presenting a problem of 
indeterminacy that resonates in the functionality of democracy. However, the 
problems do not stop there. Secondly, those affected by a decision are affected in 
differing proportions or degree, and therefore to be responsive to this principle some 
people affected greatly should be entitled to greater participation in those decisions. 
This is problematic since it is impossible or very difficult to assess degrees of 
affectedness. It is also problematic in that this would prove incompatible with our 
current arrangements based on an equal distribution of rights of participation. 
Thirdly, to determine who is going to be affected by a decision, it is necessary to 
know the outcome of the decision in which people are entitled to participate, 
something which cannot, of course, be determined in advance. There is, therefore, a 
problem of circularity in the ‘all affected’ principle.149 Some have tried to avoid this 
circularity, reframing the terms of the principle as ‘all those potentially affected’.150 
However, that necessarily leads to the inclusion of the whole of humanity as members 
of the franchise (eventually including future generations).151  
                                                 
149. See Whelan, 1983:17. See also Cheneval, 2006:163; Miller, 2009:214-8. 
150. See, generally, Goodin, 2007. 
151. See e.g. the proposals of Beckman, 2009: Ch. 7. 
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If a framework comprising an existing nation-state with a territorial jurisdiction is 
assumed, the problem of universality can be avoided by readapting the ‘all affected’ 
principle to the more modest principle of inclusion of all those ‘subjected to the law’ 
of the nation-state in question.152 This principle calls for the inclusion within the 
franchise of all of those permanent residents of the state, independently of their 
national citizenship.153 This limited version of the principle does not necessarily 
constitute a criterion for the constitution of the people as a collective agent, and it 
does not provide an exhaustive standard to distribute all entitlement to participate, but 
it can be adequate to “determine a right to participation in deliberation, decision-
making or compensation for negative effects” in the context of the national 
jurisdictions.154  
The assumption of this principle is critical for a polity that is meant to be composed 
of equal members, because it assigns equal influence in the political space to each of 
them. Distribution of electoral power is, therefore, based on political equality, which 
renders all opinions and interests held by individuals of equal value and therefore 
deserving of the same influence in the process of decision-making.155 It is also central 
in a society which recognises that equality corresponds to the plurality of conceptions 
of life, that in turn are related to both the pursuit of individual interests, but also to an 
idea of the common interest through a practice of public participation; that plurality 
must be translated into free and equal participation and influence. Finally, the idea of 
‘all subjected to the law’ is central to the aspiration, based upon the recognition of 
our equality and plurality, that we can be self-governed. 
The principle according to which all those subjected to the law of the territorial state 
must be granted a right to participation in the process of decision-making is, however, 
                                                 
152. See Näsström, 2011:117. 
153. See Dahl, 1989:93-5, 119-31. In similar terms and with same consequences, Miller (2009) 
defends a principle that includes all those coerced by the government (219-25).  
154. Scherz, 2013:6.  
155. See Sadurski, 2008. 
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prone to the criticism that regards the admission of such a normative principle as the 
normalization of the boundaries of the nation-state as the terrain of exclusion, 
marginalization and exploitation.156 If a given state must grant unconditional 
democratic citizenship to all its residents, this will create important incentives to 
adopt a policy of closed borders, increasing the incidence of illegal immigration and 
the consequent social and legal fragility of those without papers. Even if this is the 
case, the dilemma between full democratic citizenship and closed borders falls 
outside of the scope of this work, whose working hypothesis is the determination of 
the franchise of the nation-state. This in turn permits to focus on the complexity of 
the cases and reasons of exclusion within the territorial jurisdiction.  
3 A constitutional conception of universal suffrage 
The normative principle of ‘all subject to the law’ can be linked to the legal principle 
of universal suffrage that has been upheld by the courts of the judicial trend as a basic 
constitutional principle in a democracy. However, prima facie, the concept of 
universal suffrage contains an ambiguity because there is no country that allows all 
its inhabitants to vote, therefore, it is never strictly universal.157 If universal suffrage 
is not universal in a strict sense, what is the nature of its universality? 
A democracy that embraces the principle of universal suffrage must be an inclusive 
democracy.158 This implies that the right to vote is granted in principle to all subjects 
                                                 
156. Näsström, 2007:625-6. cf Song, 2012.  
157. Most of the literature, however, tends to indicate that voting is as widespread as it can be and 
therefore it is not wrong to say that most of the countries of the world provide universal 
suffrage. See Beckman, 2008:29-32. The answer, from an empirical point of view, would 
depend on the formulation of democratic inclusion as either: minimalist (which only requires 
competitive elections), conventionalist (which requires the participation of everybody usually 
not excluded) and maximalist (taking into account the number of residents of the country 
without distinction and then considering those excluded as a democratic deficit). See Beckman, 
2008:34-40. 
158. Against the idea of an exclusive democracy in which the inclusion of new subjects in the 
category of those entitled to vote must be justified by arguments about the contribution that 
those new voters could imply for democracy. From this perspective, the inclusion of the poor, 
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and the exclusion of a subject or group of subjects from the circle of the vote-holders 
must be duly justified. On this model, the principle of universal suffrage is not a 
description of the electoral universe but a rule of the burden of proof required to 
decide which subjects can vote.159 Here, the exclusion of certain groups of voters, for 
example children, can perfectly compatible with the principle of universal suffrage, 
provided that such exclusion is properly justified.160 Such notion was clearly uphold 
by the ECtHR in Hirst: “In the twenty-first century, the presumption in a democratic 
State must be in favour of inclusion […]. Universal suffrage has become the basic 
principle” [59]. It was also uphold by the national courts of the judicial trend.161 
This is the idea presented and developed by Beckman in The Frontiers of Democracy. 
He argues that the delimitation of the political community, which provides the prima 
facie scope of the universal suffrage, must be given by the ‘all subjected’ principle. 
Then, the exceptions to the enfranchisement of permanent residents members must be 
justified in terms of equality and not discrimination: “anyone affected by a 
government should be recognised as a member of the democratic community” 
(universe of analysis); “vote is democratic to the extent that it embraces as many 
members of the community as possible” (burden of proof); and “restrictions should be 
evaluated in terms of their reasonableness” (standard of proof).162 The only limit of 
the justificatory reasoning is that it cannot seek to replace the general rule that in 
principle ‘all subjected to the law’ should be able to vote with, for instance, a rule of 
meritocracy (competence or responsibility), in which by principle only some are 
                                                                                                                                                    
ethnic minorities and women, historically, can be seen as the fruit of a desire for social 
legitimacy and political and social stability. For example, an important part of political science 
literature on that topic evaluates the inclusion of children in terms of their impact on overall 
political participation. If the inclusion of children can provide an input of legitimation based 
on higher voter turnout, their inclusion is justified. If, however, it is found to decrease 
participation, children should not be included (see Wagner et al, 2012:372-83; Wang, 2012: 
Ch. 1. cf López-Guerra, 2010:123-4). 
159. See Hamilton, 2012:1478-84. 
160. See Beckman, 2009:5.  
161. See August [17]; Sauvé [33]; Roach [83].  
162. Beckman, 2009:61. 
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allowed to vote.163 Beckman, finally, recognizes that there are two understandings of 
what can count as an acceptable reason for a restriction to universal suffrage. He 
contrasts conceptions that need to justify exclusion on democratic principles and 
conceptions that justify exclusion in terms of democracy’s competing principles, 
arguing that this later approach is preferable; in fact his own work shows how he can 
found exemption to the universal suffrage on a plurality of arguments, keeping in 
mind that they are not arbitrary.164  
The problem with such a conception was already observed in relation to the 
judgments of the judicial trend.165 It demand only the absence of arbitrariness and 
redirect the democratic problem of exclusion from democracy to the discrete spaces 
in which exclusions occur and are consolidated; spaces in which democratic 
principles lose their specific force. On the one hand, this develops multiple categories 
of exclusion, which can be based on multiple, different and flexible reasons, 
impacting in that people are divested of their democratic citizenship. Additionally, it 
weakens and fragments their effectiveness of their democratic claims for inclusion. 
On the other hand, it considers the suffrage not as a fundamental right but as a right 
that is essentially revocable if a non-arbitrary reason can be offered and balanced 
against the value of voting. In these terms, it implicitly authorizes the institutional 
manufacture and reproduction of social and political inequality. 
A more attractively democratic conception of the principle of universal suffrage, 
which takes into consideration the importance of considering the right to vote as a 
fundamental right in a democracy, must start from the opposite approach. A stronger 
democratic conception of the principle of universal suffrage must consider that any 
exception to the ‘all subjected principle’ is illegitimate unless is compatible with, or 
the implementation of, democratic principles and reasons. This approach has the 
                                                 
163. See e.g. Olsson, 2008:58. 
164. See Beckman, 2009:54. See also López-Guerra, 2014a: Ch. 1. 
165. See above Chapter 2, Section II.2. 
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advantage of presenting a stronger support against the proliferation of exceptions to 
universal suffrage, setting the threshold for exclusion in categorical democratic terms. 
This idea, despite of its appearance of radicalism, can give coverage to most of the 
current rules that govern the franchise in the majority of modern democracies. It 
allows to regulate membership on the basis of the principle of universal suffrage and 
articulating two principles of exclusion that secure the demands, first, of closure of 
the franchise, necessary for democracy work as a decision-making procedure and, 
second, the guarantee of equal participation of its members. 
The first aspect, the need for democratic closure, has been traditionally expressed by 
the exclusion of the foreigner from democratic participation. In this regard, the 
national citizenship166 principle allows the exclusion from the franchise of those who 
are citizens from a foreign country whilst, at the same time, according to the principle 
of universal suffrage, it demands the enfranchisement of all national citizens. This 
exclusion rests on the argued necessity of external boundaries in order for the 
political community to engage in democratic practice.167 Citizenship is the instrument 
of this closure in order to distribute rights and privileges. Despite the function that 
national citizenship can claim to perform, as a presumption of ties, relations and 
interests that are required for a meaningful participation in common affairs, the 
arbitrary nature of nationality based in ius soli and ius sanguini requirements has led 
to several criticisms of national citizenship as the decisive element of the franchise.168 
This debate has grown fundamentally due to the increment of immigration and the 
                                                 
166. National citizenship “is the legal recognition, both domestic and international, that a person is 
a member […] of a state” (Shklar, 1991:4). 
167. The national closure of the franchise assumes the distinction between internal and external 
boundaries. Internal boundaries, currently affecting children, people with mental disabilities 
and offenders can be differentiated thus from the external exclusion of the foreign. 
168. See e.g. Arrhenious, 2005:5. 
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consequential asymmetry between those who are simply residents in a country and 
those who are considered full members of the community.169  
The constitution of a franchise based on permanent residence, as application and 
concretion of the principle of all those subjected to the law, overcomes to some extent 
the arbitrary aspects of the demands for a closure of the franchise.170 It does so, 
however, reaffirming the idea of a democratic exclusion and eventually a democratic 
right to the exclusion of those who are not subject of the law.171 Additionally, 
considering that political participation is not restricted to the exercise of voting, a 
broader idea of participation in deliberative democracy necessarily renders the 
boundaries of participation more fluid, allowing the inclusion within the public 
sphere of the political claims of those that are not formally included and have no right 
to participate.172 Distributing the right to vote based on permanent residence 
recognizes the possibility of exercising a right to formal political participation for 
those residents who, as human beings, are in the position of engaging in political 
communication. 
There is, however, a second democratic demand that may justify exclusion of the 
franchise from those subjected to the law. According to this second aspect, the 
internal boundaries of the franchise (as opposed to the external boundaries of the 
political community) compatible with the principle of universal suffrage can only be 
                                                 
169. The debate has been extended to the related problems of the justification of open or closed 
national borders, the right to immigrate/emigrate and the status of immigrants, asylum seekers, 
refugees and those without papers. Additionally, recent economic and demographic changes 
have put into question the traditional association between democracy and the nation-state as its 
natural domain. These changes call for new interpretations of democratic principles and 
institutions, through new forms of accommodation of sovereignty and human rights claims. See 
e.g. Benhabib, 2005. 
170. Owen (2013), for example, postulates that a solution can be articulated in terms of conferring a 
right to naturalization under reasonable basis. See e.g. in the context of UK voting 
requirements, Lardy, 1997. For a critical comparison between non-citizens and offenders as 
excluded from the franchise, see Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:109-113. 
171. See Beckman, 2014.  
172. For the distinction between the decision-making and the deliberative demos, see Cheneval, 
2006.  
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based on efforts to guarantee the democratic participation of the members of the 
political community. These efforts are currently expressed in the rules for the 
exclusion of the children and some mentally disabled people from the franchise. 
Democracy, as a practice of collective agency “can only include agents, since others 
are simply incapable of participation”.173 These capacity rules allow the exclusion of 
those who are not capable of participating in democratic terms in the political 
process, but at the same time require the enfranchisement of all those who are capable 
of it. This idea, that affects children and people with mental disabilities, is developed 
in greater detail in the following chapter.174  
Summing up, according to the modern practice in western democracies, universal 
suffrage means the universal franchise of capable citizens (or residents). For those 
capable citizens (or residents) the right to vote constitutes a fundamental right, which 
cannot be taken away based on considerations other than citizenship (or residence) 
and capacity. 
IV FRAMING THE PROBLEM OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
1 The democratic problem of disenfranchisement 
Even though at first appearance it may sound exaggerated, to consider that “the right 
to vote is a vehicle for social, economic and political change, as it provides all the 
members of the community with roughly equal opportunity to affect the future 
direction of society”,175 can correlate with a normative theory of democracy. 
Elections have a fundamental value in the process of building democratic legitimacy, 
because they constitute one of the limited moments in which democratic inputs are 
introduced into the decision-making process. According to this understanding of 
                                                 
173. See Saunders, 2011:287.  
174. See below Chapter 4. 
175. Beckman, 2009:1. 
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elections and the right to vote, democracy is not conceived only as a form of 
decision-making, which has been defended for its epistemological advantages in 
adopting better collective decisions, but is instead a form of government vested by 
normative principles that aim at both individual and collective self-government.176 
The right to vote plays a fundamental role in making that those that are subjects to the 
law can also be able to understand themselves as joint-authors of the law. Concerning 
this aspect is that universal suffrage assumes a critical function. 
In this context, offenders, especially when serving prison sentences, are obviously 
subjected to the law; they also are arguably “more clearly affected by the legal system 
than anyone else”.177 From this fact it follows that the offenders are natural 
candidates to have the right to vote under the principle of ‘all affected by the law.178 
Even when accepting this principle in general terms, some authors have argued that 
imprisonment constitutes a clear case of somebody being removed from society and 
therefore not being affected or being affected to a lesser extent by the laws that 
regulate the life of law-abiding citizens.179 This is clearly mistaken. First, because 
prisoners are still affected by most of the laws even when in prison. Second, because 
the idea of being subjected to the law must be interpreted in jurisdictional and not in 
causal terms.180 That is why is not wrong to assume, at least provisionally, that to 
exclude offenders from the franchise violates the principle of ‘all subjected to the 
law’,181 and therefore the principle of universal suffrage. This violation can be 
referred as ‘the democratic problem of CD’, what in turn lead to a strong presumption 
against CD.182 
                                                 
176. See e.g. Sadurski, 2008: Ch. 1.  
177. Beckman, 2009:123. 
178. See Beckman, 2009:123. 
179. See e.g. Clegg, 2002:162. See also Sigler, 2013. 
180. See Beckman, 2009:124-5. 
181. See Hill and Koch, 2011:219. 
182. See Duff, 2005a:215. 
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The Canadian Supreme Court in Sauvé has formulated the democratic problem of CD 
in very precise terms: 
“Denying a citizen the right to vote denies the basis of democratic 
legitimacy. It says that delegates elected by the citizens can then bar those 
very citizens, or a portion of them, from participating in future elections. 
But if we accept that governmental power in a democracy flows from the 
citizens, it is difficult to see how that power can legitimately be used to 
disenfranchise the very citizens from whom the government’s power 
flows” [32]. 
And the necessary conclusion of the view is that 
“A government that restricts the franchise to a select portion of citizens is 
a government that weakens its ability to function as the legitimate 
representative of the excluded citizens, jeopardizes its claim to 
representative democracy” [34]. 
It can be observed that the Court vest its claim that democracy is more than mere 
form of decision-making with theoretical assumptions similar to those offered along 
this chapter. The right to vote is seen as a channel of democratic legitimacy, the 
legitimacy of the government powers is seen as resting in input arising from the 
citizenry and the restriction of the right to vote generate a problem for democratic 
legitimacy. 183 This is so because democracy as a form of self-government demands a 
certain coherent treatment of people in every aspect of their personalities.184 As a 
result of their exclusion from the franchise, offenders are regarded as autonomous 
persons in the private sphere, according to which they can be held legally 
accountable, but they are not considered autonomous in the public sphere.185 This 
                                                 
183. See e.g. Joint Committee, 2013:38.  
184. cf Cholbi, 2002:561. 
185. This “is incoherent, if not perverse”, as is observed by Hill & Koch (2011), who observe the 
same problem using a contractarian language: “One a person’s power to consent […] is 
extinguished it no longer make sense to insist that s/he is still under obligation to submit to the 
rule of the state. This is precisely what prisoners are expected to do, however, ant to a degree 
not required of those in liberty” (221). 
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provokes a serious democratic problem. Those affected by CD are not in the position 
of understanding their duty to follow the law as a result of a process of production of 
democratic legitimacy, and therefore of self-government, but their reasons are 
reduced to threat of punishment. They are reduced to mere subjects of domination.  
As Frank Michelman have suggested, “[i]nsofar as engagement in political self-
government is deemed constitutive of personal freedom, a given person is political 
disfranchisement is prima facie highly suspect, demanding justification”.186 That 
justification must be “robust and principled”.187 The following two chapters are 
devoted to the reconstruction of the main arguments that have been offered to justify 
CD in terms compatible with democracy. Chapter 4 investigates the argument of the 
lack of political capacity, while Chapter 5 the idea of CD as a democratic form of 
punishment.  
Before the analysis of those principled justifications, the remaining of the chapter 
briefly reviews some policy arguments offered to exclude from the franchise those 
offenders that are serving prison sentences.188 
                                                 
186. Michelman, 1989:457.  
187. Joint Committee, 2013:38. 
188. Also limiting its scope to prisoners but arguing from different premises, Peter Ramsay argues 
that CD is the natural consequence of a conception of democracy committed to the idea of self-
government. Those offenders who are currently serving their sentences in prison are 
paradigmatically deprived of civil liberties, and therefore, according to Ramsay, enfranchising 
them would subvert the democratic idea of a self-governing community composed of subjects 
who are considered equally free. CD is, thus, the logical consequence of imprisonment because 
prisoners are deprived of the possibility of the political freedom necessary for being a 
meaningful part of the democratic community. Otherwise, he sustains, the right to vote is 
depoliticised and civil liberties are not regarded ‘essential’ for democracy. A defence of CD is, 
in his terms, a defence of a particular conception of democracy as the self-government of free 
and equal citizens. See Ramsay, 2013a; Ramsay, 2013b; Ramsay, 2013d). On the democratic 
foundation of his account, see Ramsay, 2013c. This argument is extraordinarily interesting but 
for reasons of space and structure it was not possible to address it in this dissertation. 
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2 Excluding pragmatic arguments against voting from prison 
In a very recent book, López-Guerra presented a fundamental idea for understanding 
the restrictions that can affect the right to vote. He argues that the right to vote 
includes two dimensions that must be distinguished for an adequate assessment of 
such restrictions: first, the right to enfranchisement and, second, the right to have the 
opportunity to vote. Restrictions to the first dimension are or must be strictly reasons 
of principle. The people excluded from the franchise do not deserve to be entitled to 
vote. In contrast, restrictions to the second dimension are pragmatic and related to the 
consequences of developing mechanisms for people in special circumstances to be 
able to exercise the right to vote.189 In the case of prisoners, concretely, these 
pragmatic arguments are connected with the problems surrounding a vote from prison 
and not necessarily with a problem of prisoners voting.190  
2.1 ‘Their choices have put them in that position’ 
To start with, it has been suggested that the state should not develop a special 
mechanism which would enable prisoners to vote from prison, since these prisoners, 
through their own actions, have placed themselves in a position in which they are 
impeded to exercise the right to vote.191 The position of the prisoners might be such, 
under this hypothesis, that even if in principle they are entitled to cast the ballot, they 
are in fact impeded from doing so.192 According to this argument, they are in a 
position similar to that of somebody who freely chooses to climb a mountain the day 
of the election, rather than that of somebody who must be hospitalised due to a 
                                                 
189. See López-Guerra, 2014a:118-124. 
190. These two categories of limitation usually overlap in practice, especially in those countries that 
have developed alternative voting devices for people with special needs, such as postal voting, 
and only apply CD to those offenders currently in prison. In these cases, the distinction has 
more analytical value than actual practical implications. 
191. See August [8, 13]. 
192. This is, therefore, a different argument from the argument of punishment that implies 
arguments of principle to justify disenfranchisement.  
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serious disease and who, lacking any special mechanism, would be impeded from 
voting.193 This involves a highly contentious assumption: prisoners have voluntarily 
chosen to be in prison and, therefore, do not deserve the benefit of special 
mechanisms for voting. 
This argument was put forward by the South African Government in both August and 
NICRO, arguing that “the categories of persons for whom special arrangements 
should be made had to be limited” [NICRO, 41] and that law-abiding citizens must 
have priority over offenders for the provision of facilities to register and vote. The 
Court produced a clear and strong response that questioned both of the 
aforementioned assumptions. In August, the Court sustained that “when people are 
imprisoned, they are forced to leave their homes and to reside in prison. They have no 
choice” [27]. A few years later, NICRO, the Court added: “Prisoners are prevented 
from voting by the provisions of the Electoral Act and by the action that the state has 
taken against them” [53]. Other categories of persons could encounter difficulties in 
exercising their right to vote (“citizens abroad, pilots, long-distance truck drivers”), 
but prisoners are in a position in with they do not face any “difficulty”; rather, they 
suffer from the “impossibility” of enjoying their rights [August, 30]. The Court in 
Chan Kin Sum was even clearer: “he is prevented by the authorities, against his 
wishes, from physically attending a polling station to vote” [179]. 
This argument also depends on the question of why the vote is not facilitated for 
everybody, even those who consciously decide to climb a mountain on election day. 
Reasons to deny access to the vote to people that have voluntarily put themselves in 
that situation might be of two types. The first kind of reason is related to considering 
elections as a sacred civic ceremony. This vision is likely to embrace ideas of voting 
as a civic duty that requires some degree of seriousness. According to this view, there 
are important symbolic motives for avoiding the proliferation of alternative 
                                                 
193. See López-Guerra, 2014a:126. 
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mechanisms of voting. This view does not offer powerful reasons to exclude 
prisoners: first, it constitutes a reason for the elimination of alternative mechanisms 
of voting in all cases, not simply that of prisoners; second, it only points towards a 
preference for the installation of a ballot box in the prison over systems of, for 
instance, postal-voting. Another kind of reason for excluding every kind of absent 
elector consists in that creating a mechanism for them to vote can prove both costly 
and difficult. 
2.2 ‘It is costly and involves logistical complications’ 
In August, the Court considered the argument of the cost of enfranchising prisoners. 
The Court rejected the argument of the “insurmountable logistical, financial and 
administrative complications” of prisoners’ voting [8]. There are two interconnected 
aspect of this argument: economic and logistic. Creating a mechanism for voting from 
prison implies an economic cost that must be assumed by the government and which 
poses the question of why the community must assume this additional cost. However, 
this argument lacks power if it is assumed that the right to vote is a fundamental right 
and prisoners are, in principle, entitled to it. The argument is self-defeating: “a 
government could always save money by not holding elections”.194 Beneath the 
surface of this argument, especially when it is claimed that other categories of 
persons who could experience difficulties in exercising their right to vote must be 
prioritized when assigning scarce resources, lies the unacceptable notion that 
prisoners are unworthy citizens, who the electoral costs policy views as being of 
bottom priority. 
However, this issue cannot be reduced merely to an economic perspective. Allowing 
imprisoned offenders to vote would bring about a series of inconvenient logistical 
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problems.195 First, a decision is required concerning whether to allow them to vote by 
post or proxy, or to locate a ballot box inside the prison. Second, it would be 
necessary to extend the system of registration, when necessary, to make it available 
for prisoners.196 Third, it would be necessary to decide where they are going to vote. 
Finally, aspects of security of the prison must be considered. The complexity 
involved in a programme to answer adequately these questions could threaten 
electoral integrity. 
All of these concerns are easily answered once – as a question of principle – the vote 
is granted to prisoners. These are not strong reasons in themselves to deny prisoners 
the right to vote and prison voting is implemented without incident in numerous 
jurisdictions. First, both the installation of a ballot box inside the prison and voting 
by post or proxy are used in those countries which allow prisoners to vote with no 
cost for electoral integrity.197 Whilst voting inside the prison “increases the likelihood 
of elector participation and enables prisoners to feel more a part of the electoral 
process”,198 voting by post or proxy allows more flexibility in the decision about 
where the prisoners’ votes are to be counted. Second, systems of registration, when 
necessary, would be simpler in the context of the prison.199 Third, both the prison 
locality and a pre-imprisonment residence have been used as residences to inscribe 
prisoners.200 In South Africa, for example, prisoners vote in the constituency in which 
the prison is located, while in Canada and Ireland prisoners vote in an ‘elsewhere’ 
residence (previous residence, family residence, place of one’s arrest, last court of 
sentencing’s constituency).201 Finally, with regards the security of the prison, a 
survey asked prison authorities in countries with prison voting about threats of 
                                                 
195. See the government submission in August [13]. See also Clegg, 2002:172; Brenner & Caste, 
2003:140. 
196. See Lardy, 2002:532. 
197. See August [28]. See also Parkes, 2003:107; Easton, 2006:449; Ispahani, 2009:51. 
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199. See Ispahani, 2009:52. 
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security in the context of elections. They answer was that they “had ever experienced 
a single instance in which prison discipline was disrupted by the electoral process”.202 
In sum, prison voting is “relatively cheap and easy to administer”.203  
2.3 ‘It subjects the local community to an unfair influence’ 
Regarding the constituency in which prisoners are to vote, critics have argued that the 
impact of prisoners voting is unfair for the local community in which the prison is 
located because, given certain circumstances, prisoners could define the election. 
This problem becomes more complex when a big prison is located in a low-populated 
area. In those cases, it is more plausible that the prisoners’ vote could effectively 
determine the electoral result. The alternative is the enfranchisement in an 
‘elsewhere’ residence. However, to enfranchise prisoners in a constituency in which 
they do not currently live, even if it can be demonstrated that they have lived there in 
the past, would not be fair towards that locality because this would include non-
resident voters.  
This argument, it must be assumed, applies only to local elections but not to national 
elections.204 It cannot therefore be taken as a general argument against prisoners 
voting.205 However, even in the case of local elections this is not an inescapable 
problem. First, the problem of prisoners voting must be clearly discerned from the 
problem of voting from prison. Once the enfranchisement of prisoners is assumed to 
be legitimate, the argument of the unfair influence tends to be banished. A similar 
problem has occurred in the US, where local communities have opposed the 
participation of soldiers in the constituencies in which their military base was located. 
                                                 
202. Ispahani, 2009:51. 
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The US Supreme Court considered the disenfranchisement of military forces to be 
against the constitution.206 The way to equilibrate the interests of the local community 
with the interests of these groups of unusual residents must assume other forms than 
CD. Second, there are other alternatives available to circumvent the problem, 
especially when a prison population can decide a local election. Prisoners can be 
enfranchised in the constituencies in which they resided previously or, if their 
previous residence is not known, in the constituency in which they were born.207 
However, when employing these alternatives, it may prove important to determine 
whether short-time prisoners and long-time prisoners could have different interests at 
the time of being enfranchised. Whereas short-term prisoners could be interested in 
maintaining their home districts, especially if they have family residing there, long-
term prisoners are likely to be interested in participating in the elections of the 
constituency in which the prison is located because these may impact upon their lives 
in longer term.208  
2.4 Public authority and electoral influence 
It must be acknowledged that if the voters become the object of coercion, there could 
well be, in principle, good reasons to restrict voting from prison. This may demand a 
preventive measure: to respect democracy as the self-government of citizens, 
prisoners must be disenfranchised with the purpose of avoiding the government’s 
utilization of its influence over the prisoners in the elections. This affirmation leads 
to the question of how the “integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure” may 
be “undermined by allowing citizens in the wholly dependent condition of prisoners 
to vote”.209  
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The relation of dependence between authority and prisoners has been thoughtfully 
analysed by Beckman. He explains this relation as a conflict between, on the one 
hand, the positive democratic value of the inclusion of prisoners and, on the other 
hand, the need to guarantee the value of political equality that would be undermined 
in those cases in which “public authorities coerce or induce prisoners to vote in 
specific ways”.210 Under certain conditions, CD could effectively help to guarantee 
political equality and electoral integrity but at the cost of limiting the inclusion of 
prisoners within the franchise. 
Beckman’s analysis starts by distinguishing two kinds of abuse involved in electoral 
coercion by executive authorities. On the one hand, this action attacks the value of 
political equality by illegally granting more votes to an electoral option. It can affect 
the integrity of the election and in certain cases even its final result. However, that is 
not the only problem with such an action. In a scenario in which prisoners are 
allowed to vote, coercion also attacks the autonomy of the prisoners by forcing them 
to vote for reasons that they cannot form themselves in a critical exercise. They are 
not voting in the relevant sense of freely and equally expressing their political views 
but only physically casting ballots according to someone else’s preferences. This 
position might be similar to that in which children are under the parental control.211 
Disenfranchising prisoners makes the abuse of authority against electoral integrity 
impossible, but only at the cost of committing the second abuse of authority against 
the prisoner’s political autonomy. A questionable conception of the principle of 
political equality is protected at the expense of the prisoners’ political freedom of 
autonomy. However, if it is acknowledged that it is not the prisoners’ right to vote 
that causes the problem but the fraudulent conduct of the authorities, the solution 
must involve acting against the fraud rather than against the victims of the fraud.212  
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An understandable objection to this conclusion rightly highlights that “with the 
exception of some developed countries, the condition in many prisons around the 
world are such that the risk of coerced voting is very high”.213 This would depend on 
the particular conditions of the prison system and should be decided on a case-by-
case basis. In some cases, the electoral fraud may be committed directly by the prison 
authorities under the control of the government, in other cases a lack of control over 
conditions inside the prison may allow criminal organizations operating inside the 
prison to sell prisoners’ votes to the highest bidder. A realistic view of such cases 
cannot trust that prison conditions would be improved by governments whose sole 
intention was allowing prisoners’ voting. There is a case for CD in those contexts in 
which prison conditions are unlikely to change, which holds until such time as they 
change. López-Guerra, who sustains this view, emphasises that this is not a 
justification for excluding prisoners from the franchise but simply a justification for 
not adopting a device to allow voting from prison. The first, he maintains, sends the 
message that prisoners deserve political exclusion, whereas the second “is an 
indicator of unacceptable life conditions […which] does not speak negatively of 
inmates, but of the society where they live”.214  
This objection must be considered carefully. To start with, it must be emphasised that 
it is far from constituting a general objection to prisoners voting; rather, it applies as 
an objection under certain circumstances. It is also very important to distinguish 
carefully, (1) those countries in which electoral coercion or electoral fraud are 
widespread from (2) those countries in which this situation affects only certain 
groups, such as prisoners. In the first case, arguments based on equality and electoral 
integrity are redundant because to exclude prisoners in those countries does not help 
to guarantee electoral integrity whatsoever. In the second case, however, the 
prospects for prisoners voting are not as dismal as López-Guerra claims. The case in 
which problems of coercion affect the prison system but not the electoral system as a 
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whole does indeed present a challenge for the electoral inclusion of prisoners, but not 
an insurmountable one. The protection of autonomous suffrage can overcome the 
problems of coercion by means of an adequate institutional design that does not 
necessarily compromise on complete prison reform. Three directions that this design 
might assume can be suggested. First, the development of stricter security measures is 
necessary to avoid coercion in the moment of casting the vote,215 for instance, by the 
strong institutional warranty of a secret ballot. Second, the electoral act should be 
administered by an institution totally independent of prison services, and elections 
within the prison must admit impartial observers. Third, it is highly advisable that the 
results of the election within the prison not be made available for prisoners or the 
inmates themselves because this could lead to undesirable retaliations. These 
plausibly achievable conditions would limit considerably the possibilities of electoral 
coercion by the prison authorities and the executive branch. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the pragmatic arguments for denying the vote to 
prisoners are not conclusive and, what is more, they imply preconceptions about 
prisoners as less worthy members of the community. 
                                                 
215. Easton, 2006:451. 
 4 
 
THE ARGUMENT OF CIVIC VIRTUE 
he legal nature of CD poses a difficult question: some consider it as 
regulative as opposed to punitive, while the right answer is probably 
that “there is an element of punishment, and also an element of 
electoral law”,1 thus it should be considered as both punitive and 
regulative. This chapter engages with the regulative dimension in which those 
affected by CD are considered as electors or potential electors. The punitive 
dimension, in which those disenfranchised are considered as offenders, forms the 
subject of the next chapter.2  
For those who support a regulative CD, its role is negatively to determine the scope 
of the franchise. One of the recurrent arguments supporting CD is based on the idea 
that offenders might vote disruptively, with the purpose of undermining the core 
values and institutions of liberal democracy. But it is considerably problematic for a 
democratic government to exclude some citizens from the franchise based on an 
assumption about how they are going to vote because democratic legitimacy depends 
at least partially on the people’s freedom to decide. However, it might be permissible 
to exclude certain individuals from the franchise for reasons grounded in their 
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2. See below Chapter 5. 
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political capacity if their exclusion regards their inputs in the political process rather 
than outputs. In that case, it would adhere to a reasoning supported by an institutional 
practice that allows the electoral exclusion of children and people with mental 
disabilities.3 Tracking the similarities with the exclusion of children can sustain a line 
of argument usually implied in the discourses supporting CD. Structuring this 
argument in a rational discourse compatible with democratic principles requires the 
elaboration of a concept of political capacity sufficiently thin to avoid the suspicion 
of an ‘abuse of the franchise’ but thick enough to include elements linked to the 
‘character’ of offenders.  
The argument is developed as follows. Section I analyses the classical argument of 
disruptive voting. Section II presents the case for CD based on offenders’ lack of 
political capacity. A deficit of this capacity would justify CD as it does with the 
electoral exclusion of children. Political capacity is constructed in terms of including 
a degree of civic virtue, with the help of Rawls’ concept of ‘sense of justice’. Section 
III subjects this proposal to a critical analysis, by arguing that the exclusion of 
children is based on different premises, and concluding that the argument faces 
insoluble democratic problems. 
I DISRUPTIVE VOTING 
One of the historically most important reasons for the justification of CD argues that 
there is a right of the community to maintain ‘the purity of the ballot box’.4 This 
notion of purity involves the belief that elections and the general democratic process 
is an extremely important aspect of community life, and therefore must not be 
contaminated by the lack of responsibility of unworthy or morally unsuitable 
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elements of society.5 The popularity of this argument is based upon the expressive 
force of the metaphor of the rotten apple in the barrel, which understands offenders as 
an infectious social disease that must be extirpated before it ruins the democratic 
process, which ought to be carried out by honest and virtuous citizens.6 It is important 
to call this argument to mind mainly because its influence on public opinion has not 
been diminished, being a central pivot of the political rhetoric of CD. In Sauvé, for 
instance, the government submitted that a prisoner’s voting “‘demeans’ the political 
system” [29] without explaining in how. 
1 Three forms of the purity of the ballot box 
Expressive metaphorical force, however, is not sufficient to exclude individuals from 
a right that is considered fundamental. A rational application of this argument should 
explain the nature of the alleged ‘purity of the ballot box’ and how it can be affected 
by the participation of offenders. There are available in the literature at least three 
different formulations of the argument. All of them are linked to the idea of the moral 
unfitness or perverse character of offenders.7 The first formulation considers it as 
synonymous with the integrity of the election,8 which is protected by means of 
preventing the commission of electoral fraud or other kinds of electoral crimes.9 A 
second formulation conceives that ‘the purity of the ballot box’ is affected when 
offenders can influence directly and improperly the outcome of the election of public 
authorities such as police chiefs, prosecutors and judges.10 In its best light, this 
                                                 
5. See Reiman, 2005:6. 
6. See Kleinig & Murtagh, 2005:225-6. 
7. See e.g. Note, 1974:587. 
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argument could only explain the exclusion of offenders from elections of a reduced 
number of authorities: namely, those local authorities that have a decisive voice in the 
criminal and prison policies within a local community.11 In addition, it is based on the 
unlikely ideas that offenders can influence the decisions of authorities only by voting 
for them,12 and that their vote would not be diluted within the vote of the rest of the 
population.  
In the third and most serious formulation of this argument, ‘the purity of the ballot 
box’ is associated simply with the way in which offenders might vote. It is an 
argument that appeals to the impact of offenders voting on the outcomes of the 
electoral process based on the expression of their political preferences. This version 
of the argument is commonly known as the ‘disruptive voting’ or the ‘subversive 
voting’ argument, since it is founded on the fear that “offenders would vote in a way 
subversive of the interest of an orderly society”.13 CD thus seeks to avoid disruptive 
voting, excluding those elements of the electorate that could erode and damage the 
current institutional configuration of the common good. They are the natural 
candidates to be excluded because the way in which they are going to vote is 
presumed to be against the rule of law and democracy,14 selfish and factional,15 or 
with the aim of altering and weakening the content and administration of criminal 
law.16 It is also claimed that offenders would be diluting the vote of those law-abiding 
citizens,17 cheapening the franchise,18 and it might even question the moral authority 
                                                                                                                                                    
of Elections (1967) and the Latvian Government intervention in Hirst [55]. See also du Fresne 
& du Fresne, 1969; Note, 1974:584; Ewald, 2004:117-8; Ewald, 2009b:13. 
11. See Ewald, 2004:118. See also Brettschneider, 2007a:107. 
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interests that originates in financial participation in electoral campaigns (Demleitner, 
2000:773). The appropriate measures to approach a conflict of interests for elected authorities 
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13. Ewald, 2004:111. 
14. See Kleinig and Murtagh, 2005:226-7. See also Lardy, 2002:537; Sigler, 2013:7. 
15. See Brenner & Caste, 2003:237. 
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of the electoral outcome.19 The disruptive voting argument does not present solid 
theoretical foundations but rather it is limited to shaping a democratic aspiration for 
the sanctity of the electoral process.20  
2 The weakness of disruptive voting 
Disruptive voting is based on the premises that offenders seek to implement a 
particular political agenda and want to use democratic means to weaken the rule of 
law.21 Based on those premises, CD would be a measure against the abuse of 
democracy, with the objective of protecting the rule of law in a similar fashion to 
militant democracy’s discourse on limiting political pluralism.22 The limitation of the 
access of certain ideologies to democratic representation, the ban of social 
movements that endorse violent actions or the criminalization of political or racial 
hate expressions can be understood as just a few examples of how liberal democracies 
protect themselves from internal enemies.23  
This argument depends, however, on assumptions that are unlikely to be 
demonstrated. For example, the feasibility of rational, self-interested and instrumental 
political behaviour of offender must be demonstrated, and further it must be shown 
how offenders can pursue an agenda collectively around candidates and parties that 
are supportive of their interests.24 The available evidence points strongly in the 
opposite direction. Prisoners and offenders vote similarly to the rest of the 
                                                 
19. See Kleinig & Murtagh, 2005:224. 
20. See Ewald, 2004:112. 
21. See Ewald, 2002:1079-81, 1099-102. See also Manza & Uggen, 2006:12. 
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23. See generally Macklem, 2006.  
24. See Ewald, 2004:124-6. See also Demleitner, 2000:772; Ewald, 2002:1079, 1099; Bennett, 
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population, and what is more, they “are far more likely to endorse the laws they’ve 
broken [...] than to join together and lobby for abolition of the criminal code”.25 
Additionally, as with any other elector, they do not vote on a single issue, in this case 
criminal policies, but by considering a wider range of elements.26 Even if all these 
assumptions are met, they are not sufficient to make a case for CD. The observation 
of Claudio López-Guerra in this regard is compelling: “if certain parties or candidates 
are so clearly unacceptable, there is a stronger case to prohibit them from appearing 
on the ballot than to disenfranchise those who would presumably vote for them”.27  
Beyond this difficulty, there are arguments of principle against disruptive voting. The 
first is related to the political significance of voting. As Alec Ewald has suggested, 
given the current political circumstances, in which apathy is the major democratic 
illness, casting the ballot has a deeply conservative meaning. This is the case because 
it contributes to renewing the commitment of the individual to the legitimacy of the 
whole political system. With these ideas in mind, the exercise of the right to vote 
cannot be disruptive but can only contribute to guaranteeing the legitimacy of the law 
and therefore it essentially works in the opposite direction to disruption; voting is 
always building legitimacy.28  
The second argument is associated with the fact that the vote assumes the form of a 
subjective right, and therefore it guarantees a space of freedom from the interference 
of the community. In the USA, the scholarship and the jurisprudence recognizes the 
prerogative of the electors to select the relevant reasons to vote for the option of their 
preference, therefore “[p]eople who might vote instrumentally in their own interest 
                                                 
25. Ewald, 2004:125-6. See also Manza & Uggen, 2006: Ch. 6; Behan, 2014: Ch. 4. 
26. See Ewald, 2004:127-8. See also Schall, 2006:82; Levine, 2009:216; Hill & Koch, 2011:218; 
Behan, 2014: Ch. 4. 
27. López-Guerra, 2014a:113. For example, militant democracy’s restrictions to freedom of 
association of Nazi parties in Germany are differently shaped and have different impact than 
restrictions to the right to vote. While freedom of association is restricted partially (citizens are 
able to support other political options), the right to vote is restricted absolutely. This different 
impact must be considered when the legitimacy of each modality is assessed. 
28. See Ewald, 2004:128-31. 
CIVIC VIRTUE 
 
 
150 
may not be excluded from the franchise for that reason”.29 More generally, there is a 
wide agreement about the way in which a potential elector vote cannot determine his 
participation in the political process.30  
This prerogative can be reconstructed as a consequence of the legal nature of the right 
to vote. The participation of individuals in the law-making process is structured in 
terms of rights of participation. As legal rights, right of participation are spaces of 
autonomy for the legal person. What characterises the legal code, in Habermas’ 
words, is “that [they] merely make lawful behaviour a duty, and hence leave open the 
motives for conforming to norms”.31 The legal person can exercise a legal right 
instrumentally without facing any demand for explanations regarding intentions or 
reasons. Legal rights are a space free of communicative obligations, because 
“[u]nlike morality, law cannot obligate its addressees to use individual rights in ways 
oriented to reaching understanding, even if political rights call for precisely this kind 
of public use”.32 This is not necessarily opposed to the perspective that voting must 
be oriented by the use of public reason,33 Habermas suggests that “these entitlements 
encourage one to make use of them in an other-regarding attitude”34 but restricts the 
implementation of that objective in schemes of political incentives compatible with 
the understanding of individual rights rather than the legally enforced eligibility 
requirement.35  
                                                 
29. Ewald, 2004:132. See also Cholbi, 2002:556. 
30. See Dunn v Blumstein (1972). See also Ewald, 2002:1099-102. Also, Itzkowitz & Oldak, 
1973:737-8; Note, 1989:1309; Fletcher, 1999:1906; Brenner & Caste, 2003:137-8; Bennett, 
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33. Rawls, for example, sees voting as a practice that must be oriented by the use of public reason 
(1996:215, 219).  
34. Habermas, 1996a:130. 
35. See also Schafer (1999), whose argument is that even if is agreed that liberal democratic 
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We recognize a right to vote as belonging to our fellow citizens because one of the 
most important premises of democracy is that people disagree about the way in which 
we should organise society. The Court in Sauvé, for instance, affirmed that “[t]he 
Charter charges courts with upholding and maintaining an inclusive, participatory 
democratic framework within which citizens can explore and pursue different 
conceptions of the good” [15]. Elections are mechanisms designed to contribute to 
settle such disagreements, and voting is “supposed to be the expression of biases, 
loyalties, commitments and personal values”.36 For example, John Rawls sustains that 
“whereas a citizen may be bound to comply with the policies enacted, other things 
equal, he is not required to think that these policies are just, and it would be mistaken 
of him to submit his judgment to the vote”.37 Nobody should be excluded from the 
franchise because he holds different opinions, even in the unlikely case of disruptive 
voting.38 This reasoning would entitle the government to deny the right to vote to 
other groups based on the way in which they are going to vote.39 In the past, when 
voting was restricted based on property, race, gender and other considerations, this 
kind of consideration played an important role.40 Such reasoning depends on a view 
of politics that does not recognise that there are several different conceptions of 
social order that are competing for hegemony and that democracy is the space for that 
disagreement to be expressed.41  
Additionally, excluding offenders the unique experiences of those affected by the 
prison system are not able to influence the law-making process.42 Their exclusion 
                                                 
36. See Fletcher, 1999:1906. 
37. Rawls 1999:360. 
38. Shapiro’s opinion is categorical: “A state may not try to secure uniformity of opinion by 
limiting the franchise to those who share a common interest in the issues being voted upon. A 
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diminishes the plurality of interest and views that are considered acceptable rather 
than being epistemologically “open to different perspectives and standpoints, 
particularly those of the oppressed”,43 therefore impoverishing the input of 
deliberation. Those who have experienced imprisonment can provide “knowledge of 
and probably insight into a major governmental activity whose operations are 
frequently hidden from others members of society”.44 
An example of this argument is evidenced in the US debate where enfranchisement 
attempts are sometimes seen as partisan motivated.45 There is some agreement that 
incorporating ex-prisoners into the franchise is going to benefit left-wing parties, in 
this case the Democratic Party. Enfranchisement initiatives face considerable 
criticism for this reason; it is a partisan motivated policy that does not take the 
general interest into consideration and gives unfair benefits to Democrats. It is 
obvious that the opposite is the case. In the current scenario of US politics, CD 
affords an unfair electoral advantage to the right-wing parties, Republican in this 
case, and that is one of the reasons why right-wing parties resist changing the law on 
this issue.46 The flaws of the reasoning are also obvious. First, the probability of a 
radical change in policies regarding the administration of criminal law, as well as the 
conceptions of rule of law and democracy, is very low considering that left-wing 
parties in government tend to be moderate.47 Second, supporting left-wing parties 
cannot be considered wrong in itself because they are legitimate actors in the political 
system. Finally, even if left-wing parties adopted weak policies on crime, and even if 
it were demonstrated that this was at least partially as a result of offenders’ support, 
this cannot be seen as illegitimate. 
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II CIVIC VIRTUE AND INCAPACITATION 
1 Disenfranchisement and the lack of political capacity 
The electoral exclusion of children and people with mental disabilities follows the 
rationale of excluding people with a deficit in their political capacity. The exclusion 
of these groups of people mainly focuses on their input to the electoral process rather 
than on any output.48 In other words, they are not excluded because of the way in 
which they are going to vote but because they do not count with the capacity to vote 
correctly. Evidently this raises the question about what is that capacity. The exclusion 
of the children, for example, is based, albeit in an ambiguous manner, on the idea that 
to claim the right to vote, people must show some degree of understanding of politics, 
electoral practices and some degree of independence in expressing their political 
preferences. This involves common references to the lack of a minimal degree of 
rationality and to the absence of the ability to overcome interference from third 
parties. Without further discussion of these notions, it must be noted that the 
tendency in the literature is to see the exclusion of children, and therefore the concept 
of political capacity used to justify it, as resting upon the lack of some cognitive 
ability that is underdeveloped or in the process of being fully developed.49 That is a 
considerably thin concept of political capacity if compared with former exclusionary 
requirements associated with character and social status.  
In a defence of CD, it could be argued that offenders are also affected by this kind of 
incapacity. However, there is no empirical evidence that offenders are unable to act 
as rationally and autonomously as others adult individuals.50 To be completely sure in 
discarding this argument, it is illuminating to consider the comparison between the 
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of knowledge rather than cognitive capacity. 
50. See Note, 1974:586. See also Kleinig and Murtagh, 2005:225. 
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electoral capability rules and the criminal liability rules. One of the conditions of the 
justification of the punishment rests in the capacity of the adults to avoid committing 
criminal offences. This capacity is absent (or attenuated) in the case of children, 
which in turn explains their lack (or attenuation) of criminal liability. Whilst it may 
be affirmed that a lack of understanding of what is at stake in their conduct underlies 
electoral and criminal incapacitation of children, this is evidently not the case with 
regards adult offenders. There is or there must be some symmetry regarding these 
capacities.51 They have been convicted precisely because it was demonstrated in a 
trial that they did understand the consequences of what they were doing; they were 
acting rationally and autonomously. If offenders were not rational and autonomous “it 
would be irrational for us to hold them responsible for their criminal conduct in the 
first place”.52 The same comparison can be made between offenders and people with 
mental disabilities.53 This analysis should lead one to discard a lack of cognitive 
ability as the standard of exclusion from the franchise for offender.  
Another route available to explaining CD in terms of political capacity is to formulate 
a thicker concept of political capacity. However, unlike the political capacity of 
children, and provided that offenders are as rational and autonomous as other adults, 
this thicker version has received poor treatment in the literature.54 The moral 
turpitude or unworthiness of offenders has been invoked in several instances, with the 
common assumption being that it is a matter of fact that does not require further 
argumentation or proof. If a thicker conception of political capacity must be offered 
in order to justify the exclusion of offenders from the franchise, it must satisfy certain 
                                                 
51. See e.g. Munn, 2012. 
52. Cholbi, 2002:563. cf bellow Chapter 5, Section 3.3.1. 
53. See Kleinig & Murtagh, 2005:223, 225. 
54. Clegg, for example, transforms the political capacity requirement into a test of ‘trustworthiness 
and loyalty’. Talking about the exclusion from elections of children, “the insane”, criminals 
and foreign citizens, he concludes that “[t]hese exceptions ensure that those casting ballots 
pass a minimum threshold of trustworthiness and common civic commitment and demonstrate 
a willingness to abide by the laws they would require others to follow” (2002:178). However, 
his account does not explain how we can be sure of, and what exactly would count as, 
convicted criminals’ lack of ‘trustworthiness and loyalty’. See also Kleinig & Murtagh, 
2005:221-3; Clegg et al, 2006:22-5.  
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standards. First, the evaluation of any deficit related to their capacity to vote should 
be theoretically argued on a different basis than that related to the public belief that 
offenders are unworthy elements of society.55 Secondly, it must disregard cognitive 
demands associated to children exclusion and instead focus on moral standards.56 
Thirdly, it must also avoid the argument of disruptive voting. In sum, the problem 
with offenders voting is not the imminent threat to the established order but the 
subversion of a relatively virtuous electorate, whose political power to decide over 
the most important aspects of the communal life must be grounded in some degree of 
civic virtue. 
2 Political capacity and civic virtue 
The natural candidate to develop a broader concept of political capacity is the notion 
of civic virtue. This concept could be linked to the republican concept of the virtuous 
citizen. From a civic republican perspective, participation in public affairs is one of 
the most important responsibilities of citizens. The common concern for the res 
publica is what permits the maintenance of liberty and pursuit of the common good.57 
In these terms, the importance of politics also has a correlation with the requirements 
to engage in it. This is the basis on which the conception of public participation is 
conceived, not as (or not only as) rights but as a privilege which is attached to the 
satisfaction of the correlative and necessary responsibility. Incorporating such a 
demanding idea within the concept of political capacity would be considerably 
problematic to justify because it would require the disenfranchisement of a broader 
group of citizens who have shown to lack the due degree of responsibility.58 
Moreover, in the past this republican conception was predisposed to justify an 
ideological abuse of the franchise. A civic republican concept of civic virtue was 
associated “with the exclusion of blacks, women and the poor from the political 
                                                 
55. See Beckman, 2009:137; Hill & Koch, 2011:217-8. 
56. See Note, 1974:586.  
57. See e.g. Sandel, 1996:25. 
58. See the notion of good and ideal citizen in Shklar, 1991:5-13, 34-.  
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process. In each of these cases, ascriptions of political incompetence rationalized the 
lines that were drawn”.59  
The exclusionary tendency of civic republicanism may be overcome if the working 
conception of civic virtue is thin or minimal in contrast with a thick republican 
conception. Consequently such a conception does not need to demand a strong 
commitment to public affairs, but only that citizens act according to a degree of 
consideration for others’ rights and interests, typically associated with law-abiding 
behaviour.60  
2.1 Civic virtue and criminal character 
In an effort to justify CD, a more substantial conception of political capacity is 
offered by Christopher Manfredi who articulates a link between the character of 
offenders and some personality traits considered to display a lack of virtue. He argues 
that offenders have a character that is predominantly self-regarding, oriented towards 
the present moment and impulsive, and on the whole less empathetic than would be 
typical of other citizens. Criminal behaviour is associated with “1) rapid time 
discounting; 2) minimal internal verbal mediation; and 3) shallowly ingrained 
standards of behaviour”.61 This supposed character outline contrasts with the idea that 
political capacity involves a minimal civic virtue element as a component, which 
consists in “empathy (‘a willingness to take importantly into account the rights, 
needs, and feelings of others’) and self-control (‘a willingness to take importantly 
into account the more distant consequences of present actions’)”.62 The inability to 
                                                 
59. Note, 1989:1308. See also Shklar, 1991:7-10; Ewald, 2002:1082-8. 
60. See e.g. Manfredi, 1998:295ff. A similar argument for a thin conception of political virtue as 
law abidance can be found in the radical republicans’ debates of US reconstruction 
amendments, see Re & Re, 2012:1584.  
61. Manfredi, 2009:274-5. 
62. Manfredi, 2009:274. 
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develop behaviour displaying minimal civic virtue is, therefore, attributed to a 
psychological cause. 
From a systematic perspective, this account gives shape to a twofold concept of 
political capacity, including a cognitive and a moral element. The first, the incapacity 
to understand politics and act autonomously in elections, operates in the exclusion of 
children and people with severe mental disabilities. The second, related to civic 
virtue, might operate in the exclusion of adolescents and offenders. According to 
Manfredi, “both groups generally exhibit unusually impulsive and self-centred 
behaviour that renders them temporarily unfit to exercise the political rights and 
responsibilities of citizenship”.63 Adolescents, however, display similar levels of 
rationality and autonomy to the adult population. In addition to explaining CD, 
therefore, this two-fold conception of political capacity has the additional advantage 
of articulating an argument to explain the denial of the right to vote to adolescents.64  
This proposal might sound unconvincing, especially insofar as it relies in an intuitive 
conception of psychological profiling of offenders as integral to explaining their lack 
of civic virtue. A claim of this kind must be, at least, supported with empirical 
arguments. It has, however, two qualities. First, it distinguishes between the cognitive 
and moral aspects of the concept of political capacity. Second, it points out the need 
to avoid the civic republican thickness in the construction of this later standard of 
capacity. 
                                                 
63. Manfredi, 2009:275. 
64. See e.g. Hart & Atkins, 2011. 
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2.2 The lack of a sense of justice 
A more solid philosophical foundation for this idea can be found within liberal ranks, 
in particular, in the Rawlsian concept of a sense of justice. He describes this notion 
as: 
“the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public 
conception of justice which characterizes the fair terms of social 
cooperation. […] also express a willingness, if not the desire, to act in 
relation to others on terms that they also can publicly endorse”.65  
This capacity is what defines the status of an individual as a moral being and 
consequentially it grounds a duty of mutual respect.66 Rawls clearly maintains that 
different individuals might have varying capacities for a sense of justice and “this 
fact is not a reason for depriving those with a lesser capacity of the full protection of 
justice”.67 But what happens to those who do not qualify for that minimum? Thus 
Rawls observes the anomaly of crime and punishment in a just society: 
“It is true that in a reasonable well-ordered society those who are punished 
for violating just laws have normally done something wrong. This is 
because the purpose of the criminal law is to uphold basic natural duties 
[…] and punishments are to serve this end”.68  
When these cases of dissonance arise, Rawls insists upon approaching them as 
individual deviations rather than social problems: “a propensity to commit such 
[criminal] acts is a mark of bad character”.69 The contempt that some crimes express 
for the basic values of mutual respect upon which democratic societies are based calls 
for the evaluation of the moral status of those engaged in such behaviour. Rawls 
                                                 
65. Rawls, 1996:19. 
66. See Rawls, 1999:337. 
67. Rawls, 1999:443. 
68. Rawls, 1999:276. 
69. Rawls, 1999:277. cf Honig, 1993b; Mañalich, 2013. 
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insists that the absence of a sense of justice would struggle to be compatible with 
certain fundamental attitudes and capacities included under the notion of humanity.70 
This is an statement with solid exclusionary implication when is link to his 
acknowledgment that certain individuals act in a manner that is not compatible with 
principles of reciprocity that reasonable people can easily identify. The conclusion 
that Rawls offers in relation to those who are not willing to act according to the 
principles of justice is revealing in this respect: 
“It is, of course, true that in their case just arrangements do not fully 
answer to their nature, and therefore, other things equal, they will be less 
happy than they would be if they could affirm their sense of justice. But 
here one can only say: their nature is their misfortune”.71  
In sum, the commission of an offence shows that offenders lack the sense of justice 
normally associated to reasonable people. This is not, however, conclusive to justify 
CD. Evidently, Rawls himself never endorsed it. Moreover, he shows an explicit 
commitment to a concept of participation that has the role of enhancing the self-
esteem and sense of political competence of citizens.72 However, what is at stake is 
not whether Rawls himself endorsed CD but rather how his ideas are supportive of 
it.73 
Jesse Furman has associated this attribution of bad character with Rawls’ express 
commitment to participation and civic virtue, to sketch critically a Rawlsian case for 
CD. Rawls agreed that “if the citizens of a democratic society are to preserve their 
basic rights and liberties […] they must also have to a sufficient degree the ‘political 
virtues’ […] and be willing to take part in the public life”.74 Furman’s move consists 
in contrasting a commitment to the civic virtues of citizens in a democracy with an 
                                                 
70. Rawls, 1999:488. 
71. Rawls, 1999:504 (emphasis added). 
72. See Rawls, 1999:203-6. 
73. See e.g. Sigler, 2013. 
74. Rawls, 1996:205. 
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understanding of the offender as a defectively motivated subject. He suggests that 
disenfranchising those who have openly shown themselves to lack a sense of justice 
and the motivation to respect their fellow citizens would not be a suppressive 
measure. It would be a step towards democratic self-protection, or in Rawlsian 
terminology, towards “the stability and welfare of a just order”.75  
In a recent article, Mary Sigler formulates what could be fairly called a Rawlsian 
defence of CD, hence escaping from Manfredi’s psychological profiling. In her view, 
electoral eligibility demands a minimal degree of civic virtue, less demanding than 
classic republicanism but more demanding than the most individualist versions of 
liberalism.76 Her proposal falls ambiguously between a demand for civic virtue and a 
punitive explanation. She suggests that CD is imposed as a mark of the loss of trust 
that citizens recognize one another in a democracy and that is necessary to make 
democracy possible.77  
Sigler builds upon the idea of a minimal degree of civic virtue in Rawls’ political 
liberalism to argue that  
“citizenship mounts to something more than the self-regarding pursuit of 
individual interests unconstrained by anything but a rudimentary duty to 
obey the law […] citizens share a commitment to the public values that 
constitute the political community”.78  
She recognizes that that civic virtue cannot be enforced, especially when it informs 
the exercise of suffrage, but it is nonetheless accompanied by an expectation that it is 
                                                 
75. Furman, 1997:1225. See also Cholbi, 2002:550-1; Beckman, 2009:139-42. 
76. See Sigler, 2013:12. 
77. See Sigler, 2013:3. Sigler departs from Deigh’s idea that the office of citizenship entails not 
just a set of rights but also a set of responsibilities. Deigh argues that “a serious breach of law - 
specifically a criminal offense because it shows that the citizen is unwilling to abide by the 
laws in the enactment of which he can participate - disqualifies him from being a legislator or 
elector. It shows him to be unfit for assuming the responsibilities of either office, and for this 
reason he forfeits its essential right” (1988:158). cf Cholbi, 2002:559-64. 
78. Sigler, 2013:14. 
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subjected to public reason. That expectation resembles the expectation that citizens 
are fulfilling the responsibilities of their office, including following the law.79A 
criminal offence constitutes a breach of the civic trust in which those expectations are 
grounded. There is therefore a claim of correspondence between the disappointment 
of the civic trust in the level of the duties of a person as subject of the law, and the 
prediction of disappointment of his duties as democratic citizen. This is followed by a 
measure (CD) that “does not require a particularized assessment of the offender’s 
trustworthiness”,80 because the breach of civic trust is something not related to the 
offender’s cognitive capacity but with the civic virtue expressed by his actions.81 
This Rawlsian argument can give more solid foundation to the idea described by 
Manfredi about the self-regarding, impulsive, less empathetic psychological profile of 
offenders. Regardless of the different formulations, a connection can be traced 
between these ideas: those who have committed a criminal offence are understood as 
defective and that deficit is related to their (in)capacity to understand social relations 
in just terms, a deficit of motivation for the respect of fellow citizens and their rights. 
                                                 
79. See Sigler, 2013:14. A similar argument is offered by Waldron, 2013b. 
80. Sigler, 2013:15. See also Lavi, 2011:796-. 
81. It is difficult, however, to understand why this would not be a punitive reaction. Sigler 
responds to this question by saying that “[o]ffenders deserve punishment for violating the 
criminal law, but citizens are liable to disenfranchisement for violating civic trust” (25). 
Sigler’s defence of her account as regulative rather than punitive is tremendously weak. She 
argues: “Although [CD] is triggered by a criminal conviction, it is justified by the breach of 
civic trust that serous criminals misconduct represents. And while punishment for serious 
crime typically involves imprisonment and the separation of the offender from his geographical 
community, the loss of voting rights signifies his separation from the political community” 
(15-6). The assumption that CD cannot by definition act as a punishment because punishment 
has the nature of imprisonment discards ex-ante any punitive dimension of this measure. If the 
distinction between regulative and punitive measures is elaborated on the basis of their 
prospective and retrospective rationalities the results are quite different and the breach of the 
civil trust appears eminently punitive. On this distinction, see below Chapter 5, Section I.1. 
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3 Disenfranchisement as (electoral) incapacitation 
This minimal concept of civic virtue might avoid: (i) an expansive concept of 
cognitive capacity, assimilating offenders and children; (ii) the problems of output 
regarding issues presented by disruptive voting; and (iii) a thicker concept of 
republican civic responsibility, proven prone to an ideological abuse of the 
franchise.82  
A defence of this concept of political capacity that includes a minimal degree of civic 
virtue must be legal codified in terms of a regulative measure of incapacitation, as 
opposed to a kind of punishment. This understanding transforms CD into a 
prospective-oriented measure that aims to prevent the political participation of those 
incapable of it. It “rests not upon what a criminal has done, but upon whom he has 
shown himself to be”.83 The crime and the criminal sentence are meant to work as a 
discovery test and not as causes of exclusion.84 The exclusion is based on an abstract 
and universal standard of political capacity applied to everybody; law-abiding 
citizens have passed the test that offenders have failed. That is why it would be 
incorrect to criticise this conception of CD on the basis that it prescribes good 
behaviour as a condition for voting rights; that argument may misunderstands the 
purpose of CD and the burden of the proof that it does satisfy.85  
                                                 
82. Lardy’s account of justifications of CD moves between the idea of ‘moral unfitness’, which 
could be assimilated into a demanding republican civil responsibility, and the idea of 
‘incompetence’, that can be understood as a cognitive problem associated with the exclusion of 
the mentally impaired and children (2002:531-4). 
83. Note, 1989:1307. 
84. Accordingly, this account attributes to the criminal convictions the role of a negative test of 
civic virtue, in contrast with judgments of moral character which secure access to the ballot, 
which would constitute a positive test, a demonstration, of civic virtue (cf Bennet, 2012:2; 
Mauer, 2011:557). Criminal sentences as a test cannot be compared with literacy tests because 
they do not alter the burden of the proof set by the universal suffrage principle. 
85. See above Chapter 3, Section III. See also Mandfredi, 2009:272; Sigler, 2013:12. cf Easton, 
2009:226-7.  
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Incapacitation in the terms outlined here is something considerably different from 
incapacitation as a tool of crime prevention.86 They share prospective rationality and 
a disregard for the relation between crime and (retrospective) punishment. However, 
while criminal incapacitation aims to avoid the commission of new crimes, electoral 
incapacitation merely seeks to prevent the participation of a subject with a lack of 
political capacity in the elections. CD is directed, in the same manner as exclusion of 
minors, towards the maintenance of a competent electoral body with a demonstrable 
capacity to engage responsibly in public affairs. 
If the rationale is purely regulative, the institutional characteristics of CD might be 
importantly influenced by that fact. First, the lack of civic virtue can be more easily 
argued by appealing to a general unwillingness to respect the law rather than to the 
commission of a single crime,87 and therefore, it would be advisable to limit its 
application only to convicted recidivists. It would be also more easily argued 
regarding those who have found guilty of serious crimes symptomatic of a lack of 
sense of justice.88 Second, it seems easier to argue the lack of civic virtue in cases 
involving those more serious crimes, those that “cast greater doubt on an offender’s 
commitment to a community’s public values”,89 as opposed to more common and 
minor crimes.90 These two elements might make CD completely independent of the 
fact of imprisonment, which gestures towards a model that partially disregards the 
fact of imprisonment.91 Third, regarding the restoration process, this should not be 
automatic after a certain period of time. As CD performs an incapacitating role, the 
political capacity which originally justified exclusion from the franchise must be 
                                                 
86. See below Chapter 5, Section I. 
87. See Lippke, 2001:564. See also Beckman, 2009:143. 
88. See Beckman, 2009:142. 
89. Sigler, 2013:20. Sigler suggests restrict CD to “the traditional common law felony 
designations” (2013:21). 
90. See Beckman, 2009:139. See also below Chapter 5, Section II. 
91. cf Sigler, 2013:21-2. 
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proven to exist “by an affirmative effort on the part of offenders”,92 for example, “by 
conforming their conduct to the law for a period of time”.93 
Considering the current institutional regulation of CD in the jurisdictions in which it 
is applied, it must be accepted that political capacity is overall a fairly poor candidate 
to explain the rationale of CD. However, some of the problems it faces could be 
overcome by undertaking a legal redesign and narrowing its application. For example, 
CD could be reconceived to affect offenders only when they have shown permanent 
and serious disregard for their civic obligation to respect the law, and by committing 
offences that permit judgement of their ‘bad character’.94  
III THE PROBLEMS OF INCAPACITATION 
In a previous chapter, it was suggested that CD present a democratic problem. It was 
argued that the right to vote plays a fundamental role in the process of legitimation of 
the law. In Section I, the argument of disruptive voting was discarded because, as was 
mentioned, it is impermissible for a government to exclude somebody for the way he 
or she is going to vote. The argument pertaining to the political capacity of offenders 
is not different: they are excluded for the way in which there are going to vote not 
because they cannot vote in an adequate way. For exposing the problems affecting 
this line of argument, it may be illustrative to start with a comparison with the 
electoral exclusion of children. 
                                                 
92. Sigler, 2013:24. 
93. Sigler, 2013:22. In this way, the question about “how does a prison sentence imprive their 
moral fitness?” (Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:134) would be answered. 
94. For example, Beckman (2009) despite being generally against CD, concedes that those clearly 
unreasonable person may be a good case for “preserving the ‘just character’ of the electorate” 
(142). These are people that have shown general unwillingness to respect fundamental norms 
of justice that “could not reasonably be rejected” (143).  
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1 The electoral exclusion of children 
The Canadian Government in Sauvé offered the argument of civic responsibility that 
was supported with the analogy between offenders and children, as two cases in 
which the legislation can exclude people from the franchise for similar reasons. Court 
in Sauvé argued that 
“The analogy between youth voting restrictions and inmate 
disenfranchisement breaks down because the type of judgment Parliament 
is making in the two scenarios is very different. In the first case, 
Parliament is making a decision based on the experiential situation of all 
citizens when they are young. It is not saying that the excluded class is 
unworthy to vote, but regulating a modality of the universal franchise. In 
the second case, the government is making a decision that some people, 
whatever their abilities, are not morally worthy to vote — that they do not 
“deserve” to be considered members of the community and hence may be 
deprived of the most basic of their constitutional rights” [37]. 
The Court reasoning is unconvincing in its main claim.95 The mere fact that children 
are excluded equally from the franchise and that their exclusion is only transitory 
does not constitute a successful justification for their exclusion.96 Their exclusion 
expresses a judgment regarding the unworthiness of children as a category of people 
in reference to adult population. Minors can be regarded as a group that is 
discriminated if not additional justification is provided. 
The widely-held idea that children must be excluded from the franchise due to their 
lack of political capacity has been challenged by the literature in recent years, 
producing an exhaustive analysis. The exclusion of children can be approached from 
two perspectives. First, by questioning the universality of the standard by which 
children are excluded. The presumption of capacity for adults and incapacity for 
minors evidently leads to the inclusion of people that do not satisfy those standards 
                                                 
95. cf minority vot Sauvé [89]. 
96. cf Rawls, 1996:196. 
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and the exclusion of people fully prepared to carry out electoral tasks.97 As well as in 
the case of offenders, problems of under and over-inclusiveness are especially in 
evidence.98  
A second perspective, observes that when other rules concerning the legal capacity of 
children are implemented, it is apparent that their incapacity only becomes relevant 
when the children themselves or a third party is in danger of being harmed by the 
children’s conduct. Legal capacity rules are protective measures. From this 
perspective, the argument concerning the political capacity of children, as for that of 
offenders, tends to be obscure about what kind of harm must be prevented by 
electoral exclusion, instead focusing on other aspects of their incapacities. 
1.1 Capacity and harm 
Children’s electoral capacity rules set out two questions. Firstly, can children 
understand what is at stake in elections? Secondly, what is protected by the exclusion 
of people that do not understand what is at stake in an election? The first question can 
lead to endless inquiry if considered in empirical terms. The experts have not reached 
an agreement regarding the political capacity of children.99  
Conceiving capacity in empirical terms implies that the fairness of the requirements 
is achieved if they apply equally to the entire universe of subjects that ‘empirically’ 
show similar levels of relevant understanding. It seeks to avoid over and under-
inclusiveness. It is evident that a 2-year-old baby does not hold the cognitive capacity 
                                                 
97. See e.g. Lau, 2012. 
98. See e.g. Lardy, 2002:532. 
99. For example, some suggest that it is not clear that adults have a rational capacity superior to 
that of children, especially adolescents, or that the cognitive development of children 
concludes at age 16; others suggest that the differences between adolescents and adults consist 
in discrete spheres such as pair relations and risky activities but that does not allow one to 
justify differences in political capacity, or that children can identify principles of justice as 
early as 6 years old (See Hamilton, 2012; Hart & Atkins, 2011). 
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to, for example, understand politics and what is at stake in elections. However, 
nothing exceptional happens in relation to knowledge and reasoning when people turn 
18 and therefore are qualified to vote. The cognitive capacity to understand voting is 
acquired at some point during young people’s course of development and it is 
acquired differently and in different times by different subjects. To be sure, there is a 
huge disagreement about exactly when this happens, to a great extent due to the fact 
that there is also significant disagreement about what is being investigated. However, 
this is not the only way to approach capacity requirements. 
In normative terms, capacity requirements are a way of setting expectations and 
distributing responsibilities by recognizing legal personality. When approached 
normatively, the fairness of the regulation is not achieved by demonstrating the 
coincidence of people’s empirical and normative status but through the coherent 
treatment of people in all aspects of their legal personality. Somebody cannot be 
treated as capable of some affairs and incapable of other affairs which involve similar 
skills, degrees of understanding or the exercise of similar kinds of mental 
processes.100 From that perspective, if the lack of recognition of political capacity is 
tied to the lack of recognition of other aspects of deliberative personality, the 
exclusion of children from elections might be coherent with their position within the 
legal system. Accordingly, it seems that the main argument supporting the reduction 
of the voting age is not based on empirical studies but on the corresponding 
attribution of legal responsibilities to minors, a fact that can be observed in private 
law and criminal and labour spheres.101 To put it briefly, the expectation of morally 
autonomous behaviour cannot be directed solely at the constitution of minors as 
subjects of the law, but must also have a correlation in the construction of minors as 
responsible individuals, capable of understanding themselves as legal persons and 
                                                 
100. For example, it is completely anomalous that subjects who are fully criminally liable, that is, 
whose conduct can form the object of condemnation, do not also possess the legal capacity to 
conduct their private business or to get married. It is also anomalous that somebody who is 
allowed to work and earn a salary cannot be granted the right to financial independence. 
101. See Munn, 2012. 
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citizens. Private and public spheres of autonomy are based on the same moral status 
and therefore cannot be radically dissociated.102 
1.2 What is the problem with children voting? 
Nevertheless, the question remains surrounding the reason behind the exclusion of 
children from the political process. Even if they are not recognized as capable, their 
exclusion can only be justified on the basis of a potential harm. Arguments that just 
point out their incapacity miss this point. For example, to sustain that “children and 
insane adults ought not in general have voting rights”, because “they are not able, 
through participation, to advance [their] interests”,103 fail to explain the problem 
generated by their participation. Three responses have been offered to explain this 
problem. 
First, it has been argued that children’s electoral exclusion is for their own benefit: 
the best interests of the child require electoral exclusion because political 
participation would be harmful for them. The right to vote would involve the need to 
assume important responsibilities, which could in turn bring about stress and 
psychological costs that it is in their best interests to avoid. If the converse were true, 
they would be able to develop activities proper to their age, such as play and study.104 
This argument seems unconvincing unless the right to vote is conceived of as a legal 
obligation or the electoral practices to convince voters change radically.105  
A second line of reasoning suggests that children’s exclusion protects the public from 
the political incompetence of children. The participation of incompetent electors 
                                                 
102. Mañalich, 2011a:124-5. 
103. Christiano, 2008:129 (n 33). 
104. See Beckman, 2009:114-9. 
105. See López-Guerra, 2010:130-1.  
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would ruin the electoral outcome and therefore it must be avoided.106 This is also 
unconvincing: on the one hand, because the rationality of elections is given by the 
electoral offer, and not by the electoral demand. An incompetent electorate would not 
necessarily harm the outcome of elections through arbitrarily affecting a political 
option because this would presuppose a consistent vote from those regarded 
incompetent and whose exclusion is defensible solely on the basis that they lack a 
rational capacity to be consistent.107 Hence, it is a self-defeating reason. On the other 
hand, even if children are assumed to vote randomly, their participation would not 
alter the outcome of a real election in a relevant manner unless the majority of the 
voters were also incompetent.108 Summing up, even including people with little or no 
political knowledge, a precarious rationality or impulsive behaviour does not affect 
electoral results in any way which is relevant.109  
The third reason for excluding children from elections is somehow more abstract. 
Excluding children is a requirement for protecting political equality, as expressed 
through the equal value of the vote. López-Guerra has suggested this idea by 
affirming that the exclusion of children is not demanded by the justice of allocation 
of the right to vote, according to which “all members of the polity who have the 
capacity to enjoy the benefits of enfranchisement (or experience the harm of 
disenfranchisement) should have the right to an equal vote”, and “the exclusion of 
those who lack the said capacity is permitted but not necessary”.110 Instead, the 
necessity of their exclusion is a demand of the operation of the electoral process. 
Children, whose participation is not necessary but not prohibited, could damage the 
integrity of the elections and the principle of political equality, because they can be 
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instructed by a third party, and therefore, like buying a vote, their vote could grant 
somebody more votes than their due share.111  
The previous observations allow an understanding of the relevance of the exclusion 
of children, albeit only to some of them, not as a guarantee of good quality in the 
outcome of elections but as a way of maintaining the integrity of the election. These 
observations, at the same time, will contribute to an appreciation of the specific 
position of the demands of civic virtue as a justification for offenders’ exclusion. 
2 Civic virtue under examination 
The argument of disruptive voting analysed in Section I must be regarded as a case of 
ideological abuse of the franchise’s requirements. What remains from it is the 
construction of a power-relation. Whereas the disruptive voting argument is 
concerned with the outcomes of the electoral process, and the inputs are considered 
important in consequential terms, the civic virtue argument is purely input-oriented, 
focusing on the maintenance of a virtuous electorate. The demand for civic virtue as 
an eligibility requirement suffers from similar problems. When its premises are 
examined carefully, what is found is the same kind of argument. To expose that fact, 
the scheme of analysis for the exclusion of children can be used to analyse CD. The 
first question is therefore related to capacity, while the second is related to the harm 
that could be caused. 
2.1 Do offenders lack political capacity? 
In relation to capacity, it has already been noted that advocates of this argument 
accept that offenders possess the cognitive capacity to understand what is at stake in 
elections and therefore are in a different position to children. It was also claimed that 
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someone’s political intentions, the way in which he or she is going to vote, belongs to 
a sphere of autonomy protected by a subjective right and therefore cannot be used as 
a reason for exclusion. Contrary to these cases, what is alleged by the civic virtue 
advocates is not that the vote is rationally outcome-motivated, in the sense of being 
aimed at furthering criminal interests, but that the vote, following the offender, is 
morally defective. For example, Mary Sigler’s argument of correspondence is based 
on the presumption that by the commission of a serious offence, offenders unveil 
their lack of compromise with the “public values that constitute the political 
community”.112 It serves as a test to connect the moral wrong of the crime and the 
expectation that such person would not vote in a morally-motivated way according to 
‘a public use of reason’. Thus, in a society that values virtuous participation, a 
offender must be excluded from voting because her vote “is somehow impure”.113 
At first appearance, the most important weakness of this argument seems to be the 
clear inconsistency between the affirmation of legal capacity implied by the 
punishment and the attribution of a lack of political capacity in relation to elections. 
If the criminal conviction implies an act of condemnation, the subject to which the 
crime is attributed must be recognized as holding the powers of a deliberative person. 
This responsibility constitutes recognition of the expectation of law-abidingness on 
the person’s part, rooted in the inclusion of that person qua citizen in the democratic 
process. A criminal offence is constitutive of a disappointment of this normative 
expectation. Can follow the criminal conviction an extinction of the deliberative 
personality of the offender? 
The answer should be negative. If what is expressed through a criminal conviction is 
condemnation, it must be acknowledged that offenders possess the moral capacity to 
be rationally challenged by such act. Offenders still recognized by the legal system, 
as equipped with these kinds of deliberative powers. Even during the time an offender 
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is serving a prison sentence, the legal system continues to consider him a legal 
person, maintaining its expectations that the subject will conform his behaviour to the 
law. An offence inside the prison still constitutes an offence. In fact, there are 
offences that can only be committed when people are in prison. Offenders are 
recognized and treated, in their dimension as legal persons, as deliberative persons. 
Otherwise, total incapacitation, isolation or surveillance would be the only response 
to the commission of a criminal offence.114 Notice the contrast with those individuals 
who have been rendered lacking some cognitive capacities, in which case the 
commission of a serious offence is followed not by a punishment but by 
incapacitation measures.115  
However, civic virtue demands more than mere deliberative personality. Given that 
an offender is deemed responsible for not acting according to a sense of justice for 
which he is cognitively and morally equipped, it follows that he must be deemed 
cognitively and morally equipped to make political choices. Therefore, the 
requirement set out by CD does not demand to be capable to respect the law, because 
if somebody does not have the capacity to respect the law, does not have the capacity 
to breach the law either. Therefore, the requirement of civic virtue set out by CD is 
better formulated not as a question of capacity but as a commitment with the law. This 
is seen as the correlative attitude of somebody that adopts ‘public reason’ as a 
standard of electoral behaviour. Civic virtue, even when minimally formulated, adds 
to the deliberative powers of the person a demand for the adoption of an ethical 
commitment with the outcome of the democratic process.  
This commitment presents two problems to be considered an adequate explanation of 
CD as a form of electoral incapacitation. The first is related with a failure in the 
justification of the commitment in relation to disenfranchised offenders. This can 
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only be based in a democratic and pluralist society in the adscription of right of 
participation to those whose commitment is expected, rights of which offenders 
affected by CD are dispossessed. The second is related with the structure of the 
response to the failure to act according the expectations set by the law in democracy. 
The infraction of such a commitment, the breach of the law, is normally codified in 
legal terms as implying condemnation for the fact that, cognitive and morally 
equipped to act otherwise, the person has committed the offence. This condemnation 
in the case of criminal offences assumes the form of punishment.  
2.2 What is the problem with offenders voting? 
Arguing on the grounds of their lack of political capacity is not sufficient to exclude 
offenders, even if it is accepted that civic virtue is a requirement to vote that sets 
standards of participation different to those which apply to persons exercising their 
right of autonomy. It must be demonstrated that there is a harm to be avoided by their 
exclusion.116 Now, due their similarities, it might be convenient to compare the 
presumptive harm of offenders voting with the reasons offered for excluding children. 
Firstly, to be sure, there is nothing in CD that can further the interests of offenders by 
excluding them from the franchise, even when some people claim that it could 
facilitate their process of rehabilitation.117  
Secondly, the putative damage to the outcome of the election must be also 
discarded.118 Offenders are not incompetent voters, and even if they are considered as 
such, that would not justify their exclusion, according to the rationality of the 
electoral offer and the statistical irrelevance of arbitrary voting. The remaining option 
is that the outcome might be ruined because offenders will vote consistently 
supporting some of the electoral offers. In that case, there are two possibilities: first, 
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they vote rationally and self-interestedly, which leads us back to the problems facing 
disruptive voting; and, second, their morally defective vote must be linked to the 
political options they support. This, again, is difficult to defend; it cannot be argued 
that allowing offenders to vote would transmit, for example, the contempt they have 
shown for the victims, to the law-making process: “votes simply cannot be interpreted 
as an endorsement of [such] principle”.119 In this way it can be seen how, on the one 
hand, rights of autonomy are erected as firewalls against intervention directed against 
the way in which offenders might vote, and on the other hand, pre-determined 
conceptions of the common good need to compete for the political hegemony, which 
only popular support can offer in a democracy. 
Thirdly, it could be affirmed that the offenders’ voting might affects the integrity of 
the elections or the principle of political equality. This would lead back to ‘primitive’ 
versions of the ‘purity of the ballot box’ in which CD is justified as preventive of the 
commission of electoral offences or conflicts of interests between elected authorities 
and organized crime structures.120 Indeed, the opposite seems to be the case. Political 
equality is affected not by offenders voting but by the practice of CD. 
3 Is voting a privilege? 
Some critics argue that CD transforms the right to vote in a privilege.121 Along the 
same lines, others have argued that “voting is a basic right, one that does not depend 
on possessing some requisite degree of virtue”.122 The claim that the right to be 
enfranchised is not a human right or a basic right but a privilege is not necessarily 
contradictory. It expresses, however, powerful exclusionary project that is able be 
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organized in the context of the modern representative institutions but reproduce the 
exclusionary ideological structures of the past. This was expressed clearly in Sauvé: 
“The idea that certain classes of people are not morally fit nor morally 
worthy to vote and to participate in the law-making process is ancient and 
obsolete. […]. Until recently, large classes of people, prisoners among 
them, were excluded from the franchise. The assumption that they were 
not fit or ‘worthy’ of voting — whether by reason of class, race, gender or 
conduct — played a large role in this exclusion. We should reject the 
retrograde notion that ‘worthiness’ qualifications for voters may be 
logically viewed as enhancing the political process and respect for the rule 
of law” [43]. 
This is so because in a democracy, the political capacity to engage in the process of 
law-making cannot be substantially dissociated from the capacity to act as a subject 
of the law and therefore be responsible for its breach. This is clear in the case of the 
children. They are excluded from political participation in a way that correlates to the 
exclusion of their legal responsibility for a legal breach. In contrast, the mark of legal 
responsibility involved in a criminal conviction should be sufficient to demonstrate 
the capacity of the offender to engage in the process of law-making. 
In conclusion, the argument of civic virtue cannot be rendered regulative of some 
condition present in the person but constitutive of certain circumstances that are 
attributed to the offenders. They are not excluded because they lack some 
requirement but in itself their exclusion articulates a difference with those citizens 
able to vote; “[i]t is the very negation of their civic capacity, a message of mandatory 
disengagement, and of revoked social status”.123 In other words, whilst democratic 
citizens are recognized because they can exercise the right to vote, which constitutes 
a mark of equality and membership, exclusion from the franchise reduces offenders to 
a lesser status, the status of those who cannot govern themselves. Therefore, CD may 
not be seen just as an ideological intervention in the sphere of the public autonomy of 
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offenders, it may also be seen as a denial of such a political aspect of their 
subjectivities. However, it is better not to jump to any conclusion and rather pay 
attention and follow the advice of Pamela Karlan: 
“If neither good character nor intelligent use of the ballot nor support for 
existing criminal laws are generally permissible prerequisites for voting, 
then it would be perverse to rely on criminal convictions as evidence that 
individuals lack qualities that voters are not required to have. The 
justification for disenfranchisement of offenders must rest not on concerns 
about the effect their participation will have on the political process but 
elsewhere. The obvious alternative is to conclude that disenfranchisement 
is indeed punitive […]”.124  
This is the kind of justification that will be explored in the next chapter. 
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THE ARGUMENT OF PUNISHMENT 
he phrase “if you break the laws, you can no longer make the laws”1 is 
repeated to express one of the most persuasive punitive intuitions 
about why offenders must lose the right to vote. It is, however, highly 
indeterminate. In another formulation, it is suggested that “[t]hose 
prepared to act in ways that deprive others of realization of the interest served by 
democratic political participation cannot consistently demand […the] exercise of the 
franchise”;2 or “When felons demand a right to vote, they demand the right to govern 
others while rejecting the right of others to govern them”.3 
These statements are powerfully rhetorical; however, they are not a complete 
explanation of the relation between the fact of breaking the law and the 
disenfranchisement of the offender. Similar difficulties are faced by those who 
propose that CD is a consequence of a breach of the social contract.4 The metaphor of 
the social contract can contribute to explaining how institutions such as democracy, 
punishment, responsibility and equality can be justified. In all these cases, the social 
contract might have some role to play. Whatever their limitations, contractarian 
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arguments are deeply connected with another kind of justification. Lying behind these 
arguments is the claim that the commission of an offence must be followed by a 
sanction, that in the case of a criminal offence adopts the form of a punishment. 
However, social contract arguments do not provide any reason to justify why such a 
sanction must adopt the form of CD.5 In a democratic society, especially when this 
kind of sanction involves the limitation of a fundamental right, such sanctions must 
adopt the form of a legal punishment and therefore should be governed by the logic of 
criminal law.6  
The previous chapter was concerned with the idea that CD is based on the lack of 
certain elements of political capacity in those convicted for a criminal offence. This 
idea was discarded for being incompatible with the democratic principles that must 
guide the composition of the franchise. In a line of reasoning that will be continued in 
this chapter, it was held that a criminal conviction must be regarded as an affirmation 
of the capacity of the offender to take autonomous decisions. In other words, being 
capable is a requirement for someone to be considered responsible. If the capacity 
that is required to follow rules is not substantially different from the capacity to be 
part of the process of making those rules – which is a key democratic idea – offenders 
should be considered capable electors. It is argued further that holding somebody 
criminally responsible in a democracy must be premised on the fact that she had been 
granted participatory rights in the law-making process. 
As a punishment, it is claimed that CD is unable to perform deterrence, rehabilitation 
or incapacitation, the three functions of punishment oriented to social protection. 
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Consequently, this chapter mainly engages with the claim of those who defend it 
more plausibly using retributive language and highlighting its expressive potential. 
The argument adopts the following structure. Section I starts by making a conceptual 
and normative distinction between the punishment and the collateral consequences of 
criminal conviction. At this stage, social protection rationales of punishment are 
discarded as justifications of CD. In Section II, the idea of a retributive CD is 
analysed in detail. This retributive argument is formulated highlighting the claim that 
CD might serve as an expressive form of democratic punishment. Finally, Section III 
shows that this justification does not satisfy the conditions for punishment to be 
compatible with democracy. It is argued that, even when conceptually CD can be 
considered a retributive punishment, it is a modality of punishment that is 
incompatible with the recognition of democratic citizens. 
I UNDERSTANDING DISENFRANCHISEMENT AS PUNISHMENT 
1 Legal nature of disenfranchisement 
The relation of CD with the commission of a criminal offence means that would make 
sense to consider it a punishment. This is the common understanding of CD in 
Europe. However, there is also a considerably widespread idea, prevalent especially 
in the United States, which considers it as a collateral consequence of the criminal 
conviction; this means a legal effect that is attached to but separate from the 
punishment itself. Its purpose, in this latter case, is to determine the scope of the 
franchise rather than punish offenders for their wrongdoings.7  
The importance of this distinction transcends rhetoric. Considering CD as a 
punishment involves the assumption that it must be designed and evaluated under a 
punitive logic, which involves legal, constitutional and theoretical restrictions framed 
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in specific terms. On the other hand, considering CD as a collateral consequence of 
criminal conviction may allow the adoption of a more flexible approach,8 in which 
the ‘regulatory aim’ of determining the franchise and protecting the electoral process 
could be subjected to less strict standards of control than the system of guarantees of 
criminal law.9 For example, a non-punitive measure would not be reached by the 
protection of the principle of prohibition of retroactive (ex post facto) criminal law.10  
Speaking about the collateral consequences of criminal conviction, however, is 
especially confusing. When examined more carefully, some distinguishing criteria 
may be found. Beside ideas that collateral consequences are named as such in the 
legislation11 and they are not under control of the judge but determined directly by the 
law,12 a third criterion pays attention to the aim or function of the measure. This 
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12. When the court has the prerogative to impose or limit a measure with some degree of 
discretion, it should be considered a ‘direct’ consequence. On the other hand, when a 
consequence does not depend on the court but is legally determined, it is ‘collateral’ (See 
Love, 2011:95-7). For example, a public and judicially-declared measure can be connected 
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suggests that a measure that is “an appropriate kind to perform the function of public 
condemnation” must be regarded a punishment; on the other hand, if it lacks such 
“reprobative symbolism”, it must be considered a non-punitive, regulative measure13. 
For example, while imprisonment is evidently punitive, the registration of sex 
offenders is essentially preventative and therefore should be considered a collateral 
consequence. This functional difference therefore entails a proposal that seeks to 
assimilate collateral consequence with the broad category of ‘disqualifications’ in 
order to distinguish it from punishment.14  
In developing this functional scheme, von Hirsch and Wasik sustain that 
disqualifications and punishment should be clearly distinguished because they 
correspond to two different legal functions, even though both normally follow a 
criminal conviction. Disqualification corresponds to a measure to deal with risk, and 
therefore operates prospectively. For example, it can be directed to avoid that a driver 
that has been demonstrated to be unable to respect traffic rule be allowed to drive. 
Punishment, in contrast, corresponds to a measure for expressing censure or 
condemnation of criminal conduct, and therefore operates retrospectively.15 For 
example, it is directed to express to the driver that killing a pedestrian when speeding 
was wrong. While disqualifications are not subject to the stricter restrictions of 
criminal law, they cannot, on the other hand, be exempt from every rational control, 
and must be the subject matter of restrictions on purpose, duration and scope.16  
Understanding disqualifications as risk-oriented measures leads to the formulation of 
a series of restrictions on their use. Firstly, they require a specified vulnerable 
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activity or occupation through which the risk can be expressed (e.g. driving a car). 
Secondly, they require the safeguarding of an interest from the alleged source of risk 
(e.g. the public).17 In accordance with these features, disqualification should be 
determined by a prediction of the likelihood that the subject will commit an offence 
or produce some harm. However, for this purpose, disqualifications should not 
consider the current capacities of the subject to develop the activity correctly, but 
rather the expectation of future misconduct in the field of those activities. In these 
terms, an equilibrated regulation of disqualifications should involve a proportional 
relation between the restriction of the person’s autonomy and the avoidance of risk.18  
On the other hand, punishment expresses censure of an offender’s past criminal 
conduct, and it is governed by other principles. Primary among these are the ideas of 
desert and the principle of proportionality. According to these ideas, only those who 
have been proved guilty of committing an offence can be punished, and the 
punishment “should be proportionate in its severity to the seriousness of the criminal 
conduct”.19 However, in contrast with disqualification, punishment is normally 
deemed necessary even in the absence of any risk of a future offence or harm. This 
description of the aim of the punishment, it must be noticed, coincides with a 
retributive account of punishment that it is just one of its accepted functions. On that 
basis, prospective risk and retrospective condemnation are the principles that govern 
the application of disqualifications and punishments, respectively.20 
This scheme not only allows classification of the consequences of criminal conviction 
in terms of disqualification and punishment, but it also allows the identification of 
those consequences that do not perform any of these functions. Demonstrating the 
critical dimension of the scheme, it allows for rational scrutiny to be applied to 
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criminal regulation insofar as its indiscriminate use can lead to offenders being 
treated as second-class citizens. Therefore, when a consequence does not follow the 
parameters of culpability and proportionality, it cannot be catalogued as a 
punishment. On the other hand, when it cannot be linked with the prevention of future 
risk posed by a dangerous subject, it cannot be seen as a disqualification. What 
remains, according to von Hirsch and Wasik, is just the political aim of degrading 
certain subjects and activities, which is not covered by the reputed legitimising 
blanket of a rationalized criminal system.21  
2 Incapacitation and social protection 
2.1 Disenfranchisement as (criminal) incapacitation 
The idea that CD can work as an incapacitation measure was considered in the 
previous chapter.22 On that occasion, however, incapacitation was understood not as a 
measure based on the risk of the commission of a criminal offence, but on the 
protection of elections from the influence of those who lack the necessary civic virtue 
to participate in them. Thus the distinction between ‘(electoral) incapacitation’ and 
‘(criminal) incapacitation’ becomes salient. In addition to this previous 
understanding, incapacitation is usually regarded as one of the aims of punishment. 
According to this view, punishment works when it directly impedes the commission 
of new crimes by the offender.23 It is based on a prediction of the offender’s 
likelihood of reoffending. In the functional scheme, however, incapacitation (or 
disqualification) is distinguished from punishment as a different kind of measure 
governed by other principles, oriented towards the prevention of future criminal 
offences. 
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Considered in these terms, the incapacitating potential of CD is probably very weak, 
having little impact on the prevention of new crimes. Its potential to produce general 
incapacitation (this is the capacity to prevent any kind of crime) is relatively narrow 
because it cannot prevent the commission of crimes other than electoral offences, 
unlike, for example, imprisonment, which has high incapacitating potential.24 On the 
other hand, it is difficult to judge the preventative aspect of CD regarding electoral 
crimes. For that purpose, the effect of CD must be carefully distinguished from that 
of imprisonment where these overlap. Inmates cannot commit electoral crimes if the 
electoral process exists only outside of the prison. As would appear obvious, this is 
an effect of imprisonment and not of CD. 
On the one hand, CD could have the effect of preventing electoral fraud inside the 
prison. However, neither empirical studies nor common sense reveals that prisoners 
are no more likely to commit electoral fraud or other electoral crimes than the rest of 
the population.25 Those who commit electoral frauds are not normally sentenced for 
other kinds of crimes, because the rationale for electoral criminality is different from 
other forms of criminality. For example, somebody convicted for drug dealing is 
unlikely to be convicted for an electoral offence. The cost of maintaining the distance 
between former electoral offenders and the ballot box is high if this is achieved by 
excluding all inmates. In conclusion, when the ban affects all prisoners under this 
premise, it is evidently over-inclusive.26 It also argued that the social control 
exercised in the prison environment is sufficient reason for arguing that the state’s 
capacity for controlling electoral processes inside prisons must be sufficient to 
overcome the possibility of electoral fraud or other related offences.27  
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On the other hand, when CD affects ex-prisoners it is more likely to serve the purpose 
of preventing electoral fraud.28 Yet, the scope for this argument is limited. There is a 
lack of rational connection between CD and the prevention of electoral fraud because 
the commission of electoral fraud does not generally require enfranchisement.29 
However, several distinctions can be traced here. Some electoral crimes might require 
that the criminal be a qualified voter (e.g. vote selling), whilst others do not (e.g. 
bribery). Thus, it might be justified to disenfranchise a person who has received 
repeated convictions for selling her vote, in order to impede her from selling it 
again.30 Another problem for this approach is that of under-inclusiveness, given that 
sometimes, electoral offences to not considered as serious crimes and therefore CD is 
not imposed on electoral offenders.31 
Accordingly, it is difficult to argue that CD can incapacitate offenders to commit any 
kind of crime, perhaps with the exception of vote selling.32 It is time to turn to 
examine its punitive potential. The very fact that CD is the consequence of a criminal 
sentence, and that it is retrospectively oriented, may be an indicator of its punitive 
nature. Traditionally, the aims performed by punishment are classified in three 
categories: deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. The first two functions are 
guided by the general purpose of social protection, whilst retribution is inspired by 
the pursuit of the abstract normative goal that offenders must receive their just 
deserts. In the functional scheme, however, deterrence and rehabilitation must be 
considered with incapacitation as preventive opposed therefore to punitive. These 
aspects of punishment are not retrospectively oriented but look to prevent the 
commission of new crimes, and as such cannot qualify as truly punitive. At most they 
                                                 
28. See Bennett, 2003: par. 18. 
29. See Manza & Uggen, 2006:36. 
30. See López-Guerra, 2014a:115. 
31. See Lardy, 2002:526. See also Note, 1989:1303; Kleinig & Murtagh, 2005:220. 
32. Other conceptualizations of the incapacitation can be even more restrictive and be specifically 
directed at impeding the commission of the same kind of crime for which the sentence was 
imposed (in this case, electoral offences). This is an interesting point of view from which to 
evaluate CD when it is observed that some of the electoral offences do not necessarily incur 
this measure. See von Hirsch & Wasik, 1997:606; Demleitner, 2000:792-3. 
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could serve as a collateral goal of the execution of the punishment (e.g. 
rehabilitation), or as a justification of the criminal system as a whole (e.g. 
deterrence).33 The following exposition, however, does not seek to question 
theoretically the generally accepted aim and social functions of punishment but to 
analyse CD in the light of standardised versions of them.34  
2.2 Deterrence 
The aim of deterrence has two aspects, general and special: “General deterrence is 
based on the prediction that punishing one criminal will influence others not to 
commit the same crime. Special deterrence means that the punished offender will be 
deterred from future offences after his release”.35 The basic claim of deterrence is that 
prospective offenders are dissuaded from committing a crime based on the fear of the 
penalty whose imposition they risk. It is difficult to separate the negative preventive 
dimension of deterrence from the positive preventive dimension of punishment, such 
as moral education, social integration and reinforcement of the law. As it has been 
seen, these later aspects play a fundamental role in efforts to characterise CD as an 
adequate form of punishment, being frequently invoked by government and courts.36  
The deterrent potential of CD depends upon how much importance offenders attach to 
the right to vote, so that they are dissuaded from committing crimes because of the 
fear of losing it. Moreover, deterrence requires that the subject know about the 
punishment, if this is expected to influence his conduct.37 In this sense, the deterrent 
effect of CD would require its public imposition (unlike in the majority of cases 
                                                 
33. Regarding hybrid sentencing, see von Hirsch & Ashworth, 1992:181-7, 241-53. See also von 
Hirsch, 1993: Ch. 6. 
34. For an overview and discussion of these objectives, see von Hirsch & Ashworth, 1992. 
35. Fletcher, 1998:31. 
36. See below Chapter 2. 
37. See Sauvé, dissenting vote [119-21]; NICRO, dissenting vote [116]. 
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observed in comparative law) and even in that case, the imperceptible physical effect 
of CD limits its deterrent potential.38  
The deterrent function of CD is difficult to demonstrate. The basis of the deterrent 
logic resides in the assumption that it is possible to motivate prospectively a person’s 
conduct. Besides the general empirical problems which complicate probing 
deterrence in general, it is difficult to imagine a case in which a potential offender 
would be dissuaded from committing a crime based on the additional punishment of 
CD. It is more engaging to think that, as a rational agent, the person would be already 
dissuaded by a severer and better-known punitive measure such as imprisonment.39 
This position is supported by empirical studies confirming the premises of a due 
scepticism regarding deterrence. Firstly, they have confirmed widespread public 
ignorance about the existence of CD, even extending to justice professionals 
including judges and criminal lawyers.40 Secondly, studies have shown that many 
offenders are not dissuaded from committing a crime by the punishment of 
imprisonment but are usually more importantly influenced by situational factors.41 
Thirdly, on a personal level, offenders tend to value other things considerably more 
than the political rights they might lose.42 If all this is true, it is hard to sustain that 
adding CD to their primary punishment could avoid the commission of crimes.43 This 
evidence shows that deterrence does not work for CD. 
                                                 
38. See Demleitner, 2000:788. See also Cholbi, 2002:557; Hill & Koch, 2011:224. 
39. See Itzkowitz & Oldak, 1973:734-9. See also Tims, 1975:157; Note, 1989:1303; Ewald, 
2002:1106; Bennett, 2003: par. 20, 33-5; Brenner & Caste, 2003:233; Reiman, 2005:9; Manza 
& Ugger, 2006:36; Easton, 2006:450; Levine, 2009:220-1. 
40. See Manza & Ugger, 2006:36. See also Easton, 2009:229-30. 
41. See von Hirsch & Ashworth, 1992:57. 
42. See e.g. Joint Committee, 2013:40. 
43. See Cholbi, 2002:557-8. 
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2.3 Rehabilitation and reintegration 
The other function of punishment directed to social protection is rehabilitation. It 
consists of a therapeutic interpretation of the punishment, which treats offenders as 
‘patients’ and therefore leads to the cure or change of their criminal tendencies.44 Its 
expected outcome is the prevention of future offences on the part of rehabilitated 
offenders, and therefore it is not primarily concerned with the cure of the criminal, 
who is meant to be separated from the community if rehabilitation is not achieved.45 
The modern terminology has shifted to the language of reintegration, due to the 
ethical problems that are imbricated with the rehabilitative ideal, such as the need to 
limit permissible state actions and the disrespect that its assumptions imply towards 
the person of the offender.46 In the new paradigm, the emphasis is placed less on 
changing the offender’s personality than on enhancing his ability to function 
normally in society.47  
In this way, as a rehabilitative or re-integrative measure CD may play a role in 
transforming offenders into law-abiding citizens. Conceiving of re-enfranchisement 
as a reward could motivate the good behaviour of the offenders, promoting 
“reintegration by making salient the rights and responsibilities of citizenship”.48 This 
account of re-integrative punishment would be compatible with the idea that 
offenders are disenfranchised for their lack of civic virtue.49 This potential outcome is 
foregone or hindered if CD continues for a long time or a lifetime after release, or 
where the process of re-enfranchisement is too difficult or complicated.50 In fact, a 
permanent or excessive length of CD is irreconcilable with any rehabilitative goal, 
                                                 
44. See Fletcher, 1998:31. 
45. See von Hirsch & Ashworth, 1992:1. 
46. See von Hirsch & Ashworth, 1992:3. 
47. See van Zyl Smit & Snacken, 2009:83. 
48. Sigler, 2013:18-9. 
49. See above Chapter 4, Section II. 
50. See Manza & Ugger, 2006:37. See also Levine, 2009:223. 
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and it is more likely that it stigmatizes offenders.51 Thus, the rehabilitation function 
may only operate where the restoration of rights quickly or automatically follows 
release.52  
However, it can also be argued that CD is incompatible with the re-educational 
commitment of rehabilitative theories. The stigmatisation and degradation that CD 
involves cannot contribute to these rehabilitative aims. This was the view of the 
Canadian Supreme Court in Sauvé when affirmed that the attempt to send an 
‘educative message’ by disenfranchising offenders is a “bad pedagogy” [30] and that 
CD implies “loosing and important means of teaching them democratic values and 
social responsibility” [38]. The empirical evidence available indicates in that 
direction: “for a significant number of ex-offender the loss of voting rights poses an 
obstacle to successful reintegration”,53 even affecting the wider community to which 
those disenfranchised belong.54  
By contrast, inclusive and participative rehabilitative strategies may generate the 
desired awareness about the importance of political participation, respect for the law 
and the value of a communal life. Letting offenders vote could contribute to building 
a sense of membership towards the community and even contribute to positively 
transforming ‘criminal identities’.55 Going further, from the standpoint of a 
rehabilitative ideal, it would be more reasonable to encourage inmates to participate 
in election,56 and even to impose compulsory voting for inmates, rather than 
                                                 
51. See Demleitner, 2000:775, 785-6. 
52. See Demleitner, 2009:101. 
53. Miller & Spillane, 2012:402. See also the party interveners in Hirst [53]. Hamilton-Smith & 
Vogel (2001) demonstrate the connection between CD and recidivism. See also the 
inconclusive data analysis on Manza & Uggen, 2006:124-135. 
54. See Bowers & Preuhs, 2009. 
55. See Manza & Uggen, 2006: Ch. 6. See also Itzkowitz & Oldak, 1973:732; Tims, 1975:156; 
Cholbi, 2002:558-9; Bennett, 2003: par. 43-5; Kleinig & Murtagh, 2005:229-30; Reiman, 
2005:9, 13-4; Joint Committee, 2013:41-2. See also the party interveners [54] and concurrent 
opinion of Judge Caflisch [5] in Hirst. 
56. See Demleitner, 2009:94. See also Behan, 2014: Ch. 7.  
PUNISHMENT 
 
 
190 
excluding them from it. This could signal a more effective and coherent method of 
challenging deviant behaviours and identities.57  
II DISENFRANCHISEMENT AS PUNISHMENT 
The social function of punishment associated with deterrence, rehabilitation and 
incapacitation depends heavily on the satisfaction of a protective goal. It has been 
seen how, independently of empirical demonstration, these functions are poor 
candidates for explaining CD. The success of retribution, in contrast, does not depend 
on the empirical verification of such a goal but on an adequate configuration of the 
legal framework for a retrospective punitive reaction. However, retribution generally 
faces other kind of problems, importantly among them, the problem of explaining 
why a form of punishment is adequate in relation to a particular offence. This section 
examines how the retributive theory of punishment can be applied to CD, ultimately 
presenting a conception of retributive CD that explains why it would be an admissible 
and adequate form of punishment. 
1 Disenfranchisement as a retributive punishment 
It was mentioned that, according to the functional scheme, punishment corresponds to 
a measure for expressing condemnation of a criminal conduct which occurred in the 
past. This corresponds to great extent to the idea of retribution. In contrast with 
deterrence and rehabilitation, retribution is commonly characterised by its purely 
abstract justification and by its unnecessary empirical proof. It also marked by its 
retrospective orientation. The main demand of retributive punishment, and what 
ensures its popularity in current times, is that the offender be treated as an 
                                                 
57. See Ewald, 2002:1110-1. See also Brenner & Caste, 2003:232; Manza & Ugger, 2006:37. See, 
critically, Ramsay (2013b), who argues that use enfranchisement as a rehabilitative tool is 
transform the vote (a political right) into a social right, and the value of self-determination is 
reduced to a mere end of policing (424, 430-1). 
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autonomous moral agent. This is achieved by setting rational limitations on the 
punitive power of the state. First, the punishment must be imposed and may only be 
imposed upon those found guilty of the commission of a crime. Second, the relation 
between the quantum of the punishment and the seriousness of the crime must be 
proportional.58 A retributive punishment is not necessarily incompatible with the 
other preventive goals, such as deterrence and rehabilitation; nonetheless, these 
notions play secondary parts in the scheme governed by the logic of desert.59  
Disenfranchising those who have committed a criminal offence as a punishment does 
not present a problem of empirical proof because there is nothing to be demonstrated. 
If causing the offender harm is justified, and this harm is expressing condemnation, 
then CD seems perfectly retributive. The fact that offenders do not value the right to 
vote, or at least not to the same extent as other rights, does not constitute an objection 
to the punitive potential of CD.60 The retributive dimension of a measure does not 
depend on subjective appreciations, it is reasonable that offenders are more concerned 
about “getting decent housing or a job […] than they are about the vote”,61 but rather 
the fact that a fundamental right is limited, suspended or removed from a subject 
following a criminal conviction and, when basic “political rights are denied, proof of 
additional harm is not required”.62  
The more common and serious criticism that affects CD is not related with its 
retributive performance but with the lack of proportionality between the nature and 
seriousness of the crime and the form and quantum of the punishment. However, it is 
not clear what the critics mean when, for example, they highlight that 
“[disenfranchisement] is hard to justify as it not clearly linked to desert, to the degree 
                                                 
58. See von Hirsch & Ashworth, 1992:181. 
59. See von Hirsch & Ashworth, 1992:182. 
60. See Joint Committee, 2013:40. See also Demleitner, 2009:94. 
61. Lacey, 2013b:107.  
62. Sauvé [59]. 
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of harm caused, the seriousness of the offence, or the culpability of the offender”.63 
This may be true in some cases but it does not affect CD conceptually and generally. 
The clearest case of a disproportionate CD is when it is imposed permanently or 
continues affecting subjects even after they have served their prison sentences.64 In 
such cases, the lack of proportionality is evidenced by contrast to the proportionality 
of imprisonment. If imprisonment, generally considered a more serious punishment, 
is imposed for a limited amount of time, proportionally to the seriousness of the 
crime, CD must also follow this limitation. The case of permanent CD, by showing 
that it may not be governed by proportionality, becomes difficult to explain, 
especially when CD is conceived of as a form of punishment.65 In fact, the opposite 
seem to be the case; CD can be seen a diagnosis of the need for a measure of 
permanent exclusion: “these sanctions are justified because offenders cannot be fully 
rehabilitated and therefore can never recapture their moral standing in the 
community”.66 The institutional configuration of permanent CD tends to be better 
explained by degrading and stigmatizing purposes.67 
When the ban only affects prisoners during the time they are serving their prison 
sentences, the question of proportionality seems to be satisfied by linking the length 
of CD to the length of imprisonment.68 Inasmuch as prison sentences are 
‘proportional’ to the seriousness of the offence and some other characteristics of the 
offenders, considering any other factor appears simply arbitrary. Nevertheless, its 
applicability to all classes of crimes has raised criticism anyway. Three issues have 
been particularly problematic in the justification of CD as a punishment: (1) the lack 
of a material connection between the right suspended and the offence committed (e.g. 
                                                 
63. Easton, 2009:229. 
64. See Fletcher, 1999:1896. See also Ewald, 2002:1103; Schall, 2006:75.  
65. See Fletcher, 1999:1896. See also Bennett, 2003: par 30-2; Kleinig & Murtagh, 2005:221; 
Levine, 2009:220. 
66. Demleitner, 2009:82. 
67. See below Chapter 6. 
68. See Reiman, 2005:9. See also Schall, 2006:75. 
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whether electoral fraud or drug trafficking); (2) the disregard for the seriousness of 
the crime (e.g. whether thieving or mass murder); and (3) the disregard for the length 
of incarceration of the offender (e.g. whether somebody is incarcerated for 10 days or 
for 10 years). These aspects reproduce, to some extent, the criticism highlighted by 
the “general, automatic and indiscriminate” nature of British legislation under the 
Hirst test.69  
1.1 Material connection 
The first concern is not related with proportionality but with the material connection 
between the crime and the punishment. Sometimes this argument is sustained against 
the retributive nature of CD. The imposition of CD in response to crimes with 
electoral content (fraud), or even with relation to the democratic process (abuse of 
office), can be reasonable, according to some critics.70 However, its indiscriminate 
application to all kinds of offences dispenses with any attempt to link it to the content 
of the crime (‘to fit the crime’), and only affirms an additional harm for the 
offenders.71 The number of declared critics of CD ready to concede that electoral 
offenders are an exception to the claim of criminals’ enfranchisement is considerably 
high, but their position is never articulated in unambiguous terms.72 For example, the 
minority vote in Hirst articulates the following argument: 
“It is perfectly conceivable, for example, that a person who has been 
convicted of electoral fraud […] should be deprived for a time of his or 
her rights to vote and to stand for election. The reason for this is that there 
exists a logical and perhaps even a natural connection between the 
impugned act and the aim of the penalty (which, though ancillary, is 
important) that serves as punishment for such acts and as a deterrent to 
others. The same does not hold true […] for any offence that leads to a 
prison sentence” [3]. 
                                                 
69. See above Chapter 2, Section I.1. 
70. See Cholbi, 2002:546. See also Bennett, 2003: par 32; López-Guerra, 2014a:116. 
71. See Demleitner, 2000:791. See also Brenner & Caste, 2003:235; Levine, 2009:217-8. 
72. See Hirst [71]. See also Beckman, 2009:130-1. 
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The answer to this alleged problem must underline the fact that this sense of material 
correspondence is not necessarily related to a retributive theory of punishment. 
Retribution does not necessarily mean lex talionis,73 but it may also adopt the form of 
‘cardinal proportionality’, meaning that “the overall levels of the penalty scale be 
kept in some reasonable relation to the gravity of the offending behaviours”.74 This is 
evident when it is observed that crimes such as robbery or rape are typically punished 
by imprisonment. Against our intuitions, imprisonment, according to such a claim, 
would be called upon to punish only those crimes against liberty, such as kidnapping. 
The absence of a material connection therefore cannot be an argument against the 
retributive use of CD. It must be noted, nonetheless, that the fact that CD is not an 
inadequate punishment does not imply its necessary adequacy. Additional reasons 
must be given for that. This argument cannot be used either to justify, without 
additional reasons, a targeted ban affecting only those who have committed electoral 
or political crimes. Reasons of this kind are explored in following pages under the 
idea of expressive CD. 
1.2 Seriousness 
The second concern of the critics of CD is its application regardless of the 
seriousness of the crime. The claim that the application of CD must distinguish 
between serious and minor offenders is explicit and central in Hirst and Scoppola, as 
conclusion of a proportionality test, and Roach embraces it as very purpose of CD, 
conceptualised in terms of punishing serious offenders. It is also implicitly 
recognised in NICRO [67] and it received significant attention in the dissenting vote 
of Sauvé [119].75 
                                                 
73. See e.g. Waldron, 1992. 
74. von Hirsch & Ashworth, 1992:182-3. See also Cholbi, 2002:544. 
75. See below Chapter 2, Section III.1.  
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This argument seems to be the counterpart of the idea that the right to vote is 
fundamental to the democratic system, and therefore that CD should be selective and 
intended to affect a narrow group of serious offenders.76 The conclusion of this 
argument is that a blanket-ban disenfranchising all those in prison is over-inclusive. 
A murderer, a rapist and a terrorist will be deprived of their right to vote in exactly 
the same way as someone who has committed a minor offence, such as driving under 
the influence of alcohol or a petty theft.77  
However, why the seriousness of the offence must be a requirement for the 
application of retributive CD is not clearly justified. It could be that a distinction can 
be made between those crimes that ‘break the civil contract’,78 understanding for 
these “a set of rules without which a democratic political order would not be 
possible”.79 In that scenario, one can honestly ask why people that have not 
committed such crimes are in prison, but that would not answer the question about 
how, under current conditions, it can be found a difference between a minor and a 
serious crime. 
The Court highlighted this cavil in Sauvé. First, it argued that any limit drawn 
between ‘minor’ and ‘serious’ offences is arbitrary, and second, it observed the lack 
of a “correlation between the distinction [between minor and serious] and the 
entitlement to vote” [55].80 Small offences deserve punishment and they are 
violations of the law to the same extent as serious offences and they both are indeed 
                                                 
76. Cholbi develops this argument but, strangely, concludes that given the fundamental nature of 
the right to vote as an expression of self-determination retribution cannot validate CD 
(2002:548-50).  
77. This seems to be one of the main concerns of the debate in the US where CD applies to a 
significantly number of minor offences. See Manza & Ugger, 2006:8. 
78. That is the idea presented by concurring opinion of judge Caflisch in Hirst, who argues that 
CD must be restricted to major crimes because [i]t cannot simply be assumed that whoever 
serves a sentence has breached the social contract” [7.b]. See also Sauvé [54]. 
79. Ramsay, 2013b:424. 
79. Ramsay, 2013b:424. 
80. See also Lippke, 2001:563; Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:134; Ramsay 2013a:6; Hugh & Roberts, 
2013. 
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punished proportionally. Why CD may only apply to serious offences? The 
distinction is deeply guided by feeling and fails to reflect the demand for 
rationalization of punishment. The conclusion of the Court is that “[t]he only real 
answer the government provides to the question ‘why two years?’ is because it affects 
a smaller class than would a blanket disenfranchisement” [55].81  
Affirming that there is no rational distinction between minor and serious crimes is not 
necessarily an argument for general enfranchisement, as was concluded in Sauvé. It 
can help also to support a blanket ban. The best example of this line is the argument 
of the UK Government in Hirst. It was argued, first, that given that a “line must be 
drawn somewhere” [52], the Parliament is the better positioned to do so in a 
democracy. Second, that imprisonment is the last resource a society has for dealing 
with crime, which should be limited to those who have committed the most serious 
offences;82 those whose offences are not punished by a prison sentence have already 
been excluded from the category of the offenders that must be disenfranchised.83  
Those who defend a targeted ban applied only to those most serious offenders serving 
prison sentences have not explained how that line can be rationally drawn. The 
criticism against Hirst and Scoppola of the minority vote in Chester and McGeoch is 
very clear in this regard: 
                                                 
81. The court noticed the political nature of the compromise solution that the government was 
seeking, and openly refused to engage with it. Chapter 7 explores this issue further, suggesting 
that some of the sentences that have followed CD cases have been the result of this kind of 
process of political negotiation. See also Easton, 2006:452; Schall, 2006: 80; Orr & Williams, 
2009:133. 
82. See Bennett, 2012:5. See also, more generally, Husak, 2004; van Zyl Smit & Snaken, 2009:86-
97. 
83. See e.g. Ramsay, 2013b:423. However, as already noticed in Hirst [77] (and empathised in the 
concurring opinion of judges Tulkens and Zagrebelsky) there is a factor of arbitrariness in 
substituting seriousness with imprisonment for the application of CD. The case of the 
suspended sentences or parole is paradigmatic; it does not attribute CD based solely on desert 
but on other social elements as well. The arbitrariness operates by considering the offender’s 
personal characteristics (Davison, 2004:11). Examples of this include the possibility for some 
offenders to make financial reparations for the offence, or “the support structures that an 
offender has around him or her, and whether these permit a less restrictive sentencing outcome 
than imprisonment” (Geddis, 2011:449). See also Munn, 2011:225. 
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“[ECtHR] has arrived at a very curious position. […] Wherever the 
threshold for imprisonment is placed, it seems to have been their view that 
there must always be some offences which are serious enough to warrant 
imprisonment but not serious enough to warrant disenfranchisement. Yet 
the basis of this view is nowhere articulated” [135].84  
1.3 Duration of incarceration 
Finally, in what appears to be the more reasoned criticism, it is sustained that the 
problem of the imposition of CD stems from a failure to take into account the length 
and the moment of the incarceration. This factor is extraordinarily relevant because, 
unlike for example liberty, the right to vote is only exercised during the days of the 
elections and therefore the punishment is only experienced if the offender is 
imprisoned during that day. It is perfectly possible that, as a result, an offender 
sentenced to 4 years, legally disenfranchised during that time, does not experience 
exclusion from the franchise because no elections occur during the time of the 
imprisonment. On the other hand, somebody sentenced to one day of prison might be 
deprived of the possibility to participate in the electoral process if the election 
happens to fall on that day.85 This element produces “very strange results”,86 and the 
problem that “whether (and how often) a person is actually disenfranchised is 
dependent on when they serve their sentence”, meaning that CD is not effectively 
dependent on the length of the imprisonment or the seriousness of the crime.87 
                                                 
84. It continue: “It might perhaps have been justified by a careful examination of the principles of 
sentencing in the United Kingdom, with a view to demonstrating that they involve the 
imprisonment of some categories of people for offences so trivial that one could not rationally 
suppose them to warrant disenfranchisement. That would be an indictment not just of the 
principle of disenfranchisement but of the sentencing principles themselves. However, no such 
exercise appears to have been carried out” [135]. 
85. See Orr, 1998:81. See also Easton, 2006:450; Lacey, 2013a. 
86. Chan Kin Sum [122]. 
87. Munn, 2011:225. 
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To overcome this problem of arbitrariness and ensure that “[c]riminals sentenced to 
terms of the same length ought to be subjected to the same exclusion from voting”,88 
the imposition of CD should consider the electoral terms. For example, a proposal to 
disenfranchise only those serving sentences of the same extension as the electoral 
term, and independently of the moment in which they start to serve the sentence, 
points in that direction. The proportionality of CD would be determined in relation to 
the elections that the offender has missed and not in relation to the time served in 
prison.89 Other alternatives in this direction would include the complete autonomy of 
CD from imprisonment. Its direct imposition as an independent punishment would 
allow targeting precisely the elections in which an offender ought to be impeded from 
voting. 
Some conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. Recognizing the immanent 
limitations of a retributive punishment, CD can be defended as a proportionate 
punitive response to those who have committed a criminal offence. The institutional 
conditions that it must assume are threefold. First, it cannot be applied permanently 
or for extraordinarily long periods after the release of the offender. Second, though 
irrelevant if CD applies only to serious crimes, it must be applied with reference to 
cardinal proportionality; that is, it must affect more seriously those who have 
committed more serious crimes and vice versa. Finally, it cannot depend upon the 
arbitrary relation between the day of the conviction and the day of the election, 
therefore, the unit for assessing the proportionality of the response must be the 
number of elections missed rather than a given period. Additionally, and echoing the 
discussion about the differences between punishment and collateral consequences of 
                                                 
88. Munn, 2011:227. 
89. Munn, 2011:226-229. 
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criminal conviction, it can be sustained that CD must be imposed in the judicial 
sentence.90  
Respecting these terms, CD can be regarded as a proportional punishment. A question 
that remains open, however, is whether CD can be an adequate form of punishment. 
Retributive theory is considerable unresponsive the question of the form that 
punishment assume, and normally give for granted that this is the form of 
imprisonment. This presents difficulties at the time of assessing other forms of 
punishment. This is important because CD usually assume the role of an ‘additional’ 
punishment that is added to imprisonment. The question of why we need this 
additional punishment is not trivial. 
2 Expressive disenfranchisement as democratic punishment 
Assuming that the retributive logic neither requires nor prohibits CD as a form of 
punishment, some theorists have offered a defence of CD as an acceptable form of 
punishment. They have argued that CD is desirable because perform an exceptional 
expressive task of condemnation against serious offences in a democratic society. 
This notion of expressive CD is especially concerned to avoid the criticisms related 
with degradation and exclusion that are directed against it. 
2.1 Disenfranchisement and condemnation 
A proposal in this direction can be found in the work of Jean Hampton, who argues 
that to exclude certain offenders from the franchise is to express a commitment to 
democratic values without degrading the offenders.91 Hampton develops a conception 
                                                 
90. See Demleitner, 2000:795-804. The dissenting opinion in Scoppola point out that judicial 
imposition is not required necessarily by consideration of proportionality but the claimed 
nature of CD as the exercise of a punitive reaction [25]. 
91. See Hampton, 1998. See a criticism of her proposal in Rothchild, 2011:62-4. 
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of punishment that integrates retribution and other expressive aspects, following 
closely Joel Feinberg’s idea that punishment can be distinguished from other 
sanctions (penalties) as “a device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and 
indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation”.92 That expressive 
function of public condemnation is essential to the institution that we know as 
punishment.93  
Hampton is aware of the democratic problem of CD. This is probably why she starts 
her defence of CD by affirming the internal link between retribution and equality. An 
offender attacks the idea of equality by damaging the “interests of another individual 
to further his own purposes […] saying to that individual ‘I am up here, and you are 
down there; so I can use you for my purposes’”.94 Criminal offences are unjust 
actions because they diminish the value of their victims. Punishment, in his account, 
is demanded as a way to defend the equal value and worth of the victim and deny the 
offender’s claim. The proportionality of the punishment, in this context, expresses the 
equal value of the victim that has been contested by the offence. But this goal cannot 
be pursued or accomplished by degrading the offender, with a “treatment that 
represents him as inferior, or less than fully human”.95 It is important, for these 
purposes, to maintain that the punishment’s condemnation not be directed at the 
offender himself, but only to his conduct; that is what distinguishes punishment from 
revenge.96 If CD is applied by targeting the offenders rather than their conduct, 
Hampton claims, it “would be a way of condemning them as outlaws – people who 
are outside the state and the community as a whole”.97 In contrast, Hampton claims 
                                                 
92. Feinberg, 1970:98 (emphasis added). 
93. See Hampton, 1992:17-23. This function may help or hinder other aims (e.g. deterrence, 
rehabilitation) but this need not necessarily be the case. Hampton generally is committed to the 
idea that punishment captures two particular functions: the expressive function of 
condemnation and the preventive function of moral education. 
94. Hampton, 1998:38-9. 
95. Hampton, 1998:39. 
96. See generally Hampton, 1992. cf Whitman, 2003:21. 
97. Hampton, 1998:39. She continues, in a way that could be read as a response to the idea of 
criminals’ bad character as follows: “I regard this way of understanding prisoner 
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that CD can be respectful to the equal status of the offenders.98 To successfully do 
that, it must serve the function of kolasis, consistent with putting the offender in his 
place rather than degrading him.99  
Her argument develops arguing the relevance of the material connection between the 
offence and the punishment, on the one hand, by acknowledging the democratic 
importance of the right to vote, and, on the other hand, insisting on the need to 
identify certain crimes that are “destructive of the values and functioning of a 
democratic society”.100 Crimes against the state and democratic institutions, crimes of 
racial hatred and crimes against women are candidates for this category. CD is an 
adequate response to these kinds of crimes in ways that are not covered by 
imprisonment, she claims, because it expresses condemnation of the political 
dimension of the act, which undermines the values which must be protected. 
Symbolically, disenfranchising those offenders, and only them, expresses the message 
that whoever does not embrace or show contempt for the values of democratic 
equality cannot take part in the important decisions of the community.101 It produces a 
morally educative effect: on the one hand, by linking “the exercise of freedom with 
responsibility”, and on the other hand, affirming the values that “make our society 
possible”.102 This expressive connection between the offence and the form of 
                                                                                                                                                    
disenfranchisement as abusive, degrading, and unjust: abusive because of its message of hate, 
degrading because of what is said to be his ‘bad’ nature (so that its message makes it akin to 
banishment) and unjust because of its unresponsiveness to possible systemic forces that can 
provoke criminal conduct” (36). See also Sigler, 2013:16-7 and above Chapter 4 Section II. 
98. cf Lippke, 2001:564. 
99. See Whitman, 2003:21-2. 
100. Hampton, 1998:41. See also Lippke, 2001:562; Lavi, 2011:800. 
101. In the words of Hampton: “What political message is sent if we let him vote? I would submit a 
very bad one is sent: i.e., that despite the fact that he tried to destroy our government and 
showed contempt for the values animating it, we will nonetheless let him participate in running 
it. This is no way to stand up for those values, or to support a democratic form of government” 
(1998:41). See also López-Guerra, 2014a:114. Beckman initially caricatures, unfairly, the 
position of Hampton as one which renders CD dependent upon the people’s beliefs regarding 
the moral corruptness of offenders (2009:137), while on the following page he recognizes the 
expressive dimension of CD in Hampton’s argument (138).  
102. Hampton, 1998:43. The above reveals certain similarities between this idea and the argument 
of disruptive voting, analysed above in Chapter 4, Section I. Both of them embrace CD as a 
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punishment constitute a reason for demanding a material connection that was 
dismissed above. 
The ECtHR, in Hirst, echoed this theory sustaining that democratic society can 
“protect itself against activities intended to destroy the rights or freedoms” using for 
this effects “restrictions on electoral rights […] imposed on an individual who has, 
for example, seriously abused a public position or whose conduct threatened to 
undermine the rule of law or democratic foundations” [71]. The dissidence in Sauvé 
adopts this view, and explicitly cites Hampton when affirms: 
“Incarceration alone signals a denunciation of the offender’s anti-societal 
behaviour and indicates society’s hope for rehabilitation through 
separation from the community. Incarceration by itself, however, leaves 
those convicted of serious crimes free to exercise all the levers of electoral 
power open to all law-abiding citizens. This maintains a political parity 
between those convicted of society’s worst crimes and their victims. 
Disqualification from voting, however, signals a denunciation of the 
criminal’s anti-societal behaviour and sends the message that those people 
convicted of causing the worst forms of indignity to others will be 
deprived of one aspect of the political equality of citizens — the right to 
vote. It can be said that, in this context, “kindness toward the criminal can 
be an act of cruelty toward his victims, and the larger community” 
[181].103 
2.2 Disenfranchisement and accountability 
Hampton’s argument affirms the pertinence of CD in relation to crimes against 
democratic values but she does not endorse it for all kinds of offences. However, as 
other commenters have highlighted, the commission of every offence expresses 
contempt for the results of the democratic process and as such, every crime, 
                                                                                                                                                    
form of defence of the values of a liberal and democratic community. The difference resides in 
the fact that, whilst disruptive voting understands CD as a way of disempowering the offender, 
expressive punishment understands it as a kind of condemnation of the crime, which is 
communicated both to the offender and to the general public.  
103. See also Sauvé [119]. 
PUNISHMENT 
 
 
203 
independently of its anti-democratic material identity, is an offence against the 
democratic values.104 This would be the case especially in the case of “those 
offenders whose sufficiently long and diverse histories of criminal conviction show 
that they are generally unwilling to comply with the laws enacted by democratic 
governments”.105 In this regard, the proposal of Christopher Bennett shares some of 
the Hampton’s premises, while remaining different insofar as it extends the 
applicability of CD to all kinds of offences.  
Bennett sustains – along with others such as Duff – that punishing the offender is a 
way to hold a person accountable for his offence.106 Accountability, however, only 
makes sense in the context of a community and, simultaneously, for offenders to be 
treated as members of the community, they must be indeed held accountable for their 
actions. Bennett suggests that accountability counts as part of what it means to form 
part of the community, to the same extent as does the right to take part in its decisions 
(for instance, by voting), concluding, in that direction, that “only someone who is ‘in’ 
can be held to account”.107 Punishment, generally speaking, has the effect of 
including the offender within the community rather than excluding him. This 
affirmation, however, can be predicated for any form of punishment, not just CD 
alone.  
Bennett continues – in what is arguably the most questionable part of his argument – 
by sustaining that the suspension of voting rights is a good candidate for this 
accountability. This is so because “the symbol that we use to express condemnation 
must have some satisfying connection with the behaviour that symbolically separates 
us from wrongdoing”.108 He then concludes that “[v]oting rights might be temporarily 
                                                 
104. See e.g. Lippke, 2001:546-7. 
105. Lippke, 2001:566. 
106. See e.g. Duff, 2003. 
107. Bennett, 2012:6. His theory of punishment is fully developed in Bennett, 2008. 
108. Bennett, 2012:7. Similarly, Sigler sustains that CD “is uniquely suited to affirm the values of 
liberal democratic citizenship. Precisely because the right to vote is a powerful symbol of the 
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removed to express the seriousness of wrongdoing without citizenship being 
denied”.109 The crime exposes a breach in the relationship between the offender and 
the community and the meaningful way to reaffirm such a relationship is to deprive 
the offender of the vote, owing to its meaningful connection with this membership. 
Bennett, however, holds that the seriousness of the offence must be a trigger factor to 
limit the application of CD under considerations of proportionality of the punishment. 
As the right to vote is a very important right, CD “should be reserved for those most 
serious crimes that are in danger of undermining a person’s status as a continuing 
member of the polity”.110 He seems to suggest that citizenship is maintained by the 
fact that the offender is communicatively included through the punishment, and this 
is even more the case with CD, which is reserved only for serious crimes. 
It is interesting to note that somebody who sketches a similar conception of criminal 
law – holding that the authority to impose such punishment is grounded in 
membership to a normative community and being punishment as a form of 
accountability and responsibility for a crime –arrives at exactly the opposite 
conclusions in the case of CD. Unambiguously, Anthony Duff considers CD as a 
resort to ‘enemy criminal law’, a practice which, far from respecting and addressing 
citizens as members of the community.111 To hold somebody to account, he continues 
with remarkable similarity to Bennett, aims to repair “our civic relationship with our 
fellow citizens: but it holds us to account precisely as citizens whose full membership 
of the polity is not in doubt – which is why the right to vote in prison is symbolically 
important”.112  
                                                                                                                                                    
office of citizen, its denial forcefully expresses the political significance of a breach of civil 
trust” (2013:18). 
109. Bennett, 2012:7. 
110. Bennett, 2012:8. 
111. Duff, 2011:14. See also Mañalich, 2011a: 135-8. 
112. Duff, 2011:15. 
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2.3 Disenfranchisement as an expressive punishment 
The justification of CD as an adequate form of punishment is marked by its potential 
to express condemnation of the political dimension of the crime. In Hampton’s case, 
it is also highlighted the strictly non-degrading character of CD. In the case of 
Bennett, CD is connected with the offenders’ belonging to the community. The 
expressive advantage of CD in relation to other forms of punishment, such as 
imprisonment, is not however entirely clear. 
The problem of justifying a form of punishment is, to a certain extent, similar to the 
general problem of the justification of ‘hard treatment’ in criminal law theory. Within 
the framework of a retributive theory of punishment, the selection of the form of 
punishment is not given by its potential to prevent the crime. In such a context, the 
demand for the infliction of suffering as the way in which condemnation for the crime 
becomes manifest can be called into question. If punishment is condemnation for a 
crime, the communication of the condemnatory sentence might render unnecessary 
the infliction of the suffering. This will be so, in any case, if it is assumed that ‘hard 
treatment’ is a necessary evil, which follows the fact that we have not developed a 
“less painful symbolic machinery” to express condemnation.113  
The answers to this problem – why do we need to mistreat fellow citizens? – have 
produced an important debate. The social protection aims of punishment, in particular 
its deterrent effect, have been posited as an important answer to the question of why 
the expressive condemnatory act of the sentence must be followed by ‘hard 
treatment’.114 According to this reasoning, if it is clear that CD does not deter would-
                                                 
113. See Feinberg, 1970:114-6. This question is evidently alien to conceptions of degrading 
punishment, in which ‘hard treatment’ is authorised and even demanded by the offender’s loss 
of moral standing. See e.g. Morris, 1991. 
114. See von Hirsch, 1999:69-70. See generally Matravers, 1999. 
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be offenders, or have any such consequence, how can the deprivation of the right to 
vote be justified? The answer must be found in the discussion above: it cannot.  
However, on an alternative justification of ‘hard treatment’, the condemnatory 
expression depends on the infliction of suffering to be truly condemnatory. A neutral 
observation of the occurrence of the offence cannot express censure in itself. The 
imposition of suffering, in this perspective, performs the expression of condemnation, 
and limits the role of the sentence to being seen as a procedural step to set the 
punitive consequence that the convict must suffer as retribution.115 
Hampton and Bennett seem to suggest that the expressive potential of CD is more 
potent than other forms of punishment, which may be considered, at least in these 
aspects, as deficient. A correct understanding of proportionality is essential here. The 
proportionality of a retributive punishment does not require the infliction of the same 
amount of suffering as that produced by the crime, but instead it requires a 
correspondence should be determined with “the condemnatory aspect of the 
punishment”.116 This implies that “more serious crimes should receive stronger 
disapproval”, but not necessarily harsher forms of punishment.117 CD, according to 
these premises, might be presented as an ideal form of expressive punishment. It 
presents a deficit of other punitive aspects, as manifested by the reduced amount of 
suffering that it inflicts on the offender, but this could be irrelevant for an expressive-
oriented retributive theory of punishment. This reduced functionality in other 
dimensions, which makes maintaining imprisonment necessary, can be compensated 
                                                 
115. See Mañalich, 2011b:171. 
116. Feinberg, 1970:118. 
117. Feinberg, 1970:118. 
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for by its extraordinary performance in what is, after all, the central aspect of 
punishment; it offers a surplus of expressiveness.118  
In that sense CD is not entirely independent of the punishment of imprisonment. The 
role of CD, under an expressive theory of retributive punishment might be that of 
reinforcing “the general moral signals communicated by the prisoner’s sanctions”.119  
The minority vote in Sauvé, perhaps present the argument is its more clear 
formulation: 
“The commission of serious crimes gives rise to a temporary suspension of 
this nexus [between the offender and the community]: on the physical 
level, this is reflected in incarceration and the deprivation of a range of 
liberties normally exercised by citizens and, at the symbolic level, this is 
reflected in temporary disenfranchisement. The symbolic dimension is 
thus a further manifestation of community disapproval of the serious 
criminal conduct” [119].120  
The conclusions of the report of Joint Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility 
(Prisoners) Bill, appointed to discuss further the issue of CD in order to conduct pre-
legislative scrutiny of the UK legislation, assume a similar position. Following the 
idea that the right to vote implies an exercise of power of the offender over the rest of 
the citizens,121 the Committee affirmed that CD is a “symbolic act”122 based in the 
“intuitive connection between exercising the vote and having [a minuscule] power 
                                                 
118. See Bennett & Viehoff, 2013a. The government submission in Chan Kin Sum articulates this 
idea as follow: “Punishment consists of at least two constituent elements: (1) the censure or 
blaming element; and (2) the deprivation or hard treatment element. Disenfranchisement serves 
primarily the aim of censure, while physical imprisonment serves the aim of deprivation. 
Disenfranchisement is a form of disapprobation that conveys society’s disapproval of the 
offender’s criminal conduct” [84]. 
119. Manfredi, 2009:274. See also Manfredi, 1998:299. 
120. See also NICRO, where the Court affirmed “[t]hat at the level of policy it is important for the 
government to denounce crime and to communicate to the public that the rights that citizens 
have are related to their duties and obligations as citizens. Such a purpose would be legitimate 
and consistent with the provisions of section 3 of the Constitution” [57]. 
121. See Waldron, 2013b.  
122. Joint Committee, 2013:44.  
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over how society is governed”,123 and that can be explained in the following terms: 
“if a member has grossly violated the basic rules, it would seem self-evidently 
appropriate to take away that member’s partial control of the affairs of the 
association”.124  
Summing up, expressive CD depends on the potential of this form of punishment of 
expressing degrees of condemnation that are symbolically nor available in the case of 
imprisonment. In a retributive framework that respect culpability and proportionality, 
CD works: (1) by reaffirming the value of the outcome of the democratic process that 
offenders have infringed; (2) by expressing the importance of the exercise of 
democratic rights that have been suspended; and (3) by expressing contempt for those 
who have denigrated the democratic process or its foundational principles. It cannot 
work, however, as an independent punishment because is difficultly seen as ‘hard 
treatment’. This may explain why CD is typically applied only to those offenders that 
are serving prison sentences and only to them. 
III THE LIMITS OF DEMOCRATIC PUNISHMENT 
Expressive CD claims to be a democratic form of punishment. It envisions itself as 
protecting democratic values and respecting the public standing of offenders as equal 
members within the boundaries of the political community. This section critically 
examines that claim, suggesting that expressive CD is bad democratic symbolism but 
also that CD is incompatible with any conception of democratic criminal law. 
                                                 
123. Joint Committee, 2013:42.  
124. Joint Committee, 2013:43.  
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1 Inclusion by exclusion and inclusion by inclusion 
The core of the argument of expressive CD is that it condemns the offence but treat 
the offender with respect, without degrading or excluding them. The importance of 
this is that express our commitment with the democratic values that have been 
violated by the crime. However, it is unclear and difficult to explain how the political 
exclusion of the offenders embodied in CD communicates symbolically their 
inclusion or the respect that it is due to them, even if it is agreed that imprisonment 
do not express sufficient condemnation to the offence.125 It is also difficult to 
understand how this form of punishment would honour the values of democracy.126 
This could well be based on the belief that there is a hidden or paradoxical symbolic 
link between exclusion and inclusion. However, thus far such a link has not been 
explained in a convincing manner. Moreover, CD lack of publicity and its absence in 
the courtroom make unlikely to think on it as an expressive punishment because 
without speaking and sending a message to the public and to the offender CD hardy 
can express anything.127 In this light, for example, Heather Green sustains that CD 
“works as a punishment precisely because it imposes upon the prisoner a politically 
unequal status […]. Society purchases [the] symbolism [associated to CD] at expense 
of its commitment to the principle of political equality”.128 
But the problem of expressive CD is not only that do not achieve its goal, but that 
undermines seriously important democratic values. The Canadian Supreme Court was 
clear when sustained that 
                                                 
125. See Easton, 2006:450. 
126. See Beckman, 2009:138. 
127. See Ewald, 2002:1117-9. 
128. Lardy, 2002:528.  
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“The government gets this connection [between “the legitimacy of the law 
and the obligation to obey the law” and “the right of every citizen to vote” 
[31]] exactly backwards when it attempts to argue that depriving people of 
a voice in government teaches them to obey the law. The “educative 
message” that the government purports to send by disenfranchising 
inmates is both anti-democratic and internally self-contradictory. Denying 
a citizen the right to vote denies the basis of democratic legitimacy […]” 
[Sauvé, 32 (emphasis added)]. 
CD as a bearer of a democratic message is self-contradictory. If an expressive theory 
of punishment claims democratic credentials, the enfranchisement of the offenders, 
rather than their exclusion, would be more natural as an affirmation of democratic 
values in general and the symbolic inclusion of the offender within the community in 
particular. This could be better understood as a democratic and inclusive sign by both 
the offender and the general community. It would also be a more resonant way to 
affirm democratic values as a symbolic form of opposition to antidemocratic forces, 
impulses and conducts. If CD is a symbol, “it is the wrong sort of symbol to 
legitimate in law. It is a symbol of rejection, not reconciliation; a symbol of 
difference, rather than communality; a symbol of domination instead of equality”.129 
Expressive CD just runs in the wrong direction 
According to a more democratically intuitive understanding of expressive 
retributivism, the signal of inclusion of the offenders within the political community 
is performed by the maintenance of his political rights during the time he suffers the 
imposition of the punishment of prison. Symbolic political inclusion is achieved, in 
this way, not by actual political exclusion but by actual political inclusion. Duff is a 
committed supporter of this view: 
                                                 
129. Note, 1989:1317.  
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“The right to vote […] is central to our identity as citizens […]: the 
removal of that right […] is a symbolically serous matter, as marking 
ones’ temporary or permanent exclusion from the rank of full citizen, and 
thus from full membership of the polity. The law […] purports to protect 
us and to bind us as citizens; in a democracy, it presents itself as ‘our’ law 
– as the common law of a polity that speaks to its members not in the 
voice of a separate sovereign who demands their obedience, but in the 
voice of citizens who speak to themselves and to each other […]. But 
when a citizen loses the right to vote, she loses her share in that voice: the 
law cannot now present itself, or address her, as the law of an ‘us’ to 
which she unqualifiedly belongs; it addresses her instead in the voice of a 
‘we’ from whom she is at least temporarily excluded”.130  
However, it must be emphasised that this is not just a symbolic problem. Sustaining 
that expressive CD is bad democratic symbolism is an argument against the use of 
CD as punishment. Disenfranchising offenders is bad criminal policy because does 
not achieve democratic expressive goals and does not deter, incapacitate or 
rehabilitate. It only may serve as a retributive punishment with no advantages over 
other forms of punishment. However, the fact that CD is bad democratic symbolism is 
relevant beyond affect its particular punitive performance. Not only because produces 
the effect of degrading, excluding and stigmatizing offenders, but because damage the 
legitimation of the imposition of the punishment as a form of democratic response to 
crime. As the Canadian Court put it, “[a] government that restricts the franchise to a 
select portion of citizens is a government that […] erodes the basis of its right to 
convict and punish law-breakers” [Sauvé, 34]. CD denies the recognition of offenders 
as authors of the law. This constitutes a problem, since the legitimacy of the 
condemnation expressed in the punishment presupposes a recognition of the offender 
as a member of the political community, and to take part in the life of a democratic 
political community implies that one both be subject to law but also be author of the 
law. If the condemnation involved in the punishment’s imposition can only be 
justified retrospectively in relation to the deficit of loyalty to the democratically-
produced law, then an exclusionary punitive practice as CD is shown to be 
                                                 
130. Duff, 2005a:213. See also Mañalich, 2011a:127; Ziegler, 2011:208; Sauvé [38-40]. 
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incompatible with the inclusion manifested in condemnation,131 and “obscure the 
exercise of power that punishment represents”.132 What is at stake may well be 
portrayed as a decision of between whether to embrace the democratic criminal law 
or a ‘war on crime’. 
The next two sections are focused in explain the problem that CD posits to a 
democratic conception of criminal law and punishment. The next chapter explores the 
idea of CD being a degrading and exclusionary practice and related it to the 
importance of the right to vote as a mechanism of recognition.133  
2 Can punishment be democratic? 
The efforts to develop a democratic theory of criminal law and punishment are not 
easy to find. Normally criminal theorists focus on questions of under what 
circumstances the punishment must be imposed, but are less concerned with the 
question of who administers the power to do so and under which conditions that 
punitive power can be legitimate.134 Two account of democratic punishment 
emphasises some of these dimensions. The first considers that democracy and 
democratic rights must be protected not only against crime but also importantly 
against a disproportionate use of the punitive power by the state. The seconds claim 
that for punishment to be democratic it must come from a community from which the 
punished is member. 
Firstly, to answer the question concerning the legitimacy of punishment, 
Brettschneider proposes the use of Rawls’ contractualism.135 In his conception of 
‘democratic contractualism’, democratic rights include not just rights to participate in 
                                                 
131. See Mañalich, 2011a:116. 
132. Note, 1989:1316. 
133. See below Chapter 6. 
134. See de Greiff, 2002:373-5. See also Brettschneider, 2007b:175. 
135. See Brettschneider, 2007b. See also Brettschneider, 2007a. 
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the process of law-making, but also rights to limit state coercion.136 In this context, he 
claims, to be legitimate, punishment must be acceptable to reasonable subjects acting 
under the principle of reciprocity. To be sure, he does not claim that an offender must 
factually accept the punishment that is imposed but that a punishment is legitimate 
when the offender “might reasonably accept [it] where she motivated to find 
universal agreement about how to balance her interests with the interest of others”.137  
This idea, he holds, would rule out conceptions which suggest that offenders have no 
rights, as well as unreasonable retributivist accounts. On the contrary, under a 
contractarian framework, offenders have a right to be punished reasonably, a right 
only compatible with their permanence in the community of citizens, which would be 
a right of citizens as “addressees of the law”, in Brettschneider’s terms. This implies, 
for example, the prohibition of unnecessary violence against prisoners and measures 
that cannot be understood to be in the interests of society. Simultaneously, this idea 
would demand respect of all those rights sometimes superfluously affected by 
imprisonment, such as political free speech and, crucially, the right to vote.138 This 
follows from the fact that reasonable subjects would join in condemning about the 
unnecessary limitation of these democratic rights.139 
A second account that is important to mention is that of Anthony Duff, who has been 
committed to the enterprise of justifying a democratic kind of criminal law and 
punishment. His main concern is to explain how punishment can work as an inclusive 
response to crime.140 Criminal law, it cannot be denied, is by definition an 
                                                 
136. See Brettschneider, 2007a: Ch. 2. 
137. Brettschneider, 2007b:179. 
138. See Brettschneider, 2007b:187-90. 
139. Despite its virtues, consisting in respect for the autonomy of those subjected to the punitive 
power of the state and the protection of their democratic rights, the specifically democratic 
aspect of the legitimacy of punishment in this account is developed only in its negative side, 
probably due to the contractualist methodology used. The main emphasis is upon the protection 
of the democratic rights of the offender, with little concern for the broader, positive democratic 
demands of criminal law. 
140. See Duff, 2003:702-3.  
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exclusionary practice.141 It is not difficult, for example, to notice the dramatically 
exclusionary aspects of imprisonment. Imprisonment constitutes physical exclusion 
from normal life in the community, carrying the message that prisoners “do not 
belong in the ordinary community of citizens”.142 Such a message is reinforced when 
prisoners lose – in addition to their liberty – the rights of political participation, in 
particular the right to vote. How can a punitive response be inclusive? How can we 
develop a way to fight the exclusionary tendencies of criminal law and construct a 
model of punishment that provides an inclusionary response to crime?143 
Duff’s proposal, as mentioned above when compared with Bennett’s, conceives 
punishment as a form of accountability grounded in membership to a normative 
community. Offenders are called upon to answer for a breach of the law, “by a law 
that claims to be their law”.144 The way in which this is achieved is by means of 
restricting punishment in accordance with a demanding set of inclusionary factors 
which go to make up somebody’s membership within the community (political, 
material, normative and linguistic). When punishment affects the offender by 
excluding him from any of these dimensions of community life, or by treating him in 
ways that are incompatible with this membership, the claims of the abolitionist school 
are persuasive: “punishment is unjustifiable, since it is inconsistent with true 
community”.145 If the condition for the application of the punishment is therefore 
membership in the community and the subjection to the law is a fundamental 
democratic aspect of it: 
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“this should not be subjection to a law that is imposed on us by another, 
separate power distinct from us: the law that binds us should be our law—
a law to and by which we bind ourselves, not a law that is imposed on us 
by a sovereign; it should be in that sense a ‘common’ law”.146  
This ‘common law’ must take everybody into consideration as addressees of the law, 
“whether offenders or not, as people who are protected as well as bound by its 
demands: the ‘we’ who are to be protected against crime, in whose name the 
wrongdoer is to be called to account, include the wrongdoer”.147 Inclusion, therefore, 
is crucial, especially for the communicative dimension of punishment. Without 
inclusion, punishment cannot involve condemnation but becomes “a matter of mere 
control”.148  
3 Democratic law and democratic punishment 
The two conceptions of criminal law reviewed show interesting connections between 
democracy and punishment. Brettschnider focuses on the protection of democratic 
rights against the punitive power of the state. Duff shows concern for the justification 
of criminal law and punishment. However, his account does not accord importance to 
democratic rights, instead adopting a conception of democracy centred on 
membership. Both present a theory of democratic punishment that is in open conflict 
with the practice of CD. In one case, because it affects democratic rights without 
justification constituting an arbitrary use of the punitive power; on the other case, 
because it undermine the inclusion required for the punishment to be legitimate in a 
democracy. 
A third theory of democratic punishment is presented by Kindhäuser and Mañalich 
which following Habermas articulate a connection between the democratic production 
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of the law and the legitimacy of the punishment. Punishment, they sustain, is only 
legitimate in a “constitutional democracy because only in such a context is it possible 
to understand the subject of the law whose intentional breach is considered a crime, 
simultaneously, as author of the norm; and only then is it possible to punish him for 
an objective deficit of normative loyalty”.149 This is the basic premise of a theory of 
democratic criminal law and punishment according to a model of democracy in which 
the legitimacy of the law is based upon the public autonomy of citizens.150  
In the context of a representative democracy, the importance of the right to vote, in 
this regard, is crucial. Karlan, summarise the argument in the following terms: 
“the legitimacy of criminal punishment […] depends on the legitimacy of 
political processes that produce and enforce criminal law which. The 
legitimacy of that process in turn depend on the ability of citizens to 
participate equally in choosing the officials who represent them in 
deciding what behaviour to outlaw, which individuals to prosecute and 
how to punish persons connected of a crime”.151  
Criminal law and punishment, in order to be compatible with democracy, must satisfy 
certain conditions. These conditions, to be sure, are not substantially different from 
those which any democratic law must satisfy: as seen in a previous chapter, 
democratic criminal law must be neutral and be produced through a democratic 
process. Democratic neutrality implies that nobody can be punished for following the 
law, even when the law was followed for the wrong reasons. As mentioned before, 
the offender cannot be punished because his conduct was a moral wrong but may only 
be punished because he committed an offence described in a legal norm. In addition, 
criminal law must be the consequence of a process of democratic law-making in 
which the subjects of the law are granted participatory rights, therefore adopting the 
                                                 
149. Kindhäuser & Mañalich, 2011:1 [translation of the author]. 
150. See above Chapter 3, Section I. 
151. Karlan, 2004:1169. See also Manza & Ugger, 2006:7; Ziegler, 2012. 
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role of citizens. In this role, a person may assume a critical position towards the legal 
norms and advocate for their modification or cancelation.152  
3.1 Culpability as deficit of democratic loyalty 
The previously described requirements have fundamental implications for the notion 
of criminal culpability which require attention. Culpability, for a conception of law 
premised on the deliberative power of the person, does not imply the positive 
attribution of responsibility for a conduct to the person but is solely concerned with 
negatively determining the conditions under which such an attribution is to be ruled 
out. Typically, the conditions that exclude the culpability of someone’s conduct are 
threefold. First, a lack of the cognitive capacity needed to understand the legal 
implications of one’s actions (defences); second, a lack of knowledge of the law 
which transforms one’s action into a crime (error iuris even when generally 
ignorantia iuris nocet), and third, a concurrence of circumstances which makes 
respect for the law an unendurable burden (excuses).153  
The reasons for this negative construction of culpability are, firstly, the attribution of 
criminal responsibility is inserted into a legal system that is already based on a 
conception of deliberative persons. Rights and responsibilities are attributed by 
default due to the general recognition of persons’ capacity to evaluate norms and 
actions critically. The abovementioned causes of the exclusion of culpability are 
cases in which such deliberative power is deficient or absent.154 In contrast, when 
these causes are absent is that it can be concluded that the person could decide to act 
lawfully but have decided to act unlawfully.155  
                                                 
152. See above Chapter 3, Section I.3. 
153. See Günther, 2001:8-9. See also Kindhäuser, 2011b. 
154. See Kindhäuser, 2011b:211-8. 
155. Mañalich, 2011a: 118.  
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Secondly, there is a normative expectation of lawful conduct which applies to persons 
living in a society organized democratically. By giving rights of participation to those 
subjected to the law, disagreement is expected to be reproduced within the political 
process. This is a condition to transform a violation of a democratically-produced 
norm into a conduct that deserves condemnation. That conduct cannot count as an 
expression of legitimate disagreement but only as disloyalty toward democratically-
reached agreement that, even if provisionally, distributes spheres of personal 
autonomy in the form of positive law.156 The attribution of right of participation in 
the law-making process is, therefore, a precondition of the criminal liability of the 
offender in a democratic society.157 Without those rights, the punishment cannot be 
imposed as a consequence of a disloyalty toward the democratic process because “the 
infringed norm [cannot] be seen as the norm of the offender”. This is why in a 
democratic model of criminal law the punishment only can be imposed in those that 
are treated as citizens. But, on the other hand, “the fact of the offence cannot impede 
that the infringed norm continues being a norm of the offender, that the offender 
continues being a citizen”.158 That is the reason why, the punishment cannot imply the 
exclusion of a person from the circle of those that are treated as citizens. In sum, the 
condemnation involved in the punishment and the consequences that follow from it 
must be adapted to the democratic framework. 
3.2 What counts as democratic punishment? 
The requirements of neutrality and democratic production of the law, and the negative 
conditions under which culpability can be attributed to the offender set parameters 
under which the imposition of the punishment can be compatible with democracy. 
Punishment will not be able to claim democratic legitimacy under those 
circumstances in which the criminal law itself cannot claim such legitimacy. Two 
                                                 
156. See Kindhäuser, 2011a:102-5. See also Mañalich, 2010:59-61. 
157.  See Mañalich, 2010:60. 
158. Mañalich, 2011a:125 [translation of the author]. 
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cases, which relate with the two requirements abovementioned, are particularly clear. 
First, the criminalization of conducts that cannot be fully determined in advance is 
forbidden under the principle of neutrality. The subject must be able to plan rationally 
according to a set of rules that constrain his conduct, in such a way that he can avoid 
being punished by adapting his behaviour to the law. The principles of lex praevia, 
stricta, scripta et certa perform the role of restraining the punitive power of the State 
in balance with the need for certainty and individual freedom. Secondly, the 
criminalization of formal expressions of dissent cannot be justified democratically. In 
a democracy, citizens should be able to express disagreement; otherwise the basis for 
the democratic process of ‘challenge and response’ is destroyed.159 Under those kinds 
of conditions, the principle of neutrality is dismantled because it is not able to claim 
protection for the different conceptions of good existent in a pluralist society. 
Criminalizing dissent is a clear case of non-democratic criminal law. 
However, it is not only a process of legal criminalization of conduct that can be in 
conflict with democracy. The rules of attribution of responsibility and regulation of 
punishment must also conform to democratic principles. This implies, regarding the 
first aspect, that punishment cannot be imposed upon those who are not recognized as 
capable of following legal norms. In this sense, for example, the attribution of 
criminal responsibility to children is in open tension with the idea of democratic 
culpability. Based on the attribution of a deficit of legal capacity in other areas of life 
and especially in their exclusion from the exercise of political rights, it is clear that 
society does not expect the exercise of deliberative power from children. The 
imposition of a punishment, therefore, is in those cases unjustified.160  
The legal aim pursued by a punishment must be premised on the same grounds, that 
of a democratic formulation of the criminal condemnation; more specifically, on the 
                                                 
159. See e.g. the case of disruptive voting, above Chapter 4, Section I. 
160. See above Chapter 4, Section III.1. This view is adopted in Sauvé: “Indeed, the right of the 
state to punish and the obligation of the criminal to accept punishment are tied to society’s 
acceptance of the criminal as a person with rights and responsibilities” [47]. 
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autonomy of the offenders grounded in their deliberative character. Consequentially, 
the punishment cannot be directed to the instrumentalization of the offender. The 
only aim of punishment that is not affected by this kind of problem is retribution. 
This is not to say that punishment cannot, additionally, perform other goals, such as 
deterrence, but that these other goals cannot assume a primary role in the imposition 
of the punishment. Rehabilitation and incapacitation, in this perspective, are 
especially problematic with relation to democratic criminal law. The first presents an 
intromission in the autonomous sphere of the subject that is incompatible with due 
respect for their autonomy. The second does not consider the subject as a legal agent 
but only as a danger that must be prevented. 
Finally, the form adopted by the punitive response must be consistent with the 
requirements of democratic criminal law. The legal punishment cannot obliterate the 
basis on which the normative expectation of lawful conduct of persons is grounded in 
democratic societies.161 If what makes possible the condemnation of criminal conduct 
(as a deficit of democratic loyalty) is the possibility that the offender, as a citizen, 
may question the law within the political process, then the denial of rights of 
democratic participation constitutes the destruction of the very basis on which the 
subject may be held criminally responsible in a democracy. This is the sense in which 
CD is antithetical to democratic criminal responsibility. The loss of rights of 
participation as a consequence of a criminal conviction makes explicit that 
punishment works, in the society in which this is the case, as a practice of 
degradation and exclusion. 
As a summary of the findings of this chapter, it can be said that CD cannot be 
justified as a democratic punishment, fails to overcome the democratic problem of 
CD and therefore cannot constitute a legitimate exception to the principle of universal 
suffrage. This is entailed by the fact that, on the one hand, CD cannot be explained in 
                                                 
161. See Mañalich, 2011a:127-33. 
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terms of incapacitation, rehabilitation or deterrence. On the other hand, when it is 
argued that CD may perform a retributive function, it is found that there are no strong 
reasons to prefer CD to other forms of punishment. The argument to justify the need 
for CD that appealed to the performance of a particular democratic expressive form of 
condemnation ultimately appeared counterintuitive and unconvincing. There are good 
reasons to think, on the contrary, that CD is an impermissible form of punishment in 
a democracy because it withdraws rights that are fundamental to the claim of 
culpability of those who commit a criminal offence. 
 
 6 
 
DEGRADATION, EXCLUSION AND 
RECOGNITION 
he starting point of this inquiry was the democratic problem of CD: in 
the light of core democratic principles, CD is prima facie undemocratic 
because it excludes subjects of the law from a fundamental right of 
participation in the law-making process without democratic 
justification. The previous two chapters explored two different justifications of the 
practice of CD on democratic grounds: (1) CD might embody the regulation of a 
franchise requirement of civic virtue, or (2) it might work as a form of democratic 
and expressive punishment. Both reconstructions, it was argued, fail to do justice to 
democracy. First, civic virtue cannot be seen as a requirement of the franchise. In a 
democracy, the franchise is based upon the reciprocal recognition of ‘deliberative 
personality’, which involves both the capacity to follow the law and the capacity to 
adopt a critical position in relation to the law as a democratic citizen. Civic virtue 
may qualify as a desirable attribute of the citizenry but cannot, without considerable 
undemocratic impact, be adopted as a requirement for participation. Second, the 
legitimate imposition of a punishment in complex, pluralist and democratic societies 
depends on the possibility of the offender, as a subject of the law, being in a position 
to participate in the process of law-making. In this latter regard, CD is not only seen 
T 
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as a problematic form of punishment but also as a measure which endangers the 
legitimacy of the whole punitive apparatus. 
The problem of democratic justification of CD, therefore, must be regarded as 
genuine, and the inquiry into it must be redirected towards the powerful signals which 
indicate that CD is a constitutive practice of degradation and exclusion. This, to be 
clear, is not to say that CD does not work as an electoral requirement of civic virtue 
or that it cannot be conceptualized as an expressive form of punishment but that, in 
light of the previous analysis, the above constitute ways of thinking about CD that as 
such embody forms of abuse and oppression that tend in an undemocratic direction. 
They cannot serve as a justification but “follow from, rather than explain, a pre-
existing sense that [offenders] cannot be members of the community”.1 
This chapter, in contrast with the previous two, seeks to investigate the logics and 
principles underlying CD: the politics of CD. It draws upon the assumption that CD is 
a device that serves the goals of degradation and exclusion. This exploration seeks to 
conceptualize the exclusionary dimension of CD2 and to exploit it to support the idea 
that the importance of the right to vote is not exhausted as a mechanism of 
democratic participation. The evident exclusionary logic underlying CD may 
paradoxically contribute to highlighting the right to vote as a core mechanism of 
social and political recognition in modern societies. 
This chapter duly considers the widespread idea among critics of CD that, whatever 
the alleged justification and legal nature of the measure, when offenders are deprived 
of the right to vote they are being excluded from some of the most important forms of 
public participation and therefore are relegated to being second class-citizens.3 The 
                                                 
1. Note, 1989:1310. 
2. See, generally, Dilts, 2014.  
3. See Parkes, 2003:92. The US literature has agreed that the case of CD of ex-prisoners falls 
under this interpretation, but strangely does not extend that conclusion to the inmates. See e.g. 
Demleitner, 1999; Pettus, 2013. 
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argument of the chapter is developed as follows. Section I develops the idea that CD 
is the expression of a political conception that does not consider degradation as 
problematic. Section II presents the exclusionary aspect of this practice, therefore 
linking the ideas of punishment and membership.4 Finally, Section III helps to ground 
a dimension of the right to vote that can serve the aims of the politics of CD but 
which may also serve as an instrument of political recognition of membership and 
equal dignity. 
I DISENFRANCHISEMENT AS A DEGRADING PUNISHMENT 
A brief remark about history may help to introduce these ideas. As it is frequently 
remarked upon, the historical background of CD is marked by the idea of degradation 
and exclusion. For example, a comment about this kind of practice amongst the early 
American settlers tells us that: 
“[T]he stigma of the loss of civil rights in the small communities of those 
times increased the humiliation and isolation suffered by the offender and 
his family and served as a warning to the rest of the community, all of 
whom probably knew the offender”.5  
The literature on CD usually refers to its historical development, indicating that 
contemporary expressions of CD are fed by pre-modern practices.6 Greek atimia,7 
Roman infamia8 and Germanic practices of ‘civil death’ perpetuated during the 
medieval age as ‘civil death’, ‘outlawry’, ‘attainder’ or ‘infamy’.9 There are common 
                                                 
4. See e.g. Dilts, 2014:4.  
5. Itzkowitz & Oldak, 1973:726-7. See also Manza & Ugger, 2006:23-4. 
6. See e.g. Ewald, 2002:1059-66; Easton, 2006:443. 
7. See, generally, Manville, 1990; Allen, 2000; Pettus, 2013:21-6; Christ, 2006. 
8. See, generally, Goudy, 1897; Greenidge, 1894; Mommsen, 1976; Pettus, 2013:26-8. 
9. See, generally, Pollock & Maitland, 1968; Rowe, 1976; Freiberg & Fox, 2000; Calisse, 2001; 
Pettus, 2013:28-35. 
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themes that cross these historical practices, which can aid an understanding of CD.10 
Firstly, they are an expression of a pre-modern conception of membership and 
standing in the community based in civic virtue.11 Secondly, as punitive reactions 
they work by excluding individuals from membership and degrading them to the 
status of outcasts.12 This ambivalence between incapacitation and punishment 
belonged to the historical antecedents of CD, contributing to represent societies in 
which one’s public standing depends and is based upon some membership standards 
usually linked to cultural and racial alliances of power, but expressed in institutions 
in which the virtuous character of some (citizenship, dignitas, religious and feudal 
loyalty) permitted the exclusion of many. Thirdly, the exclusion of current members, 
maybe in a scapegoating role, performed a ritual of confirmation of those alliances, 
                                                 
10. According to Demleitner, the main difference between these two traditions consists in the 
nature of “the loss” in question. The classical tradition consisted in the loss of the citizen’s 
honour. In contrast, Germanic law did not consider solely the public status, but linked civil 
death with the notion of honour as mutual recognition within a more complex net of social 
relations (2000:757). 
11. From the collective perspective, atimia performed the task of giving shape to the community’s 
identity by means of conserving the collective civic virtue, which the offender was 
demonstrated to lack. Moreover, the act of excluding the offender from the polis constituted in 
itself a joint, virtuous public practice (see Melville, 1990:148). That exclusionary character 
fitted with a model of membership whose emphasis was placed upon the relation between 
rights and duties. The fact that this punishment was reserved for citizens alone allowed it to 
express the importance of the link between membership within the circle of citizens and the 
need for involvement in public life as a higher form of life from which atimos was excluded. 
Something similar happened with infamia, which expressed moral and civic unfitness to carry 
out public business which involved communal affairs, and outlawry, which excluded the 
offender from all social relations, constituting him as an undesirable character, unworthy of 
membership in a religious community. These three practices were mechanisms of membership, 
which expressed a marked opposition to the notion of an ideal citizen of the community and 
worked by expelling those members who demonstrated their corruption. 
12. The loss of public standing in a society organized around certain statuses naturally also 
involves a loss of the social respect that allows citizens the enjoyment of communal relations. 
Linked to exceptional causes, deviant behaviours and the more serious offences against the 
community itself, this degradation and the loss of the privileges of membership appear as 
natural results of exclusive membership and hierarchical political and social structures. The 
rationalization of criminal law, under which the minimisation of these practices takes place, 
translates the modernization of political structures (universal rights, democracy and 
citizenship) into a system of criminal law that does not operate in terms of statuses, but rather 
in homogenous terms. By a slow process, initiated at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
most of the elements of the civil death were gradually suppressed (e.g. the US Constitution 
expressly prohibited bill of attainder, forfeiture for treason and corruption of the blood in 
article III), although they are currently experiencing an important revival. It is not by chance 
that this kind of criminal response was substituted by the institutionally narrow, limited and 
measurable punishment of imprisonment. 
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adopted the form of an internal exclusion. The offenders physically remain within the 
community but are legally and politically marginalized.13  
Today, however, affirming that CD produces second-class citizens14 is not as easy as 
it seems. On the one hand, other social practices also can be seen as producing this 
effect. Remaining within the field of criminal justice, the imprisonment of certain 
persons, it can be argued, constitutes them as a second class of citizens because they 
do not enjoy the liberty guaranteed to the rest of the population.15 On the other hand, 
the mere exclusion from the franchise, according to some “a petty form of 
degradation”,16 would not be sufficient to configure such a situation, as those who 
were disenfranchised would still be able to exercise many of their other rights.17 The 
affirmation that CD is a degrading mechanism must be clearly articulated to 
demonstrate (1) what is particularly degrading about it, and (2) why that degradation 
is of such magnitude that constitutes a second-class of citizenship. 
An initial way to do so would be, following von Hirsch and Wasik, to affirm that CD 
as a consequence of a criminal conviction can neither be functionally attached to a 
punishment nor to an incapacitation, and therefore it necessarily becomes a form of 
degrading or stigmatizing the offender and, consequently, of creating second-class 
citizens. When CD is imposed indefinitely or for a disproportionate length of time, 
this argument is useful due to the lack of correspondence to the formal structure of a 
                                                 
13. Interpreters read an expressive meaning into the practice of atimia that can, as a punishment, 
be extrapolated to infamia and outlawry. It is a punishment that involved the criminal’s 
presence, instead of their absence – in contrast to exile or the death penalty. This presence, 
however paradoxically, is intended to express, in an analogous manner to exile or death, the 
need for the community to forget the offender’s existence (see Allen, 2002:203-4). This 
symbolic function is expressed in the ban upon taking part in any activity in the public life of 
the community. As Allen mentions, “[t]he atimos became an invisible man who had lost 
whatever control he might once have had over the city’s networks of social knowledge. His 
safety depended on his total disappearance from the mind’s eye of the citizenry” (Allen, 
2002:204).  
14. Easton, 2006:451. 
15. See Ramsay, 2013b. 
16. Orr, 1998:70. 
17. See Lippke, 2007: 203.  
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punishment.18 However, this argument it excludes degrading effect of those measures 
calibrated to the structure of punishment. 
A second way to identify the degrading aspect of CD would be via the recourse to a 
variable that is ignored by this functional scheme and unlike it, it might explain the 
degrading character of CD in any event. International and constitutional standards for 
the legitimacy of punishments tend to be built around concepts such as ‘cruel and 
unusual’19 or ‘inhuman or degrading’,20 distinguishing acceptable forms or modalities 
of punishments from those that are not. These standards do not just demand a 
proportional application of punishment and the elimination of those treatments that 
cannot pursue a legitimate incapacitation, but instead go further, embracing the idea 
that there are some treatments and forms of punishment that are not considered 
legitimate in any event. In these cases, what is assessed and rationalised is not the 
functional justification for the imposition of the measure or the degree of harm 
caused to the offender, but “the denial of moral standing or fellowship that they 
essentially involve”.21 In other words, some forms of punishment are wrong not 
insofar as they are disproportionate – as seen above, under certain circumstances CD 
can be proportionate – but because they are “intrinsically inappropriate as a way for a 
state to treat its citizens”.22 This has been the case of, for example, capital 
punishment, as well as all those forms of treatment that involve torture in the 
international law of human rights.23 The question that is posed by this additional 
variable is whether CD can be regarded as a degrading form of treatment or 
                                                 
18. See von Hirsch & Wasik, 1997:605-6. See also Demleitner, 1999:158-60; Fletcher, 1999:1906-
7. See above Chapter 5, Section II.1. 
19. See e.g. English Bill of Rights 1689; Eighth Amendment, US Constitution; British Slavery 
Amelioration Act 1798.  
20. See e.g. Article 5, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); Article 16, Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984); 
Article 3, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000). 
21. Duff, 2005a:149. 
22. Duff, 2005a:149. Contrarily, Bennett (2012:5) suggests that the degrading element can also be 
reconstructed in terms of proportionality. A degrading punishment is disproportionate because 
the right that is affected is of such importance that no offence can justify its suppression. In a 
similar vein is the position of the ECHR concerning degradation, according to Vorhaus (2002). 
23. See e.g. Schabas, 1993; Nagan & Atkins, 2001. 
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punishment and whether it must be deemed – for that reason – as illegitimate, 
irrespective of other considerations. This argument for the proscription of CD based 
on its degrading character has not been clearly articulated in the jurisdictions of the 
judicial trend on CD.24  
To draw conclusions regarding prohibition and illegitimacy from the idea that CD is 
degrading would be overly hasty. A rational discussion of CD as a degrading 
punishment requires, firstly, a substantive concept of degradation and, secondly, a 
critical position about the legitimacy of degradation. 
1 The meanings of ‘to degrade’ 
It is useful to start with some idea of what degradation means. According to James Q. 
Whitman, “[t]he literal meaning of ‘to degrade’ is to reduce another person in status, 
to treat another person as inferior”.25 Degradation is conceptually distinct from 
violence or torture – which are, however, usually regarded as degrading treatment – 
because it is possible to think of degrading treatments that do not involve physical or 
psychological suffering.26 Whitman distinguishes two senses in which a punishment 
can be degrading: (1) ‘reduction of rank’, when a punishment reduces the offender 
from a high status to a low status, usually applied to those who fail to live according 
to the standards of their rank; and (2) ‘status abuses’, which are the kind of 
punishments that deliberately express the low status rank of whoever is subjected to 
them.27 Refining these ideas, Duff distinguishes four forms of degradation. Firstly, 
performative degradation is the action that formally reduces a person to a lower rank 
or status. This form of degradation “is possible only in contexts in which there are 
                                                 
24. See below Chapter 7, Section III.2. 
25. Whitman, 2003:8. 
26. See Whitman, 2003:20. 
27. See Whitman, 2003:25-32. 
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recognized grades or ranks down which people can move, or be moved”.28 Secondly, 
consequential degradation is understood as a treatment, not designed especially to 
degrade but that has the effect of reducing his or her status. Thirdly, expressive 
degradation is what is involved in the treatment of a person as if that person was of 
lower status than he or she actually is, without producing a reduction of status. 
Finally, psychological degradation is the subjective feeling of a person about being 
treated as lower in status. The first two, which coincide with Whitman’s ‘reduction of 
rank’, have a transformative character and their degrading success depends on the 
possibilities of effectively determining the status of the addressee. The final variety, 
ignored in Whitman’s analysis, is a parasitical form, according to Duff, because its 
legal, political and moral relevance depends on the concurrence of other forms of 
‘objectively observed’ degradation.29  
The modern democratic concept of equality supposes the negation of formal 
privileges and the public treatment of every person as being of equal worth.30 It 
means the abolition of higher and lower ranks. Degradation, on this view, seems to be 
a pre-modern idea; an idea whose implementation depends on the existence of at least 
two different groups of subjects, namely the privileged and unprivileged. This implies 
that somebody cannot be reduced to a lower rank or treated as such if those ranks do 
not exist anymore and the particularity of degradation must be differentiated from 
other forms of disrespect compatible with the formal recognition of equal worth. The 
problem in understanding degrading treatment arises when degradation loses its 
reference point due to the abolition of privileges and their subsequent replacement by 
the universalistic categories of ‘human’ and ‘citizen’. 
The only conceptual alternative to degrading treatment in a modern democratic 
society adopts the form of punishments that ‘lower down’ these universal 
                                                 
28. Duff, 2005a:149. 
29. See Duff, 2005a:150-1. See also Vorhaus, 2003:86-8. 
30. See e.g. Dahl, 1989: Ch. 6; Christiano, 2008: Ch. 1. 
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conceptions.31 A treatment or punishment degrading a person in his humanity “will 
involve spelling out a substantive conception of what [it] is to be a human being”.32 
The core cases of degradation in the practice of human rights law are cases of 
expressive degradation, in which ‘treatments and punishments’ are associated with 
‘humiliating practices’ and their effects upon ‘human dignity’.33 
On the other hand, to degrade a citizen, a treatment or punishment must deprive him 
of the distinctive element that characterise citizenship, especially those rights related 
to participation in a democracy. This might well be the case of CD if it can be 
demonstrated that without the right to vote citizens cannot be recognized as such. 
Even if some of its critics see CD as an instance of consequential degradation, it may 
also – and more clearly – be described as a legally-regulated action of performative 
degradation, by which an offender is dispossessed of one of the rights that comprise 
his status of citizenship. CD can be rightly regarded, in these terms, as a degrading 
practice. 
2 The philosophy of formal equality 
Understanding how CD can be regarded as degrading is not the end of the story. It 
was mentioned previously that the rise of ideas about equality contributed to 
abolishing privileges, and therefore to constraining widespread degradation practices. 
There is an implicit critical claim there concerning the wrongness of degradation as a 
form of response towards the offending actions of our fellow citizens; one that sees 
degradation as intrinsically harmful. However, another view about the relation 
between punishment and degradation can be found in the so-called philosophy of 
‘formal equality’, revisited by Whitman, which illustrates how a tendency to think of 
                                                 
31. See Duff, 2005a:152. 
32. Duff, 2005a:153. 
33. See Vorhaus, 2003. 
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degradation as problematic depends on equality’s presupposition and consequences.34 
Formal equality offers a view in which degradation is seen as less problematic; one 
that actually reconciles the demands for equality and the subsistence of certain 
practices of degradation. 
Formal equality basically involves a denial of the idea that everybody must be treated 
equally. Treating people differently is perfectly acceptable. This different treatment, 
however, cannot be on the basis of their status (class, race, sex) but is only admissible 
if it rests upon the basis of people’s conduct. Formal equality demands civil and 
political equality for all subjects without distinction, in contrast to a system of 
privileges, for example, of status-based qualifications for voting. However, it does 
not require equality at any cost. This is because, as noted by Michael Walzer, under 
the new regime of modern political equality, “no one has a fixed place” and 
everybody is an “equal competitor for honour and reputation”.35 In these terms, 
equality is not equality of outcomes but is instead equality of opportunities. 
According to formal equality, if the starting point is that of equality of rights, the 
crucial standard for treating people differently is that of some objective standard of 
desert. This involves in turn a conception of personal autonomy that permits the 
attribution of performance to a responsible individual. Unequal treatment, therefore, 
is still present in modern society, which singles out persons with prices (or electing 
them as officers), while subjecting others, those who have acted unlawfully, to the 
powerful stigma of punishment for what they have done.36 In words of Judith Shklar, 
“The claim that citizens of a democracy are entitled to respect unless they forfeit it by 
their own unacceptable action is not a triviality. On the contrary, it is a deeply 
                                                 
34. See, generally, Whitman, 2003. 
35. Walzer, 1983:253. 
36. See Walzer, 1983:256-70. To be sure, Walzer himself does not subscribe to the idea of formal 
equality as an underlying logic of degrading punishment. See critically above Chapter 5, 
Section III. 
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cherished belief”.37 According to this account, formal equality might not just admit 
degradation but it may even demand it. The punishment of criminal conduct would be 
the way in which that mandate is imposed upon the offender: in a complex tension 
with the idea of punitive condemnation, it may affirmed that punishment is 
degradation. 
According to Whitman, whose focus of analysis concerns the differences between US 
and European styles of punishment, the philosophy of formal equality assists in 
explaining the US tradition of harshness in relation to the milder European penal 
systems. He elaborates two aspects of the influence of formal equality. Firstly, 
distinctions in favour of people with higher social or personal statuses were forbidden 
very early in US law; formal equality demanded that all must be treated as equals 
before the law. Secondly, there was no need to treat offenders with the respect due to 
the rest of the people; formal equality, in its negative dimension, permits those 
differences when based on people’s conduct.38 In Europe, in contrast, the traditional 
criminal justice of pre-modern times was one that applied different punishments for 
people separated by status. With the rise of the horizontal integration of citizenship, 
the reforms were directed towards a process of ‘levelling up’, abolishing the low-
status forms of punishment associated with cruelty and shame and applying high-
status modes of punishment, previously reserved for the aristocracy and the wealthy, 
to everyone. The European tradition of respect for offenders can be tracked back, 
according to this explanation, to a reaction against a history of hierarchical social 
structures.39 The United States, according to Whitman, lacking such heavily 
hierarchical structures, had no room for respect towards the offenders.40  
Following Whitman, the phrase “the irony of equalitarian disenfranchisement” has 
been used by Re and Re to explain the way in which contemporary versions of CD 
                                                 
37. Shklar, 1991:3. 
38. See Whitman, 2003:43. 
39. See Whitman, 2003: Ch. 4. 
40. See Whitman, 2003: Ch. 5. 
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have been profoundly influenced by the philosophy of formal equality. It has been 
suggested, for example, that formal equality underlines and explains, in an important 
manner, the historical “expansion of constitutional voting rights without regard to 
race” carried out by radical Republicans after the US Civil War. It also explains, 
however, “the constitutional entrenchment of punitive disenfranchisement” as its 
counterpart:41 “if the philosophy of formal equality had the egalitarian power to 
liberate”, as it did with the slaves, which were formally transformed in citizens with 
equal rights to participate, “it also had the retributive potential to degrade” as it did 
and still does with offenders, which were excluded from the franchise.42  
3 Punishment, degradation and disenfranchisement 
Even when it is used for different purposes – by Whitman to explain the harshness of 
the US style of punishment43 and by Re and Re to explain the historical context and 
ideas that motivated the constitutional entrenchment of CD in the US44 – and to 
present ideas that are contentious, the argument from formal equality reveals an 
alternative conception of equality in relation to degradation; one that may contribute 
to expose an understanding of CD as a legitimate response to a criminal offence. This 
                                                 
41. Re & Re, 2012:1590. See also Shklar, 1991:2-3. It makes reference to the enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution, whose first section considers the equal 
protection clause, and whose second section explicitly protects the right to vote against (racial) 
discrimination threats. However, the second section, probably the legal provision more 
frequently referenced in the literature about CD, also establishes a reference to CD as an 
exception to this protection: “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State [...]. 
But when the right to vote at any election [...] is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such 
State [...], except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced [proportionally]” (Emphasis added). The historical interpretation of 
the Reconstruction amendments, and of Section II of the 15th Amendment in particular, has 
generated an important literature in US scholarship. See e.g. Morgan-Foster, 2006:286-93, 314-
8; Holloway, 2014. 
42. Re & Re, 2012:1596. See also Holloway, 2014:5-16. 
43. In relation to the explanation for harsh punishment in America, see e.g. Zimring & Johnson, 
2006. About its relation to CD, Demleitner, 2009:81-2. 
44. For a disputation of the idea that formal equality, as the historical explanation of the 
entrenchment of CD in the Fourteenth Amendment, is something relevant for current 
constitutional practice, see Ewald, 2013. For a discussion of the historical accuracy of their 
account, see Holloway, 2014:159. 
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is not, to be clear, a purely theoretical or historical notion. The prestige of the notion 
of formal equality, intrinsically linked to the discourse of just deserts in the US, and 
increasingly everywhere, can be pointed to as the main reason for the way in which 
the evidence presented by racial CD has been disregarded. For example, a standard 
response to those who claim that CD is being used as an instrument of racial abuse is: 
“If it’s blacks losing the right to vote, they have to quit committing crimes. We are 
not punishing the criminal. We are punishing conduct”.45 What is key about this 
conception of punishment, is the negative of the community to assume any 
responsibility for the criminal conduct.  
Acknowledging that certain commitment with degradation is part of modern 
discourses on crime and punishment should not be difficult. What is indeed difficult 
is to argue that certain degrading aspects do not belong to the very concept of 
punishment, even when these have been consistently neglected and rationalized by 
philosophical accounts of punishment.46 For example, the very expression ‘degrading 
punishment’ suggests that there is such a thing as non-degrading punishment.47 
Degradation, however, “often plays a significant role in punishment [and] part of 
what makes punishments effective is their power to degrade”.48 This is an obvious 
conclusion when the historical forms of punishment are examined but also holds true 
in current times. It is difficult to argue, for example that imprisonment is not 
degrading.49 In the best of the scenarios, one can attempt to downplay the degrading 
dimension of punishment, as shown by the work of Jean Hampton referred to above,50 
                                                 
45. Warren Wise, South Carolina legislator, cited in Manza & Ugger, 2006:43. See also Clegg, 
2002:169. cf Note, 1989:1310-1. It is interesting to note how the emphasis in these arguments 
is always located in the triggering element (the crime that deserves punishment) and not in the 
consequential element (degrading punishment).  
46. See above Chapter 5, Section III.3.  
47. See Vorhaus, 2003:67. 
48. Whitman, 2003:8. 
49. In the background to this idea may be found the ‘doctrine of less eligibility’: “the assumption 
that a disjuncture must exist between the living condition of prisoner and free citizens, with the 
former necessarily inferior to the condition encountered by the most marginalized social 
groups” (Czajka, 2005:118). 
50. See above Chapter 5, Section II.2.1. 
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but neglecting it entirely exposes one to great danger. In the context of a community 
that embraces the philosophy of formal equality, degradation is naturally regarded as 
a core aspect of punishment, which often creates a gap between penal theorization 
and popular feelings and beliefs regarding criminal justice. As George Fletcher 
suggest, the practice of criminal law “suggests that in fact the system often pursue 
goals other than the ones conventionally articulated”.51  
Especially if the degrading aspects of our punitive practice are not acknowledged 
publicly, and are conducted somewhere else out of sight,52 treating people as inferiors 
can be, according to Whitman, intoxicating. It can bring out the worst in us, even 
leading to a certain acceptance of penal sadism.53 In such a context, degradation 
proliferates and comes to be seen not as an undesired but necessary consequence of 
condemnation but, on the contrary, as a legitimate belief and a public value. Its 
defenders might “think, talk and act as if those who commit crimes […] should not be 
seen and treated as our fellow citizens and fellow human beings, but form a distinct 
and lower class or category of being” from whom they must distinguish themselves 
and protect against54. According to this view, punishment functions by degrading the 
offender. 
This form of understanding punishment shares some of the premises and the problems 
of the shaming sanctions. It has been sustained that “[s]haming penalties might even 
more accurately be described as degradation penalties”.55 It symbolizes the loss of 
social status within the community that affects the offender,56 are imposed by an 
authority, denouncing the wrongdoing and separating ritualistically the wrongdoer 
                                                 
51. Fletcher, 1999:1896. 
52. See Mañalich, 2011b:167-9.  
53. See Whitman, 2003:21-3. 
54. Duff, 2005b:154. 
55. See Kahan, 1996:636. 
56. See Bennett, 2003: par 36-9. 
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from the community.57 What is fundamental in them is not the psychological 
degradation of the offenders – even when it is not unreasonable to think that stigma 
may be a coherent justification –58 but the public expressive dimension of the 
imposition of the treatment or punishment,59 as correctly suggested by the theorist of 
expressive CD, which it must be possible for other members of the community to 
understand.60 
In the context of this discourse, the particularity of CD in relation to other forms of 
degrading practices derives from its performative character, by legally transforming 
offenders into second-class citizens. Therefore, the effectiveness of CD depends in 
turn not just upon the symbolic importance of the right to vote,61 but also the function 
that the right to vote performs in society as a mark of dignity and membership as the 
starting point granted by formal equality. According to those premises, CD can 
perform the function of punishing, degrading and excluding those members of the 
community that deserve it. 
Besides the negative punitive function and its degrading effect, CD can work 
positively by contributing to elevate democratic politics in the eyes of the law-
abiding citizens through the marginalization of those who lack the necessary value, 
moral authority or worthiness.62 This might enact the “image of the electorate as a 
                                                 
57. See Kahan, 1996. 
58. See Austin, 2004.  
59. That is why Bennett (2003) is wrong in sustaining that shaming in the case of CD is not only 
public but can be experienced internally and in the private circle of those disenfranchised (par 
39). From this premise follows his observation that this kind of rationale would work only with 
middle-class offenders, those who care about the loss of social status (par 37). 
60. Publicity, therefore, is a fundamental aspect of shaming punishment, and CD is affected by a 
deficit of visibility and, therefore, of the ability to produce the desired public stigma. See 
Demleitner, 2000:786. It is essential to draw attention to the fact that degradation on this 
account is to a certain extent autonomous, and its value does not necessarily depend on its 
deterrent effect, as it does in some accounts of shaming punishment. See Kahan, 1996:637-44. 
61. Deimleitner, 2009:94. 
62. See Ewald, 2002:1117.  
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closed community of well-behaved democrats”63 that look to “distinguish themselves 
from their inferiors”,64 or configure a regime comprising “‘Citizens proper’ and a 
periphery of subjects”.65 In this imaginary, CD may express and remind the value of 
the activity of exercising one’s democratic rights – a dimension of the franchise that 
is hidden by the universalization of political rights – by serving as a reminder of the 
dignity and ‘the moral character’ involved in democratic activities.66 Accordingly, 
conceding the right to vote to criminal (offenders) would be disrespectful towards 
(law-abiding) citizens because doing so would be to treat them with a respect they 
have lost as a consequence of their own deeds, diluting the vote of law-abiding 
citizens.67 
II BOUNDARIES AND EXCLUSION 
The characterisation of the practice of CD as a degrading punishment talks only 
partially about its political significance because CD is not only a punitive practice. It 
also responds to the question of the boundaries of the political community in a way 
that makes the exclusion from elections of those who have committed a criminal 
offence an essential part of the answer. 
1 Exclusionary tendencies of democracy 
Liberal authors agree with the demand of closure made by the performative aspects of 
democracy. For example, David Miller has pointed out that the question of whether a 
constituency can be expanded or contracted in the name of democracy implies a 
trade-off between two sets of conflicting principles. A highly inclusive democracy 
must be ready to admit a relatively thin form of democracy, based mostly in terms of 
                                                 
63. Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:121. 
64. Shklar, 1991:15.  
65. Pettus, 2013:8.  
66. See Mills, cited in Planinc, 1987. See also Schall, 2006:91. 
67. See e.g. Clegg, 2001:177. cf Shklar, 1991:34. 
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output democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, the more demanding the conditions 
that a normative conception of democracy sets for participation and social cohesion, 
the more value should be accorded to closure; consequently, this would be translated 
into a push for exclusion.68 The practice of democratic decision-making requires not 
just closure but “some degree of social unity” to function adequately.69 The degree of 
unity can vary depending on the democratic models and the kinds and levels of 
performance expected from them. For example, at one extreme is found a republican 
demand for social cohesion in terms of ethical agreement, trust and stability. At the 
other extreme lies the proposal for a liberal instrumental identification of mutual 
interest with the aim of subjecting the government to an effective control.70 In either 
of these forms, the degree of social unity that a group of people can develop is at 
odds with the premises of universal inclusion.71  
Echoing arguments of social cohesion, Charles Taylor has argued that contemporary 
liberal democracy has an unseen tendency to include individuals in politics, at the 
same time as it embraces a dynamic that pushes “towards exclusion”.72 He expounds 
this paradoxical feature in very simple terms: 
                                                 
68. Miller, 2009:226. This argument tends to coincide with the classical idea that ‘citizens’ 
effectiveness’, that is, the real involvement of people in decision-making, is only attainable in 
relatively small units with strong social cohesion. In contrast, large units offer comparatively 
greater ‘system capacity’ to control the significant agenda and to act effectively (Dahl & Tufte, 
cited in Whelan, 1983a:38). 
69. Miller, 2009:211. See also Manfredi, 1998:293-4. 
70. Miller, 2009:207-12. 
71. In contraposition to this participatory reading of social cohesion stands a reading driven by the 
requirement of political unity. Famously, Carl Schmitt developed his concept of political or 
democratic equality based on a very demanding pre-political homogeneity that the State must 
protect as the precondition of its subsistence (Schmitt, 2008:255-63). However, in principle, 
Schmitt sustains the same criticism towards universalism. Human equality, he maintains, is 
essentially non-political because it does not admit of any political distinction between members 
and non-members of a democratic community, rendering equality superfluous, and impeding 
the development of democracy as a political and egalitarian practice. 
72. Taylor, 1998:143. 
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“Democracy is inclusive because it is the government of all the people; put 
paradoxically, this is also the reason that democracy tends towards 
exclusion. The exclusion is a by-product of the need, in self-governing 
societies, of a high degree of cohesion. Democratic states need something 
like a common identity”.73  
He unpacks the paradox in the following terms. Those engaged in the deliberative 
democratic practice must “know one another, listen to one another and understand 
one another”,74 otherwise the practice is impossible or a mere appearance. Therefore, 
only a collective identity based on strong commitment is able to “create the 
confidence on the part of the various subgroups that they will indeed be heard”.75 
This mutual trust is threatened when some citizens do not behave according to the 
expectations established. This element of cohesion produces, on the other hand, a 
tendency to exclude those who do not belong to the defined collective identity. The 
obvious case is that of immigrants, but this phenomenon is not confined to them. In 
its more “rigorous and uncompromising” versions, it can be turned against all other 
ways of being that do not subordinate themselves to the proposed common identity: 
“ideological enemies, slackers and, when the case arises, immigrants”.76 Taylor 
acknowledges that this type of cohesion can lead to what he calls “inner exclusion”, 
that is, “the creation of a common identity based upon a rigid formula of politics and 
citizenship, one that refuses to accommodate any alternatives and imperiously 
demands the subordination of other aspects of citizens’ identities”.77 Notwithstanding 
the fact that Taylor’s idea is more directly related to cultural differences, immigration 
and multicultural societies, the concept of ‘inner exclusion’ is appealing for 
developing an understanding of the dynamic of exclusion affecting offenders.  
                                                 
73. Taylor, 1998:143. 
74. Taylor, 1998:143. 
75. Taylor, 1998:145. 
76. Taylor, 1998:147. 
77. Taylor, 1998:148. 
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The exclusionary tendencies of democracy are produced and articulated toward the 
idea of the stranger, most perfectly embodied in the foreigner.78 However, 
strangeness is nothing natural and therefore is not stable but mobile and fluid.79 The 
increasing complexity of modern societies make the identification of lineages and 
traditional cultural identities more difficult to capture. Under a public philosophy that 
treats persons according to their actions and not according to their status, as is the 
case in liberal states committed to the protection of the rule of law, it may be right to 
affirm that once the stranger is admitted to live within the community, he must be 
treated as a member and respected as such. This should neutralize the aversion to the 
strangeness. 
These exclusionary tendencies, though, do not seem to disappear. They are expressed, 
indubitably, in the informal interactions in society, and reformulated and codified to 
be, again, formally channelled through the legal system. If the stranger acts in line 
with the community’s values, he will be protected by the law. He might become de 
facto and de jure a citizen; otherwise, he will be probably criminalized.80 
Criminalization is one of the main ways in which a liberal state under the influence of 
the rule of law doctrine formally expresses the exclusionary tendencies of democracy. 
This model is intrinsically linked to the philosophy of formal equality that, however, 
admitting the inclusion of the foreigner also admits the reverse process through which 
those persons formerly regarded as citizens become strangers through conviction for a 
criminal offence.81  
                                                 
78. The external exclusion of the strangers has been largely protected by immigration law and 
border controls (See e.g. Bosniak, 2006:31-6). The exclusion of the stranger who lives within 
the territory of the national state is performed by the criminal justice system.  
79. See e.g. Balibar, 2006. 
80. It is no coincidence that besides Hirst, the only other judgment of the ECtHR that has produced 
local opposition in the UK is Othman (Abu Qatada) v UK (2012]). See, about this case, 
Michaelsen, 2012. 
81. Several rules express this connection. First, normally the requirements for naturalization, or 
even those which apply to claims for refugee status, exclude (or make it difficult for) those 
convicted for a criminal offence (see e.g. Lapp, 2012). Second, the procedures for the 
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This reverse process is central to the politics of CD, a practice in which a citizen is 
divested of the more important rights of citizenship, label them as “irredeemably 
different and dangerous”,82 to be located, in this respect, with other strangers. There 
are strong links between the figure of the stranger and the figure of the criminal. In 
Discipline and Punishment, for example, Michael Foucault affirms that imprisonment 
involves a subjectification of the offender. From the perspective of the criminal law, 
which addresses the offender as a subject of the law, he is held responsible for his 
actions as an autonomous subject and is made the object of the condemnation. 
However, he is transformed by his conviction, principally by means of his 
incarceration, into a delinquent, somebody who must be reformed by the application 
of the techniques of discipline.83 This transformation is described as “curious 
substitution”: 
“from the hands of justice, it certainly receives convicted person; but what 
it must apply itself to is not, of course, the offence, nor even exactly the 
offender, but a rather different object, one defined by variables which at 
the outset at least were not taken into account in the sentence, for they 
were relevant only for a corrective technology. This other character, whom 
the penitentiary apparatus substitutes for the convicted offender, is the 
delinquent”.84  
In the terms outlined above, the punishment is a consequence of his wrongdoing in 
the realm of formal equality. His imprisonment reflects, on the other hand, his 
exclusion from such terrain; the confirmation of his strangeness, and the 
transformation of the offender into a criminal. His exclusion is not, however, 
completed with his incarceration. What is uncomfortably implied by the prison logics 
mentioned by Foucault is made explicit and adopted publicly, formalizing the 
                                                                                                                                                    
deportation of non-citizens (Edgely, 2010:411) and the application for refugee status pay 
considerable attention to the commission of any criminal offences (see e.g. Abriel, 1996). 
Finally, and even more dramatically, the revocation of (national) citizenship as a consequence 
of a criminal offence is a sanction that has been implemented in several jurisdictions (see e.g. 
Lavi, 2011). 
82. Note, 1989:1311. 
83. Foucault, 1995. 
84. Foucault, 1995:251. 
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substitution of the citizen by a criminal, and completing the physical, legal and 
political exclusion of the offender. 
2 The internal exclusion 
Not only Taylor has used the ideas of internal exclusion to describe the pathologies of 
liberal democracy. Critical theorists such as Agamben have used the idea of internal 
exclusion to describe a political situation necessarily implied by structural injustice in 
advanced capitalist societies. Those who belong or are members of society are all the 
individuals recognized as such. However, not all those who belong are included but 
only those who are represented by the state, which advance their interests. This 
situation creates a dissonance between those who belong and those who are included, 
typically those individuals levelled as electors.85 Disregarding the complex and 
radical political implications that can be drawn from this scheme,86 which have 
usually been employed to describe the position of illegal immigrants,87 the 
terminology can be borrowed to illustrate the situation of internal exclusion of those 
disenfranchised by the commission of a crime.  
The key aspect of the offender’ internal exclusion is that those who were once 
regarded as citizens are now excluded. This is make their case different from those 
that were born and remain outside of the political community as it is the case of a 
temporary resident. They become alien in their “own country, and worse”.88  
In the best of lights, it can be said that offenders are incorporated not as complete but 
as ‘conditional citizens’, whose reincorporation depends on their unlikely 
                                                 
85. See Agamben, 1998:15-29, who follows Badiou, 2007:81-111. 
86. The implication of this dissonance is that, for Badiou and Ranciere (in contrast to Agamben), it 
opens the space for the occurrence of a true political moment that questions the situation in 
which some are included but do not belong. See, generally, van den Hemel, 2008. 
87. See e.g. Balibar, 2008; Ranciere, 2010. 
88. Note, 1989:1311. 
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normalization, but who – in the case that this condition is not met – are destined to be 
permanently segregated.89 However, this exclusion expresses but transcends the idea 
that there are tight differences between the ‘good’ members of the community and 
‘the others’, as an idea that strongly underpins social validation of the state’s punitive 
apparatus.90 This is because offenders are “never utterly irrelevant or absolutely 
useless”, and that is perhaps the reason why they are not simply exterminated or 
deported, because their existence “comprises the antithetical other in relation to 
which the abjector self is defined”.91 Their superfluity as members of the community 
of honest citizens from which they are expelled is transformed paradoxically into 
“utility and necessity precisely because of their expulsion. Superfluous and redundant 
on the ‘inside’, their utility is wholly dependent on their abjection from society”.92 
They are expelled because they are a threat, but the threat they pose to the cohesion 
and purity of the community is transformed into part of the community’s cohesion 
and purity.93 The community is both transformed and reinforced through the 
exclusion of the undeserving. The criminal offender is not (or not always) expelled 
beyond borders or executed but “imprisoned, defranchised, immobilized, and stored 
away, out of sight, out of mind”.94  
The modalities of the internal exclusion of the offenders is something that can be 
described more broadly by drawing upon several aspects of the expansive 
exclusionary dynamic of the criminal justice system in countries such as the US and 
the UK. A first and more obvious aspect is the fact that imprisonment isolates 
offenders from society. Imprisonment is literally an internal exclusion in contrast 
with, for example, transportation. In opposition to punitive mechanisms that publicly 
expose the punishment, imprisonment makes the punishment invisible to the public, 
                                                 
89. Vaughan, 2000:23-6. See also Duff, 2005a:215; Pettus, 2013:125. 
90. See e.g. Drake & Henley, 2014:6.  
91. Czajka, 2005:112. 
92. Czajka, 2005:112. 
93. See Note, 1989:1312. 
94. Czajka, 2005:114 (emphasis added). Czajka refers her analysis only to certain prisoners, but 
the sections used here are of a generality that does not distort her position.  
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therefore meaning that “[w]e don’t have to bear witness to the regime of brutality and 
dehumanization that is imposed in our name”.95 The public becomes immune to the 
suffering. It involves, as Foucault points out, “lowering at least the threshold of 
tolerance to penalty”.96 In these terms, “a dormant social function of the prison is 
guaranteeing, ‘to the outside’, the invisibility of the inmates”,97 which “is the flipside 
of the intensive surveillance they face inside prisons”.98  
However, the internal exclusion suffered by the offender is not limited to the 
particular conditions of their (usually) temporary imprisonment. In a second respect, 
their exclusion can be perpetuated by the permanent or temporary removal of 
prisoners and former prisoners from ‘respectable society’, a process often referred to 
as ‘invisible punishment’, effectively resembling the ancient practices of ‘civil 
death’.99 These measures, which “emerge silently from diverse, scattered statutes and 
government and private sector policies, and descend on the criminal under the cover 
of darkness”,100 and which are not motivated by an incapacitate rationale,101 but 
mostly oriented towards the perfection of the expressive and symbolic exclusion from 
the circle of the deserving members,102 including the loss of welfare benefits (e.g. 
public housing) or the ban from certain forms of employment (e.g. public service). As 
some of the more acute observers of these practices affirm: 
                                                 
95. Edgely, 2010:415. See also Vaughan, 2000:26-8. 
96. Foucault, 1995:301. See also Note, 1989:1316. 
97. Mañalich, 2011b:169 [translation of the author]. 
98. Edgely, 2010:415. 
99. See Demleiter, 2000:775. See, generally, the collections by Mauer & Chensney-Lind, 2002 and 
Brown & Wilkie, 2002. These effects are sharpened by the extension of CD to a permanent 
status (Demleitner, 2000:775), as has been empirically demonstrated (Manza & Ugger, 
2006:151-163).  
100. Edgely, 2010:404. 
101. See above Chapter 5, Section I. 
102. See Demleitner, 1999:159.  
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“the full range of civil penalties and informal stigmas that are imposed 
with a criminal conviction effectively deny individuals the rights of 
citizenship. This denial, in turn, makes performing the duties of 
citizenship difficult”.103  
The idea of internal exclusion can be used, finally, in a third and very specific way to 
describe the importance of CD, as the necessary expression that those affected by the 
criminal system are indeed strangers and not citizens. For that, they are excluded 
from the exercise of the most fundamental expression of citizenship.104 This is 
crystallized by the widely accepted terminology in which the political discourse on 
crime and punishment is framed: criminal justice is a case of protecting the rights of 
the citizens and the victims against the crime and the criminals.105 Such a distinction, 
which is commonly linked to discourses of penal populism, is however encrypted in 
the very institutions of the criminal law system, commonly internalized by the 
offenders,106 and provided with a political meaning and a constitutional character by 
CD.  
Offenders are deprived of the right to vote as a demonstration that they are no longer 
citizens, but politically invisible107 or worse, enemies.108 From the moment of the 
conviction, they started to be treated as criminals, not because of what they have 
done, but because of what they have become. They are no longer subjects of the law, 
                                                 
103. Manza & Uggen, 2006:127. See also Demleitner, 1999. The collateral legal consequences of 
criminal conviction or imprisonment constitute a considerably broad category. They can affect 
other formal aspects of social life, depriving offenders of an immense amount of freedom and 
opportunity. For example, the right to divorce, the exercise of parental rights, the right to hold 
a licence to drive vehicles, the right to possess a firearm and the obligation of belonging to a 
public criminal register are the most common traditional issues resulting from a criminal 
conviction in the US. The scope of rights and benefits affected by collateral consequences has 
been dramatically expanded due to the success of ‘tough on crime’ policies, affecting housing, 
employment and public benefits. The seminal legal work on this is Damaska, 1968a and 
Damaska, 1968b. For the evolution of collateral consequences in the US, see Grant et al, 1970; 
Burton et al, 1987 (cf Olivares et al, 1996). For a comparative study of this expansion, see 
Pinard, 2010. 
104. Edgely, 2010:417. See also Fletcher, 1999:1989-90. 
105. See Duff, 2005a:214. See also Gómez-Jara, 2008. 
106.  See Omar Little, in “The Wire: One Arrest (#1.7)” (2002). 
107. Pettus, 2013:98.  
108. See, about the idea of an ‘Enemy criminal law’, Gómez-Jara, 2008. 
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which addresses them as deliberative persons, but are regarded as dangerous strangers 
“against which only continues the possibility of a cognitive approach”.109 Stripped of 
citizenship they must be controlled by mechanisms and technologies that 
consequentially reduce their position to the state of ‘bare life’, expelling them from 
the realm of human dignity,110 or, at best, returned to a ‘state of nature’ in which the 
offenders, divested of their citizenship rights, are treated as ‘naked human beings’.111 
3 The subversion of the boundaries 
The idea of internal exclusion runs against the democratic framework presented 
above, which suggested that a normative conception of democracy is highly 
committed to the principle of ‘all those subjected to the law’ must be granted rights of 
participation.112 However, as should be clear now, CD evidences that such a principle 
is not valid. In those jurisdiction that embrace CD, the boundaries of the franchise are 
determined under other sets of parameters, which may be the imperceptible 
consequence of the denied exclusionary tendencies of democracy and the invisibility 
of the degrading aspects of the punishment that subtly intersect with the question of 
the boundaries. Firstly, CD implements the closure of the boundaries in a way almost 
entirely opposed to that of the ‘all affected principle’, that is, by excluding those who 
are included because they have been subjected to the law. Secondly, CD helps to 
affirm positively, by this ‘internal exclusion’, the identity of the community of law-
abiding citizens by opposition to the symbolic figure of the criminal.113 
On the one hand, law abidance as the definitive rule of distributing the right to vote 
subverts the idea underlying the universal franchise, transforming the principle of ‘all 
                                                 
109. Mañalich, 2011a: 139. 
110. Czajka, 2005:133. 
111. Mañalich, 2011b:175-6. 
112. See above Chapter 3, Section III. 
113.  The thesis of Beckman (2014) according to which the included may have a right to exclusion 
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those subjected to the law’ into the principle of ‘only those law-abiding”. This is 
clearly prevented by the Court in Sauvé:  
“The social compact requires the citizen to obey the laws created by the 
democratic process. But it does not follow that failure to do so nullifies 
the citizen’s continued membership in the self-governing polity. Indeed, 
the remedy of imprisonment for a term rather than permanent exile implies 
our acceptance of continued membership in the social order […]” [47]. 
This idea stands against the extended conception of citizenship as constitutive of the 
basic status that relates individuals and the State, being attached to those who are full 
members of society, bearers of rights (civil, political and social) and share their status 
in equality.114 In the conception of citizenship defined in opposition to the criminal 
offender, the duty of law-abidance precedes the enjoyment of rights and formal 
equality is privileged over any notion of substantive equality.  
Three elements can be distinguished from this change of paradigm. Firstly, it affects 
the entire population on the basis of the denial of the basic premise of Marshall’s idea 
of citizenship, which holds that rights are necessary for full participation in society. 
Instead, it replaces it with a model of governmentality,115 this is, a demand of 
internalization of a standard of conduct that “define[s] a person as a competent 
member of society”, contingent upon which rights of citizenship “may be granted or 
rescinded”.116 Secondly, it subsequently unleashes an exclusionary dynamic over 
some of the members of the community that is well explained by the paradoxical 
relation between prison and recidivism, but also has been empirically documented in 
terms of an inbreeding relation between crime and several forms of social 
disadvantage.117 Finally, it affects the political system. The fundamental kinds of 
political antagonism (e.g. between the privileged and the unprivileged, between the 
                                                 
114. Marshall, 1998:102-4. 
115. See, generally, Foucault, 2008. 
116. Vaughan, 2000:25. 
117. Edgely, 2010:408-12; 425-8. 
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liberal and conservative and between the defenders of the state and the defenders of 
the market) are usurped, and replaced by the unbalanced opposition between the 
citizen, represented by the State, and offenders, in what is usually described as a “war 
against the criminal class”.118 A war, however, that never ends.119 This movement 
towards the use of strategic violence, the use of prison as tactical intervention120 and 
the exploitation of fear, which indicate necessarily the end of deliberative politics,121 
“express an unacknowledged recognition of the precariousness of our own conformity 
and therefore of the need to guard against influences that would push us over the 
edge”.122 In sum, if it clearly expresses a sense of superiority, as incarnated in the 
politics of degradation, paradoxically it may also “reflect feelings of vulnerability”.123 
This attitude of hostility, that “has the unique advantage of uniting all members of the 
community in the emotional solidarity of aggression”,124 can be seen, on the other 
hand, as part of a decision to reaffirm a commitment to a certain community identity, 
which appraises values such as mutual respect and the rule of law. If it is accepted 
that CD can be pursued legitimately as a punishment under the coverage of formal 
equality, excluding temporarily from the franchise those subjects that have violated 
an important norm of mutual respect,125 it can also be affirmed that CD constitutes a 
legitimate practice that contributes to determining the communal boundaries,126 and 
the nature and identity of a political community.127 In the words of Robert Altman, 
who put forward this idea, “how the citizens of a state collectively decide to respond 
to the violation of important normative constraints embodied in their laws constitutes 
                                                 
118. See Fletcher, 1999:1897. 
119. See Ellis Carver, in “The Wire: The Target (#1.1)” (2002). 
120. See Mañalich, 2011a: 139.  
121. See Arendt, 1970. 
122. Kleinig & Murtagh, 2005:224.  
123. Kleinig & Murtagh, 2005:224.  
124. Mead cited in Note, 1989:1312.  
125. Altman, 2005:264-7. 
126. See Kleinig & Murtagh, 2005:224.  
127. Altman, 2005:267-9. 
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an important part of the identity of their political community”.128 This argument is 
grounded, first, in the existence and legitimacy of cultural and historical differences 
among communities129 and, second, in the fact that “a collective right to self-
determination would have little, if any, meaning if the citizens of a state operated 
under the obligation to always choose the morally optimal policy”.130 It is 
presupposed by this claim that communities that disenfranchise offenders have a 
different political identity to communities that do not. The remaining question then 
becomes what is the cost of protecting this values for the identity of the political 
community?  
The answer can be easily envisaged at this stage. CD confuses the authority to punish 
with the power to determine its own membership.131 This confusion expresses 
punitiveness and not urgent democratic concerns. In relation to the punitive element, 
for example, the Court in Roach does not have any qualms to acknowledge and 
endorse CD as a way to “stigmatise” offenders [89].132 The same idea is captured, 
however in a critical light, in Sauvé: 
“Denying citizen law-breakers the right to vote sends the message that 
those who commit serious breaches are no longer valued as members of 
the community, but instead are temporary outcasts from our system of 
rights and democracy. More profoundly, it sends the unacceptable message 
that democratic values are less important than punitive measures 
ostensibly designed to promote order. If modern democratic history has 
one lesson to teach it is this: enforced conformity to the law should not 
come at the cost of our core democratic values” [40]. 
                                                 
128. Altman, 2005:269. It is perhaps relevant to note that Altman is not defending CD as a 
necessary response to crime; in fact, he considers that certain circumstances must be met in 
order for CD to be legitimately applied. See also Manfredi, 1998:294. 
129. Altman, 2005:269. See also the discussion on the MOA above Chapter 2, Section I.1.1.  
130. Altman, 2005:264. 
131. cf Lardy, 2002:528.  
132. See also NICRO [54-6]. 
DEGRADATION 
 
 
250 
On the other hand, that CD affirms a model of government that shows no concerns for 
democratic legitimacy is the necessary conclusion from the Hobbesian presupposition 
that the state authority is not granted in participation but in the protection that the 
citizen receive from the law. Starting from that paradigm, effectively the right to vote 
assume the role of privilege “granted to citizens in the sense that the law would retain 
its authority with or without citizen participation in elections”.133 The authority of the 
law is not that created by democratic legitimacy but the kind of authority that also 
authoritarian governments may also enjoy.134 In this model, the right to vote do not 
present itself as a mechanism of participation and generation of democratic 
legitimacy but primarily as mark of distinction and separation of those who have the 
privilege of citizens against those who have not. 
The exclusionary tendencies of democracy and the dynamics of internal exclusion 
constitute invitation to rethink the problem of the boundaries in political rather than 
in normative terms. A conclusion that might be drawn from the aforementioned 
problems is that the definition of the boundaries – e.g. the determination of the 
franchise – forms the paradigmatic case in which the normative solutions expose 
themselves as an exercise of the political power to distinguish between ‘us’ and 
‘them’, which cannot be subjected to substantive, nor to procedural rules. Mouffe, for 
instance, recognises, following Schmitt, that “democracy always entails a relation of 
inclusion-exclusion”.135 She continues, 
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“[t]he logic of democracy does indeed imply a moment of closure which is 
required by the very process of constituting the ‘people’. This cannot be 
avoided, even in a liberal-democratic model; it can only be negotiated 
differently. But this in turn can be done only if the closure, and the 
paradox it implies, are acknowledged”.136  
CD has the potential to expose the contradictions and fragilities of the democratic 
constitution of the boundaries of the political community, throwing into relief what 
can be termed an exclusionary tendency of liberal democracies.137 
III THE RIGHT TO VOTE AS RECOGNITION 
Against a hasty conclusion, such as that voting is not quite a fundamental right,138 the 
previous ideas regarding the logic of CD as a degrading punishment and an 
exclusionary practice could contribute to highlighting that the right to vote performs a 
fundamental political function when it determines those who are part of the 
community and those who are not; who are included and who are excluded.  
This section claims that in light of these findings, the right to vote may be also 
understood, and perhaps primarily, as a mechanism of recognition of “membership of 
a community of deserving citizens […] rather than as a purely legal entitlement to 
participate in periodic elections”.139 This is clear in the historical trajectory of the 
extension of the franchise, but has nonetheless been obscured by the modern 
emphasis on participation. These ideas about what is at stake in the politics of CD can 
contribute to a rediscovery of the importance of this aspect that is inscribed in the 
very core of the right to vote. Moreover, the retrieval of this notion may enable the 
emergence of possibilities for contesting the discourse that intertwines crime and 
citizenship. 
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1 The franchise as a terrain of exclusion and recognition 
The idea of the extension of the vague idea of citizenship and, therefore, the 
recognition of people as members of a community of equals has been strongly linked 
to the historical extension of the right to vote. In past times, exclusionary electoral 
rules were complicated and multiple, excluding numerous groups within society from 
political participation, thus configuring a system of privileges. The original 
constellation of exclusions from early modern democratic arrangements generally 
included women, workers, the poor and the propertyless.140 At present, just a few 
cases of exclusions remain generally in force,141 and this evolution can be understood 
in terms of a development from an early regime of limited voting to a tendency to 
embrace the principle of universal suffrage. 
In the ancient regime, political participation was restricted to that select group whose 
lineage was transmitted through hereditary privileges. The hierarchies and the 
integration into intermediate associations were the fundamental pillar of pre-
democratic political regimes. The break from the ancient regime initiated a new era 
governed by the rising principle of political equality.142 By this process, political 
rights were slowly transformed, by means of their extension to everybody, from 
particular privileges into fundamental rights.143 Three elements coincided to generate 
the scenario in which this transition emerged. 
The first was paradoxically the form of the nation-state. Taylor links the break with 
the ancient regime with the emergence and consolidation of a new paradigm of 
                                                 
140. For a complete analysis of the rationale of those exclusions from the perspective of class-based 
and capitalist rationality, omitted in the following passages, see Macpherson, 1977. 
141. See Blais et al, 2001; Massicotte et al, 2004: Ch. 1. Other important exceptions are some local 
residence requirements. In those cases, somebody is impeded from voting in a determined 
place, but is still considered as an elector. On how this factor can intersect with CD, specially 
producing a detrimental demographic effect, see Taormina, 2003. 
142. See e.g. Brubaker, 1989. 
143. For a critique of this inclusive view of the transition from pre-modern to modern orders, see 
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modern political organisation. Two central ideas show that the ideal of democratic 
inclusion was already latent, albeit in embryonic form, in the formative stages of the 
nation state: first, through a direct association of membership between citizens and 
the state; and second, by the fact that this association was immediate and horizontal, 
in contrast to pre-modern forms of organization in which the bonds were mediate and 
hierarchical.144 The nation-state made possible the formation of democratic 
participation, yet at the same time it contributed to its limitation under the framework 
of the national model of citizenship, according to which only national citizens were 
entitled to rights of participation. This constituted the external boundaries of the 
political community.145 
The second element is the emergence of the public sphere. In Habermas’ description, 
the transition to modernity implied that public affairs ceased to be synonymous with 
government affairs and instead diverged into an autonomous space from the 
government apparatus and a private sphere in which subjects qua citizens could join, 
discuss and influence government decision-making. Participation in the public sphere 
was opened up to formerly-excluded actors (the bourgeoisie) and dominated by 
principles of rationality with which anybody could engage.146 At the same time, 
however, those participatory standards were crystallized into barriers that excluded 
those arguably unable to engage in a rational and impartial dialogue, or “capable of a 
well-informed and reasonable judgement”,147 about the common affairs of the 
community. Importantly, the emergence of the public sphere potentially left behind 
those people associated with the spheres considered as private by setting up 
mechanisms of exclusion, which came to be legally codified in terms of political 
                                                 
144. See Taylor, 1997. The horizontality of membership gave citizens direct access to the public 
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capacity to participate meaningfully in rational political discussion.148 However, 
when the public sphere adopts the form of a deliberative space in which socialization 
is discursively mediated, it has the potentiality to open the external boundaries of the 
community to the participation of those who lack formal membership.149 The ideas of 
public sphere and capacity requirements constituted and still constituting the internal 
and deliberative boundaries of the political community.150 
The third and driving element can be described as the embrace of the doctrine of 
natural rights. The idea of natural rights was the most powerful discursive tool of 
those who made a claim for inclusion as equal citizens in the public sphere of the 
nation-state. The idea of the universal and natural freedom and equality of all 
individuals is still used as the more incisive argument in struggles for recognition. 
The universality and, therefore, the openness of the concepts of the public, citizenry 
and people are in a tense conceptual relationship with the tendency towards closure of 
both the nation state’s membership and the public sphere’s capacity requirements.151 
The language of the rights is used for certain groups to further their interests and to 
demand justifications. In that context, as Marta Minow put it, “no one claimed that 
these new ideas [individual self-determination and equal justice] would apply to 
everyone […] the range of status categories diminished, but legal incapacities and 
regulated relationships of dependency still supplied reasons for excepting certain 
groups from various legal and economic activities”.152 Notwithstanding these 
shortcomings, the language of universalism “allows us constantly to challenge – 
through reference to ‘humanity’ and the polemical use of ‘human rights’ – the forms 
of exclusion that are necessarily inscribed in the political practice of installing those 
                                                 
148. The demand of political capacity is easily identified with the political theory of republicanism 
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rights and defining ‘the people’”.153 This antagonism between the legal categories 
used to incorporate the difference within the law and the language of the universal is 
what permits an understanding of the process of setting the boundaries of democracy 
as an ongoing process of political contestation.  
Once it is generally observed that the franchise was one of the terrains marked by the 
tensions between exclusion and the recognition of free and equal persons, there is a 
need to explore the circumstances of the transition from a regime of limited voting to 
one of universal suffrage. Behind this progression lies a complex process of struggle 
against two interconnected ideological structures – in the sense that sustain relations 
of domination appealing to representation.154 On the one hand, there is the republican 
construction of requirements of responsibility, virtue and capacity offered by the new 
dominant bourgeoisie against the working-class, by men against women, by the 
Europeans against other ethnic groups. On the other hand, there is what remains of 
the aristocratic conceptions that understand political power as a privilege. The 
historical sum of these structures was the construction of the rights of democratic 
participation as a question depending on the satisfaction of certain requirements.155 
The rhetoric built around concepts such as responsibility and virtue worked by 
disempowering those groups of the population targeted as dangerous to the interests 
of the privileged class, as well as those groups considered inferior, marginal, or 
different.156 They provided the method by which, using legally-enacted competency 
requirements, the powerful members of society constructed a formal difference that 
permitted the ‘harmonious exclusion’ of the underprivileged class from positions of 
political power, thereby maintaining a relationship of political domination.157  
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Against this kind of construction, the process of enfranchisement of the general 
population was produced by an ambivalent process of struggle for recognition, 
“fulfilling the demands of the excluded to share power on an equal basis with people 
they recognize as their natural equals, but who do not recognize them as such”.158 
Structures of production massively affected by modern warfare and the civil rights 
movements gradually yielded the right to vote for all those who claimed it.159 While 
elite governments sought social legitimacy, in order to maintain the order that 
favoured them and to avoid revolt and instability, those excluded sought recognition 
and empowerment.160  
                                                                                                                                                    
model, the idea of public standing as privilege was linked to birth-right and belonging to a 
particular social group or family, with the rise of republican principles, suffrage became 
formally independent of circumstances of birth; however, the idea of public standing as 
privilege survived, this time linked to the status of landowner or taxpayer to accommodate the 
emergence of the new bourgeois class. At this stage, a link between political rights and virtue 
and capacity, in this case with an emphasis on responsibility, was explicit. The requirement of 
property was rationally explained as constituting the necessary guarantee for citizens’ 
commitment to the common good. Because property-owners are committed to the destiny of 
the society upon which they depend, they deserve be enfranchised, whereas those with nothing 
to risk and therefore only egoistically concerned with their own advantage – their own survival 
– could not engage with a common perspective; therefore, they must be excluded. A similar 
rationale was offered regarding autonomy: the integrity of the owner’s character as responsible 
and competent was cited in contrast with those without property, who were thought to be weak 
and accustomed to relying upon others (see Ewald, 2004:119. see also Beckman, 2009:7). This 
autonomy-based argument particularly affected the exclusion of wage labourers, who were 
considered as dependent upon the will of the employer, and therefore prone to be “manipulated 
and induced to act politically in the interest of others” (Beckman, 2007:15. See also 
Macpherson, 1977). 
158. Pettus, 2013:69.  
159. It is possible to view this process from the perspective of the change that it produced in the 
composition of the electorate. The percentage of the population permitted to vote during the 
nineteen century was minimal. From the time of the establishment of modern elections to 
current times, the number of citizens eligible to cast their ballots has gradually increased (see 
Przeworski, 2008). For example, according to Katz (1997), in the United Kingdom just 3.7% of 
the population was eligible to vote in 1850, while in France the number rose to 25%. One 
hundred years later, the UK permitted 68% of its population to vote and France 61% (236-7). 
This can be attributed to the gradual elimination, during the course of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, of property, contributory and literacy requirements associated with the 
privileges of the upper classes. Patterns of exclusion based on religion, ethnicity, race and sex 
were also eliminated.  
160. See Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000. Lizzeri & Persico (2004), in contrast, view the extension of 
suffrage to the masses as also part of a political process internal to the ruling-elite’s economic 
affairs. See also Przeworski, 2010b. The ambivalence between strategic reasoning to face 
relations of oppression, on the one hand, and the use of moral universal principles to unveil 
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Notwithstanding progress in the consolidation of a more inclusive franchise,161 
present exclusionary rules can be subjected to the same kind of critique against their 
abuse, because “the arguments employed in relation to contemporary exclusions owe 
much to the structure of the arguments of the past”.162 To a certain extent, this was 
the purpose of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
2 A conception of the right to vote as recognition 
The previous historical remarks help initiate an exploration of the recourse to the 
language of recognition to address what is at stake in the current practices of 
exclusion from the franchise. Echoing this historical trajectory, it has been argued 
that the “denial of the right to vote constitutes an unacceptable form of exclusion 
from a validating social practice. Exclusion from voting is, in effect, a mark of 
inferiority, a consignment to a degrading form of second-class citizenship”.163 
Acceptance of this vision may well be based on the affirmation that the principal 
reasons which have driven struggles for the vote are more closely related to the 
question of inclusion within the circle of those considered equals, within the 
                                                                                                                                                    
their ideological exclusion, on the other, was a background condition of the struggle for the 
right to vote. This ambiguity becomes salient when it is noticed that the rhetoric of virtue and 
capacity was not only present in the exclusionary competency requirements, which were 
combated by the integrationist demands, but that it was sometimes present in their contestation 
(See e.g. Karlan, 2003:1346-62). They did not assume purely the form of the claim for 
inclusion and the elimination of requirements, but regularly affirmed, maybe for strategic 
reasons, the legitimacy of the exclusionary rules (see Ewald, 2013:329-32). 
161. See e.g. Hirst: “In the twenty-first century, the presumption in a democratic State must be in 
favour of inclusion […]. Universal suffrage has become the basic principle” [59]. See, for an 
historical account of the case of the US, Keyssar, 2000. 
162. Beckman, 2009:8. See also Ewald, 2004:119; Wang, 2012: xv. The assumption that electoral 
inclusion has been a process of constant expansion is misguided. Keyssar (2013) describes it 
more accurately as a process of experiencing by turn moments of expansion and moments of 
contraction. The massive disenfranchisement affecting an ever-increasing population of 
prisoners and, on the other hand, the problem affecting those for whom it is difficult to provide 
government-issued photo identification at the polls, are both cases of contraction of the 
franchise, under new indirect and sophisticated formulas. 
163. Gardner, 1997:901. 
DEGRADATION 
 
 
258 
boundaries, than with some alleged increasing and deepening participation of the 
people in public affairs.164 
The conception of the franchise as recognition, notably advocated by Judith Shklar, 
points to the identification of citizens as free and equal members within their political 
community. More important than a participatory function in a democratic 
community,165 citizenship can be understood as a form of social standing, and the 
right to vote as its mark of recognition.166 The value of political rights, she notes, is 
that which distinguishes the free man: 
“The vote has always been a certified full member status in society and its 
value depends primarily on its ability to confer a minimum of social 
dignity”.167  
Notwithstanding the fact that it may displace the gravity of voting from a strong or 
thick model of democracy,168 this conception is connected to a vision of political 
participation as something constitutively valuable. This does not necessarily imply 
that the experience of participation itself is portrayed as an enlightening or educative 
practice.169 This may well be the case but it is not what the idea of recognition 
emphasises. When Shklar contrasts citizenship as standing against citizenship as 
participation, she seems to be marking an important difference between her account 
and a conception of political participation that also confers intrinsic value to political 
rights but for different reasons. Her point is even more essential: participation 
expresses citizen’s membership and inclusion in society;170 and what is fundamental 
is the unconditional right to participate, freely and equally, rather than the actual 
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participation itself.171 Her claim is not about democratic performance, agency and 
empowerment, but about the inclusion in democracy. In these terms, it can be 
appreciated as a conception of the importance of the status of voters rather than of the 
practice of voting per se. 
This account provides a particularly enriching meaning for exclusion from the 
franchise. Those who are denied the vote are denied much more than the opportunity 
to participate in the democratic process, they are denied the transcendental possibility 
of becoming a part of the polity.172 The ideas developed before work as a context for 
use of the mechanism of disenfranchisement as a mechanism of punitive degradation 
and the exclusion of those on the boundaries of a political community comprising 
equal members.173 The denial of the right to vote, in these terms, may claim to be one 
of the more perfect forms in which degradation and the exclusionary tendency of 
democratic politics can operate: “standing as a place in one the higher or lower social 
strata and the egalitarian demands of respect are not easily reconciled”.174  
This idea is illustrated powerfully by the contradistinction between citizenship, those 
who can vote and earn, and slavery, those who can neither vote nor earn. In her 
portrayal, the birth of democratic citizenship in the United States is seen as a 
contradictory moment. On the one hand, citizenship was built against the institutional 
background of hereditary privileges, which constituted a system of social hierarchies 
that were subsequently transformed by the universalistic tendency of the struggles for 
recognition. On the other, the new citizenship coexisted with its very denial, due to 
the continuation of slavery in the new republic. Slavery played a significant role in 
the construction of citizenship in America. This conception of citizenship, which 
integrates two main elements that signify the equal status and dignity of citizens, was 
important in determining both the openness and closure of the democratic process in 
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America, and worked as the engine of the struggle for recognition: firstly, the right to 
vote signified the public standing of a full member of the community175 and, 
secondly, the right to earn and therefore the right to work freely.176 The affirmation of 
these rights stood as a sign of citizenship’s recognition and their denial the sign of 
some form of slavery. 
This opposition between citizen and slave, in the context of the US, further 
illuminates the more general idea of the right to vote as a mark of inclusion and 
exclusion from the citizens’ equal membership. Its value depends on its denial. It 
highlights, on the one hand, the vote as an element of recognition; as “the most basic 
expression of the principle of equality, a recognition that each person has basic, equal 
and presumptively irrevocable civic status in the society”.177 It is the “public 
affirmation of the status of equal citizenship for all’, and those possessing them retain 
their self-respect and self-confidence”.178 Its denial, this is CD, is, on the other hand, 
as a form of disrespect: “people who are not grated these marks of civic dignity feel 
dishonored, not just powerless and poor”.179 Therefore, it is not, or not only, a 
balance of political power or the articulation of an adequate set of rights that permit a 
more or less perfect expression and participation what is at stake when CD is 
discussed. From the perspective of recognition, it points to something more crucial. It 
is the very admission of the other into the terrain of dignity. 
This conception is assumed by the Court in Sauvé, when it is affirmed that “rights are 
not a matter of privilege or merit, but a function of membership in the Canadian 
polity that cannot lightly be cast aside. This is manifestly true of the right to vote, the 
cornerstone of democracy […]” [14]. This point is taken even further when it is 
asserted, later, following August, that “denying citizens the right to vote runs counter 
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to our constitutional commitment to the inherent worth and dignity of every 
individual” [35].180 The original formulation, from the South African Constitutional 
Court, must be regarded as a landmark in the jurisprudence on the right to vote: 
“Universal adult suffrage on a common voters roll is one of the 
foundational values of our entire constitutional order. The achievement of 
the franchise has historically been important both for the acquisition of the 
rights of full and effective citizenship by all South Africans regardless of 
race, and for the accomplishment of an all-embracing nationhood. The 
universality of the franchise is important not only for nationhood and 
democracy. The vote of each and every citizen is a badge of dignity and of 
personhood. Quite literally, it says that everybody counts. In a country of 
great disparities of wealth and power it declares that whoever we are, 
whether rich or poor, exalted or disgraced, we all belong to the same 
democratic South African nation; that our destinies are intertwined in a 
single interactive polity. Rights may not be limited without justification 
and legislation dealing with the franchise must be interpreted in favour of 
enfranchisement rather than disenfranchisement” [August, 17].181  
3 On equal dignity and citizenship 
Charles Taylor’s celebrated essay about the politics of recognition distinguishes 
between two meanings of recognition.182 The celebrity of his essay is due to his 
affirmation of the existence of a politics of difference, highlighting the importance of 
admitting as socially relevant respect for each group or each person’s distinctness 
from others. In contrast to this kind of recognition, Taylor identifies a historically 
prior form of recognition that focuses instead on those characteristics that all human 
beings have in common, which he describes as the politics of equal dignity.183 He 
argues: 
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“With the move from honor to dignity has come a politics of universalism, 
emphasizing the equal dignity of all citizens, and the content of this 
politics has been the equalization of rights and entitlements. What is to be 
avoided at all costs is the existence of ‘first-class’ and ‘second-class’ 
citizens”.184  
Taylor associates the demands of equal dignity with those claims that are related to 
personal and political autonomy, that is, the capacity to autonomously form and 
develop a conception of the good and be treated accordingly. This aspect of his work 
overlaps with the Kantian account of moral autonomy, which in turn is profoundly 
linked to Habermas’ ideas about democratic legitimacy, as unpacked above. That is 
why it is not wrong to say that demands for recognition of the politics of equal 
dignity coincide at a normative level with the mutual recognition of human beings as 
deliberative persons, and therefore with their admission into the group of those 
individuals responsibly subjected to the law as potentially critically engaged 
democratic citizens.185  
This is even clearer in the language of another theorist of recognition. Axel Honneth 
argues that what is at stake in exclusions from the domain of rights is a form of 
cognitive respect. He argues, following T.S. Marshall, that the rights of citizenship 
involve a particular kind of legal recognition that is grounded with respect to the 
person as morally responsible.186 The recognition of somebody as a legal person 
expresses a form of respect that is directed to consider every human, and everyone to 
the same degree, as being an end in itself.187 The more radical ramification of this 
idea is that the recognition of legal personality may assume the function of a test for 
the determination of the circle of human subjects.188 However, for the discussion of 
CD, perhaps more pertinent would be the idea that legal recognition, assuming the 
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form of the entitlement of rights and associated with the capacity to “raise socially 
accepted claims”, 
“with a legitimate way of making clear to oneself that one is respected by 
everyone else. […] the individual now has available a symbolic means of 
expression whose social effectiveness can demonstrate to him, each time 
anew, that he or she is universally recognized as a morally responsible 
person. […] a person who shares with all other members of one’s 
community the qualities that make participation in discursive will-
formation possible”.189  
The consequences of this idea are that for the individual member of society “to live 
without individual rights means to have no chance of developing self-respect”,190 
because for the individual, “having socially valid rights-claims denied signifies a 
violation of the intersubjective expectation to be recognized as a subject capable of 
forming moral judgments”.191 In this sense, the language of recognition has the 
particular capacity to include elements of social life associated with universal claims 
and in particular with the attributes of moral and legal personality, and citizenship.192 
It must be noted that the practice of punishment may be seen as challenging the very 
core of the politics of recognition. However, the disrespect involved in the denial of 
the right to vote is not just opposed to the idea of recognition but even to the 
paradoxical idea of negative recognition necessarily involved in a democratic 
punitive practice. This, as argued above, is crucial to understanding why CD is 
irreconcilable with such a practice.193 Negative recognition is what a democratic 
criminal law demands as a punitive response in the case of a commission of a 
criminal offence: a response that expresses condemnation towards the offence by 
recognizing the offender as a fellow citizen, and maintaining that recognition after the 
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conviction, during the execution of the sentence and beyond.194 In contrast with the 
practice of democratic punishment, CD cannot be understood in such terms but, as the 
expression of a demand of degradation and a tendency to exclusion, can only be 
codified as a form of denial of recognition. 
The codification of CD in the terminology of recognition is, to a certain extent, 
unusual and can lead to reasonable objections. First, and under the premise that the 
analysis is conducted without evidence of racial motivation or impact,195 the 
discussion of CD could been conducted, misguidedly, towards the terrain of 
minorities’ rights. What is at stake in CD is not the social esteem demanded for 
certain people’s cultural way of life. As the minority vote in Chester and McGeoch 
correctly intuits, “[p]risoners belong to a minority only in the banal and legally 
irrelevant sense that most people do not do the things which warrant imprisonment by 
due process of law” [112]. However, the claim that prisoners are indeed a minority 
can be codified in terms of the recognition of equal dignity. Their position as a 
minority is constituted by the mistreatment involved in the punitive response of the 
State and not in a presumptive cultural identity. In other words, they are not a 
minority because they share a distinctively criminal history but because they are 
subjected to imprisonment as a particular form of human experience that deprives 
them of numerous rights, considered fundamental for forming and developing a 
conception of the good. Summing up, they constitute a minority because they are 
denied those rights to which everybody else has access due to their human dignity. 
Second, the idea of recognition in the terrain of equal dignity still requires 
elaboration in the more limited language of citizenship. That is why the objector 
would sustain that the exclusion from the exercise of political rights is not, or is not 
necessarily, a wholesale exclusion from humanity and, therefore, cannot be explained 
as a denial of human dignity. In other words, the right to vote, as a political right of 
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citizens, is not a human right. There are two alternative ways to address this 
objection. On the one hand, it can be said, as Jeremy Waldron has recently argued, 
that citizenship is a particular form of dignity. Following Kant, he assumes that 
“citizenship is a certain sort of dignity”, and as well as human dignity it is a “status 
that is cherished as special notwithstanding the fact that [it] is widely spread”.196 
However, the dignity of citizenship does not merge – for that reason alone – with 
human dignity: “[e]ven when it applies to all humans in a given country, the dignity 
of the citizens remains specific and relational”.197 It is specific in the way that it 
relates to membership in a particular community of equals. It is relational because it 
constitutes a link between a closed group of citizens and the democratic governmental 
structure. In this way, citizenship “represents one possible realization of human 
dignity”.198 
On the other hand, the connection of the recognition of equal dignity to the concept 
of autonomy contributes to create a link that may have been missing between dignity 
and citizenship. Recognition of autonomy is what is involved in the capacity to 
follow rules, the capacity to be held accountable for a criminal action, the capacity to 
examine critically the actions of the political authorities and the capacity to vote. 
Habermas’ notion of deliberative personality, which grounds the attribution of 
legally-guaranteed spheres of private and public autonomy, can be regarded as the 
expression of this link between dignity and citizenship.199  
As a final remark, it is necessary to make explicit the claim that as a degrading 
punishment, CD emphasises the idea of the right to vote as recognition. The use of 
the idea of recognition may seem contradictory when placed alongside what was 
previously described as the politics of CD. Degradation and exclusion are precisely 
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the forces against which struggles for recognition have been historically directed. 
How can these ideas be reconciled and, what is more, be said to contribute to the 
emergence or revival of the right to vote as a mechanism of recognition? Equal 
dignity and formal equality present a similar framework by which to understand the 
importance of the right to vote. Both demand that persons be treated according to 
their rational capacity. The difference consists in that formal equality departs from 
the premise of inclusion and uses mechanisms of recognition to produce a dynamic of 
exclusion and inclusion depending on the social performance of the actor. The 
identity of the community is built upon victimization, and  
“[t]he community that result is, of course, a simulacrum of community; a 
phantasm that speaks of a nostalgic desire for oneness and unity, while at 
the same time structuring itself around its dependence upon fear, 
alienation […] Recognition is not based on shared friendship but on shared 
risk and danger […]”.200 
In contrast, equal dignity demands the peremptory inclusion of every human being in 
the domain of the rights of citizenship, including the right to vote, because the social 
performance that is expected from them is largely dependent on such inclusion. 
Despite this deep philosophical and political antagonism, degradation and recognition 
indicate a common understanding of the value of the right to vote. Codified in the 
language of Honneth, this manifests, from the perspective of the politics of 
degradation, a mechanism for expressing disrespect, whilst the opposing perspective 
sees the right to vote as a mechanism of recognition. In other terms, CD can be 
characterised in terms of inclusion and exclusion from the political community. This 
understanding of the right to vote contrasts with other notions that overemphasise its 
participatory potential to create democratic legitimacy. 
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IV BETWEEN PARTICIPATION AND RECOGNITION 
The foregoing observations about the recognition dimension of the right to vote are 
not directed to undermine its value as a fundamental mechanism of democratic 
participation. Even when “voting is a power symbol of political equality”, that 
symbol is given by the fact that “each vote counts the same, and each voter gets one, 
and only one, vote”.201  The mere recognition of the status of voters supplies an 
incomplete picture of the importance of voting.202 The affirmation of political 
equality represented in the vote as recognition therefore needs to be equilibrated by 
an account of the practice of political equality in which everybody’s vote has an equal 
impact on the electoral outcome, and consequently upon the law-making process. 
These observations are intended to underscore the importance of embracing a 
constitutional conception of the right to vote, capable of providing a harmonious 
account of the right to vote which not only expresses its function of public 
participation but also acts as a sign of membership and equality. This last section 
seeks to articulate the tense relation between participation and recognition inherent to 
the right to vote. 
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1 The right to vote as participation 
Some ideas have been mentioned regarding the participatory nature of the right to 
vote in Chapter 3, mostly regarding it as a key mechanism to produce input 
democratic legitimacy.203  
The case of a liberal conception of the vote as participation coincides with an 
instrumental dimension of political participation that enables the protection of those 
inalienable rights of individuals against others and in particular against the 
government of the majority.204 This involves assessing politics’ goal of the “optimal 
compromise between given, and reducibly opposed, private interests”205 and political 
participation “as a means to defend or further interests formed and defined outside of 
politics”.206 For example, in a classic judgment, the US Supreme Court said that 
voting “is a fundamental right because it is preservative of all rights”.207 Voting, 
according to this account, can also contribute to identify those interests worthy of 
defence: 
“exclusion in some form or another from the franchise leaves them with an 
inadequate ability to influence the outcomes of governmental decision-
making processes. That is, their inability to vote, or to vote effectively, 
leaves them politically naked and at the mercy of processes over which 
they exercise no control”.208  
In short, it coincides with the ideological presuppositions of aggregative democracy. 
Even when this approach to voting may highlight the liberal and more individualistic 
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dimension of voting, it devotes substantial attention to the question of the practice of 
voting and therefore is substantially linked to the question of democratic 
participation. 
A democratic conception of the right to vote as participation can also admits an 
instrumental form, in this case to the process of collective self-government. Voting is 
a valuable practice to the extent that it allows the control of the representatives by the 
citizens. In this version, voting performs a markedly important role in which citizens, 
through the programming of the government in accordance with the interests of 
society, are relieved of the task of conducting government themselves.209 Voting 
rights are recognized as the first and most important accountability measure in the 
hands of electors against potential corruption and abuse of the government.210 The 
democratic version is attractive also because it understands that the influence or 
control that each citizen can exercise independently within the electoral processes is 
almost insignificant and important decisions are not made by a person or group of 
persons but by all those who are involved in a collective practice of government.211 
For example, Habermas’ account of the democratic legitimacy of the law grounded in 
citizens’ political participation illuminates importantly a conception of the right to 
vote that moves towards these requirements: both inclusion and participation are 
present. Although he does not develop specifically the role played by different rights 
of participation and the concrete role that the right to vote plays, nonetheless some 
general lines can be sketched on the basis that, for him, participation in the law-
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making process is codified in terms of autonomy and communication, and therefore 
the right to vote should be understood with regards these key aspects.212  
For Habermas, the participation of citizens in a democracy must be legally guaranteed 
in terms of rights of participation. Equal rights of participation are, therefore, a 
fundamental element of a procedural account of democracy. Such rights “result from 
the symmetrical juridification of the communicative freedom of all citizens”.213 At 
this point, it is important to revisit some basic ideas. The communicative freedom of 
agreeing and disagreeing with others is institutionalized in terms of rights, giving a 
voice to everybody in the democratic process.214 The autonomously motivated 
agreement of citizens produces the communicative power that feeds the process of 
law-making with legitimacy, and finally justifies the authority of the law. Following 
the idea of a two-track model of democracy, political power might be 
communicatively manufactured in both the public sphere and the parliamentary fora. 
However, as representative institutions monopolize decision-making competencies, 
the power generated in the public sphere must be transferred into the political system 
to be effective in what is a procedural paradigm of law-making based on 
communicative power: “Passing through the channels of general election and various 
forms of participation, public opinions are converted into a communicative power 
that authorizes the legislature”.215 Considering the right to vote as a right to 
participation implies, according to the previous description, firstly, that voting can be 
understood as a form of communication generated among the citizenry and directed 
toward the public authorities. Elections, as the collective action of voting, may play a 
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fundamental role in channelling and generating communication and therefore 
actualizing the democratic promise of self-government. 
In this model, however, the right to vote is a poor example of the communicative 
exercise of power when compared with, for instance, free speech. Even when voting 
“does communicate a preference, [it] is not a good example of political 
communication given its lack of discursivity”.216 Voting has a limited capacity to 
articulate the plurality of interests, values and ideas that citizens might be concerned 
with introducing into the decision-making process. Rights of communication and 
expression involved in electoral campaigns, for instance, have much more important 
communicative potential. This claim, however, requires qualification. Voting is only 
a partial account of what the citizens do when they engage in elections. The interests 
they put forward are only visible to the community inside a more complex web of 
communication that includes the construction of a common discursive landscape in 
which those interests can be located, balanced and eventually postponed in a practice 
of public dialogue and decision-making that precedes and follows elections. An 
understanding of voting as communicative action offers an account for that 
complexity and permits understanding of the vote as a key part of the democratic 
process.217  
The very fact of its low intensity might contribute to making the right to vote an 
important right of participation in a modern democracy; indeed, a fundamental one. 
Correlative to its poor or limited discursive performance, the fact that voting is not a 
very demanding activity and imposes a limited burden on citizens can be seen as an 
institutional virtue in complex societies.218 Compared with the exercise of other 
political activities, voting has a temporally limited character,219 demands a limited 
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amount of knowledge and it can be open to every kind of personal character, style of 
life and conception of the good life. It does not inscribe in its institutional structure 
the exclusionary tendencies of discursive participation in the public sphere. This 
quality of voting is what makes it possible for everybody to assume some 
responsibility in common affairs. In other words, the right to vote matters because it 
‘is a low-cost way of making a civil contribution”.220 The vote is an inclusive device 
that, even when at a low-incidence rate, expands the potential of political 
communication across society, eventually including everybody. 
2 Recognition and the legal structure of the right to vote 
In contrast with the character of communicative action, the advantages that the right 
to vote has over other participatory rights, and therefore its importance, lie in its 
aspect of recognition. The right to vote is a right that embodies auspicious conditions 
to assume the function of recognition of individuals as free and equal members of a 
democratic political community. Conversely, these very conditions also make it the 
perfect mechanism to manifest disrespect in a democratic context. This advantage can 
be observed when the legal structure of the right to vote is dissected and its different 
aspects are distinguished. 
All of these normative positions should play an important role in the constitutional 
reconstruction of the right to vote. However, the right to be entitled to vote (or right 
to enfranchisement) is of a fundamental, yet sometimes unnoticed or underrated, 
importance in that it is linked to the idea of recognition. For example, in analysing 
the legal structure of the right to vote, Jeremy Waldron defends that idea that the core 
of the normative positions associated to the right to vote is that of a power rather than 
a liberty: “to exercise the right to vote is to exercise a Hohfeldian power: it is to 
perform an action which alters the assignment of rights and duties in the political 
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community”.221 This is not to say that this power is not connected with other elements 
that assume the form of liberties, but rather to suggest that those elements – and this 
is the argument about the core and the periphery of the right to vote – are meant to 
protect the value attached to the exercise of the power.222 On other terms, while the 
power is associated to the authority the liberty is associated to the discretion in the 
exercise of that authority.223 Despite the sharpness of his claim, Waldron’s distinction 
between power and liberty misses something fundamental about the normative 
positions involved in the right to vote that can only be illuminated by the hypothesis 
of a violation of rights. 
The infraction of liberty involved in the right to vote is the clearest case. When State 
agents threaten a citizen to vote for a certain candidate, the right to vote freely is 
violated. But the power to vote remains. The power to vote has limited value without 
the right to vote freely. This case can be generalized to say that a violation of the 
power to vote is always constituted indirectly by a violation of the State’s obligation 
to do or abstain from doing something. 
However, what we usually describe as a violation of the right to vote includes another 
kind of situation. This sort of case arises when somebody is excluded from the 
elections by law, as is the case with CD. In those cases, the excluded people are not 
in the position to exercise the vote as power; not because of an infraction of a 
peripheral right, but because those people are – more radically – excluded from the 
group of those entitled to the vote as power. The violation of which those people are 
victims is analytically prior to the entitlement to a power; it is a violation of the right 
to be entitled to a power. It is a violation of the right to be included in the franchise. 
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The way in which Waldron addresses the right to vote as a power includes some ideas 
that may reveal that he considers the right to be enfranchised as part of the content of 
the power. For example, he emphasises the fact that the importance of voting as 
power is given by “the equality of one’s power with the power of each of one’s 
fellow-citizens”.224 He also refers to the notion of ‘comparative justice’ as an 
underlying value of the vote whose main goal is to avoid “arbitrariness and insult that 
unequal or disproportionate treatment involves”.225 Both of these features imply a 
reference to the deeper narrative of recognition and are only exposed by the exclusion 
of somebody from the franchise. 
It may be important to distinguish therefore, on the one hand, the right to vote as 
power as a description of the practice of voting and part of the democratic form of 
government from, on the other hand, the right to be included in the franchise that can 
claim the position of a mechanism of recognition of public autonomy of persons qua 
citizens. The right to vote as power, the right to cast the vote, considered the core of 
the right to vote, is the realization of that prior right. 
Being analytically precise, it can be seen that there are at least three kinds of 
normative positions involved in the constitutional discussion about the right to vote. 
First, the right to vote as a fundamental right can be described as a right to be entitled 
to vote. This right is not a power but a “right to powers” that the citizens hold against 
the State, because “voting without some form of organization is impossible”,226 and 
this organization is something that the State owes to the citizens. Second, the right to 
vote is usually described as a legal power of the individual that is exercised by 
voting. In reference to this aspect, Robert Alexy highlights that “[o]n the basis of the 
power to vote, the possessor of this power is, albeit in an indirect way, a participant 
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in legislation”.227 Finally, the right to vote includes a set of negative liberties. It can 
be described primarily, following Alexy’s terminology, as the right to a negative 
State action, which must abstain from coercing the elector or impeding him from 
casting the vote, and secondly, as a right to a positive State action, which demands 
protection against coercion coming from other citizens.228  
The institutional and constitutive aspects of the vote highlighted by the above 
clarifications is what makes the right to vote irreplaceable for expressing the idea of 
democratic recognition.229 On the one hand, in its dimension of power, it is a right 
that cannot be reconverted or confused with an exercise of private aspects of 
autonomy. It is different, in this respect, from other legal rights that guarantee the 
existence of liberty of action. It is because the individual actions protected by, for 
example, freedom of speech fall in a grey terrain, that the liberty covered by it can be 
used to advance private interests or even be abusively exercised (especially when it is 
used to silence other voices230). In contrast, the institutional character and 
communicative simplicity of the right to vote, even when it is meant to be exercised 
in an instrumental, self-interested way by the electors, entails that its exercise cannot 
be confused with an exercise of private autonomy, nor can it be abused.231 The 
institutional aspect of the right to vote is, therefore, intrinsically linked to the 
importance of being entitled to participate, affirming at the same time equality and 
membership. 
On the other hand, its institutional character is what leads to an understanding of the 
denial of the right to vote as distinct from the restrictions of freedom of speech or 
association. Limitations on a person’s freedom of action can be based on protection 
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against the harm that such an action can cause. That is the entire logic of 
proportionality as a way to accommodate conflicting interests and rights. 
Disenfranchisement, in contrast, can never be interpreted as a legitimate limitation of 
private autonomy based on the protection of a private or public interest, because there 
is no harming action whatsoever to be protected from.232 The exercise of the right to 
vote always consists in a minimal and then harmless exercise of liberty. Therefore, 
the reasons for which people are disenfranchised are of another nature. When 
somebody is disenfranchised, this always implies an act of denial of his or her status 
as a valid interlocutor, his character as a deliberative person, his status as an equal 
fellow member of the community. This is evident in the judgments examined above. 
The reasons offered for CD never involve the protection of another person’s 
fundamental rights, or a public interest whose protection can be concretely advanced 
by a measure such as this. In contrast, the motives offered to justify 
disenfranchisement are always symbolic and abstract. 
The notion of the right to vote as recognition highlights not just an egalitarian 
dimension of voting, devoting considerable attention to the question of the status of 
elector as a mark of membership to the political community, but also the 
emancipatory potential and social importance of the recognition of a person as a 
competent legal and political person, and it proves an adequate account for 
understanding the importance of obtaining and being able to exercise the right to 
vote.  
This is not the constructivist affirmation of a very demanding conception of the right 
to vote. Firstly, it is not an unrealistic explanation of the value of electoral 
participation, but a limitation of its importance and its preconditions. Second, as a 
discrete form of recognition within the political sphere, this conception leaves to one 
side those other spheres of recognition in which other mechanisms are better situated. 
                                                 
232. See above Chapter 4, Sections I and III. 
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Finally, it gives a critical account of current democratic practice in western 
democracies. 
3 Tensions between participation and recognition 
The general democratic tension between participation and recognition, it can be said, 
is also the tension between two ways of grounding the democratic value of the right 
to vote. This tension is naturally expressed in a competition to acquire the hegemonic 
position in democratic discourse.  
A first aspect is that, this competition, commonly framed in a different language (e.g. 
between the idea of democracy as a decision-making process and democracy as a 
normative ideal) is indissoluble in modern complex societies. At this stage, one might 
come back to the ideas of input and output legitimacy presented above.233 Based on 
these ideas, one may suggest that those who trust in a political community’s 
democratic performance, and therefore expect a high degree of input legitimacy, may 
be more inclined to defend a highly participatory and relatively exclusionary 
democratic process. This exclusionary trend, however, may ground the value of the 
right to vote, for example, in the actual freedom of the elector234 or in demands of 
social cohesion.235 On the contrary, those who are more concerned with output 
legitimacy might defend an expansion of participation as a mechanism of inclusion at 
a lower cost for an outcomes-oriented process. It might be the case that CD is a 
landmark of the rise of an historical period in which democracy must conform to the 
achievement of some degree of peace and development. In such a post-democratic 
regime, CD does not present a problem different from any other legal limitation of 
rights because democratic rights cannot claim a special status. In short, the right to 
vote is not fundamental for participation therefore we can use it as a symbolic tool to 
                                                 
233. See above Chapter 3, Section II.1. 
234. See Ramsay, 2013a. 
235. See above Section II. 
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further majoritarian social policies. In the case of prisoners, this dichotomy would 
involve either excluding or including those currently serving prison sentences within 
the circle of electors. 
A second aspect of this tension can be framed in terms of ideological discourses. 
From left wing positions, it is argued that claims for inclusion, respect and justice, as 
has been demonstrated, cannot be captured by representative institutions and are 
increasingly channelled into the public sphere by direct and disruptive actions of 
contestation. In the current scenario, elections and the right to vote in consequence 
seem to have lost the potential to play an emancipatory role in the politics of western 
democracies. It means to play an inclusionary role, against marginalization and 
exclusion. From right wing positions, in contrast, the defence of the status quo, and 
therefore the maintenance of schemes of social, political and economic exclusion, are 
framed in arguments based on the rule of law, which are usually coupled with the 
performance of representative institutions. 
Having this tension on mind, what role remains for the participatory aspect of right to 
vote? It has been argued that it can play an important role of political recognition, 
which, in turn, may have an influence in social and economic spheres. However, even 
a successful political inclusion cannot guarantee the survival of what remains of 
representative democratic structures. The blockage of the channels of communication 
between the citizenry and the administrative power cannot be overcome except 
through political participation both formal and informal. The threat of inclusion 
within a neoliberal, post-democratic model of government, that is, the inclusion of the 
marginalized underclass into the exploited classes, is something of which the left, in 
its claims for inclusion, must be aware. Peter Ramsay explicitly identifies this point 
when he defends disenfranchisement as a risk of normalize a neoliberal model of 
democracy: 
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“It may be true that ‘retaining the right to participate as a citizen in the life 
of the community is symbolized in democratic societies by the right to 
vote […]. But without civil liberty, voting citizens (whether prisoners or 
not) retain the symbol but not the substance of self-government”.236  
For this conception of the vote as recognition adopts the form of a progressive 
argument, the value of the right to vote as a mechanism of participation must be also 
rescued. 
This examination of the case of CD has shown, however, that this democratic tension 
between inclusion and participation is vulnerable to be confused with discourses of 
degradation and exclusion.237 In the case of prisoners, it does not seem necessary to 
balance and accommodate these factors in ways that produce exclusionary outcomes 
or less participatory mechanisms of decision-making. Enfranchising prisoners does 
not damage the performance of the democratic process and it does not necessarily 
endanger the process of prisoners’ social inclusion but the practice of CD produces, 
as seen in this chapter, dangerous legal, social and political dynamics. 
It is perhaps convenient to conclude by summing up the argument of this chapter. 
First, a view was introduced which presents the concept of degradation as an 
objective in a community that considers equality only as a ‘starting point’. The 
philosophy of formal equality, which may demand the constitution of second class-
citizens, can serve to explain the permanence of CD in the context of modern 
societies as part of a historical lineage of ‘inner exclusion’; not necessarily as a 
“cultural hangover from times when attainder [or atimia, or infamia] seemed 
penologically appropriated”,238 but as a practice that achieves a certain harmony with 
                                                 
236. Ramsay, 2013b:435. However, he goes further by affirming that prisoners’ voting may 
transform the right to vote from a political right into a social right. He sustains that social 
inclusion is a means to the end of political self-determination and that by granting the right to 
vote to prisoners “the value of democracy is turned inside out”, as democracy is reduced to a 
means of policing (Ramsay, 2013b:430). 
237. See e.g. Shklar, 1991:28-30.  
238. Edgely, 2010:407. See also Note, 1937; Note, 1974:596. 
DEGRADATION 
 
 
280 
autonomy and equality as regulative principles of modernity. On this hypothesis, it 
could be suggested that CD is capable of simultaneously punishing the crime and 
degrading the offender.  
Second, the exclusion of offenders may be an important determinant for the 
maintenance of the social cohesion of the community. These two ideas can be 
conjoined by the broader idea that CD may be correctly described as a powerful 
symbolic form of inner exclusion. This understanding of CD might have severe 
implications for democratic legitimacy because, under these premises, the use of state 
coercion involved in the punitive response no longer depends upon the practice of 
self-government.  
Third, in order to articulate fully the relation between CD and the decline of the 
demand for democratic legitimacy, another notion of the importance of the right to 
vote is needed. The idea that the enfranchisement of people can contribute to their 
recognition and that disenfranchisement can contribute to their degradation and 
exclusion is a fundamental step toward understanding the practice of CD. The 
distinctiveness of CD resides in the central position that the right to vote plays in 
discourses of legitimacy of the law in representative democracies but tends to be 
obscured when this is presented primarily as a mechanism of democratic 
participation. No other deprivation of a right can crystallize the degradation and 
exclusion involved in CD in such a clean and perfect manner. This, in turn, helps to 
illumine the inclusive dimension of the right to vote, according to which it is 
conceived primarily as a mark of equality, membership and dignity. Elections, 
accordingly, can be understood as civic ritual, in which those who vote today 
celebrate “the civic estate for which so many generations of excluded men and 
women have fought so energetically”.239  
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 7 
 
DEFENDING THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
t is perhaps pertinent to begin this concluding chapter with a brief recall of 
the main arguments offered in the previous chapters. The bulk of this 
dissertation has been devoted to demonstrating the tension between CD and a 
normative conception of democracy in which those who are addressees of the 
law must also be seen as its authors. This conception is partially crystallized in the 
ideas that a right to vote is a fundamental right and that the suffrage is universal. 
Those who advocate democratic versions of CD, as a form of democratic electoral 
incapacitation or a democratic form of punishment, cannot overcome the democratic 
problem of CD, even in its more restrictive forms. Claiming that CD is justified 
necessarily implies disregard for the idea that the law’s legitimacy derives from the 
democratic participation of those who are subjected to it. This led to the affirmation 
of three main propositions. First, the justification of CD may be better understood as 
a mechanism that implements degradation and exclusion. Second, this shows how the 
right to vote is important not only as a mechanism of participation, but also as a form 
of recognition of equal membership in the community. Third, in societies that 
embrace the practice of CD, the relation between the community and those subjected 
to its punitive power may not be possible to understand as democratically codified. 
It is time to return to where this inquiry started; that is, with the observation 
concerning the rise of a judicial trend on CD. The analysis of this trend shows that 
I 
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the judgments from a selected set of legislations have advanced the cause of 
enfranchisement, declaring the unconstitutionality or incompatibility of certain 
legislation with the right to vote. This has been achieved, however, at the cost of 
consolidating the right of the legislature to exclude serious offenders from the circle 
of democratic citizenship and consolidate “a hierarchy of voting qualifications”.1 In 
the last section of Chapter 2, it was suggested that this latter consequence could be 
due to a lack of engagement on the part of the Courts, with the exception of Sauvé, 
with a substantive conception of democracy. It was also suggested that the legal 
methodology employed by the courts, the principle of proportionality, could stand 
behind this, as a contributing factor that helps explain why, in the opinion of the 
courts, serious offenders are legitimately disenfranchised. 
In an excellent article that examines the main cases of the judicial trend on CD, 
Plaxton and Lardy point out the courts’ poor argumentation and their “unsatisfactory 
exploration” concerning frameworks of reasoning that includes various levels of 
constitutional law and political philosophy. They conclude, “[l]egislatures may be 
better-suited to addressing these practical and theoretical questions, but vested 
interests, limited parliamentary time, and other political pressures make that 
unlikely”.2 
This final chapter seeks to discuss these assertions and their pertinence to CD cases, 
on the one hand, attempting to avoid mounting a defence of a certain model of rights 
adjudication, while at the same time sustaining that CD can perhaps assume the role 
of an exception that permits an exploration of the limits of general discourses about 
fundamental rights. Section I argues that there are good reasons to avoid redirecting 
the issue of CD towards parliaments. Section II analyses the legal method of 
proportionality, identifying how its use in the case of CD is likely to lead to 
conclusions that arbitrarily accept some forms of CD. However, these are not reasons 
                                                 
1. Easton, 2006:452. 
2. Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:140. 
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to abandon the judicial review of CD. Section III presents an alternative method, 
affirming that cases dealing with the constitutionality of CD can be rationally 
addressed by the Courts.  
I WHO DECIDES? 
1 The dilemma of rights adjudication 
The case of CD may illustrate what has been called “the basic dilemma of 
constitutional rights adjudication”.3 Given that a democratic parliament has the 
political power to violate citizens’ fundamental rights, who should have the last word 
regarding those rights? Some, in an argument based mainly on democratic legitimacy 
but also on its institutional design, maintain that a sovereign parliament must decide. 
Advocates of this position are traditionally associated with what is called political 
constitutionalism.4 Others argue that ‘you cannot leave the fox guarding the hen 
house’; that is, they defend the idea of judicial supremacy in rights adjudication, 
inspired by a model of legal constitutionalism. In this case, the constitutional courts 
have the last word on fundamental rights.5 
However, these strong, idealised and polarised positions have been tempered by 
proposals that seek intermediate solutions. Among these, two are of particular 
interest. The first is a moderate version of legal constitutionalism, which argues that 
courts must grant deference to parliaments that are better technically equipped and 
have greater democratic legitimacy to assess policies, and therefore should only 
                                                 
3. See Fredman, 2013. 
4. Even though the expression is linked to Richard Bellamy (see e.g. Bellamy, 2007; Bellamy, 
2011) it probably has its most famous defence in Waldron, 2006. See also Tomkins, 2005. For 
an assessment, see Gee & Webber, 2010. 
5. The advocates of legal constitutionalism are considerable in number, especially in the US, and 
include Habermas, 1996a; Dworkin, 1996; Michelman, 1999. See particularly, Fallon, 2008 
engaging in an argument with Waldron, 2006. 
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intervene when the rights violation falls outwith this space for deference on the basis 
of its disproportionality.6  
The second approach is a moderate version of political constitutionalism, which has 
sometimes been called institutional dialogue, in which the courts can make 
representations about the violation of fundamental rights to Parliament, but it is 
Parliament that has the last word on the matter.7 This approach attempts to instantiate 
the collaboration between parliaments and courts, adding deliberation to the decision-
making process. By means of this dialogue, the parliament can understand the 
problems that it has overlooked in previous legislative attempts, thus drawing on the 
courts’ expertise in dealing with problems of rights in concrete situations. The 
success of this model depends on two conditions. First, the institutional configuration 
of the relation between legislative body and the courts, as parliament is required to 
have the last word.8 Second, the deliberative input. Its differentiation from a mere 
claim of parliamentary sovereignty is determined by the capacity of parliament to 
take a deliberative approach to fundamental rights rather than just take interest-
bargain decisions.9  
To adopt a collaborative attitude and deliberative approach, scholars have suggested 
that parliament must explain and justify its decisions in a convincing way, stimulated 
by the courts in the manner of a deliberative catalyst “insisting on deliberative 
                                                 
6. See, e.g. Brady, 2012. There are of course diverse classes of deference [ECtHR, UK, US], and 
the deference of an international court operates by different standards than that in the domestic 
system.  
7. The concept was introduced by Hogg & Bushell (1997). See, generally, Tushnet, 2009 and 
Yap, 2012. Regarding the British case, see Young, 2011; Davis, 2012; and Fredman, 2013. 
8. In the UK, this is instantiated due to the Supreme Court finding a breach of fundamental rights 
caused by the legislation, and declaring its incompatibility, a declaration that requires further 
legislative action. The Parliament, in this case, retains the last word regarding remedial 
legislation (Human Rights Act, Sections 4 and 19). Similarly, the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms establishes a “notwithstanding clause” (article 33), which allows certain rights 
be limited by Parliament, even against the opinion of the Supreme Court. See, generally, 
Gardbaum, 2013. 
9. Fredman, 2013. 
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justification for the interpretation or limitation of rights”.10 David Dyzenhaus’ recent 
contribution to this debate has tried to overcome the differences between the 
approaches of deference and institutional dialogue, arguing that the important 
question is not who has the last word but whether that final decision is duly justified 
in terms of fundamental rights. He calls for a third way between legal and political 
constitutionalism, appealing to a ‘culture of justification’.11 Under this paradigm, 
judicial review is an instance in which courts ask “governments to justify their action 
on substantive grounds”12 rather than appeal to their authority to exercise political 
power. Under a culture of justification, the authority to act is “a necessary but 
insufficient condition for legitimacy and legality”,13 it need additionally, be justified 
in rational and reasonable terms. 
2 A case for judicial review of disenfranchisement 
Even if powerful reasons can be found to argue that parliaments are in general better 
situated than the courts to decide about the content of rights, for instance, because 
they are more legitimate and better institutionally equipped,14 when the general 
discussion is abandoned and the particular case of CD is addressed, the strength of 
those reasons tends to disappear.15 General arguments of democratic legitimacy and 
deliberative institutional advantages, which generally support the cause of 
Parliaments to decide questions of rights, tend to be weakened in the case of political 
rights, and in the particular case of the right to vote this is even clearer.16 In this 
sense, the case of an act of Parliament disenfranchising a general category of citizens 
                                                 
10. Fredman, 2013:297. Commenting on the application of this approach, Sandra Fredman 
suggests: “The State must also be capable of convincing the court [...]. At the same time, the 
court should not dictate the result” (299). 
11. See Dyzenhaus, 2013. The original formulation is from Mureinik, 1994. 
12. Cohen-Eliya & Porat, 2013:112.  
13. Cohen-Eliya & Porat, 2013:112. 
14. See Bellamy, 2011:91. 
15. It is not suggested, to be clear, that this is the case every time that the courts address 
“contestable, watershed rights issues” (see Young, 2011:795-7).  
16. See Goldoni, 2013b:1070. 
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might be considered a paradigmatic case in which judicial intervention is justified to 
protect the right to vote in the sense that, if this case is excluded from judicial review 
it is difficult to conceive of a case that would be covered by it. In this vein, the Court 
in Sauvé formulated a strong defence for its intervention as a constitutional actor:  
 “The Charter charges courts with upholding and maintaining an inclusive, 
participatory democratic framework within which citizens can explore and 
pursue different conceptions of the good. […] it is precisely when 
legislative choices threaten to undermine the foundations of the 
participatory democracy guaranteed by the Charter that courts must be 
vigilant in fulfilling their constitutional duty to protect the integrity of this 
system” [15]. 
Subsequently, it grounded its intervention in the attack constituted by CD against the 
substantive conception of democracy that has been discussed throughout this 
dissertation:  
“But if we accept that governmental power in a democracy flows from the 
citizens, it is difficult to see how that power can legitimately be used to 
disenfranchise the very citizens from whom the government’s power 
flows” [32]. 
The particularities of the case of CD undermine not only the general claim that 
Parliament must decide on questions of rights, but also the assertion that courts must 
defer on this kind of issue to parliament. The reasons for this are that, on the one 
hand, the right to vote holds a special place in the democratic structure, being the 
basis on which Parliament can claim democratic legitimacy over the courts. On the 
other hand, those affected by CD are unlikely to be treated with justice by a 
representative institution, given a context that can be characterised as penal populism.  
The first argument can be generally formulated in the following terms. To the extent 
that Parliament excludes citizens from the right to vote, it diminishes the basis upon 
which it can claim democratic legitimacy and which justifies the claim of 
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parliamentary sovereignty.17 Put simply, if the parliament derives its democratic 
legitimacy from citizens’ political participation, in particular through elections in 
which the idea of the right to vote as participation is central, to exclude a group of 
citizens from the franchise is only formally a democratic decision, or, using the terms 
of the Canadian Court, a “simple majoritarian political preference” [20]. However, 
substantively it is an un-democratic decision, that is, a decision that undermines its 
own democratic legitimacy.18 Accordingly, to claim democratic superiority over the 
courts in the case of CD is, at the very least, problematic.  
From a democratic perspective, however, two problems of representation can be 
observed. On the one hand, there is a clear conflict of interests in leaving the 
parliament to choose who can vote in the parliamentary election. Such conflicting 
interests can turn very easily into an abuse of power.19 For example, “a temporary 
political majority may seek to extend its hold on power into the future” using 
disenfranchisement as a strategy of “legislative entrenchment”.20 The “inherent self-
interest […] can never escape doubts about whether these rules […] were adopted to 
reproduce previous outcomes that benefit incumbents, entrench benefits for 
established parties and marginalize dissenting perspectives”.21 This is a democratic 
defence of the judicial review in cases in which voting rights are involved. On the 
other hand, through exclusion from the electorate, the possibility that the interests of 
those disenfranchised be taken into account within the law-making process is reduced 
even further.22 To this, one must add that when imprisoned, offenders are normally 
limited in their possibilities of political influence owing to the restriction of their 
                                                 
17. See Goldoni, 2013b:1068. See also Waldron, 2011. 
18. The observation of this democratic contradiction is made in Ramsay, 2013c:214, this time, 
however, regarding the relation between preventive criminal law and civil liberties as the 
foundation of democracy. See the extraordinary discussion in Note, 1987. 
19. See Goldoni, 2013b:1068. See also Behrens, 2004:273-4; Ziegler, 2011:241. 
20. Klarman, 1996:498. See also Bennett & Viehoff, 2013b:97. 
21. Hiebert, 2013:2271. 
22. See Fredman, 2013:299. 
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liberty. The parliament can combine disenfranchisement and imprisonment as the 
perfect political weapon against dissenting voices. 
The primacy of the courts over parliament in this case is not a question of choosing 
them because they are more likely to be right regarding competing interpretations of 
rights, but is instead a question of protecting the entitlement to participate in the 
democratic process of law-making, particularly when a decision of the legislature is 
actually weakening the political process. The case for parliamentary sovereignty of 
political constitutionalism simply does not “consider the existence of disenfranchised 
minorities”,23 mainly because does not answer the question “what happens when 
representation fails”.24 Cases of CD constitute the quintessential instance of 
triggering a judicial response that John Hart Ely called a ‘representation-reinforcing 
approach to judicial review’.25 He strongly claim that in cases involving voter 
qualifications the ‘ins’ cannot be trusted “to decide who stays out, and it is therefore 
incumbent on the courts to ensure not only that no one is denied the vote for no 
reason, but also that where there is a reason (as there will be) it had better be a very 
convincing one”.26 Marco Goldoni commenting on Hirst adopts a similar perspective: 
“[i]f those who are affected by democratic decisions are denied a voice in the process 
by the same institution which is the seat of the process, then it is difficult to imagine 
which other institution may hear their grievances but courts”.27 
3 The optimism of the justification in disenfranchisement 
It is dubious whether parliaments are entitled to claim democratic legitimacy against 
the judicial review of disenfranchisement legislation. The second argument for the 
parliament’s priority in deciding is that it is better equipped to decide on certain 
                                                 
23. Benton, 2010: 406.  
24. Pettus, 2013:94. 
25. See Ely, 1980: Ch. 4. See also Klarman, 1996. 
26. Ely, 1980:120. 
27. Goldoni, 2013b:1070. See also Fredman, 2013:299. 
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issues given its deliberative potential, that is, its capacity to take the interests of all 
those affected into due consideration.28 The case of CD shows how parliaments have 
a systematic tendency to answer questions about who should be included in the 
electorate by excluding offenders. They have done so without engaging in a 
deliberative dialogue in which the offenders’ right to vote has been properly 
considered. The courts have demonstrated, in contrast, that they are likely to modify 
these measures, at least according to some rule of law standards and sometimes 
according to democratic values.29 The institutional deliberative advantages of 
parliaments, at least in this case, seem to constitute a weak basis to claim for the 
parliaments’ last word. 
Observing this scenario, some have suggested that CD is a good case to test ideas 
surrounding institutional dialogue and the culture of justification.30 Sandra Fredman, 
for example, has suggested that the Court must be guided to assist in the resolution of 
issues involving human rights through a deliberative style of decision-making.31 The 
role of the courts is that of augmenting democratic participation “by functioning as a 
forum for deliberation” 32 and steering the legislative “decision-making away from 
interest bargaining and towards deliberation”,33 in concrete, “insisting on a 
deliberative justification for the interpretation or limitation of rights” 34 rather than 
exercising “a conclusive veto or to prescribe authoritative interpretation”.35 In the 
case of CD, Fredman sets out two requirements for the collaboration between courts 
and parliaments: on the one hand, the government must demonstrate that CD is 
consistent with the background value of the right to vote, “including that all should 
                                                 
28. See above Chapter 3, Section II.2.2. 
29. See above Chapter 2, Section III.2. 
30. See, about the idea of a dialog in cases of CD, Fredman, 2013; Dyzenhaus, 2013. 
31. A similar approach can be found in Dyzenhaus (2013) who, similarly to Fredman, argues that 
the limitation of rights must be justified in terms of democratic values. The best relation 
between courts and parliaments is established by “an institutional structure that makes possible 
appropriate processes of justification” (2-3).  
32. Fredman, 2013:295. 
33. Fredman, 2013:296. 
34. Fredman, 2013:297. 
35. Fredman, 2013:298. 
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be treated with equal concern and respect, and that all should have a right to 
participate in the political decision-making”.36 On the other hand, the courts “should 
not dictate the result”;37 rather, Fredman insists upon a decision coming from the 
parliament with substantive reasoning. 
When examining the South African cases, Fredman concludes that the Supreme Court 
adopted this style by urging major justifications for CD from the Parliament, 
something that finally closed the dialogue in NICRO. Very important for this 
characterization is the Court’s statement, which does not foreclose the possibility that 
in the future, having satisfied the burden of proof and of argumentation, the 
Parliament could pass limitative legislation on the right to vote, excluding some 
offenders from the franchise.38 On the other hand, examining the case of ECtHR in 
relation to the UK Parliament, Fredman claims that arguably the Court adopted a 
deferential approach rather than a deliberative one,39 ruling that, first, the blanket ban 
is unacceptable but, second, that the final decision lies within the competence of the 
UK Parliament. The Parliament, in turn, proceeded to hold a debate which fell far 
short of engaging in a deliberation which addressed the normative questions involved 
in the democratic problem of CD.40 
It is true that whereas a difference can be observed in the argumentative attitude of 
the Courts, no difference can be positively observed in the argumentative attitude of 
the Parliaments. The South African Parliament did not even attempt to satisfy the 
demands for a better justification, likewise in the cases of the Canadian Parliament 
after Sauvé and the Australian Parliament after Roach, and the UK Parliament did not 
engage with the call of the ECtHR to discuss the substantive problem.  
                                                 
36. Fredman, 2013:299. 
37. Fredman, 2013:299. 
38. See above Chapter 2, Section I.3. 
39. In contrast, Murray (2012) suggests that the ECtHR’s “most serious concerns, in Hirst, were 
with the inadequacy of the UK Parliament’s procedures for protecting human rights” (13). See 
also Lewis, 2006:212. 
40. See e.g. Nicol, 2011. 
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There are two reasons that cast serious doubts about the ability of parliaments to 
engage in discourses of justification of CD, and that could contribute to explain why 
parliaments have not addressed the alleged ‘dialogic call’ of the courts. The first 
argument has been developed along the main corpus of this dissertation, and it is an 
answer to the question about whether it would ever be possible to justify a limit on 
the right to vote.41 The conclusion is that engaging with a normative conception of 
democracy rules out the possibility of justifying CD. The alternative option is 
adopting values that are incompatible with democracy. The fact that CD cannot be 
justified in a democratic framework makes redundant the calls for a dialogue or a 
deliberative approach: “strong deliberative process cannot ‘neutralise’ a clear rights 
violation”.42 What is unjustifiable under democratic principles cannot be object of a 
culture of justification. 
The second argument concerns the particularity of the group that is being excluded 
from the franchise and sustains that, even in a widely embraced culture of 
justification, the issues related to the symbolic status of the offenders tend to fall 
outside of such a culture when addressed by representative authorities, and this is 
reflected in the quality of the debate. To advocate for the right of those convicted 
offenders may be seen as unpopular,43 and “displays of liberal progressiveness 
towards disliked minorities [is] highly risky, even for otherwise sympathetically 
minded politicians”.44 This can be generally referred to as penal populism and it is 
likely to affect those jurisdictions in the debate about CD.45 The main idea associated 
with penal populism is that the electoral dimension of policy takes precedence over 
its penal effectiveness: “In short, penal populism consists of the pursuit of a set of 
penal policies to win votes rather than to reduce crime or to promote justice”.46 This 
dynamic is indubitably more complex. First, in which could be call a rhetorical 
                                                 
41. Dyzenhaud, 2013:12. 
42. Lazarus & Simonsen, 2014. 
43. See Berhens, 2005:273-4. 
44. Gearty, 2007:65.  
45. See e.g. Murray, 2012:15-17. See also above Chapter 6, Section II.3. 
46. Pratt, 2007:3. 
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challenge to a deliberative culture,47 the content of the penal discourse that is offered 
as in tune with the public mood is importantly influenced and manipulated by the 
establishment, groups and organizations, which claim to speak on behalf of the 
people. Second, it is also linked to a certain atmosphere of a crisis of authority and 
therefore the elites seek to offer simple, understandable solutions to crime that are 
more likely to be endorsed by ordinary individuals who comprise the electorate. This 
can be explicitly associated with new forms of punitiveness, and with the 
proliferation of penal symbolism, the frame of penal discourses in an emotive 
language (‘three strikes’ or ‘zero tolerance’).48 Finally, populist responses to crime 
are premised on a distinction between the citizens and the victims, on the one hand, 
and “a group of criminals that seem utterly different from the rest of the 
population”,49 on the other hand. The wishes of this ‘moral majority’ are easily 
offended when offenders exploit fundamental rights as a mechanism to protect their 
interests,50 because “the public can so easily imagine these criminals as seriously 
threatening society when any prisoners’ rights question comes up”.51 In this context, 
no rational politician will champion this cause.52 
When considering possible reasons why the elected authorities are unlikely to assume 
a deliberative approach towards issues related with offenders’ rights, it becomes 
salient to note that the representatives are not only interested in effectively tuning in 
with their electorate, but more concretely they assume that pursuing policies which 
implement popular punitive attitudes will guarantee that the political establishment 
stays in power.53 The extreme case of this sad spectacle occurs when political parties 
not only do not want to be seen as soft in their treatment of offenders, but actually 
                                                 
47. Levy, 2013:366.  
48. See, generally, Pratt et al, 2013. 
49. Pratt, 2007:5. See also Drake & Henley, 2014:4. 
50. Elliot, 2013:147. This idea triggered an express declaration of the ECtHR in Hirst: “there is 
any place under the Convention system […] for automatic disenfranchisement based purely on 
what might offend public opinions” [70]. 
51. Demleitner, 2009:91. 
52. See Pettus, 2013:122. 
53. See e.g. Pettus, 2013:90-99.  
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compete electorally in terms of being “tough on crime”.54 In this context, public 
opinion and attitudes towards CD can be seen as a determining factor in the adoption, 
following Fredman’s terminology, of an aggressively punitive interest-bargain style 
of decision-making.55  
In conclusion, there are important reasons to think that in the case of CD, the 
parliaments do not enjoy the legitimacy (because the right to vote is involved) and 
institutional position (because offenders are involved) that constitute an advantage 
over the courts when facing other controversies. This is not to say that the 
parliaments are not the appropriate forum to deal with CD,56 or that courts are more 
legitimate or better placed, but the more limited claim that there are important 
reasons for a judicial review of a legislation enacting CD. 
II THE QUESTION OF THE LEGAL METHOD 
The protection of offenders’ right to vote call for the courts intervention and there are 
good reasons to doubt that they would engage in a deliberative relationship with 
parliaments. There is, therefore, a democratic case for the use of the courts as fora for 
contestation.57 The cases of the judicial trend on CD have exhibited, however, a 
hesitant attitude towards these tasks: on the one hand, declaring the 
unconstitutionality or incompatibility of certain legislation but, on the other hand, 
consolidating a right of the legislature to exclude serious offenders over and against 
the demands of democratic principles.  
The reason why some courts cannot deal adequately with the issue of CD may not be 
related to the fact that they are more poorly-situated than the legislatures, but to the 
                                                 
54. See Pratt & Clark, 2005. 
55. On the analysis of public opinion on CD and how it can contribute to shape policy-making, see 
Pinaire et al, 2002; Dawson-Edwards, 2008 (US case); Dhami & Cruise, 2013 (UK case). 
56. See Behrens, 2004:274. 
57. See above Chapter 3, Section II.2.3.  
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legal method which the courts have deployed when solving these cases. Generally, 
these cases are not addressed by asking why we, as a democratic political community, 
should exclude offenders from political participation, but instead by asking whether 
the law that disenfranchises prisoners presents a constitutionally legitimate limit to 
the right to vote. The use of the legal method of proportionality as a substitution for 
engagement with the substantive principles at stake may explain the outcomes of the 
cases. Even in Sauvé, as rightly noticed by Dyzenhaus, the Canadian Supreme Court, 
despite its great engagement with a normative conception of democracy, seems 
“undecided between the proposition that no limit on the right to vote of inmates could 
be justified and the proposition that Parliament and/or the government’s lawyers had 
failed to show that this particular limit was justified”.58 If there is a link between 
proportionality and a presupposed right to disenfranchise serious offenders is correct, 
this method seems to stand as an obstacle for the protection of the right to vote. 
Despite the fact that proportionality has been the subject of controversy and 
criticisms, it may nonetheless be acknowledged that it enjoys increasing acceptance 
within judicial review discourses as a mechanism that legitimatises judicial 
intervention in legislative decisions, by means of presenting itself as a rational way to 
control the political activity intended by the legislative and executive branches.59 
Proportionality is however under crossfire. On the one hand, from the perspective of 
democracy, proportionality is accused of being a facade for the political intervention 
of the courts into the sphere of other state powers, affecting the separation of powers 
and democratic legitimacy of public decision-making. Even if this is generally true, it 
was argued above that there are good reasons to favour judicial review of legislation 
in the particular case of CD. On the other hand, proportionality has also been 
criticised from the perspective of the protection of rights, this time because it 
diminishes the very deontological character of fundamental rights, making them 
                                                 
58. Dyzenhaus, 2013:12. See also Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:129-30. 
59. See, generally about an expansive discourse on judicial review and proportionality, Sweet & 
Mathews, 2008. 
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negotiable and accepting their limitation under conditions of apparent rationality.60 
This criticism is particularly acute in cases of CD, especially due to reiterated 
references to the idea of deference or the MOA that courts have granted to 
parliaments in determining the concrete terms of CD. The courts, by adopting these 
notions, have responded to the democratic criticism; they have done so, however, 
while leaving their judgments even more exposed to the rights criticism. 
This section seeks to explain how the idea of deference has influenced the legal 
method of proportionality, leading the courts to provide an unsatisfactory answer to 
the problem of CD.  
1 The importance of deference 
The strongest position that judicial review can achieve, which grants great protection 
against the democratic critics, is one based on an adequate account of the standard of 
review applied by the courts in relation to the doctrine of deference. This 
‘equilibrium’ stands as a limitation on the intervention of the courts in spheres that 
belong to the political and administrative domains, but also, and crucially, shapes 
proportionality, transforming it into an even more limited mechanism of 
constitutional control.  
A scheme that accommodates proportionality and deference starts from the basis of a 
distinction of functions in the process of limiting a fundamental right by legislation. 
A primary question is both formulated and answered by the decision-making 
authority. The legislature has to deal with social problems and offer solutions which 
integrate technical, economic and political considerations. A secondary question 
regarding the choice made by the decision-maker is “a supervisory question which 
addresses the legitimacy (but not the accuracy) of the answer to the primary 
                                                 
60. See e.g. Webber, 2009. 
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question”.61 This secondary question concerns the compatibility of the legislation 
adopted with fundamental rights and does not deal with a diagnosis of the social 
problem or with the political strategy selected by the decision-maker. Proportionality 
therefore asks the question: “Was this decision a disproportionate intrusion on human 
rights?” and reserves for the decision-maker the primary question concerning ‘What 
is the best solution available for dealing with this problem?’62 
In this context, proportionality is a method that helps the courts with this secondary 
question. The restraint assumed by proportionality can be illustrated by the 
distinction between reasonableness and correctness. Depending on the concrete 
matter to be addressed, a range of measures resulting from the primary decision-
making would be considered proportionate. Proportionality, it is said, does not 
provide the only correct answer or an ‘optimal answer’, but constitutes a negative 
standard by which to exclude those policies that are unreasonable invasions of 
fundamental rights, with no gains for the interest pursued by the legislation. In sum, 
proportionality is “focused on what it is not rather than what it is”.63 The concern 
with reasonableness rather than correctness therefore necessarily implies that courts 
applying proportionality must defer to the primary decision-maker in certain respects. 
All of this becomes, certainly, much more complex in practice.  
Deference can assume various forms. Two are of particular interest, as they have 
impacted upon CD cases. They might be referred to as substantive and structural 
deference.64 Substantive deference is the spectrum of governmental actions from 
which the intervention of the courts and therefore the proportionality test are 
excluded. This account of deference is limitative of the precedence of judicial review 
                                                 
61. Brady, 2012:11 (emphasis added). 
62. Brady, 2012:11. Pettit’s distinction between authorial and editorial roles can also be applied 
here (Pettit, 2000:114-8). 
63. Brady, 2012:10-1. 
64. This is not the distinction offered by Letsas (2006) who also talk about substantive and 
structural dimensions, in this case, of the MOA doctrine. 
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and it has an exclusionary relation with the application of the proportionality test. 
When courts identify certain areas that fall substantively within the spectrum of 
deference, they are restricted to adopting a passive attitude: a constitutional laissez 
faire. The perfect example of this form of deference is the US doctrine of political 
questions.65  
This is also the account of deference widely upheld by the ECtHR in its doctrine of 
the MOA, to which the British government emphatically referred in its claim that the 
issue of prisoners voting was something that corresponded to the British Parliament 
to decide.66 In the case of the MOA doctrine, the substantive difference is based in 
the international character of the ECtHR. In Hirst, however, the ECtHR restricted the 
scope of this doctrine. In what seems to be one of the more confusing aspects of its 
reasoning, the Court sustained that the MOA depends on the limitative legislation 
achieving a certain degree of proportionality.  
Structural deference, in contrast, assumes the form of a restriction upon the Court in 
several aspects of the assessment of the legislation, based on the functional role of the 
courts and the recognition of parliaments as the primary decision-makers. This 
encompasses proportionality and deference in a relation of structural complementarity 
based on three factors: “(1) the decision-maker’s freedom to choose its own 
objectives”; (2) “the range of options available to the decision-maker”; and 3) “the 
scope of the decision”.67 These are matters on which the Court must necessarily defer 
to the Parliament, and that may have a far-reaching significant on the review’s overall 
effectiveness. For example, the courts cannot question the degree of satisfaction of 
the objective pursued by the legislature. This kind of structural deference is 
embedded within the proportionality, integrating instances of deference within the 
                                                 
65. See e.g. Sullivan & Gunther, 2004:31-48. 
66. See Hirst [47-8]. 
67. Brady, 2012:85. See also Rivers, 2007. 
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test judicial application. This second form of deference has played an inadvertent, 
though fundamental, role in the judicial decisions regarding CD. 
It is crucial to notice that normatively structural deference is grounded, unlike the 
substantive deference of the MOA doctrine, on the same arguments for parliamentary 
sovereignty analysed in the previous section; that is, democratic legitimacy and the 
particular institutional advantages of parliament. This is relevant because some of the 
courts seem to be aware of this only partially. In a controversial aspect of its 
judgment on Hirst, the ECtHR withdrew the substantive deference on electoral issues 
traditionally granted to signatory states of the ECHR based in the poor deliberative 
performance of the UK Parliament. Something similar happened with the Australian 
Court in Roach, this time considering the nature of the right involved. However, none 
of the courts of the judicial trend seemed to limit or modified their conceptions of 
structural deference. They conducted a ‘business as usual’ proportionality analysis. 
2 The deference of proportionality 
Structural deference embedded in the legal discourse of proportionality may explain 
why the judgments of the judicial trend recognise a right of the legislature to exclude 
serious offenders from the franchise. This kind of deference can be expressed in all 
the stages of the proportionality test.68 However, the most critical moment in which 
the proportionality test defers to the legislature in the CD cases is in the assessment 
of the purpose of the limitation, because this introduces an additional interest into the 
scene, which competes with the protection of the right to vote, assuming from the 
beginning that the optimal solution would be the consequence of the due 
consideration of both interests. 
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2.1 Proper purpose  
The proper purpose stage of proportionality seeks the determination of the 
constitutionality (or legitimacy) of the purpose advanced by the limitative legislation. 
It is therefore a normative rather than means-ends assessment. This stage normally 
examines the constitutionality of the purpose in itself, without consideration of the 
intervention in a fundamental right. Only once the purpose itself has been admitted as 
legitimate, the analysis turns to the means that the legislation uses to advance that 
purpose.69  
The main problems affecting this assessment are those linked with the identification 
of the purpose.70 At least two elements of this identification might prove contentious, 
and are crucial in CD cases: first, the question of who must decide what the purpose 
is; and, second, how much concrete explication and precision the purpose requires. 
Who should determine the purpose is problematic because it remains unclear whether 
it is the objective purpose of the law or the subjective purpose of the legislators that 
the courts must consider.71 This relates to the second question, which is fundamental 
to understanding the burden of proof, of whether the purpose must be judicially 
                                                 
69. Three analytical steps can be followed for judging whether the purpose of the limitation law is 
constitutional: firstly, determine whether the constitution requires the limitation of the 
constitutional right to be restricted to a special purpose or, on the contrary, if it allows 
discretion to determine it (see Barak, 2012:260-77); secondly, evaluate whether the purpose of 
the legislation is compatible with a general (implicit or explicit) limitation clause, such as an 
‘open, free and democratic society’ (See Barak, 2012:257-59); thirdly, the proper purpose 
should also meet the proper degree of urgency considered by the standard of review. Some 
purposes can be argued to be urgent or very important whilst others are just desirable or 
legitimate. Different jurisdictions can set unified or differentiated standards of urgency to 
evaluate when a purpose can constitutionally limit a constitutional right. The standard of 
urgency can be, therefore, unified and high (“pressing and substantial”) as in Canada, unified 
and low (“legitimate”) as in Germany or differentiated between high (“compelling”), 
intermediate (“important”) and low (“legitimate”), depending on the rights involved, as in the 
US (see Barak, 2012:277-85).  
70. Barak, 2012:285-302. 
71. The idea of objective purpose necessarily turns the attention of the assessment of the Court to 
the impact that the limitative legislation has in the real world, taking it far from the express 
purpose of the parties involved. 
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determined (subjectively or objectively) or if the government can articulate it 
according to some degree of deference.72  
In this respect, all the courts of the judicial trend on CD not only deferred to the 
government concerning the decision of identifying the purpose, but they also paid 
scant attention to the relation between the arguments offered by the government 
officers and the legislative discussion of CD in the parliament. This is problematic 
because if what is under exam in the judicial review is a concern for the public 
justification of the limitation of a fundamental right, it cannot be assumed that the 
motives are proper and focus the inquiry only in the way in which those motives are 
implemented.73 
 The formulation of the purpose also implies certain questions. They can be presented 
in very abstract and general terms or in terms that are more concrete and precise. 
The second alternative allows a better judgment of both the constitutionality of the 
purpose and the causal relation which obtains between the purpose and the limitative 
legislation. In contrast, more abstract and general purposes should generate suspicion, 
as the “triviality of the goal is a reason to believe that it is merely a pretext for an 
action de facto motivated on grounds which are not publicly citeable”.74 All the 
judgments, with the exception of NICRO in which the Court discarded it for problems 
of proof and argumentation, accepted as valid the abstract and diffuse idea that CD is 
a form of punishment and that it enhances civic responsibility and respect for the rule 
of law. The ECtHR in Hirst even defend the idea that “abstract or symbolic purposes 
could be valid of their own and should not be downplayed simply for being symbolic” 
[37]. Only the Court in Sauvé [22] objected to this purpose as problematic, 
notwithstanding that it finally accepted it in a signal of deference. 
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73.  See Sadurski, 2014:5. 
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When the government is given discretion to define the purpose and subsequently does 
so in abstract and diffuse terms as in the cases under analysis, there are reasons to 
suspect that it may assume a purely rhetorical role,75 “susceptible […] to distortion 
and manipulation”76 or that “the public value justification is a façade”.77 First, even 
though these purposes may be fair in abstract terms, it is difficult to conceive of how 
they could be otherwise.78 Under this parameters, it is only when the purpose is 
evidently or explicitly discriminatory that its constitutional analysis is useful.79 This 
approach limits the possibility to include within the proportionality test the notion of 
“excluded reasons” as part of the protection of rights.80 The government has 
incentives to act strategically and to avoid articulating a purpose that could be 
affected by those flaws. Second, once the purpose of the legitimate legislation has 
been accepted, it assumes, with all its abstraction, the role of the competing interest 
that faces the right to vote in the proportionality analysis, transforming the limitation 
of the offender’s vote into a conflict of interests that must be solved following the 
ideal of optimization of both of the interests at stake. Third, by accepting 
deferentially a general and abstract purpose freely formulated by the government the 
Court limits its own possibilities to question the rational connection and the necessity 
of the measure.81 
2.2 Rational connection and necessity 
Structural deference can appear also in the means-end assessment. Rational 
connection (or suitability or appropriateness) requires that the means used by the 
                                                 
75. See Frankfurt & Wilson, 2005. 
76. Sauvé [22]. 
77. Sunstein, cited in Sadurski, 2014:6. 
78. Sauvé [22]. 
79. That could be argued based, for example, on the categories of the US judicial history, in (i) the 
use of traditionally-banned discriminatory classifications such as race, sex or religion; or (ii) 
the positive and historically demonstrable attempt to discriminate or incite prejudice against 
some group or class. See Kumm, 2007:147. 
80. See Kumm, 2007:142-8. 
81. Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:121. 
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limitative device must be capable of advancing that purpose; that is, they must lead to 
the fulfilment of that purpose. The rational connection test is therefore a minimal 
requirement of rationality that only excludes as disproportionate those means 
rationally disconnected from the purpose that the law or the administrative act 
attempts to advance. In these terms, it does not require the use of the most efficient 
means (to a higher degree, more economically or with a lesser cost to the fundamental 
rights involved). The only way to fail the rational connection test is where the means 
selected do not have any effect upon the advancement of the purpose that the law 
pursues.82 The major problem facing rational connection is that of factual uncertainty. 
In order to evaluate the rational connection, a certain degree of certainty about the 
consequences of the limitative law is needed because this test assesses a factual 
relation. courts do not count with mechanisms to obtain this information 
independently, therefore, what is expected is a certain degree of technical deference 
based on the ability of the government to process information, with the Court 
conserving the competence to examine the probability by recurring to data provided 
for the branches that have designed the policy and that have the burden of proof and 
must be able to demonstrate such a connection.83 
In contrast, the necessity test (or minimal impairment) requires the use of the means 
that are least restrictive to the right in question, within the range of those available to 
advance the purpose of the limiting device. This test assesses if the purpose of the 
legislative devise can be advanced to the same extent by other means that limit the 
fundamental right to a lesser degree. The test, therefore, demands the selection of the 
most efficient means in terms of the limitation of rights. This requires, first, the 
existence of a hypothetical alternative means, which equally advances the law’s 
purpose, and second, that such hypothetical means limit the fundamental right to a 
lesser extent.84 This is not a test of balance; therefore, it is not about improving 
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83. Barak, 2012:308-15. 
84. See Barak, 2012:317-333. 
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respect for fundamental rights at the expense of moderating other objectives of 
governmental policy, such as financial expedience or the degree of compliance with 
its purpose. It only attempts to exclude the existence of alternative means that could 
affect fundamental rights to a lesser extent while maintaining all the other variables. 
Where the alternative means are less limiting but advance the purpose to a lesser 
extent, this cannot be considered an infraction of the necessity test.85 At the level of 
necessity a degree of deference is also present. On the one hand, it correspond to the 
legislator to set the level of intensity of the satisfaction of the proper purpose, which 
is done by selecting a devise that satisfy the purpose to a high, medium or low level. 
On the other hand, the process of assessing the extent to which fundamental rights 
can be affected involves analysing several factors that require technical deference: the 
scope of the limitation, its effects, its duration and the likelihood of its occurrence, 
etc.86  
In the judgment of the judicial trend the analysis of the mean-ends relationship 
produced little controversy. The Court in NICRO did not arrive to this stage. In Roach 
and Sauvé the courts did engage explicitly in an assessment of the means-ends 
relation, concluding that the government failed to demonstrate a rational connection. 
The Canadian Court affirmed this ill-relation affected every case of CD. The 
Australian High Court, in contrast, argued that this problem affected only the blanket 
ban and a targeted ban affecting only serious offenders would pass the rational 
connection test. In this later case, this is due to the Court grant great discretion to the 
government to define the purpose that finally was accepted by the Court in terms of 
censuring serious offences. 
The decision of the ECtHR is curious in this respect (as it was Chan Kin Sum), as it 
did not formally carried out an assessment of the means-ends relation. There is no 
reference in the Court reasoning to the ways in which CD can advance the purpose 
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offered. It seems that the Court went directly to the proportionality in a strict sense in 
its analysis. However, as Plaxton and Lardy rightly point out, disregarding the 
legislative aim of CD, as did the court, made it impossible to assess its application of 
the rational connection and necessity tests, and “made its proportionality analysis 
inherently suspect”.87 Perhaps this is the key reason of why the Court “did not explain 
why some people might be disenfranchised but not others”.88 This casts great doubts 
regarding whether the Court was actually applying a proportionality test, because if 
the proportionality of the measure is judged only in relation to the characteristics of 
the crime committed or the duration of the imprisonment, it is not unreasonable to 
think that the Court was effectively carrying out a criminal proportionality judgement 
(art. 49 ECHR), without, however, showing the other element of the balancing test, 
which in this case must be the criminal desert of the offenders or the seriousness of 
their misconduct.89 
2.3 Proportionality in a strict sense 
Finally, the core and most important element of the proportionality test is 
proportionality in a strict sense. This test assesses the existence of a proper relation 
between the benefits gained by the fulfilment of the purpose and the harm caused to 
the fundamental rights by advancing the purpose.90 It is a balancing test, in which the 
situation to be avoided is a disproportionate relation between the limitation of the 
right and the success of the limitative policy. This would be the case, for example, 
when an important limitation of a right is based on a minimal satisfaction of the 
legislative purpose. The proportionality in a strict sense test assumes a constitutional 
purpose and a satisfactory means-ends relation, which are excluded from its analysis. 
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Factors that must be considered pertinent to balancing, because they influence the 
weight the courts assigns to the limitation or fulfilment, include, for example, the 
probability of the fulfilment of purpose and the limitation; the social importance of 
the limited right and the urgency of the purpose; and the scope, duration and intensity 
of the limitation.91 The object of the balancing test is to create a response to the 
problem of different, contradictory demands in which the content is not the ‘all-or-
nothing’ traditional judicial decision-making output. The balancing is sensitive to the 
fact that what the courts are facing are political decisions and that political decisions 
must consider the interests of all those involved. 
There are good reasons to think the ECtHR was engaging in a different kind of 
reasoning and all the other courts did not arrive to the proportionality in strict sense 
stage because found problems in earlier stages. The idea of balancing, which is what 
is at stake in the last stage on the proportionality test, is fundamental to understand 
what the courts are doing when applying this legal method.  
Even if proportionality is understood as the protection of fundamental rights by 
means of the rationalization of legislation and these fundamental rights are designed 
as the “standard to which all governmental action must conform”, these standards 
however “are not absolute and so can be limited in certain circumstances”.92 Thus 
within the very notion of proportionality is already encrypted an acceptance of the 
idea of the right’s limitation, to a certain extent inverting the terms set out by the 
traditional conception of fundamental rights as fire walls against the state 
intervention.  
In other words, proportionality also performs the function of acknowledging, first, the 
legal authority of the government to restrict fundamental rights and therefore to 
regulate specific spheres of the citizens’ lives that are prima facie protected from 
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intervention by a fundamental right. The role of judicial review under the 
proportionality paradigm is relegated to the task of determining whether the 
government has violated a right or not and is confined to acting as a “standard test for 
determining whether a limitation of a [...] right goes too far”;93 it is no longer a test to 
determine whether intrusions have occurred or not, but is charged with “assessing 
intrusions by government onto [...] rights” that are, in an inversion of the protection 
of rights discourse, prima facie authorised.94 
3 Against proportionality 
This idea of structural deference highlights, as was mentioned, another group of 
criticisms against proportionality; those which point out that proportionality affords 
no substantive protection to fundamental rights. The deference that proportionality 
shows to the primary decision-makers enables CD, albeit in a restricted form, to pass 
the legal test even when substantively its compatibility with democratic principles 
may be questioned.  
Firstly, the use of proportionality has helped to mask the concrete political reasons 
behind excluding offenders and the particularities of the genuine political problem of 
CD. This problem is related mainly with the terms in which the courts deal with the 
purpose of CD. This may be observed in the transformation from the transparency of 
the UK Prime Minister’s opinion, when he claimed that prisoner voting makes him 
feel physically ill,95 inspired by the rhetoric of law and order, into the invariably 
milder, general and abstract versions concerned with enhancing civic responsibility 
and the rule of law given in the courtroom. However, this obviously transcends a 
problem of the use of public reason. The legal question of the compatibility of CD 
with the constitution or human rights instruments when framed in terms of 
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proportionality has obscured the genuine political question at stake. The genuine 
political question of why we must exclude citizens who have committed a criminal 
offence from political participation still go unaddressed, or at least unsatisfactory so.  
Secondly, proportionality has tended to produce compromise solutions. This tendency 
stems from how it seeks to render compatible what are in fact two antagonistic 
principles, employing the economic language of optimization. This is a consequence 
that is immanent to the use of the idea of proportionality. Under this scheme, which 
promises to compensate the loss of fundamental rights protections with efficient 
public policy making, the limitation of fundamental rights is not seen as an 
exceptional event but as normal. Even when this cannot fully explain the tolerance of 
the courts towards CD, it permits us to understand the frequent recourse to the over-
inclusiveness argument based on the ‘rule of law’, which works as a discursive 
mechanism to give the reason to the human right defenders, saying the government 
cannot arbitrarily apply CD. On the other hand, it also supplies reasons to the 
governments that want to advance policies which make them appear ‘tough on crime’. 
The claims from either side, it is convenient to keep in mind, argued that CD was 
unconstitutional tout court, independently of its scope, and that a blanket ban was 
constitutional. The compromise idea of make a difference between minor and serious 
offenders was, in the majority of cases, an idea put forward by the courts, which may 
be explained as an effort to produce a distributive decision.  
It is also important to highlight the role of deference in the identification of the 
proper purpose. If the measure is correctly advancing a legitimate purpose, all the rest 
is a process of bargaining and accommodation between the interests at stake. The 
fundamental right in question can be affected massively if the satisfaction of the 
public interest is also of great magnitude. With the good institutional design of a 
measure and a cogent argumentative apparatus, human rights can be reduced 
considerably on the basis of efficient governmental activity. The problem is that 
“citizenship and humanity of prisoners, must somehow be weighed against” other 
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interest, and there are not “symbolic scales on which to perform such comparison”.96 
This criticism, which points to the lack of deontological reasoning which is proper to 
the language of the fundamental rights, and also the lack of a deliberative effort to 
accommodate interests rather than meet them half way,97 will be discussed briefly in 
the last section of this chapter. 
Thirdly, a diachronic view of these judgements may indicate that they will neutralize 
the future political strength of the prisoners’ claim for inclusion. Before the cases and 
the struggle produced by them, CD was an uncomfortable practice whose nature was 
complicated to explain; it was evaluated within the group of those practices that 
constitute a pre-modern legacy, affecting elections and offenders. Now, after the 
judgments, it can be argued that CD, in its limited version, has received considerable 
legitimacy. This legitimacy is provided by an impartial mechanism of the judicial 
review of legislation. The doctrine of proportionality “identifies the importance of the 
State action [...] against the importance of the infringement of the right”.98 In so 
doing, it highlights the importance of democracy and fundamental rights and creates a 
solution that looks for equilibrium within the two by tapping into both traditional 
legitimacy sources in modern democracy. Consequently, procedural legitimacy is 
transmitted to the norms which approve the proportionality test or to those norms that 
the courts consider would approve it. This legitimacy affects directly the cause for 
inclusion by silencing the political claims for a more complete inclusion of all 
prisoners. On the other hand, it could lead to a reactivation of the aim of exclude 
serious criminals in those countries such as Canada and South Africa whose courts 
have not completely proscribe CD.  
Summing up, the important degree of deference that proportionality show to the 
legislator makes it vulnerable to the objections of those that criticise proportionality 
                                                 
96. Orr, 1998:72. 
97. See Levy, 2013:361-7. 
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as a poor protection of rights against the demands made by the legislator. What you 
have in virtue of having a right to vote is weak protection against the arbitrary 
intervention of the legislator, and a conception of fundamental right does not capture 
the priority of the right to vote in a democratic society, at least in certain aspects, 
must be considered as deficient in some way.  
III AN ALTERNATIVE TO PROPORTIONALITY 
Under the assumption that there are good reasons for a judicial review of CD 
legislation, and considering the problems which beset proportionality as a legal 
method able to protect effectively offenders’ right to vote, fundamentally because the 
legislative still has a determinant influence in the process, an alternative proposal 
must be considered. The idea of the right to vote as configured by an assembly and a 
balance of elements of participation and recognition can be extremely relevant for 
this task. First, however, it is shown that, besides cases such as those in the US, 
where there is a constitutional blockage of the judicial review of CD, alternatives to 
proportionality are available. 
1 Israel (1996), Ghana (2010) and Kenya (2010) 
In contrast to those courts that have adopted the proportionality method to deal with 
cases of CD, another group of courts have decided to avoid proportionality in their 
reasoning and have assumed the strongest conception of the right to vote. Their 
peripheral legal and cultural position may explain why not enough attention has been 
focused on them.  
The first and most celebrated judgment was handed down by the Israeli Supreme 
Court, which faced a complicated moment when deciding Alrai v Minister of the 
Interior et al (1996). The case originated when a third party petitioned the Court to 
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review a decision of the Minister of the Interior denying the attempt to deprive a 
prisoner of his citizenship. The prisoner was Yigal Amir, the assassin of the Prime 
Minister of Israel, Yitzak Rabin. Citing Trop v Dulles (1958), the Court refused to 
disenfranchise Amir based on the fundamental role assumed by the right to vote as a 
“prerequisite of democracy”.99 The Court considered that “the revocation of 
citizenship, because it included the right to vote and to be elected, was drastic and 
extreme step” [, saying] “that the contempt for this act [assassination] must be 
separated from respect for his right” [to vote].100 
A second judgment in this line is Ahumah Ocansey v The Electoral Commission 
(2010), in which the Supreme Court of Ghana decided that the Electoral Law, which 
disenfranchised all those prisoners serving sentences longer than six months, was 
unconstitutional. It argued that limitation of fundamental rights must be strictly 
constructed and should be expressly provided for Section 42 of the Constitution 
guarantees the right to vote to all adult Ghanaians of sound mind, and it does not cede 
“any of its authority to either the EC [Electoral Commission] or some other authority 
to add further to the list of who shall not have the right to vote”.101 The Court 
concluded that prisoners were included within the electorate:  
“that the drafters of the Constitution would have been explicit if they 
intended to debar those in legal custody from voting. The fact that the 
Constitution was clear in excluding those who have been convicted of a 
crime from eligibility to stand for election to the office of the President 
and as a member of parliament implied, according to the court, that the 
drafters of the Constitution did not intend to exclude prisoners from 
voting”.102 
The Court was receptive, nevertheless, to the idea that fundamental rights can form 
the object of limitations, but insisted that, in the case under analysis, “it was 
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extremely difficult ‘to understand what constitutionally legitimate interest is served” 
by the exclusion of prisoners from voting registration.103 
Finally, other African experience is also illuminating. Before the 2010 referendum set 
to approve the new Constitution, in Priscilla Nyokabi Kanyua v Attorney General 
(2010) the Kenyan High Court upheld prisoners’ right to vote in that process. This 
was done despite the general ban entrenched in the Constitution, which impeded them 
from participating in both parliamentary and presidential elections. The Court 
affirmed that the referendum was distinct from elections and that Section 43 of the 
Constitution did not exclude prisoners from voting in it. On arriving at this 
conclusion, the Court affirmed 
“On the balance of proportionality we hold that there is no legitimate 
governmental objective or purpose that would be served by denying the 
inmates the right to vote in a referendum. The Njoya Case has 
demonstrated that the people’s constituent rights to vote in a referendum is 
a basic human right. A right that ushers in or refuses to usher in a new 
Constitution. A constituent power higher than the Constitution and the 
National Assembly and Presidential Election Act. Can the Constitution 
and the National Assembly and Presidential Act Cap 7 prevent inmates 
from taking part in a referendum if the prisoners are deemed to be part of 
the people? In our view they cannot” [22].104 
The new Constitution has not laid down a ban on prisoners’ right to vote in any 
election or referendums. At the same time, Section 38(3)(a) guarantees the right to 
vote to every adult citizen, stipulating the narrow exception of those convicted of 
electoral offences for a period of 5 years. In Kituo Cha Sheria v Independent 
Electoral and Boundaries Commission (2013), the Court affirmed, “The Constitution 
[…] does not exclude prisoners from being registered to vote and consequently voting 
in an election” [2]. It seems unlikely that the High Court will allow the Kenyan 
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Parliament to restrict the right to vote of some prisoners.105 In such a case, however, 
the Court would encounter the dilemma of whether to apply categorical legal 
reasoning, as in the cases examined above, or to engage in proportionality.  
These three cases do not contain perhaps the most sophisticated theoretical 
argumentation available in opposition to CD. In that regard, Sauvé must be 
considered as the strongest and more sophisticated compendium of arguments.106 
However, they show something that is absent from Sauvé: a path that can be taken up, 
presenting the right to vote as something that should not be subject to negotiations 
and calculus; a conception of the right to vote that does not need to compete with 
other interests and whose limitation does not follow immediately from the fact of a 
parliamentary intent. Indeed, they take seriously the ideas that the right to vote is a 
cornerstone of democracy and the universal suffrage is a basic principle. 
But why the method need to be replaced and a case for enfranchisement must be 
offered, one may ask, if Sauvé offered strong reasoning, engaged with democratic 
principles and stroke down the CD provision completely using the proportionality 
test. This question demand comments in two levels. In a first level the answer does 
not imply a criticism to Sauvé but the opposite. Sauvé is an extraordinary judgment. 
A judgment unlikely to be repeated and difficult to be emulated. In fact, all the 
remaining four cases of the judicial trend cite the authority of Sauvé, and 
notwithstanding recognize implicitly or explicitly a legislature right to exclude 
serious offenders. One may add that it is complicated, and may generate suspicion, to 
think about constitutional courts as fora of philosophical questions to be discussed. In 
a second level, however, Sauvé presents an unresolved tension between upholding 
democratic principles and the dogmatic use of a legal method that do not close the 
door to the rise of new undemocratic claims of exclusion.  
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2 A case for enfranchisement 
The tendency of these courts can be articulated in a constitutional argument that 
opposes CD in terms that do not reproduce the arbitrary distinction between minor 
and serious offenders and, therefore, is able to protect the right to vote in more 
categorical terms.  
2.1 The proscription of disenfranchisement 
Ziegler suggests that the current trend on the rationalization of CD under 
constitutional standards, which, as a consequence of the application of the principle 
of proportionality, restricts its application only to serious offenders and only during 
the time they are serving their prison sentences, mirrors the standards developed in 
international law. The current general international law standards on the issue do not 
proscribe CD tout court but, for reasons similar to those of the national courts and the 
ECtHR, only condemn a blanket ban and the disenfranchisement of those offenders 
who have served their prison sentences.107 He advocates, with the aim of the total 
proscription of CD, for the adoption of an optional protocol to the International 
Convention of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in a similar fashion to how it was 
adopted in the case of the death penalty with important results.108 Despite the 
particularities of this strategy, it is important to bring forward the premises on which 
he bases his argument for the proscription of CD, which can inform other concrete 
strategies to defend the right to vote. In particular, it can inform legal reasoning in the 
context of national jurisdictions and regional human rights courts such as the ECtHR 
or the Inter American Court of Human Rights (IACHR).109 Ziegler’s case for CD 
proscription is based on the following argument. First and somehow grounding the 
following points, the right to vote is conceived of as a defining element in a 
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democratic political identity and its deprivation or suspension as an indicator of the 
inequality and the lower social status into which the offender is transmuted, 
eventually resulting in individual and collective effects of alienation and 
disempowerment.110 Second, CD is a degrading punishment, even if it can presumably 
perform a punitive goal, due to the particularity of its mentioned effects.111 Third, the 
essence of the right to vote is voting eligibility. The essence of the right is that 
content of the right that cannot be eliminated by a limitative legislation; therefore, 
questions regarding one’s eligibility to vote must be judged differently to questions 
regarding voting regulation.112  
Importantly, the first and second arguments of Ziegler have been largely developed in 
previous chapters as the ideas of the right to vote as recognition113 and CD as a form 
of degradation.114 The third idea must be analysed in more detail because it can guide 
constructively the aforementioned suspicion about the legal method in CD cases and 
in this way could be critical to the project of extending the right to vote to every 
prisoner. In this regard, some useful analytical distinctions were already made. I 
previously expounded upon López-Guerra’s distinction between a right to 
enfranchisement, whose attribution is entirely determined by considerations of 
principle, and the right to have the opportunity to vote, which can be guided by 
pragmatic considerations depending on competing interests.115 Close to this 
distinction, Ziegler argues that there is a difference between, on the one hand, voting 
regulations, consisting in “registration or procedural requirements” that may cause 
inconvenience or “impose technical difficulties” and, on the other hand, voting 
eligibility, consisting in the determination of “whether one has a right to vote”.116 
                                                 
110. See Ziegler, 2011:254-7. 
111. See Ziegler, 2011:254-5. 
112. See Ziegler, 2011:257-9. 
113. See above Chapter 6, Section III. 
114. See above Chapter 6, Section I. 
115. See López-Guerra, 2014a:118-124. This distinction is arguably also presented in Sauvé [55] 
according to Plaxton & Lardy, 2010:111. 
116. See Ziegler, 2011:257. 
DEFENDING THE VOTE 
 
 
316 
According to the argument of Ziegler, questions of regulation and questions of 
eligibility must be addressed differently, since the latter comprises the essence of the 
fundamental right to vote that is immune to interference from the legislature, whilst 
the former remains in the zone of penumbra that can be legitimately limited by a 
parliamentary act. 
This argument articulates correctly the intuition that legislative intervention in two 
distinguishable normative positions involved in the right to vote requires different 
solutions, but is too hasty to conclude that voting eligibility belongs to the essence of 
the right that is immune to legislative intervention. There are two problems here. The 
first is methodological. To say that something is the essence of a right is not 
equivalent to saying that the limitations of the right cannot be subjected to 
proportionality analysis. The core of the right is, as noted by Alexy,117 the aspects of 
the right that always triumph in the proportionality test. The distinction between 
essence and penumbra does not present a case against proportionality. This is related 
to a second problem. To say that the right to be entitled to vote is immune to 
legislative regulation, because it is a right that always triumphs in the proportionality 
test is to assume that other claimants, for instance, children and non-citizens, could 
have also claimed a presumptive right to vote in a judicial review procedure. The 
distinction between regulation and eligibility can still be helpful if the language of the 
penumbra (regulation) and the essence (eligibility) of the right is abandoned, but the 
emphasis on categorical or deontological reasoning is maintained. 
2.2 Questioning the method 
There are no reasons to think that proportionality is the legal method appropriate to 
resolve every kind of dispute about rights. It was argued above that more than one 
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normative position could be ascribed to the right to vote.118 Of special relevance to 
the argument of the differentiated judicial review, one can distinguish, for example, 
between a right to be entitled to vote, or as Ziegler described it, a right to be eligible 
to vote, and a set of negative liberties that protect the right to vote freely.119 Different 
normative positions may be protected differently. This can be according to (1) 
different standards of scrutiny,120 or (2) appealing to different legal methods to assess 
the legitimacy of the legislative intervention. 
There are at least two arguments to prefer a completely different methodology rather 
than merely a different standard of review in the case of CD. First, as seen in the 
previous section, proportionality systematically defers elements of judgment to the 
primary decision-taker, which in the case of CD can lead to arbitrary decisions, 
guided by the aim of political compromise. The cases examined in Chapter 2 were 
arguably implementing different standards of review, and a certain reading of the 
judgment could attribute the different outcomes to this factor. However, what is 
interesting here is that even when applying a demanding scrutiny standard when 
employing the proportionality method, the Court was not able to achieve the 
proscription of CD.  
Second, and essentially, CD operates with a binary code – that of inclusion/exclusion 
from the electorate – that makes the idea of a ‘proportional limitation’ of the right to 
vote an impossible operation. This is relevant because disenfranchisement has a quite 
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radical consequence in the right to vote: it involves its total suppression. Considering 
the disenfranchisement that affects only serious offenders but excludes those 
offenders completely from the franchise as a proportional limitation of the right to 
vote is to disregard the right to vote as a right of the citizen or a human right. The 
citizen, in this case, is completely deprived of the right, even when the electorate as a 
collective is affected only marginally.121 Taking the right to vote as an individual 
right implies an acknowledgement of the fact that CD implements a binary code.  
The distinction between voting eligibility and other aspect of the right to vote can be 
framed in terms of recognition and participation. While the recognition aspect of the 
right to vote is strongly linked to the idea that a person is accepted as an equal 
member of the community, and therefore is enfranchised, the participatory aspect of 
the right to vote must concern the circumstances under which the electoral practice 
can perform the function of controlling the government and channel communicative 
power from the people to the representative authorities. 
Under these conditions and bearing in mind the different normative functions of the 
normative position associated to the right to vote, it is possible to think that for cases 
of voting eligibility, that is, cases about the scope of CD, a deontological method of 
adjudication is better situated. Here is where the argument concerning degrading 
punishment proves relevant, not only as a legal framework in which CD legislation 
can be judged as unconstitutional or incompatible with human rights, but also, and 
perhaps more importantly, because it illustrates how a deontological method of the 
adjudication of rights works. A punishment that is considered degrading is not 
subjected to an examination of its aim, or an analysis of its means and the relation to 
its ends, and finally is not subjected to a process of balancing the interests at stake. In 
sum, there is no proportionality analysis. A punishment that is considered degrading 
is considered simply wrong, unconstitutional and impermissible. Other interests - 
                                                 
121. See Sauvé [55]. 
DEFENDING THE VOTE 
 
 
319 
which it might be argued could call for the application of such a punishment - are 
simply not considered as relevant reasons to a limitation of the right to not be 
subjected to degrading treatments, even when they can be legitimate in abstract terms. 
In contrast, a punishment that is considered non-degrading could be submitted to an 
analysis of proportionality.122 
2.3 Voting eligibility as a deontological constraint 
The deontological method of adjudications of rights assumes that a right is a 
deontological constraint or, in other terms, a fire wall123 or a trump124 that, where 
appropriate, rules out completely the intent of legislative intervention, acknowledging 
that “constitutional rights exists principally to protect against such selective […] 
distribution of the franchise”.125 As Habermas argues, when “the deontological 
character of basic rights is taken seriously, they are withdrawn from such a 
[proportionality] cost-benefit analysis”,126 constituting “‘threshold weights’ against 
political policies and collective goods”.127 As Mattias Kumm adds that “[t]he idea of 
deontological constrains cannot be appropriately captured within the proportionality 
structure”, because proportionality filter relationships that are “often morally decisive 
features of the situation”.128 
Understanding voting eligibility as an aspect of the right to vote, assumed to be a fire 
wall or a trump, does not necessarily entail that it is a normative position immune to 
limitations because it is the more important aspect – the essence – of the right, as 
Ziegler sustain. It simply acknowledges that voting eligibility is a binary question 
about whether somebody should be included in the electoral body and therefore is 
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entitled to vote, or should be excluded and therefore does not have such a right. 
Voting eligibility cannot be proportionally limited because it is an all-or-nothing 
question.  
Admitting this distinction may lead one to confirm the hypothesis of Ziegler and 
López-Guerra that questions of voting eligibility and other normative aspects of the 
right to vote must be addressed differently. While questions of eligibility must be 
resolved using a deontological method due to its binary nature, other questions may 
be arguably balanced against competing interests to produce regulations of 
compromise. Adopting a more adequate method of adjudication would allow for the 
expression and discussion of the relevant arguments for questions of eligibility.  
A deontological method implies two aspects. Firstly, these cases would be argued in 
terms of substantive discussion that proportionality tends to cover. The question of 
why a democratic political community should exclude offenders from the franchise 
may be properly addressed. Arguments about a normative conception of democracy, 
such as those articulated in Sauvé within the proportionality argumentation, would be 
possibly conclusively expressed. Secondly, understanding that voting eligibility is a 
binary question implies that the process of judicial argumentation and decision is 
directly oriented to resolve the question about whether or not the subject or group of 
subjects are entitled with the right to vote. Such an instance would be a moment to a 
community to express its democratic commitments but it would also present a 
moment in which the tensions between participation and exclusion can be 
rearticulated and expressed without ambiguities.  
This conclusion, however, has a limited scope affecting only to the right to vote. The 
projection of this defence of the democratic value encapsulated in the right to vote 
towards other rights is a task that must satisfy different standards of argumentation. 
This is due to the structure of power of the right to vote, as opposite to the structure 
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of liberties of other rights of democratic participation, discussed above that make 
possible to associate it, without ambiguities, to the idea of recognition of democratic 
citizenship.129 
Summing up the argument of this chapter, there are several reasons to consider that 
the case for a legislative ‘last word’ in fundamental rights adjudication is seriously 
debilitated in the case of CD. However, this cannot lead to the immediate conclusion 
that courts are, without qualification, better situated for the task. The analysis of the 
judicial trend on CD and its use of the proportionality test as a method to adjudicate 
cases of CD shows that constitutional courts tend to operate with a legal reasoning, 
led by the proportionality paradigm, which is inadequate given the nature of the right 
at stake. Rooted in a reflective reading of the normative structure of the right 
premised in the acceptance of the right to vote as a mechanism of recognition, there 
are good reasons to think that cases of CD, as the paradigmatic case of voting 
eligibility, must be adjudicated considering the right to vote as a fire wall. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
he work started from the observation in Chapter 2 that the judgments of 
the judicial trend on CD have, to some extent, avoided engaging with 
substantive justifications for excluding offenders from the electoral 
process. It was affirmed that they have focused instead on the legal 
question of the proportionality of such a measure in terms of its compatibility with 
fundamental rights. The very question of why offenders must be excluded from 
political participation, which could help to explain the official significance of CD, 
has therefore been circumvented by the majority of such judgments, or has played 
only a marginal role in judicial arguments. This finding led, in turn, to scepticism 
regarding those claims that assert the success and the progressive effect of this 
judicial trend. As was sustained subsequently, even when the judgments reduced the 
scope of those affected by CD, they may have contributed nonetheless to the 
normalisation of the political exclusion of serious offenders. 
The conclusions of this legal analysis contrast with those that follow from an 
examination of CD from the perspective of democratic theory. This second direction 
of enquiry began in Chapter 3, by developing the premises on which the courts 
grounded their legal decisions. It argued that recognizing the fundamental democratic 
role of the right to vote being distributed universally amongst all members of the 
political community, necessarily leads to the conclusion that CD presents a serious 
T 
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democratic problem; it conflicts with the central democratic claim according to which 
all those subject to the law must have rights to participate in the process of law-
making. 
That claim necessarily rests on an assumption about the role that the right to vote 
plays. This assumption is that political rights in general and the right to vote in 
particular perform a fundamental function necessary for democratic communities. In 
general, they work as a mechanism of participation, and, in that sense, they are 
strongly connected to the building of democratic legitimacy, by means of enabling the 
circulation of political power and subjecting power relations to actions of 
contestation. In this sense, the right to vote is a mechanism for building the 
legitimacy of the structures of authority. 
The democratic problem of CD acted as a starting point from which to explore the 
role that CD can adopt within a democratic political community. This exploration was 
carried out in the dissertation by searching for the points of tension and the 
possibilities of reconciliation between CD and democracy. Chapter 4 discussed the 
argument regarding the civic virtue of offenders, that is, the idea that CD, as with the 
exclusion of children, can be based on a certain conception of political capacity. 
From this perspective, CD is presented as the consequence of a demand for civic 
virtue that, inspired by the tradition of republican citizenship, is equated with a 
deficit affecting one’s sense of justice. However, as was argued, in a democracy, the 
capacity to engage in the process of law-making cannot be substantially dissociated 
from the capacity to act as subject of the law and therefore to accept responsibility for 
its breach. This is clear in the case of children. They are excluded from political 
participation in a way that proportionally correlates with their exclusion or the 
restriction of their legal responsibility. Chapter 5, in turn, analysed the justification 
of CD as a form of punishment, and in particular as a democratic form of punishment. 
After considering, analysing and discarding the arguments of deterrence, 
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rehabilitation and incapacitation, it was argued that the more important defence of 
CD as punishment must emphasise its expressive function within a retributive 
framework. However, it was highlighted that when this expressive function assumes 
the form of CD, it becomes unavoidably incompatible with democratic punishment 
because it affects the preconditions of its own imposition. On the one hand, it fails to 
constitute a form of symbolically inclusive punishment; on the other hand, it conflicts 
with the premise of the imposition of punishment in democratic societies, that is, that 
the offender must be able to understand the legal norm whose breach demands the 
punishment as his own norm. The absence of such conditions not only excludes the 
possibility of democratic punishment, but also leads one to conceive of the practice of 
imprisonment as a form of risk-management and CD as a form of symbolic 
degradation. 
At this stage, it was demonstrated that the analysis of CD understood in terms of 
participation in the process of the generation of democratic legitimacy leads to 
confirmation of the democratic problem. However, this is just a negative affirmation: 
the existence of CD erodes democratic legitimacy. The question concerning what 
might be the positive role of CD in societies that claim to be democratic was yet to be 
answered. This was the point where notions of degradation and exclusion were be 
incorporated meaningfully into an explanation of CD. 
This diagnosis was developed in Chapter 6 by articulating how the ideas of punitive 
degradation and the political exclusion of offenders can be seen as a reaffirmation of 
the commitment to the certain community values, helping to strengthen the identity of 
community articulated by the fundamental political distinction between citizens and 
criminals as shaping the boundaries of what is understood as political community. 
Once this is acknowledged, another aspect of the right to vote acquires importance. It 
was argued that the notion of participation does not extinguish the meaning and 
importance of being entitled to vote. Political rights in general and the right to vote in 
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particular may function, mirroring the degradation and exclusion experienced by 
those disenfranchised, as mechanisms of political recognition and, in that sense, they 
are strongly linked to the attribution of membership, and functionally embody 
principles of political equality and mutual respect. In this sense, the right to vote is a 
mechanism used not only to demarcate, but also to contest the legitimacy of the 
boundaries of the political community. This function of the right to vote is likened to 
the notion of a right to be included, that has an institutional expression in the right to 
be enfranchised in electoral registers. 
At this stage, the main claim of the dissertation appeared clearly: the recognition 
aspect of the right to vote is a key factor for understanding CD, and, in turn, CD is a 
key factor for understanding the right to vote as a mechanism of recognition in 
democratic communities. However, this is not only the case in a theoretical context. 
This approach may cast new light with which to examine the judicial cases of CD, 
producing critical awareness of how the courts have dealt with these cases. 
Specifically, it was observed that those courts that have conferred some importance 
upon the idea of recognition have developed a stronger standard of review for 
legislation that enacts CD provisions. 
The final Chapter 7 was grounded in the belief that the debate on CD can be seen also 
as an opportunity for using the legal fora to resist and contest the politics of 
degradation and exclusion which underlies the disenfranchisement of serious 
criminals endorsed by the courts of the judicial trend. It was argued, on the one hand, 
that if democratic self-government is to be pursued and defended, then offenders’ 
right to vote must be safeguarded from the majoritarian and exclusionary tendencies 
usually pursued by Parliaments when dealing with criminal problems. On the other 
hand, it was argued that the structure of the legal method of proportionality is an 
inadequate tool for dealing with the case of CD, and must be abandoned, paving the 
way for a legal method compatible with a more robust conception of the right to vote, 
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which when adequately grounded in the idea of the right to vote as recognition, 
permits the distinction between the question of voting eligibility and the question of 
voting regulation.  
This must be seen as an opportunity for building a democratic project not only based 
on the participation of citizens, but also on the recognition of everyone as a valuable 
and respectable member of the community, thereby guaranteeing the right to vote for 
even the most serious offenders as an essential element of a democracy that is both 
inclusive and participatory. 
To conclude, some aspects requiring further research may be identified. There is a 
group of cases that present similarities with CD but that require further assessment, 
such as the case of the right to stand for election and the prohibition against standing 
or being elected as a candidate which affects those convicted of a criminal offence,1 
or the case of the use of denationalization as a punitive response compatible with 
democratic principles.2 There is another group of cases in which CD itself adopts 
particularities that must be explored in greater detail. For example, when it affects 
those convicted for terrorist offences,3 or those sentenced to the death penalty while 
waiting for it (waiting for what?).4  
However, possibly the major shortcoming of the present analysis of CD is that it 
leaves untouched the massive exclusion performed by the very fact of imprisonment.5 
There are several issues that must be discussed concerning prison reform in the 
direction towards a more democratic model of imprisonment; however, the 
recognition of prisoners as citizens is an urgent affair. In contrast with other rights of 
                                                 
1. See e.g. Grant et al, 1970:987-1000, 1175-7. 
2. See e.g. Grant et al, 1970:966-74; Aleinikoff, 1986; Kingston, 2005; Waldrauch, 2005; Lavi, 
2010; Lavi, 2011.  
3. See e.g. Duff, 2008; Lavi, 2011. 
4. See e.g. Hugh & Roberts, 2013. 
5. See Ramsay, 2013a; Ramsay, 2013b. See also López-Guerra, 2014a:128-9. 
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participation, the right to vote is particularly propitious to expressing recognition in 
the context of the prison. This is mainly because it does not depend on a demanding 
notion of participation. Even prisoners in conditions of serious deprivations of liberty 
and whose possibilities to exercise other participatory rights are usually curtailed can 
be included within the members of the democratic community by their 
enfranchisement. If something such as a compensatory relation between mechanisms 
of participation and forms of citizenship recognition can be imagined, the right to 
vote is certainly an essential formula for this recognition. The subjection of prisoners 
to a legal regime in which other rights of participation are massively affected makes 
the continuation of the recognition as citizens a serious problem, to which their right 
to vote constitutes an adequate response.6 The crucial importance of this 
compensation can be highlighted by appealing to the meaning of democratic 
citizenship. According to Etienne Balibar, democratic citizenship has two sides that 
configure it as an antinomic concept. It is institutional and disruptive at the same 
time. While, democracy is a process of questioning the political conformation of 
oligarchy, citizenship is an activity of struggle for recognition, equality, of claiming 
rights by those who have no rights. But democratic citizenship has an institutional 
side incarnated in elections.7 According to this description, CD is the way in which a 
group that lacks the capacity to produce non-institutional struggles, thus lacking 
democratic citizenship in its disruptive sense, is also deprived of the rights to 
                                                 
6. It is interesting to note that this seems to be the logic of the German model of CD. In Germany, 
CD does not affect prisoners, but only ex-prisoners. According to the Criminal Code “[t]he 
duration of the loss of ability or of a right shall be calculated from the day the term of 
imprisonment has been served”. Section 45a, German Criminal Code 1975. In addition to that, 
the German model (1) depends on special provisions of the substantive criminal law that target 
those crimes in which the conduct attempts to “undermine the foundation of the state” or 
constitutes “tampering with elections” (Demleitner, 2000:761); (2) judicial intervention in the 
case of the right to vote is not just required but essential; (3) the length of the ban can fluctuate 
between a period of two to five years; (4) the restoration proceeds ipso iure, without any 
additional requirement. About the German model, see Demleitner, 2000. 
7. See Balibar, 2007; Balibar, 2008.  
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institutionalised participation in the public sphere.8 When this is the case, it is not 
exaggerated to say that they lack ‘the right to have rights’.9 
 
                                                 
8. See also Lippke, 2007:203.  
9. See Arendt, 1966: Ch. 9 (esp. 296-7). See also Michelman, 1996b; Passerin d’Entreves, 
2001:139-66; Gundougdu, 2006; Shaap, 2011. 
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